preme Court of the United States. And until such a decision it cannot be certain that government of the colonies by the administration can be carried out. For example, if in every civil dispute there must be jury trial, government of these foreign peoples will be hampered; and if in every criminal proceeding there must be grand jury and petit jury, no effective police of these regions will be possible. However, there should be no hasty action on the part of Congress in determining the form of our colonial government. If Congress has full power in the matter, the more cautious should be its exercise. And especially during this, which is called by the Hawaiian Court the transition stage, the firm government of the executive free from much interference by Congress is needed. It is only after some years of experience and after much discussion that we should determine our colonial policy and frame our colonial governments. The political experience upon the subject has developed various types of colonial administration. If the wrong system is applied to the wrong situation, disaster follows. Note first that a colony may have a comparatively large number of inhabitants of the same race; or the colony may have inhabitants of an alien and inferior race. Again note that there are three principal forms of colonial administration: an almost complete independence, both legislative and administrative authorities being chosen locally; an almost complete dependence, both legislative and administrative authorities being appointed by the home state; a compromise between these two, the legislature being elected locally, the administrative authorities being appointed by the home state. ! Let us see for a moment what has been the experience with these forms of colonial administration. Where the inhabitants are of the same race, a large measure of independence is given. Where the inhabitants are of an alien and inferior race, all powers are reserved to the governors and their councils appointed directly or indirectly by the home state. In some fewer instances there has been experiment with the combined type; but seldom with success, except in small units. Here have been ph the most conspicuous failures upon the whole. If, then, so much depends upon applying the right type of colonial administration to the proper situation, let us face our new colonial problem at the outset squarely. For there is no such thing practical in colonial government as any one system of colonial administration. Each of our colonial problems must be met separately; and for each we must find our own solution. There are three such colonial problems: the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, and Porto Rico. The problem of the government of the Hawaiian Islands is a problem no longer. It is solved; and probably solved finally because it seems to be solved rightly. In Hawaii we have a compact American class large enough and strong enough in the end to dictate and maintain American government of the islands. This they had done before they came to us. They came to us a self-governing nation, and they were rightly incorporated into our American Empire as a self-governing unit-as of the first type of colonial government mentioned, rather than the third. Indeed, all that was done was to apply to the Hawaiian Islands the long established and well developed type of government which we had for a hundred years used in governing our territories. And in that type, although the administrative head, the Governor, is appointed from Washington, yet as a matter of fact, when applied to an American selfgoverning population, the control of Washington is very seldom felt, and so Hawaii cannot longer be cited as a colonial problem. Indeed, it is a proof of the capacity of the American in colonial administration. In the Philippine Islands a proper beginning is being made. We are applying the proper type of colonial administration, the second type of direct administrative government from Washington, to the proper situation, alien and inferior inhabitants. The present civil government, executive for the most part, is well conceived. The instructions that come from Washington are among the ablest of American state papers. It would simply be an example of weak political sentimentality to give the Filipinos independence with nominal suzerainty of the United States. That a Filipino legislature should be set up against the American governor and his administration is not to be thought of, either. In governing the Philippines thus by administrative government, we are wise; we follow the ascertained result of political experience in governing tropical colonies peopled by an alien and inferior race. But for Porto Rico the problem is different. We have an alien, but not inferior race to deal with. The plan begun, indeed, in the late legislation of Congress, is that of an appointed governor and an elected legislature. That is dangerous; it does not begin auspiciously. Already in the elections a strong anti-American party is appearing. It is to be feared that they will be led in the legislature by leaders who must make their political capital from criticisms of an administration which they themselves can never direct. These consequences will follow unless the fundamental principle is remembered: that the way to govern colonies-is to govern them. Indeed, there is for alien colonies, as it seems, but one proper form of colonial government-complete administrative government: a governor with a properly organized administration, advised by proper adminis trative councils with legislative powers; all appointed directly or indirectly from Washington. For if the history of colonial administration teaches anything, it teaches the inherent dangers of the combined form of colonial administration. Doubtless it will be found expedient that the native inhabitants should be given all places in this administration and in these administrative councils possible. To that extent they should have a part in their own government. Such a form of government is secure. But this idea of pitting an alien legislature against an American administration is dividing the house against itself.25 § 33. Conclusion. Thus far in this discussion the executive department has been found in operation within the scope of its functions; many of the cases may have seemed extreme, but upon the whole nothing was found done that was 25 COLONIAL.-Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1; Armstrong v. United States, 182 U. S. 243; Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151; Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U. S. 176. But it must not within the power of the department. have been obvious that many of these cases were close to a line; and that some limitation beyond which the executive department could not go must soon be laid down. Else the private rights would be at the disposal of the executive; and the head of the department would be in effect dictator; while under our constitutional government, of course, every power of government by whatever department exercised must be subject to various limitations. No person must be seized, none of his property may be taken, none of his rights may be abridged-without due process of law. This applies to the administration in the performance of executive functions. The President in his action as chief executive is not like the Czar in his action as chief executive; in every phase of our government the distinction between a constitutional system and an autocratic system must be observed. An instance in point is seen in an opinion of the Attorney-General entitled The Diamonds of the Princess of Orange, 2 Opin. 452 (1831). It was represented to the executive department by the diplomatic representative of the Kingdom of Holland that a criminal had just entered the United States, a fugitive from Holland with diamonds in his possession stolen from the Princess of Orange. The request was that the diamonds be seized and returned and the man arrested and surrendered. The opinion of TANEY reads as follows: I have the honor to state: 1st. That in my opinion, the President of the United States has not the power to order the delivery of the diamonds and precious stones referred |