on

"The Life and Public Service of James Wilson." The program also included the following papers and responses to toasts: "The Law School and its Duty to the State," by Dean Henry W. Dunn of Iowa City; "Leading Cases," by Justice W. S. Withrow of Mt. Pleasant; "The Relation of the Lawyer to the Public," by Maurice O'Connor of Fort Dodge; "Progress and the Lawyer," by J. S. A. Pollard of Fort Madison; "The Promise of the Lawyer," by Schuyler W. Livingston of Washington; "Returning to First Principles," by Simon Fleischman of Buffalo, N. Y.; "Law in the Making," by J. U. Sammis of Le Mars; and "Criticizing the Courts," by F. F. Faville of Storm Lake.

MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.-The eighteenth annual meeting of the Maryland State Bar Association was held at Cape May, N. J., on July 1, 2 and 3. The meeting opened with an address by President A. Hunter Boyd, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, who had as his subject "Twenty Years on the Bench." Other addresses were as follows: "The Government in the Transportation of Small Packages," by David J. Lewis of the Cumberland bar; "The Proposed Federal Income Tax Laws," by Congressman A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania; "The Case of the King v. Raleigh," by Judge Hammond Urner of the Maryland Court of Appeals; "Sources of Maryland Testamentary Laws," by Edgar H. Gans of Baltimore; and "The Democracy of the Constitution," by Judge George Gray, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Judicial Circuit. Officers for the ensuing year were elected as follows: President-Judge Walter I. Dawkins, Baltimore; vicepresidents-first circuit, Gov. Phillips Lee, Goldsborough; second, William Mason Shehan, Easton; third, Judge Frank I. Duncan, Towson; fourth, William J. Witzenbacher, Hagerstown; fifth, Francis Neal Parke; Westminster; sixth, Robert B. Peter, Rockville; seventh, James C. Rogers, Hyattsville; eighth, Joseph C. France, Baltimore; ninth, Roger T. Gill, Baltimore; secretary-James W. Chapman, Jr., Baltimore; treasurer R. Bennett Darnall, Baltimore.

THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION held its nineteenth annual meeting at Cape May, N. J., on June 24, 25 and 26. The president's address was delivered by Judge George R. Orlady of Huntingdon, Pa., and the annual address by Robert C. Smith, K. C., of Montreal, Canada. "In Memoriam" was the subject of a paper prepared by John G. Johnson of Philadelphia, and Judge Edward Lindsay of Warren read a paper on "The Need for a Science of Law." Other speakers were James M. Beck of New York, former Assistant United States Attorney General; Albert B. Osborne of Erie; James S. Moorehead of Greensburg; Stevens Hecksher of Philadelphia; and Deputy Attorney General Jesse E. B. Cunningham of Pittsburg. Officers were elected at the closing session as follows: President-Hampton L. Carson of Philadelphia; vice-presidents-William D. Porter of Allegheny, James S. Moorehead of Westmoreland, Charles I. Landis of Lancaster, Isaac R. Hiester of Berks, William E. Rice of Warren; secretary-Judge William H. Staake of Philadelphia (re-elected); treasurer-Samuel E. Bashore of Cumberland; executive committee-Peter M. Speer of Venango; Clarence E. Sprout of Lycoming; Fred J. Shoyer of Philadelphia; F. B. Beitler of Philadelphia; A. P. Smith of Susquehanna; Francis J. O'Connor of Cambria; Owen J. Roberts of Philadelphia; David A. Reed of Allegheny; Henry A. James of Berks; Alonzo T. Searle of Wayne; William M. Ryon of Northumberland; John M. Core of Fayette; A. M. Holding of Chester; W. Rush Gillian of Franklin; W. A. Challoner of Allegheny; Albert W. Johnson of Union; A. L. Cole of Clearfield; A. P. Dickinson of Delaware county; Casper Dull of Dauphin.

English Notes.

APPOINTMENTS TO BENCH.-Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady has been appointed a lord justice of the Court of Appeal in succession to Sir George Farwell, resigned, and has also been appointed a member of the Privy Council.

Mr. James Richard Atkin, K. C., has received the honor of knighthood on his appointment to be a justice of the High Court, King's Bench Division.

Mr. John Meir Astbury, K. C., has been appointed a judge of the High Court, Chancery Division. Mr. Astbury was called by the Middle Temple in 1884 and joined the Northern Circuit. He took silk in 1895.

