villany. In fact, I have heard this very circumstance adduced to prove that rascality must be a prominent attribute of the profession. But be the cause of the misconception what it may, we know the fact to be, that popular sentiment is greatly against us, insomuch that the question is often asked, whether the world would not be better off if there were no lawyers. No doubt it would be a happy state of society in which lawyers could be entirely dispensed with; for it would be that perfect state in which laws themselves would be superfluous; and it may also be admitted that just in proportion as laws become simple and certain, the demand for lawyers will grow less, because litigation, which is their aliment, will be correspondingly diminished. But so long as the litigious spirit exists among mankind, and the uncertainty which belongs to all human affairs furnishes occasion for its exercise the principle which requires a division of labor in all other cases will require it also in this; and we may safely conclude that a distinct class of men will always be required to conduct the litigation of their fellow men. Indeed, those who join in the obloquy so generally cast upon us, seem to forget that in so doing they reproach mankind in the mass. Let the demand for lawyers be diminished, and the supply will correspond. Let men cease to be contentious, and be always ready to do right without compulsion, and lawyers will not trouble them. But while it is evident that without dishonest clients there would be no dishonest lawyers; and that as a profession we are grossly belied by this indiscriminate censure; yet it may perhaps be safely admitted, that the standard of professional ethics is not always as elevated as the honor of the profession requires it should be. In fact, it is by no means easy to fix a precise standard. There is not, perhaps, a more difficult question in casuistry, than that which every lawyer has to decide in determining the nature and extent of his professional obligations. We are, however, to remember at the outset, that in becoming attorneys, we do not cease to be moral agents; that in pledging ourselves to our clients, we do not also pledge to them our consciences; and therefore, that no principle can justify us in doing, or our clients in requiring us to do for them, what we should blush to think of doing for ourselves. It is also obvious that even on selfish principles, honesty is the best policy for us, as it is for all other men; and, therefore, that in consultations with clients, we are not only morally bound to tell them frankly our real opinions, but it is manifestly our interest so to do, because otherwise we shall soon cease to be consulted. Again, it is clear that in conducting proceedings through the various stages of litigation, we can never be justified in attempting to mislead either the court or jury, by wilfully misrepresenting the law or the facts. Thus far there can be no room for hesitation. But if we believe that our client has the wrong side, and have candidly told him so, are we then justified in undertaking his cause, if he should persist in having it litigated? This is a question of no small dif

ficulty, and it arises in two classes of cases; namely, first, when we believe the law to be against our client; and secondly, when, though the law may be with him, the abstract justice of the case appears to be against him. With regard to the first, when we think the law to be against him, it would seem that after so informing him, if he should still persist, we need not hesitate to act for him; because we are not infallible, and peradventure the law may turn out to be the other way; or he may have justice on his side, though the law may seem against him; and in either case, he ought not to be cut off from the chances of litigation. The chief difficulty then arises in the second class of cases, where we believe right and justice to be against our client, though the law may be with him. But even here, I have come to the conclusion, that no principle of moral obligation prohibits me from prosecuting his cause. In the first place, I am not an infallible judge of right and wrong, and possibly I may be mistaken; but at all events, I am not his conscience keeper. I undertake only to assert his legal rights; and if, in so doing, I make use of no chicanery or deception, I come out of the cause with clean hands. The question of abstract justice is with him, and not with me; and I am as much justified in conducting his cause, as the judge is in deciding it for him. But there is another more comprehensive view conducting to the same result. Every man, as a general condition of the social compact, has a right to have his case fairly presented before the court; and it is the province of counsel to assist him in so doing. Now, although there may be particular cases, which, considered by themselves, ought not to be prosecuted, yet as no line of demarcation can be drawn beforehand, to indicate which these are; if it were the duty of counsel to decide in each case, the preliminary moral question, whether they ought to undertake it, their decision against any case would be a prejudging of its merits, which might operate prejudicially upon the final result; and on this account it is a good general rule, that counsel are not to be held responsible for the moral character of the cause they advocate, but only for the manner in which they discharge their duty. This reasoning may be fallacious, but it has satisfied my own mind. I desire, however, to be distinctly understood. I abhor, as much as any one, the rascally maxim that everything is fair in litigation. I hold that the greatest fee ever offered is no justification for attempting to gain a cause by dishonest means; and I look upon that lawyer as essentially a knave, who practises upon such a doctrine. Such then are my views of professional integ rity, as indispensable to professional success. have considered the question chiefly in a worldly point of view. And the result is, that if there were no such thing as religious or moral obligation, it would still be true, that the strictest honesty is the lawyer's wisest policy. Confidence and trust are the life-blood of his being; and the All-wise Creator has ordained that integrity alone can inspire confidence and trust. Set out, then, with the

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unwavering purpose, that, come what may, you will hold fast to your integrity; and that the world may always know where to find you, by simply considering where you ought to be found. Let this unbending integrity co-operate with a daily increasing knowledge of the law, and a faithful attention to the business committed to you, and your success is as certain as any thing future can be. (a)

(a) There is an excellent article on The Rights and Duties of Advocates, in the Edinburgh Review, for October, 1836, No. CXXIX. p. 82.