ance upon that allegation made out. One of the leading cases upon that rule at the present time is Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S. 221 (1900). The facts upon which this controversy arose were uncontradicted, as follows: One Evans had done a large amount of work for the District of Columbia in laying concrete and brick pavements in the City of Washington, for which two certificates were issued to him. After the issue of these certificates, long delays followed before the claimant could get them into his possession, because he was in default. In the meantime various acts of Congress had been passed applicable to his case. At last he presented his claim to the Treasurer of the United States, Roberts, the defendant in this case. The Treasurer thereupon refused to pay interest upon this claim, taking a view of the effect of the various statutes in the case which the Supreme Court of the United States held to be unwarrantable. His final defense is that mandamus should not go against him, error or no error, since the making of payments was part of his official function.

The Supreme Court-Mr. Justice PECKHAM writing the opinion-disposed of this position: The remaining and most important objection is that this is not a case in which the writ of mandamus can properly be issued to one of the executive officers of the government. The law relating to mandamus against a public officer is well settled in the abstract; the only doubt which arises, being whether the facts regarding any particular case bring it within the law which permits the writ to issue where a mere ministerial duty is imposed upon an executive officer, which duty he is bound

§ 39 to perform without any further question. If he refuses under such circumstances, mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his duty. In this case there is but one act of Congress to be examined. We think its construction quite plain and unmistakable. It directs the Treasurer to pay interest on the certificates redeemed by him; and the only question is whether they had been redeemed by him within the meaning of the act. That they were, we have already attempted to show; and the duty of the Treasurer seems to us to be at once plain, imperative, and entirely ministerial, and he should have paid the interest as directed in the statute.

Unless the writ of mandamus is to become practically valueless, and is to be refused even where a public officer is commanded to do a particular act by virtue of a particular statute, this writ should be granted. Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law; and he must therefore in a certain sense construe it, in order to form a judgment from the language what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and which upon the facts existing he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute which requires, in some degree, a construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be so, the value of the writ is very greatly impaired.30

30 SPECIFIC.-Hall v. Steele, 82 Ala. 562; Pritchard v. Woodruff,

§ 40. Mandatory.

That is the beginning and the end of the adminis trative function-the law. The function of the administration is to enforce the law; in a case where there is explicit law to enforce, there is no scope for any function of the administration. The law is the authority for administration; the law is also the limitation upon the administration. This appears by an examination of both sides of the statement that the law is at the beginning and the end of the administrative function. This involves two propositions, one negative, one positive; if there is no law there can be no sort of government; if there is law there may be any sort of administration. All this is statement and restatement of an abstract proposition. It will be well to proceed at once to more definite discussion.

The negative proposition, that if there be no law there can be no administration, must be evident; since if there is no law to enforce there cannot be any law to carry out. There is a brief case in one of the books of administrative cases to that effect-McElfatrick, 5 Pen. Dec. 278 (1892). This was a claim for a pension as the dependent sister. It appeared by construction of the pension law that no pension was provided by law for a dependent brother or sister until after the termination of the prior

36 Ark. 196; Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165; Land Co. v. Routt, 17 Colo. 156; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Ia. 538; Gill v. State, 72 Ind. 266; Martin v. Ingham, 38 Kan. 641; State v. Board of Liquidation, 42 La. Ann. 647; Chase v. Canal Co., 10 Pick. 244; People v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich. 468; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; State v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 620; State v. Milne, 36 Neb. 301; Humboldt Co. v. County Com'rs, 6 Nev. 32; School Directors v. Anderson, 45 Pa. St. 388; Lane v. Schomp, 5 C. E. Green, 82; Citizens' Bank v. Wright, 6 Oh. St. 318; Cotten v. Ellis, 7 Jones L. 545.

8 40 right to pension of the dependent mother and father, and at that date the alleged dependent brother or sister was under sixteen years of age. As at that date this dependent had long since passed the age of sixteen, the department rejected the claim.

This paragraph in the opinion of Assistant Secretary BUSSEY must be fundamental in all discussion of the function of the administration: The department has no right, authority, or power to grant a pension to any person for whom the law does not provide a pension, no matter what may be the circumstances of the case, nor how much it may appeal to the sympathies. The only relief for the appellant must be sought at the hands of Congress, whose power to grant pensions is unlimited. The rejection of this claim by the bureau was strictly in accordance with law, was undoubtedly correct, and is affirmed accordingly. A brief statement like this clarifies matters. It is of course obvious. It is nevertheless indispensable from time to time in any discussion to recur to first principles.

There is one class of cases which upon analysis require nothing else than this elementary rule for their solution. Davis v. Porter, 66 Cal. 658 (1885), may represent this class as well as any other case. This was a petition for mandamus to compel the treasurer of the City of Sacramento to pay to the petitioner the amount due upon certain coupons, together with interest upon the same from the date of maturity. A motion was made to strike from the directions the clause requiring the payment of interest, upon the ground that there was no provision of law which authorized the payment of such interest. This case was made out

to the court, which found accordingly that, upon all the statute law upon the subject, there was no such duty. What must be the result of such a finding upon the issuance of the mandamus?

There could only be one result, as Mr. Justice THORNTON points out: Is the petitioner entitled to the writ with the command as claimed by him? This writ is issued to enforce the performance of an act especially enjoined by law, as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. No court in this state can command a person to perform an act beyond that enjoined by law upon him as a duty pertaining to his office or position. If then such command in the writ of mandate to be issued would impose upon the respondent, as treasurer of the city as aforesaid, the performance of an act beyond what was required of him by law in the discharge of the duties of his office, such command should not be inserted in the writ.

All of which amounts to this: that if there is no law to execute there is no duty to perform-which must be an axiom in the law governing administration. All of the cases discussed in the last paragraph which bear upon ministerial duties are in point in this matter in a negative way, for it is only if the duty is directed by some exact law that the courts will command the performance.31

31 MANDATORY.-Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. 435; United States v. Windom, 137 U. S. 643; Ex parte Banks, 28 Ala. 28; Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596; Freeman v. Selectmen, 34 Conn. 406; Howell v. Cooper, 2 Colo. App. 531; State v. Barker, 4 Kan. 379; Logansport v. Wright, 25 Ind. 512; Brown v. Crego, 32 Ia. 498; Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189; People v. Supervisors, 3 Mich. 475; State v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44; State v. Roderick, 23 Neb. 505; State v. Blasdel, 4 Nev. 241; State v. Titus, 47 N. J. L. 89; Raleigh, etc.,