given international difference shall fall under any one of several carefully defined categories, the signatories concerned shall by special agreements refer the difference to The Hague Tribunal.

It seems that Mr. Lodge, of Massachusetts, by way of keeping his fellow Senators in countenance, has prepared a paper in which he undertakes to show that, when the Senate emasculated the six arbitration treaties concluded by our State Department (by insisting upon substituting for "special agreement" the word "treaty "), it did what almost every European Government, based on representative institutions-Great Britain is acknowledged to be an exception-habitually does and must do under its organic law. In other words, neither the French nor any other Continental Parliament will-according to Mr. Lodge-ratify an arbitration treaty concluded by its Executive, except upon the understanding that every separate application of the arbitration principle should be embodied in a distinct treaty, and, as such, ratified in conformity to the organic law's provisions. That is what Mr. Lodge means to say, if he means anything by his memorandum. We can exemplify the value of his elaborate array of pretended parallels and precedents, if we take the case of France. Everybody who ever read the organic law of 1875 is conversant with the terms in which the treaty-making power is defined and regulated. It is not true that all treaties concluded by the French Executive must be submitted to the French Parliament for ratification. The most vital of all treaties in the history of the Third French Republic-the Treaty of Alliance with Russia-has never been so submitted. Only treaties dealing with certain carefully specified classes of subjects require ratification by both Houses of the French Parliament. Even as regards those specified classes, it has never been disputed that the French Parliament has the power, by sanctioning a general treaty of arbitration, to ratify in advance any special agreement entered into by the Executive in pursuance of that treaty. If the French Executive should exceed its authority by transcending the prescribed limitations, it would do so at its own risk. Does Mr. Lodge want chapter and verse for our averments? In the first place, when France became a signatory of The Hague Convention, it agreed, with all the formalities of a treaty, that its Executive should have the power to enter into a special agreement to refer to The Hague Tribunal any international

difference that should fall under any of the categories formulated in that Convention. Subsequently, and very recently, the French Parliament has ratified an arbitration treaty with Great Britain identical with the compacts that our Senate has just rejected, a treaty providing that the French and British Foreign Offices might, by a special agreement, refer to arbitrators any controversy which should belong to any of several specified classes. Secretary Hay, for his part, was aware, because he had taken measures to inform himself, that not one of the six European countries with which he had negotiated arbitration treaties, would experience any difficulty in securing a Parliamentary ratification of those treaties-if such ratification were needed-" specialagreement" clause and all. Nor can there be any doubt that he had made known the fact to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to every member of which he had submitted drafts of the proposed treaties, and had elicited an expression of approval from all of the members except one. This is admitted, and the only excuse offered by the members of the Committee for breaking the promise given to the Secretary is that they did not then fully realize the distinction between a "special agreement" and a "treaty." In other words, they plead the baby act.

What is the actual status of the Santo Domingo affair? It is not true that the original protocol of January 20, however desirable it may have seemed to President Morales of Santo Domingo, and however admirable to the eyes of the amateur diplomatists who framed it, was either authorized in advance, or subsequently accepted, by our State Department. On the contrary, it was repudiated the moment its text was inspected. It has never been acted upon in a single Dominican port. Our representative at the Dominican capital was forthwith instructed to negotiate a new agreement, more in consonance with our Government's intentions; and the substituted compact, having been duly signed by our diplomatic agent and the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs, reached our State Department on February 15, and, together with a special message explaining its purport, was submitted to the Senate that very day. The agreement, which is embodied in a treaty, provides that the United States shall collect the customs revenues of Santo Domingo, and turn over to President Morales's Government 55 per cent. thereof, to meet the cost of the Dominican Republic's

domestic administration, the remaining 45 per cent. being reserved for disbursement among foreign creditors. The United States covenant, on their part, to respect the territorial and political integrity of Santo Domingo; and it is stipulated that the protocol or treaty shall be approved by the Dominican Congress, as well as by the United States Senate. We do not see how Senators can refuse to ratify this compact, except upon the assumption that the Monroe Doctrine does not pledge us to interpose between European creditors and a debtor American commonwealth, by playing the part of a receiver, and undertaking to collect and pay, not only indemnities due for public wrongs, but ordinary debts arising out of contract. Up to the time when we permitted the blockade of Venezuelan seaports by European creditor-Powers, and allowed them to confiscate a part of their debtor's customs revenues for the payment, not only of compensation for wrongs, but also of ordinary debts, our Government might have argued that, to debts arising out of contract, the maxim "caveat emptor" should apply, and that we could not permit European Governments to enforce by violence the satisfaction of such obligations by a delinquent American commonwealth. The Roosevelt Administration, however, was estopped from taking such a stand after it remained an impassive spectator of the Venezuela blockade. There was only one possible loophole of escape from the dilemma in which our Government had placed itself. Mr. Roosevelt saw the loophole, and availed himself of it by announcing in the letter read at the Cuban dinner, an announcement now embodied in the agreement with Santo Domingo, that, if any debtor American republic is to be placed in the hands of a receiver, we ourselves will assume the receivership. As Mr. Roosevelt points out in his special message to the Senate, if we are to guarantee the territorial and political integrity of American republics, and if we are to fulfil our promise that their destiny shall in no wise fall under foreign control, it has become indispensable for us to see that just debts and obligations contracted by these republics be paid, so that there may be no pretext for foreign intervention in their affairs. It is for Senators to say whether they prefer to sanction the President's position, or to provoke a repetition of the Venezuela blockade. The United States must take one course or the other. They cannot pursue any longer a dog-in-the-manger policy.

given international differe carefully defined categori special agreements refer th

It seems that Mr. Lodge his fellow Senators in c which he undertakes to sh the six arbitration treatie (by insisting upon subst word "treaty "), it did wh based on representative in edged to be an exception its organic law. In other Continental Parliament an arbitration treaty con the understanding that ev tion principle should be such, ratified in conform That is what Mr. Lodge by his memorandum. W orate array of pretended case of France. Everybo

1875 is conversant with power is defined and reg concluded by the French French Parliament for ra in the history of the Thi liance with Russia-has dealing with certain care ratification by both Ho as regards those specified the French Parliament treaty of arbitration, to entered into by the Exe the French Executive sh ing the prescribed limit Does Mr. Lodge want In the first place, when Convention, it agreed, that its Executive shoul agreement to refer to