32 which provide that hired or leased equipment, if not owner-driven, shall be operated only by employees of the certificated or permitted carriers and require those carriers to use their own available equipment before hiring any extra equipment. Art. XXXII, §§ 4 and 5, 358 U. S., at 298-299. While we do not think the issue was tendered to us when the case was last here, we are of opinion that these provisions are at least as intimately bound up with the subject of wages as the minimum rental provisions we passed on then. Accordingly, as in the previous case, we hold that Ohio's antitrust law here may not "be applied to prevent the contracting parties from carrying out their agreement upon a subject matter as to which federal law directs them to bargain." 358 U. S., at 295. The judgment accordingly is MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER dissents. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Per Curiam. WILDE v. WYOMING ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WYOMING. No. 645, Misc. Decided May 16, 1960. Certiorari granted; judgment vacated; and case remanded for hearing on petitioner's allegations in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that he "had no counsel present" when he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and that the prosecutor suppressed testimony favorable to petitioner. Petitioner pro se. Norman B. Gray, Attorney General of Wyoming, and W. M. Haight, Deputy Attorney General, for respondents. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. In petitions for writs of habeas corpus, filed with the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Wyoming and with the Wyoming Supreme Court, the petitioner alleged, among other grounds for relief, that his plea of guilty to second degree murder in December 1945, upon which he received a life sentence, was induced when he "had no counsel present" and that the prosecutor wilfully suppressed the testimony of two eyewitnesses to the alleged crime which would have exonerated the petitioner. It does not appear from the record that an adequate hearing on these allegations was held in the District Court, or any hearing of any nature in, or by direction of, the Supreme Court. We find nothing in our examination of the record to justify the denial of hearing on these allegations. The judgment is therefore vacated and the case is remanded for a hearing thereon. Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116; Sublett v. Adams, 362 U. S. 143. MCMORRAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF NEW YORK, v. TUSCARORA NATION OF INDIANS, ALSO KNOWN AS TUSCARORA INDIAN NATION. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 4. Decided May 16, 1960. Judgment vacated and case remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot. Reported below: 257 F. 2d 885. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Julius L. Sackman for appellant. Arthur Lazarus, Jr. and Eugene Gressman for appellee. Thomas F. Moore, Jr. for the Power Authority of the State of New York, as amicus curiae. PER CURIAM. Upon the suggestion of mootness, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot. Per Curiam. HELM ET AL. v. ARIZONA. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA. No. 768. Decided May 16, 1960. Appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Irving A. Jennings for appellants. Wade Church, Attorney General of Arizona, Leslie C. Hardy, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Jay Dushoff, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Syllabus. 362 U.S. LEVINE v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 164. Argued March 22, 1960.-Decided May 23, 1960. Subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury, petitioner refused, on grounds of possible self-incrimination, to answer questions relevant to the grand jury's inquiry. The grand jury sought the aid of the district judge, who heard arguments on the subject, ruled that petitioner would be accorded immunity as extensive as the privilege he had asserted, and ordered him to answer the questions. After returning to the grand jury room, petitioner persisted in his refusal, and he was again brought before the district judge, who addressed the same questions to him in the presence of the grand jury, explicitly directed him to answer them, and, upon his refusal to do so, adjudged him guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year. During these proceedings, everyone was excluded from the courtroom except petitioner, his counsel, the grand jury, government counsel, the judge and the court reporter; but no objection to the exclusion of the general public was made at any stage of the proceedings. Held: In the circumstances of this case, exclusion of the public from the courtroom when petitioner was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced did not invalidate his conviction. Pp. 611-620. (a) A proceeding for criminal contempt under Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, which explicitly guarantees the right to a "public trial" only for "criminal prosecutions." P. 616. (b) It was not error for the judge to clear the courtroom initially when the grand jury appeared before him for the second time seeking his assistance in compelling petitioner to testify; and, in light of the presence of petitioner's counsel and his failure to object to the continued exclusion of the public, failure of the judge to reopen the courtroom to the general public on his own motion before adjudging petitioner in contempt and sentencing him did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 616-620. 267 F. 2d 335, affirmed. |