BURLINGTON-CHICAGO CARTAGE, INC., v. UNITED STATES ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 726. Decided April 18, 1960.

178 F. Supp. 857, affirmed.

John E. Lesow for appellant.

Solicitor General Rankin, Acting Assistant Attorney General Beck, Robert W. Ginnane and Carroll T. Prince, Jr. for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.

BOGLE ET AL. v. JAKES FOUNDRY CO.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE.

No. 760. Decided April 18, 1960.

Certiorari granted and judgment reversed insofar as it awards a permanent injunction.

Reported below:

Tenn. App. 329 S. W. 2d 364.

Cecil D. Branstetter for petitioners.
Judson Harwood for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is reversed insofar as it awards a permanent injunction. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers & Taxicab Drivers, Local Union No. 327 v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U. S. 968; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236.

Per Curiam.

362 U.S.

DUSKY v. UNITED STATES.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 504, Misc. Decided April 18, 1960.

Certiorari granted.

Since the record in this case does not sufficiently support the findings of petitioner's competency to stand trial, the judgment affirming his conviction is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for a hearing to determine his present competency to stand trial, and for a new trial if he is found competent. Pp. 402–403. 271 F. 2d 385, reversed.

James W. Benjamin for petitioner.

Solicitor General Rankin for the United States.

PER CURIAM.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. Upon consideration of the entire record we agree with the Solicitor General that "the record in this case does not sufficiently support the findings of competency to stand trial," for to support those findings under 18 U. S. C. § 4244 the district judge "would need more information than this record presents." We also agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that it is not enough for the district judge to find that "the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of events,' but that the "test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."

In view of the doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal significance of the psychiatric testimony in this case and the resulting difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the District Court for a new hearing to ascertain petitioner's present competency to stand trial, and for a new trial if petitioner is found competent.

It is so ordered.

IZZO v. ILLINOIS.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 772, Misc. Decided April 18, 1960.

Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied.

PER CURIAM.

The appeal is dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.

NEW HAMPSHIRE FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. SCANLON, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 339. Argued March 22, 1960.-Decided April 25, 1960.

Acting under statutory authority to levy, distrain or seize property or rights to property belonging to a delinquent taxpayer, a District Director of Internal Revenue served notices of levy on a city demanding that it pay to him money alleged to be due from the city to a contractor for construction work. The surety on the contractor's performance and payment bonds then instituted a summary proceeding in a Federal District Court to have the levy quashed, claiming that the money was due to it, instead of to the contractor, since the surety had been compelled to complete performance of the contract when the contractor defaulted. Held: The District Court was without jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties in a summary proceeding. Pp. 405–410.

(a) Especially when a controversy like this is begun by peremptory seizure without an initial determination of the taxpayer's liability, there is neither justification nor authority for carving out an exception to the uniform and regular civil procedure laid down by the Federal Rules, either for the benefit of the party from whom the property was seized or for any other claimant. Pp. 406-408.

(b) Such a summary trial of a claim for property seized by Internal Revenue officers is not authorized by 28 U. S. C. § 2463. Pp. 408-410.

267 F. 2d 941, affirmed.

Jack Hart argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Myron Engelman.

Richard M. Roberts argued the cause for respondents. On the brief for respondent Scanlon were Solicitor General Rankin, Howard A. Heffron, Wayne G. Barnett, Robert N. Anderson and Joseph Kovner.

404

Opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Acting pursuant to statutory authority to levy, distrain or seize property or rights to property belonging to a delinquent taxpayer,' respondent Scanlon, District Director of Internal Revenue, served notices of levy on the City of New York demanding that it pay to the Director money alleged to be due from the city to respondent Acme Cassa, Inc., under a contract for the construction of a school playground. The purpose of this distraint was to secure payment of taxes owing by taxpayer Acme Cassa to the Federal Government. The petitioner, New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co., then brought this summary proceeding, by a "petition" in a United States District Court, seeking to have the levy quashed. The "petition" alleged that the indebtedness of the city for the construction work was not owing to Acme Cassa but to the petitioner because, under its obligation as surety for Cassa's faithful performance of the construction contract, the insurance company had been compelled to complete the playground after Cassa got into financial difficulties and defaulted on the job. Pointing out that petitioner could institute a plenary suit for recovery on the indebtedness if it chose, the District Court held that it was without jurisdiction to determine the respective rights of the parties in a summary proceeding, and accordingly dismissed the petition." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed upon the opinion of the District Court. Because the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously held that a

1 I. R. C. of 1954 §§ 6331, 6332.

3

2 New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 172 F. Supp. 392. The District Court relied on two Second Circuit cases, Goldman v. American Dealers Service, 135 F. 2d 398, and In re Behrens, 39 F. 2d 561, holding that parties from whom property was seized could not avail themselves of summary proceedings for its recovery. 3 New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 267 F. 2d 941.