Mr. NEVIN. Do I understand that this is a matter of crossexamination?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it is a matter entirely in the province of the committee to decide. A great many on both sides have asked the question whether they could interrupt a speaker and ask him questions. I said, while I did not want to speak for the committee, I thought it would be entirely proper for any gentleman who wanted a question to be asked to reduce it to writing and hand it to some member of the committee, and if that member of the committee did not feel at liberty to ask the question he would send it to the chair and let the record show it was asked, but the

Mr. POWERS. Those questions relate to the principle from which this legislation comes, and it seems that any answer from the other side with relation to the principles on which this bill is founded is entirely material.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. BECK, OF NO. 44 WALL STREET, NEW YORK CITY.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am here by your courtesy to represent, in the first place, the Building Contractors' League of the city of Chicago, a city very sorely distracted with labor disputes, and an association representing the employers of every branch of labor in the building industry of Chicago. I also represent the National Association of Marble Dealers, and, further, the American Anti-Boycott Association, an association of manufacturers formed to protect themselves against that which they conceive to be the cruel and criminal boycott.

I have no desire to enter into the academics of the labor problem. If I ventured to make any general observation it would be this, that the relations of employers and employees are such that with few exceptions the legislative department of governments never enter into that forbidden field without producing worse mischief and confusion than prevailed before. The whole theory of our jurisprudence has been founded upon the fact that there is a vast field of human activity into which the legislature is not generally competent to go and into which it never goes, as I have said, without producing greater mischief; and it has always been the theory, not only of our own country, but the country from which we are sprung, that the courts, being in close contact with the people, and administering that great body of law which we regard as the heritage of the English-speaking race-the common law, are more responsive to the ever-changing needs of society, and are more fair and just to all classes of society than can possibly be the case by a legislature acting through rigid and inelastic written laws. Therefore we have built up this great body of the common law that in all the States of the Union, except Louisiana, administers justice between man and man, not only in the particular character of disputes now before us, but also in all questions that arise between human beings.

I will base my opposition to this legislation upon four grounds. In the first place, the bill is ambiguous and will give rise to a flood of evils, of which, if this committee interprets it as the committee previously interpreted it, we can have but faint conception. In the second place, as a bill it is wholly uncalled for by any existing conditions. In the

third place, that it will validate unlawful combinations of men to restrain not merely the rights of property, but the infinitely greater right of every man, whether he be a member of a labor organization or not, to sell his labor as he pleases, when he pleases, and to whom he pleases. And, lastly, the bill is unconstitutional, upon which point I have personally no doubt whatever.

In the first place, as to the ambiguity of this proposed legislation. Let me say preliminarily, gentlemen, that we must not fool ourselves with the thought that either the report of Congressional committees or the individual opinions of members of Congress will prevail with the courts, if, unhappily both for the employer and employee, they are ever called upon to construe this legislation; because, if there be one principle of construction of our courts, it is this, that they can not be guided by the opinions of individual legislators nor even by the reports of committees, unless there be a plain ambiguity in the legislation to be construed. We have had a striking instance of that in the so-called Sherman antitrust law, of which Senator Hoar has said that it was never intended to forbid any restraint of trade, except such as where at common law unlawful-namely, unreasonable restraints of tradeand other members of Congress had the same view; and yet when the Supreme Court, in the joint traffic and trans-Missouri cases, came to construe that statute, they very properly said, "We can not be guided by what Senator Hoar or any other Senator, or any other member of the House meant. We must construe this according to the plain and fair import of its language, and hold that all restraints of trade, whether reasonable or unreasonable, are within the ban of the written law.

If you pass this law, at all events beware lest your general language shall be taken at its fair worth by the judicial department of the Government, and you thus give rise to a law which, if the majority of the opinion of this committee at previous session of Congress is to be the judge, you never intended whatever. The previous Committee of the Judiciary held that this act was designed to restrain simply combinations of men, but that acts done in pursuance of those combinations were not intended to be in any manner validated. Such construction contravenes the direct letter of the act itself, and would never be sustained by the courts. Let me read this act for one minute.

That no agreement, combination, or contracts by or between two or more persons to do or to procure to be done, or not to do or procure not to be done, any act in contemplation or furtherance of any trade dispute between employer or employee in the District of Columbia * * shall be deemed criminal.