Mr. Thomas Francis Molony, K. C., Attorney-General for Ireland, has been appointed a judge of the King's Bench in Ireland, in succession to the late Mr. Justice Wright.

DEATH OF CHIEF MAGISTRATE BENNETT.-Sir Henry Curtis Bennett, the new chief magistrate at Bow-street Police Court, died suddenly on June 2, at the Mansion House, after the annual meeting of the St. Giles' Christian Mission, the cause being angina pectoris. He was the son of the Rev. George Peter Bennett, rector of Kelvedon, Essex, and was born on the 11th May, 1846, being called to the bar by the Middle Temple in 1870. He went the south-eastern circuit, on which he enjoyed a considerable practice. In 1884 he was appointed a revising barrister for Essex, and in 1886 a metropolitan police magistrate, sitting first at West London, then at Marylebone, Westminster, and Bow Street. On the 9th May last he succeeded Sir Albert De Rutzen as chief magistrate, and was knighted about a week afterwards. As a magistrate he was excellent, being a good lawyer and a broad-minded man. He was magistrate for Essex, Hertford, Kent, London, Middlesex, and Surrey, and an alderman of the borough of Kensington. His death will be greatly lamented.

PUBLIC MEN AS WITNESSES.-The frequency of the appearances of ministers of the crown and other eminent public men in the witness-box during the last few months may recall the circumstance that Lord Chief Justice Coleridge and his successor in the lord chief justiceship, Lord Russell of Killowen, have both been witnesses in courts of justice, and that Mr. Gladstone, Mr. George Wyndhan, Lord St. Aldwyn (when Sir Michael HicksBeach and Irish Secretary), and Viscount Middleton (when Mr. Brodrick) have all given evidence as witnesses in legal proceedings. Lord Melbourne, when prime minister, in 1836, would have been called as a witness in an action to which he was defendant had a party to an action then, as since the passing of the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869 (32 Vict. c. 68) he has become, been a competent witness. The most remarkable recorded instance of a great number of public men having been examined as witnesses in one case occurred in the trial of Mr. Arthur O'Connor at Maidstone, for high treason, in 1798 (27 State Trials, pp. 31-53), when Lord Moira, Mr. (Lord Chancellor) Erskine, Mr. Fox, Lord Suffolk, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Michael Angelo Taylor, Mr. Grattan, and Mr. Whitbread were called, and many other gentlemen equally respectable, to give evidence as to the character of the prisoner for loyalty. Sir Fitzjames Stephen observes that great importance must have been attached to this evidence, as the prisoner gave up the advantage of being defended by Erskine for the sake of calling him as a witness.

LAWYERS AS POETS.-The fact that the late poet laureate, Mr. Alfred Austin, was a barrister of the Inner Temple, at

which he was called in 1857, and practiced for several years at the York assizes and West Riding sessions, may recall the fact that the legal profession can number in its records many members who have obtained fame as poets. Sir John Davies, the author of Nosce Teipsum: The Orchestra, or a "Poeme of Dancing," had a career of the very highest distinction at the bar, and at the time of his death in 1626 was Chief Justice Designate of England. Sir Walter Scott practiced for years as an advocate at the Scottish bar, and was the holder of an office in the Scottish courts. Macaulay was a member of the English bar and an accomplished jurist. Sir Samuel Ferguson, the author of "Forging of the Anchor," was a Queen's Counsel at the Irish bar. John O'Hagan, the poet of the Young Ireland movement, whose poems are collected in "The Spirit of the Nation," was an eminent member of the Irish Equity bar and became a judicial commissioner of the Irish Land Commission with the rank of a judge of the High Court of Justice in Ireland. It is remarkable that Dr. John Anster, who was Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of Dublin from 1850 till his death in 1867, and his honor the late Judge Webb, K. C., County Court judge of Donegal, who succeed Dr. Austin in the Regius professorship, were both translators into verse of Goethe's "Faust," and both these translations are regarded by critics as more faithful and poetical than the versions of their many rivals in this endeavor.

