matter was referred to a committee of twenty-one, composed of men of all parties, the largest and ablest committee of the Convention. The majority of the committee reported, through the Chairman, Mr. Griswold, a modified system of Town Representation; the minority reported through Mr. Hale, a District System. This District System was rejected, on a test vote, by a vote of two hundred and forty-four to one hundred and twenty-two, just two to one. This was decisive that the Convention would adhere to Town Representation. The report of the majority was very materially modified, and was finally adopted by a vote of two hundred and thirty-five to one hundred and thirty-one, over a hundred majority, This system provides that towns of one thousand inhabitants and less, shall have six Representatives in ten years; towns from one thousand to four thousand, one Representative yearly; towns of four thousand, two; and every four thousand additional shall entitle to an additional Representative, with a provision that under the census of 1865 and thereafter, the number entitling a town to two or more Representatives shall be increased in proportion to the increase of the population of the State. This plan secures to every town of one thousand inhabitants one Representative every year, thus checking the operation of the sliding scale, which, under the present Constitution, is gradually disfranchising the small towns. This plan, taken in connection with the districting of the cities and the election of Senators by single districts, gives us a plan of representation almost infinitely MORE JUST AND MORE EQUAL than the old system.

The Convention was in just this position A large majority, over a hundred, as shown by repeated votes, was in favor of a town system of representation as against a district system-and for a town system-one which, without doing both cities and large towns injustice without compensation-should preserve the political power of the country towns from being annihilated. In this respect they agreed with the sages of the Revolution who composed the Convention of 1780; and with those other great men of the Convention of 1820. In both those Conventions the District system was proposed, and in both rejected by very large majorities. In the Convention of 1820, a majority of the Boston delegates, twenty-nine out of forty-five, voted for Town Representation against a District System. MR. WEBSTER, though representing Boston, was decidedly against the District System. He said:

66

Representation by towns or townships is peculiar to New England. It has existed, however, since the first settlement of the country. Where local districts are so small and of such unequal population that if every town is to have one representative, and larger towns as many more as their population, compared with the smallest town, would numerically entitle them to, a very numerous body must be the consequence in any large State. I agree, Sir, that this is a very difficult subject. There are three hundred towns, all possessing the right of representation; and representation by towns is an ancient habit of the people. For one I am disposed to preserve this mode so far as may be practicable. There is always an advantage in making the revisions which circumstances may render necessary, in a manner which does no violence to ancient habits and established rules. I prefer therefore a representation by towns, even though it should necessarily be somewhat numerous, to a division of the State into new districts, the parts of which might have little natural connexion or little actual intercourse with one another."

Precisely such were the views of a large majority of the Convention of 1853. We felt thus :-" Our conviction is, that the town system of representation is the best system for Massachusetts; we believe a large

majority of the people are in favor of it; we shall, therefore, follow our own convictions, and present to the people a system which we believe they demand." This we did, and the result is a system, which, while it classifies a few of the very smallest towns, gives to the great number the right of annual representation.

But we went farther. We said that though we did not believe that the people wanted a district system, we were willing to trust them in the matter; and, therefore, we put into the Constitution a provision, that in 1856 the question shall be submitted to the people whether they prefer a district system, and if a majority of one votes for it, they have it; and thus the district system is secured without a two-thirds vote of two successive Houses, which could never be had, as the Representatives of small towns would vote against it.

But it is asked, Why not present both systems together now, and let the people select. For this plain reason:-We believe that the town system, as we present it, is the best that can be prepared. Try this a couple of years, and then you can vote intelligently upon the district system. "Let it alone this year also; if it bear fruit, well; if not, then cut it down."

"But this system is outrageously unequal." The very men who have held on to the old system, with all its injustice, with the grasp of drowning men-who cling to the general ticket system of Boston as to their political life-make the welkin ring with declamation about the inequalities of the New Constitution. But even admitting all their figures, the New Constitution, still, is almost infinitely more equal than the old one. They tell us that under the New Constitution less than one-third of the people can elect a majority of the House. Yes; but they forget to tell us that under the old Constitution less than one-third of the people can elect not only a majority of the House, but ALSO A MAJORITY OF THE SENATE AND THE WHOLE STATE GOVERNMENT. The worst case that can be made against the New Constitution is, that one-third of the people can elect a majority of the House alone; while under the old Constitution, this same one-third can elect a majority of the House and Senate, and Governor, Councillors, and all the rest of the State Government.

For two years in ten, 220 towns, with a population of 294,383, are entitled to elect 220 members, being a majority of 438, the full House, when every town elects. 294,383 is considerably less than one-third of 973,715, the whole population of the State.

Seven towns exhaust their right to send in two years. Omitting these, for three years in ten, 216 towns, with a population of 299,410, elect 216 members, being a majority of 431, the full House; still less than one-third of the people elect a majority.

Eleven towns exhaust their right in three years. Omitting these, for four years in ten, 211 towns, with a population of 308,635, elect 211 Representatives, being a majority of 420, which is the full House.