*

That sentence is complete in itself. If it means anything, it means that two or more persons can do anything, whether they be employer or employee, whether there be any actual trade disputes in which they have any legitimate concern or not, whether it is in contemplation of a trade dispute, and any act that they do, if in furtherance of such trade dispute, shall not be deemed criminal. Then it proceeds:

Nor shall those engaged therein be indictable or otherwise punishable for the crime of conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime.

Have you sufficiently shown that the words "if such acts committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime," qualify the first paragraph of the act, because a reasonable construction is that they only qualify that sentence of the act which says, "Nor shall those

engaged therein be indictable or otherwise punishable for the crime of conspiracy, if such act, etc." But I waive the question of construction, and passing to the last section, direct your attention to the section where it says, "Nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation thereto." To what does "thereto" apply? It applies to any "trade disputes." It may apply to any "combination;" it may apply to any acts done in pursuance of a combination, but is it not wise in any event that the word "thereto" shall be made sufficiently explicit in order to show exactly what Congress means, and what this committee, if it should unhappily recommend this bill, means to recommend to the favorable consideration of Congress?

However, in any discussion of this question, I propose to put the construction upon it that is most favorable to the passage of the legislation. I shall assume that the proviso, "If such act committed by one person," etc., qualifies all that precedes, and I shall assume that the word. "thereto" refers to the combination and to acts done thereunder, and not to trade disputes as such. Let me say, just in passing, that if the construction of the act to which I have referred was to be regarded as the true one by the judicial department of the Government, I do not know of anyone who would be more sorely disappointed than the gentlemen who favor the passage of the bill; because it is impossible to read Mr. Gompers's speech, it is impossible to read the previous speeches before this committee, when the same bill was pending, and not feel that what they desire to secure at the hands of this committee is not merely the prevention of a restraining order against a combination in itself, but the prevention of a restraining order against acts done thereunder and now unlawful and in many States criminal.

And I think that these gentlemen on my right would say that this committee, when they asked them for bread gave them a stone, if they gave them an act which simply said the court should not issue a restraining order against a combination, but could restrain any act done under the combination. Such legislation would be analogous to the wise advice of the mother, who told her daughter she could go out to swim, but she must not go near the water. In effect, it would say to the labor organization, some of whom desire this legislation, "You can combine and the courts shall not restrain you, but if you do one single overt act to carry out the purpose of the combination, the heavy arm of the law shall fall." Such is not their interpretation of this statute, and I venture to say that it will not be the interpretation of the judicial department of the Government, if this should ever become a law.

Coming now to the question, Is there anything in present conditions to justify this legislation? I believe that the labor leaders, the leaders of the organizations that favor this bill, do not correctly understand the state of the law with reference to injunctions. They believe, and I think mistakenly believe, that injunctions can be issued against the right of men, singly or collectively, to strike. As a matter of fact, if there be one principle of law that the Federal courts have laid down beyond question or cavil, it is that the right of men, singly or collectively, to quit work is secured by the bill of rights; that they may inflict irreparable damage on the business which they are leaving; but none the less their right to quit work either individually or as a combination is a sacred right, with which the court will not interfere. The law does enter its prohibition when the men who have struck

say that other workmen shall not have the privilege to do the work which they have abandoned, and if they do attempt to work, that they, the striking workmen, who have voluntarily severed the relation which they had borne to their employer, will, by violence and intimidation, prevent these willing workmen from selling their labor precisely as they please. To prove that it is so-because I think it is a very essential part of this controversy-let me just read one single case, decided by a very eminent Federal jurist, one whom every American honors, and who to-day occupies a position in the Cabinet of the President of the United States-I mean the new Secretary of War. Judge Taft in the case of Thomas versus Cincinnati Railroad Company said: It may be conceded in the outset that the employees of the receivers had the right to organize, or enter into, or to join a labor union, which should take joint action as to their terms of employment. It is of benefit to them and to the public, that laborers should unite in their common interests and for lawful purposes. They have labor to sell. If they stand together, they are often able, all of them, to command better prices for their labor than when dealing singly with rich employers, because the necessities of the single employee may compel him to accept any terms offered him.

Then he speaks of the right and advantage of the accumulation of a fund for their common benefit. Then he goes on to say that not only is it a good thing to have labor organizations, when conducted lawfully, but he adds that it is entirely within their power to elect officers of such organizations, to whom they will abandon their own volition and judgment and accept their orders. They may unite with other unions.

