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moval, and to enable him to remove an officer when in his discretion he regards it for the public good, although the term of office be fixed. Upon the whole this opinion is strong enough to be authority against any tenureof-office legislation henceforth.39

$ 51. Judicial.

The extent to which the rule goes that requires judicial action in removal from office is seen in People v. Treasurer, 36 Mich. 416 (1877). The Board of Supervisors of a county passed a resolution to remove the Overseers of the Poor. The statute fixed the terms of these overseers at three years, which time had not half run out in this case. And the provision for making removal by the supervisors prescribed certain grounds, which were not present in this case. The supervisors had selected these overseers at the outset, however. It was claimed, therefore, that the supervisors might at any time remove the overseers by virtue of that situa: tion.

The court-GRAVES, J.—laid down an important limitation upon the rule that a power to appoint involves a power to remove: Our state system favors appointments for fixed periods, and almost entirely rejects the policy of removals at will, and this rule of action should

39 ARBITRARY.—Eckloff v. District, 135 U. S. 241; Patton v. Vaughan, 39 Ark. 211; Sponogle v. Curnow, 136 Cal. 580; Carter v. Durango, 16 Colo. 534; State v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433; State v. Mitchell, 50 Kan. 289; Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140; Field v. Malster, 88 Md. 691; Williams v. Gloucester, 148 Mass. 256; People v. Stuart, 74 Mich. 411; Parish v. St. Paul, 84 Minn, 426; State v. Cooper, 53 Miss. 615; State v. Board of Lands, 7 Neb. 42; Weidman v. Board, 7 N. Y. Supp. 309; State v. Owen, 125 N. C. 212; Field v. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. St. 478; Maroney V. City Council, 19 R. I. 3; Keenan v. Perry, 24 Tex. 253; State v. Prince, 45 Wis. 610.

be observed in this case. We have not found any case where an officer who was appointed for a fixed termand when the power of removal was not expressed and declared by law to be discretionary—has been held to be removable except for cause; and whenever cause must be assigned for the removal of an officer he is entitled to notice and to a chance to defend. Every officer appointed for a fixed term should be entitled to hold his office until the expiration of such period unless re moved therefrom for cause upon a fair trial. This is the general argument that is made in the states where the administration is decentralized.

Where the power of removal is judicial the principal issue is whether there are sound reasons or not. A representative case on that is Todd v. Dunlap, 99 Ky. 419 (1896). The Board of Public Safety and the Board of Public Works, executive boards of the government of the City of Louisville, instituted these actions in equity in which it was alleged that the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen were about to remove the members constituting the two boards from office without cause, and the sole question in each case was: Had the Mayor the power, with the approval of the Board of Aldermen, to remove these officials without notice and trial and without assigning any cause for their action? The statute law upon the subject was to the effect that the Mayor, giving his reasons, might remove with the approval of the Aldermen.

Chief Justice PRYOR held against the Mayor: These officials having been appointed by the Mayor, it is urged in his behalf that any reason satisfactory to himself and approved by the Board of Aldermen is a compliance with the statute, and that no limitation on this power of removal exists when applied to those officers holding under his appointment, and, however competent and faithful they may be in the discharge of their duties, their positions are held at the mere will of the Chief Executive. But we think that when the power to remove is for reasons given, the legislative meaning was a removal for cause for legal reasons based upon a sufficient cause--and when removed for reasons given or for cause, the parties are entitled to a hearing and to be proceeded against in due form upon charges, notice, and opportunity to be heard.40

go far.

$ 52. Conclusion. The results of the conditions related in this chapter

An administration in which membership is given by appointment and taken away at discretion is one type. An administration in which membership is acquired by election and lost only by a judicial process is another type. The result in the first type is centralized administration; while in the second type the re sult is decentralized administration. As will appear as the discussion advances, the processes of centralized administration are of one sort; the processes of decentralized administration are of another sort. Indeed, these two types are opposites.

40 JUDICIAL.-Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; State v. Hixon, 27 Ark. 402; People v. Mizner, 7 Cal. 519; Trimble v. People, 19 Colo. 187; State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; Queen v. Atlanta, 59 Ga. 318; State v. Chatburn, 63 Ia. 659; Todd v. Dunlap, 99 Ky. 449; Duboc v. Voss, 19 La. Ann. 210; Townsend v. Kurtz, 83 Md. 331; Andrews v. King, 77 Me. 224; Hallgren v. Campbell, 82 Mich. 255; State v. Peterson, 50 Minn. 239; State v. Smith, 35 Neb. 13; State v. Trenton, 50 N. J. L. 338; Territory v. Ashenfelter, 4 N. M. 95; People v. Roosevelt, 168 N. Y. 488; State v. Mitchell, 115 N. C. 190; State v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359; Keenan v. Perry, 24 Tex. 253.



§ 53. Introduction.

54. External Divisions.
55. Federal.
56. State.
57. Internal Subdivisions.
58. Department.
59. Bureau.
60. Division.
61. Conclusion.

$ 53. Introduction.

When many officers are found in action together the law must provide for their inter-relation. Some officers act in co-ordination with each other-how shall their functions be divided? Other officers act in subordination one to another-how shall their duties be ranked? It is the internal law of the administration to a large degree that deals with these complex matters of organization; and it has to solve these intricate matters by theories of its own. These questions require full discussion, which will be had later on. Administrative law has much to do with these questions; for it is obvious that administration could not proceed without rules of law of some sort. And without a properly balanced organization an administration could not go on.

What external divisions between administrations themselves there shall be is a question of constitutional law; while what internal divisions there shall be in an

administration is the question in administrative law. At the same time no description of the position of the administration in the United States can be given unless the general divisions between the various administrations is exposed as the basis of the general schemation of the administration. These, then, are the principal divisions of the problem of the organization of the administration. The first concerns the external division between administrations; while the second concerns the internal sub-divisions of the respective administrations.

$ 54. External sub-divisions.

In the United States the number of independent administrations is the greatest in the world. In no other nation is there such division of powers between the various governments, and the disorganization of the administrations is the consequence of this. In the first place there is that entire division between the government of the United States and the government of the states. This inevitably results in an entire division be. tween the federal administration and the state administrations. This entire division between the administrations is a necessity as a practical matter if the theory of che founders of the federal nation is to be preserved and the relative independence of the state and nation is to be maintained.

But within the administrations of the states themselves there is the same disorganization. The central administration in the state has seldom any administrative relations with the local administrations in the state. The central administration and the local administration are in the usual case both elected by the people. Each, therefore, is independent of the others in its

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