BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE. No. MCXXXI. JANUARY 1910. VOL. CLXXXVII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMANY. THE interest aroused in this country by the extraordinary development of Germany has found expression not only in Parliament and in periodical literature, but in the publication in the past year of more than one book on the subject. The 'Daily Mail's' 'Our German Cousins,' written, we are told on the title - page, by a combination of the most distinguished among the special correspondents of the great newspapers, acknowledged experts on the subjects discussed, is unfortunately unattractive in form, and is so uneven in composition that it leaves the reader unsatisfied. Mr Ellis Barker's 'Modern Germany is far more complete, but only serious students are likely to read through its 630 pages, and at the end of their study, though they cannot but be greatly impressed, they will regret that this third and enlarged edition, whieh is said to be completely revised and brought up to February 1909, shows signs of carelessness in its revision, and does not fulfil its promise as to the date to which it is corrected.1 But, such lapses apart, Mr Ellis Barker's book is an extremely valuable contribution to the literature upon Modern Germany, and we are chiefly in 1 For example, in the chapter on Germany and Russia it is said that the time of a bold and active policy for Austria-Hungary may perhaps be considered as past, and that her present and still more her prospective ruler has hardly the spirit required to initiate an energetic national policy. There is not a word about the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is universally admitted to have been accomplished with the full approval of that prospective ruler. Again, we find more than one reference to the seventeen years' rule of the Emperor William of Germany; but William II. came to the throne in 1888, and had reigned more than twenty years when this edition was published. Statistics, too, are not up to the latest date. VOL CLXXXVII-NO. MOXXXI. A 99 debted to its author for the writings-"Secrecy is an infacts which we propose to dispensable virtue in politics lay before our readers,-facts as well as in war.' "A war and considerations which every is a good war when it is underBritish subject should rememtaken for increasing the presber and weigh carefully; for tige of the State." "Endeavour the subject of Germany's ex- to become an ally of that pansion is one that does not neighbour who may become concern Germany alone, but is most dangerous to the State." of vital importance to all other "A ruler is obliged to sacrifice nations, and first and foremost engagements, the continuation to Great Britain. of which would be harmful to his country.' "Is it better that a nation should perish or that a Sovereign should break his treaty?" And so Frederick the Great laid the four cornerstones of Prussian policy. was What are the salient facts? Germany, as she now exists, is an enlarged Prussia. She has grown, in a short space of years, from a poor and purely agricultural country into one of the richest industrial countries in the world. Her shipping, which forty years ago negligible, is now second only to our own. Her population has grown till it is half as large again as that of these islands. Her army is unquestionably the most powerful of any European nation. Though badly off for seaports, she is spending vast sums of money to create a fleet, which, in the words of the Preamble to her Navy Bill of 1900, must be "of such strength that a war against the mightiest Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." These facts are indisputable. How have they come about? A Hohenzollern was sent in 1415 to create and maintain order in the unruly territory of Prussia. He carried out his mission, as did his successors, by the sword. Frederick the Great came to the throne in 1740, and put into practice the theories contained in his Years rolled on. Napoleon set his foot on Prussia's neck at Jena; and out of that defeat rose, Phoenix - like, the Prussian army, for it was the treaty then made limiting the standing army of Prussia which gave to Scharnhorst the idea of universal service, under which the letter of the treaty was kept by the maintenance of a small army in peace, expansible to a large army in war by calling up the trained reserves from their civil occupations. The new short service army did good service in the later campaigns against Napoleon, notably at Waterloo; but when those wars ceased Prussia was impoverished and exhausted, an agrioultural country with for the most part a poor soil and a bad climate, a country without inducements to promote other industries, for her means of land transport were feeble and her seaports few and inferior. Germany at that time was a conglomeration of feeble States, jealous of each other and without real power of combination, either for a commercial or any other policy. But while Germany, including Prussia, remained thus enfeebled, Great Britain was building up her Colonial Empire, and at the same time those marvellous industries and that commerce which enabled it to be said