The officers they appoint or any other person to whom they choose to listen may advise them as to the proper course to be taken by them in regard to their employment, or, if they choose to repose such authority in anyone, may order them, on pain of expulsion from their union, peaceably to leave the employ of the employer, if any of the terms of their employment are unsatisfactory.

So spoke Judge Taft. Another case, and I shall cease citation of authorities. I refer to Arthur . Hayes. I think one of the greatest judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, some of us might call him the "noblest Roman of them all"-I mean Mr. Justice Harlan-not only affirmed this law, but affirmed it in a very striking way. He says:

It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him (the workman) to work for or remain in the personal service of another. One who is placed under such constraint is in a condition of involuntary servitude, a condition which the supreme law of the land declares shall not exist within the United States.

And then he proceeds to say, that it is the unbroken law of both England and America that if any man violates his contract of personal service the courts are powerless to compel him to do that service. And then, answering a suggestion that had at one time been made to him, that public corporations, I mean quasi-public corporations, like the railroad, in which, the public have an interest, stood on a different footing, not because they serve great public ends, but because of the intrinsically dangerous character of the business, the judge says in substance: "No. Every employee of a railroad may collectively abandon, with or without notice, the railroad in a moment's warning. He may abandon the signal towers, and put every passenger who is going along the lines in imminent danger of death. He may abandon his work at a place where great hazard is encountered, and yet, notwithstanding those great dangers to life and the menace it is to the interest of the public, Justice Harlan says, and I trust you will pardon me if I read it, because I want

you to understand the law of the Federal courts, and see how unjust the criticisms of some labor leaders are with respect to decisions which they do not understand. Justice Harlan says:

Undoubtedly the simultaneous cessation of work by any considerable number of the employees of a railroad corporation without previous notice will have an injurious effect and for a time inconvenience the public. But these evils, great as they are, and although arising in a great many cases from the inconsiderate conduct of employees and employers, both equally indifferent to the general welfare, are to be met and remedied by legislation restraining alike employees and employers so far as necessary adequately to guard the rights of the public as involved in the existence, maintenance, and safe management of the public highways. In the absence of legislation to the contrary, the right of one in the service of a quasi-public corporation to withdraw at such time as he may see fit, and the right of the management of such corporation to discharge an employee from service whenever they see fit, are deemed so far absolute that no court of equity will compel him against his will to remain in such service or actually to perform the personal acts required in such employment.

And then he goes on to say that there is no distinction between a railroad in the hands of a receiver. There is the extreme case, a corporation which the court is conducting, in which everybody from the receiver down to the humblest brakemen are pro tanto officers of the court; and yet, he says the court's power over the receiver and the court's employees is no greater, and every employee of the receiver, either alone or together, for what caprice suits him, no matter how imminent the danger to life, can quit their work and no court can stop it. He says:

The fact that employees of railroads may quit under circumstances that would show bad faith upon their part, or a reckless disregard of their contract or of the convenience or interest both of employer and the public does not justify a departure from the general rule that equity will not compel the actual affirmative performance of merely personal service, or (which is the same thing) require employees, against their will, to remain in the personal service of their employers.

Mr. ALEXANDER. May I ask you one question? Does not Mr. Gompers assume that that is the law at present?

Mr. BECK. I did not so understand him. I read the stenographic copy of his speech; on the contrary, I understood him to say again and again in his speech that the courts of equity restrained the labor organizations from combining to elevate the condition of the laboring man, or from striking, and so forth and so on.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. They make the additional complaint, which to an extent is well founded, that some of the courts have gone beyond the bounds of the law in issuing these injunctions.

Mr. BECK. I will come to that in a moment. I am trying to show what is the law. Just to show that this language of Justice Harlan's was not merely words of consolation, but that it was carried into the decree of the court in the case of Arthur v. Oaks, the lower court included in their injunction these words:

From so quitting the service of the said receiver with or without notice as to cripple the property, or prevent or hinder the operation of said road.

Mr. NEVIN. That was in the hands of a receiver (and they were officers of the court, too) was it not?

Mr. BECK. Yes, sir. The lower court had said, "You can not quit; you can not so quit as to cripple this road, because life and property are passing over it;" but Justice Harlan in the upper court said, "No." I have cited his reasons for it; and the appellate tribunal struck out of that injunction the restraint against employees with or without notice from quitting work, upon which not only the public