HARLAN, J., dissenting. 362 U.S. Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, which points to the contrary. The temptation is strong, no doubt, to ask the Court to innovate with respect to the McCarran-Ferguson Act when state regulation may be thought to have fallen short. Two years ago we declined to do so when invited by the Federal Trade Commission in the National Casualty case, supra, at 564-565. I think it unwise for us now to yield to this encore on the part of the Commission. One innovation with the Act is apt to lead to another, and may ultimately result in a hybrid scheme of insurance regulation, bringing about uncertainties and possible duplications which should be avoided. "Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This was done in two ways. One was by removing obstructions which might be thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The other was by declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation of this business is in the public interest and that the business and all who engage in it 'shall be subject to' the laws of the several states in these respects. "Moreover, in taking this action Congress must have had full knowledge of the nation-wide existence of state systems of regulation and taxation; of the fact that they differ greatly in the scope and character of the regulations imposed and of the taxes exacted; and of the further fact that many, if not all, include features which, to some extent, have not been applied generally to other interstate business. Congress could not have been unacquainted with 293 HARLAN, J., dissenting. these facts and its purpose was evidently to throw the whole weight of its power behind the state systems, notwithstanding these variations." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 429–430. See also Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 318-321; Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Variable Annuity Co., supra, at 68-69, and dissenting opinion at 93 et seq. If innovations in the policy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are thought desirable, they should be made by Congress, not by us. I would affirm. Per Curiam. 362 U.S. TILGHMAN v. CULVER, PRISON CUSTODIAN. ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. No. 135, Misc. Decided March 28, 1960. Certiorari granted; judgment vacated; and case remanded. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and Reeves Bowen, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The motion for leave to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Treating the papers submitted as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is granted. In view of the representations of the Attorney General of Florida that the cause has become moot, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is vacated and the cause is remanded for such further proceedings as that Court may deem appropriate. See N. A. A. C. P. v. Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice, 358 U. S. 40. 362 U.S. Per Curiam. McGANN v. UNITED STATES. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. No. 488, Misc. Decided March 28, 1960. Certiorari granted; judgment vacated; and case remanded. Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Rankin for the United States. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. Upon the suggestion of the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the petitioner had been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis by the District Court, the application to the Court of Appeals was unnecessary, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings. 362 U.S. Opinion of the Court. MITCHELL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, v. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 83. Argued February 25, 1960.-Decided April 4, 1960. Employees of a large construction contractor engaged in constructing a dam solely to increase the reservoir capacity of the local water system of a city and its vicinity, all within a single State, are not "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" or in "any closely related process or occupation directly essential to the production thereof," within the meaning of §§ 3 (j) and 7 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended in 1949, and, therefore, they are not covered by the overtime requirements of the Act, even though a substantial part of the water will be used by producers of goods for interstate commerce and an insignificant part by interstate instrumentalities. Pp. 310-321. 262 F. 2d 546, affirmed. Bessie Margolin argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Harold C. Nystrom, Sylvia S. Ellison and Jacob I. Karro. R. Dean Moorhead and Chester H. Johnson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. The Once again we are presented with a nice question concerning the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended. 63 Stat. 912, 29 U. S. C. § 207. respondent, a construction contractor, was engaged by the Lower Nueces River Water Supply District (hereafter to be called the District) to construct a dam and impounding facilities on the lower Nueces River in Texas at a cost of about $6,000,000, in order to increase roughly tenfold the District's then-existing reservoir capacity. The dam is not a multi-purpose project; its sole purpose is to |