Twenty-six towns exhaust their right in four years. Omitting these, for five years in ten, 198 towns, with a population of 324,109, elect 198 Representatives, being a majority of 394, which is the full House. It thus appears that for five years in ten, less than one-third of the people can elect a majority of the House.

Suppose that every town in the State should elect representatives every year until those entitled to a fractional representation had exhausted their right, it would only be for two years in ten that a majority of the people could elect a majority of the House. And yet the Whigs ask us to reject the new Constitution on account of its inequality, and go

back to the old, which, in precisely the same respect, is liable to the same objections.

Under the new Constitution this disproportioned power of the minority is confined to the House; the Senate is elected by the people in equal districts; but under the old Constitution this majority of the House, elected by one-third of the people, fills the vacancies in the Senate, and thus controls the whole government. Under the new Constitution it may be that a minority may check the government; under the old it CONTROLS it.

Let us look at the inequalities of the old Constitution in another view. At the elections of 1845, '46, '47 and '48, the vote for Governor was as

For two of these four years the popular majority was against the Whigs; and yet, for every one of those four years the Whigs had from two-thirds to three-quarters of the Representatives, and EVERY MEMBER of the Senate. Thus in 1845, fifty-four thousand two hundred and eightysix voters, being a majority, and representing a half a million of the people-an actual majority of the whole people, had not a single representative in the Senate; in 1846, forty-seven thousand one hundred and three voters, in 1847, fifty-one thousand seven hundred and one voters, and in 1848, sixty-two thousand four hundred and fifteen voters, a majority of the whole, had not a single Senator, and the Whigs had the Governor and every State officer. And this is the beautiful system of equal representation which the Whigs mean to retain. Out upon their cant about equality! Why did they not give it to us when they had the power?

A small pamphlet has been circulated in town, prepared to show the inequality of the old system. It gives the following table to illustrate the inequality of the old system :

"Franklin elects a Representative for every 1,456 inhabitants. Hampshire

66

66

1,648

66

Is it EQUAL, that 1,456 inhabitants in Franklin should have the same voice in the government that twice that number in Essex, Bristol, and Nantucket have? 99

Well, admitting all this, how much better is the old Constitution? Here is a table which gives the distribution of power by counties under the present system :

Franklin elects a Representative for every 1,845 inhabitants.

Hampshire

Is it EQUAL, we ask in the indignant language of the Whig document, that one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven inhabitants in Dukes should have the same voice in the government as nearly twice that number in Essex, Bristol, and Nantucket? Compare these two tables; and is there any difference between the two, which warrants sensible men in rejecting the old ?

Here is a table showing the number of votes cast in each county for Governor, and the average number to each Senator, the number of Representatives elected in each county, and the average number of votes to each :

Is this equal, as the Whigs ask, that 1,380 voters in Dukes and Nantucket, and 2,201 in Suffolk should have the same voice in electing a Senator as 5,958 voters in Franklin? Where is the equality of a system which

allows 226 voters in Barnstable, or 338 in Suffolk, to have the same power to elect a Representative as 1,154 in Bristol ?

In order to judge of the operation of a system we must look at its practical results. One great evil of the present system is, that while Boston elects her 44 men every year, on the general ticket, a large portion of the country towns fail to elect, and this gives the great preponderance to the power of Boston. We shall see the bearings of this consideration by looking at the elections of 1845, '46, '47 and '48, being the four years before the Coalition, and at the results of those elections in the political complexion of the Legislatures of 1846, '47, '48 and '49. The following table gives the population of each county at the previous census, the number of Representatives elected in each county, and the average population to each elected Representative :

Such is the practical operation of the present system, and such will hereafter be its operation if the New Constitution is rejected. What has been will be, and if the Coalition should be abandoned, this inequality would continue, and in fact increase; for without coalitions to-day, there would be more failures to elect in more country towns than in the abovenamed years. By this table it appears that there are but five counties in the State where so few voters have the power to elect a Representative as in Suffolk. In the language of the Whig document, is it EQUAL, that 2,393 inhabitants of Boston should have the same voice in the government that 3,804 have in Nantucket?

Here is another illustration of the equality of the old Constitution. In the towns which elected the Whig members of the last legislature, Gov. Clifford received 27,235 votes, less than one-fifth of the whole vote of the State. Thus less than one-fifth of the people elected a majority of the House, filled the vacancies in the Senate, elected the Governor and the whole State Government, and elected a United States Senator for six years. Such monstrous inequality is impossible under the new Constitution, because the Senators will be elected by the people.

Take another illustration. Fifty towns, with a population of 87,513, elect each one Representative yearly; and fifty other towns, with a population of 172,171, elect each one Representative yearly.

Here is another. A man in Walpole votes for ten Representatives in ten years, and a man in New Ashford votes for two Representatives in ten years; while a man in Boston votes for four hundred and forty Representatives in ten years. Thus the political power of the voter in Boston