ture, sculpture, or whatever other designing art. 'Tis the same case where life and manners are concerned. Virtue has the same fixed standard. The same numbers, harmony, and proportion will have place in morals, and are discoverable in the characters and affections of mankind; in which are laid the just foundations of an art and science superior to every other of human practice and comprehension.

[Berkeley is the only English philosopher of the eighteenth century whose style makes him a figure of importance in literature. In 1710 he had published his Principles of Human Knowledge, setting forth his theory that the universe is purely spiritual, and that the existence of material substance is an unnecessary assumption. It had been much misunderstood, and to answer the arguments of his opponents he made use of the form of the Platonic dialogue in the work here represented. In Hylas (connected with Greek vλŋ, matter) he personifies the belief in material substance; in Philonous ("lover of mind") his own doctrine. The extracts are chiefly from the first dialogue, with a short passage from the second and another from the conclusion of the third.]

Hylas. You were represented in last night's conversation as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as material substance in the world.

Philonous. That there is no such thing as what philosophers call material substance, I am seriously persuaded; but if I were made to see anything absurd or skeptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion..

Hylas. What! Can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest piece of skepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as matter?

Philonous. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold there is, are by virtue of that opinion a greater skeptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to common sense, than I who believe no such thing?

Hylas. You may as soon persuade me the part is greater than the whole as that, in order to avoid absurdity and skepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.

Philonous. Well, then, are you content to admit that opinion for true which, upon examination, shall appear most agreeable to common sense, and remote from skepticism?

Hylas. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say.

Philonous. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a skeptic?

Hylas. I mean what all men mean, one that doubts of everything.

Philonous. He, then, who entertains no doubt concerning some particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a skeptic.

Hylas. I agree with you.

Philonous. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question?

Hylas. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that doubting signifies a suspense between both.

Philonous. He, then, that denies any point can no more be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.

Hylas. True.

Philonous. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a skeptic than the other.

Hylas. I acknowledge it.

Philonous. How cometh it to pass, then, Hylas, that you pronounce me a skeptic because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial as you in your affirmation.

Hylas. Hold, Philonous, — I have been a little out in my definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I said, indeed, that a skeptic was one who doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.

Philonous. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of matter; the denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

Hylas. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them? Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a skeptic?

Philonous. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest

ignorance of them? — since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest skeptic?

Hylas. That is what I desire.

Philonous. What mean you by sensible things?

Hylas. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else?

Philonous. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to be sensible which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?

Hylas. I do not sufficiently understand you.

Philonous. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters, but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, etc. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt; but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

Hylas. No, certainly; it were absurd to think God or virtue sensible things, though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connection.

Philonous. It seems, then, that by sensible things you mean those only which can be perceived immediately by sense? Hylas. Right.

Philonous. Doth it not follow from this that, though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colors, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?

Hylas. It doth.

Philonous. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds? Hylas. You cannot.

Philonous. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?

Hylas. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you

once for all that by 'sensible things I mean those only which are perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately; for they make no inferences. The deducing, therefore, of causes or occasions from effects or appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.

Philonous. This point, then, is agreed between us, — that sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. You will farther inform me whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colors, and figures; or by hearing anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odors; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.

Hylas. We do not.

Philonous. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

Hylas. I grant it.

Philonous. Sensible things, therefore, are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?

Hylas. Nothing else.

Philonous. Heat, then, is a sensible thing?

Hylas. Certainly.

Philonous. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived? or is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?

Hylas. To exist is one thing, and to be perceived another. Philonous. I speak with regard to sensible things only; and of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?

Hylas. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.

Philonous. Heat, therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind?

Hylas. It must.

Philonous. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat which we perceive, or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it of others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.