partment. But whenever it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that in any case of ascertained duties, more money has been paid to the collector, or to the person acting as such, than the law requires, it shall be his duty to direct the said Treasurer to refund the same. The question then went to an inquiry into the constitutionality of this statute; which by its terms provided that the decision was left to the administration.

The opinion of Mr. Justice DANIEL is an excellent statement of the situation: The plain intent of this statute is that if the money has been placed to the credit of the Treasury, that it is the Secretary of the Treasury alone by whom the rights of the government and of the claimant are to be decided; and whoever shall pay to the collector any money must do so subject to the consequences. Uniformity of imposts and excises is required by the Constitution. Regularity and certainty of the payment of revenues must be admitted by every one as of primary importance. Within the extended limits of this country are numerous districts. Many officers must be entrusted with the collection of revenue, and with the payments by the government. To permit the receipts on the customs to depend on constructions as numerous as those who might be interested, or to require that those receipts shall await a settlement of every dispute or objection that might spring from so many conflicting views, would greatly disturb, if not prevent, the uniformity required by the Constitution. The money shall be placed in the possession of the Treasury to await decision instead of in the hands of collectors.

These measures are taken expressly to secure uniform

ity of decision and practice in relation to the amount of duties imposed by law. In devising a scheme for imposing and collecting the public revenue it is competent for Congress to designate the officer of the United States in whom the rights of that government should be represented, and to prescribe the manner and trial. There is nothing arbitrary in such an arrangement; they are general in their character; they are the results of principles inherent in the government; they are defined and promulgated as public law. The courts of the United States can take no cognizance of matters that are not assigned them by law, or conversely. They can take no cognizance of matters that by law are either denied to them or expressly referred ad aliud examen.

This decision goes to the extent of allowing that the jurisdiction of the administration may be exclusive. That covers the whole situation if they may be exclusive; it is plain that they may be concurrent. Again, those decisions go to the extent of regarding the decision of the administration as final. That again covers the whole situation. And this is upon a plain ground that this is all administration from first to last. It is all based upon the independence of the administration.

Another plain case, People v. Dental Examiners, 110 Ill. 180 (1884). The statute at that time provided that the State Board of Dental Examiners should issue a license to any regular graduate of every reputable dental college. The petitioner stated that he was a graduate of an Indiana Dental College. In his petition he states elaborately the course of instruction in that institution. Wherefore, being without other legal remedy, the petitioner prayed a writ of mandamus to the Board of

Dental Examiners to compel them to issue him a license, which he claimed was withheld by them contrary to law. It all depended upon whether the ruling of the board that the institution was not reputable in their view should stand.

This is the same issue as before,-whether this is within the discretion of the board; and the COURT says again that it is: These questions are by the act submitted to the decision of the State Board of Dental Examiners. Their action is to be predicated upon the requisite facts, and no other tribunal is authorized to investigate them. The act of ascertaining and determining what are the facts is in its nature judicial, involving investigation, judgment, and discretion. So upon this refusal of the Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners to grant a license to a person whose application was based upon a diploma issued by a dental college, mandamus will not issue to compel the board to grant the license, because to entitle the applicant to a license, the diploma must have been issued by a "reputable" dental college, and whether the college is a "reputable" one is, under the statute, within the judgment and discretion of the board to determine. In accordance with this decision are all cases similar to it; for the principle is undoubted.87

87 JURISDICTION IN ADJUDICATION.-Gidley v. Palmerston, 3 Brod. & B. 275; In re Boyes, 13 Ont. 3; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236; Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 272; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken L. & I. Land Co., 18 How, 272; Carrick v. Lamar, 116 U. S. 426; Noble v. Logging R. R., 147 U. S. 165; United States v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 308; Ex parte Selma R. R., 46 Ala. 423; Lee v. Huff, 61 Ark. 494; Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94; Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80; United States v. Douglass, 19 D. C. 99; Pensacola R. R. v. State, 25 Fla. 310; State v. Thrasher,

$ 114. Exclusive.

The case of Dugan v. United States, 34 Ct. of Cl. 458 (1899), shows that this has the positive side. This was

a decision by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under R. S. sect. 3426, upon satisfactory evidence of the fact that the post exchanges or canteens were not subject to the internal tax upon liquor dealers as they were in fact governmental agencies. The Commissioner, acting upon the statute, thereupon made an allowance by his certificate for a refunding. The question was whether this award was final upon the government.

The opinion of PEELE is in substance: The Commissioner's functions with respect to the matter referred to under the statute are judicial in their nature; and his action concludes a claimant from taking to the courts for investigation the things designed to be finally settled by him. Whatever rights the claimants had rested upon the statute, which left to the revenue officer to determine whether the special tax was wrongfully collected and for that reason should be refunded. The Commissioner had jurisdiction in the matter, and his allowances or awards for the refund of the taxes so paid, being unim

77 Ga. 671; People v. Dental Examiners, 110 Ill. 180; Spitznogle v. Ward, 64 Ind. 30; Chamberlain v. Clayton, 56 Iowa, 331; Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 170; Construction Co. v. Police Jury, 44 La. Ann. 863; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379; Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 592; Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540; Highway Commissioners v. Ely, 54 Mich. 173; State v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 38 Minn. 281; State v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 29 Neb. 412; Edes v. Boardman, 58 N. H. 580; Williams v. Weaver, 75 N. Y. 30; Board of Education v. Bladen Com'rs, 113 N. C. 379; Thomas v. Wilton, 40 Oh. St. 516; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. St. 151; Keenan v. Perry, 24 Tex. 260; Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va. 354.

peached, must stand. Judgment will be entered in his favor for both awards.

How final the decision of an officer of the administration may be is shown in the ruling cases concerning grants by a government. United States v. The Commissioner, 5 Wall. 563 (1866). The case in that court arose on a petition by McConnell for a mandamus to command the Commissioner to issue a land patent to him. The relator held a certificate, but the Commissioner had refused to grant him a patent. What reasons influenced the Commissioner in this refusal did not appear. The court refused to go into the question at all.

The court disposed of this mandamus in a very summary manner. NELSON Said: Where the merit of the several objections and questions made in this case lie we do not undertake to determine, nor can they be determined understandingly upon this record. Many of the acts of the parties, and of the officer, the registers and the commissioners of the land office may be valid or void. We have referred to them for the purpose of showing that this case is not one to which the remedy by mandamus can be applied. It calls for the exercise of the judicial functions of the officer and those of no ordinary character. The duty is not merely ministerial, but involves judgment and discretion, which cannot be controlled by this writ. We have found no case in which this power has been exercised. Patents are to be signed by the President in person or in his name by a Secretary under his direction and countersigned by the recorder of the general land office. The phrase in this opinion