of her that she was "the merchant, manufacturer, carrier, banker, and engineer of the world, and ruled supreme in the realm of business.' List, the great German economist, wrote of her: "England is a world in itself, a world which is superior to the whole rest of the world in power and wealth;" and Cobden said, "Great Britain is and always will be the workshop of the world." It seemed indeed that England's position was unassailable when Cobden enunciated his policy of Free Trade-"the weapon," as Bismarck called it in later years, "of the strongest. Britain and Germany were now, each of them, at the parting of the ways. Britain adopted Free Trade; List, at the very time that Cobden was preaching his own doctrine, was preaching Protection for Germany. But he preached to deaf ears; broken-hearted, he shot himself, and not till after his death was he hailed as the economic regenerator of Germany, and a monument to his memory erected by the nation. At last there came to Prussia that greatest gift that a nation can receive from God, a strong Bismarck arose. "For man me," he once said when accused of an unsound and unscientific policy opposed to economic principles, "for me there has always been one single aim and one single principle by which I have been guided-salus publica." He was determined to make Prussia the greatest Power in Germany, but it could not be done all at once. Without armed force to back his policy that policy could have no effect. So he doubled the strength of the army. There came a time when Parliament proved intractable, so he governed without a Parliament. If Prussia was to progress commercially she must have better seaports. He made war upon Denmark and took from her the province of SchleswigHolstein, which gave to Prussia the fine Baltic harbour of Kiel and the control of both banks of the Elbe, thus enabling the Kiel-Brunsbüttel canal to be constructed, giving direct communication between the Baltic and the North Sea. He broke up the effete German Bund, and two years after the war with Denmark, in which he had tested the temper of the army, he made war upon Austria and emancipated Prussia from the last shadow of Imperial control. And so Prussia became the greatest Power in Germany, and the way was cleared for the next step in Bismarck's policy to make Germany the greatest Power in Europe. Austria had been persuaded to assist him in his Danish war; France was persuaded by specious promises, never in tended to be fulfilled, to hold aloof during his war with Austria—a war which not only made Hanover a Prussian province but settled once for all the question of supremacy in Germany between Austria and Prussia. Four years later came the turn of France, and from the Franco-German war of 1870 Prussia emerged the captor of an indemnity of two hundred millions sterling, and the King of Prussia became the Emperor of Germany. And Germany, now increased by the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, Germany, with the King of Prussia and Bismarck at its head, became the greatest Power in Europe. Years afterwards Bismarck said to Bucher: "Up to the year 1866 we pursued a PrussoGerman policy. From 1866 to 1870 we pursued a GermanEuropean policy. Since then we have pursued a worldpolicy." It is that world-policy that we have to consider now. The The time of blood and iron was over. Three wars had been fought in seven seven years with triumphant success. strong man now turned his mind to peaceful projects. But to enable those projects to be peacefully carried out without interruption, the army, the instrument which alone could ensure peace, must be kept perfect, brought indeed to greater perfection than ever before. And it was so. To keep quiet France, with her dreams of revanche; Austria, with her soreness and feelings of humiliation; Russia, with her sense of German ingratitude for help and favours given, they must be kept occupied with other themes. As for Great Britain, though the whale could not attack the elephant, it would be better that she should be kept busy too. And manifestly the best method to occupy them all was to foment quarrels between them. And so France was egged on to quarrel with Italy over Tunis, and with England about Egypt. Russia was advised to pursue her career of ambition in Asia, in hope it would bring her into collision with England over India. Austria was pushed forward into adventures in the Slav States of South Eastern Europe, in the hope they would eventuate in war with Russia. This policy, at least, if it did not produce war, had the desired effect of distracting all these Powers, and of, a8 was well put by the late Lord Lytton in a letter published in 'Maga' in April last, "changing the centre of gravity" of the three European land powers,-inducing Russia to become a great Asiatic power; France to seek expansion seaward rather than landward, and to become a great Mediterranean power; and Austria to become & Slav rather than a German power. And by such means the new peaceful policy - the policy which was to make Germany a great commercial nationwas secured from interruption. Only twice after 1871 did Bismarck seriously propose to depart from his policy of peace |