THE CHILTERN HUNDREDS.-Mr. E. Crawshay Williams in a letter to his constituents says: "I have applied for the Chiltern Hundreds, which involves the resignation of my seat. You will be aware that a divorce suit is pending in which I am concerned." The character of the Chiltern Hundreds and the circumstances under which the appointment to the stewardship is made are little appreciated or understood. A resignation of a seat in the House of Commons is an impossibility. It is a settled principle of Parliamentary law that a member after he has been duly chosen cannot relinquish his seat, and, in order to evade this restriction, a member who wishes to retire accepts office under the Crown, which legally vacates his seat and obliges the House of Commons to order a new writ. The office usually selected for the purpose is that of steward or bailiff of his Majesty's three Chiltern Hundreds of Stoke, Desborough, and Bonenham. This office is merely nominal, but as the warrant of appointment grants it "together with all wages, fees, and allowances," it assumes the form of a place of profit. Since 1861, however, all words which formerly attached honor to the appointment were omitted in order to remove any scandal in granting it to persons unworthy of the favor of the Crown who may desire to vacate their seats in Parliament. Sir William Harcourt, speaking as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on the 31st January, 1893, said: "It is the duty, in the first place, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to grant the Chiltern Hundreds immediately when they are asked for, unless there is some lawful reason to the contrary. In the second place, the grant has no reference to the character or fitness of the applicant that is shown in the change of the warrant. Thirdly, the action of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is purely ministerial."

THE AGE FOR WHIPPING.-The curious and novel situation of a prisoner appealing for the substitution of a sentence of whipping in lieu of that of imprisonment incidentally raised an ingenious, though unsuccessful, point of law before the Court of Criminal Appeal in the recent case of Rex v. Cawthron. Under the proviso to section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, "in the case of an offender whose age does not exceed sixteen years, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any

term of imprisonment, order him to be whipped." Under section 123 of the Children Act 1908 certain provisions are made for ascertaining the age of an alleged youthful offender, and such provisions apparently relate to the date when the charge is preferred. In the case in question the appellant when under the age of sixteen had committed an offense under section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, but had passed that age when he was charged. The court was of opinion that there was no power to sentence him to whipping, inasmuch as the proviso quoted above referred to the age of the offender when charged. It was urged that the proviso applied to the age of the prisoner at the date when the offense was committed, and that this view was fortified by the fact that the Children Act 1908 dealt with the age of the offender when charged. In view of the fact that, although in general whipping cannot be awarded to offenders over the age of sixteen, the appellant's counsel was driven to admit that his argument involved the proposition that an offender under sixteen years of age at the date of the offense, if not apprehended until he was fifty years of age, might on conviction still be sentenced to whipping under the proviso to section 4, it is scarcely surprising that the Court of Criminal Appeal did not accede to the appellant's desire for the change of his sentence. INTEREST AS AFFECTING VOTE IN PARLIAMENT.-There can be no doubt that the overruling by Mr. Maclean, acting as deputy speaker of the House of Commons, of an objection raised by Mr. Outhwaite against the participation by Sir George Younger in the recent debate on the second reading of the Temperance (Scotland) Bill, was correct. Mr. Outhwaite urged that Sir George Young, as a brewer, should not intervene in a debate on the restriction of the sale of liquor in whose promotion he is actually interested. "I know," said the deputy speaker, nothing in the usage, practice, or standing orders of the House which precludes the honorable baronet from taking part in debate." A member, even if he have a direct pecuniary interest in the matter, is not restrained by any existing rule of the House of Commons from proposing a motion or amendment, much less from participation in debate. To give an illustration: On the 26th July, 1859, Mr. Whalley moved an amendment to a clause added by the Lords to a railway bill, in which he admitted that he was personally interested. In the debate exception was taken to such an amendment having been proposed by a member having a pecuniary interest, but the speaker ruled that, although it is a well-known rule of the House that a member, under such circumstance, could not be permitted to vote, and though the course adopted was certainly most unusual, yet there was no rule by which the right of a member to make a motion was restrained, and that he had been given to understand that Mr. Whalley did not intend to vote. Sir George Younger not only spoke in debate, but recorded his vote in the division on the second reading of the Temperance (Scotland) Bill. No objection was taken to the recording of the vote, and a motion that the vote be disallowed would clearly have been quite indefensible. It is a rule that no member who has a direct pecuniary interest in a question shall be allowed to vote upon it, but in order to operate as a disqualification this interest must be immediate and personal, and not merely of a general or remote character. On the 17th July, 1811, the rule was thus explained by Mr. Speaker Abbot: "This interest must be a direct pecuniary interest and separately belonging to the persons whose votes were questioned, and not in common with the rest of His Majesty's subjects, or on a matter of state policy." The Temperance (Scotland) Bill deals with a matter of cardinal state policy, and as such a member, however interested he may be in the promotion of the liquor trade, is entitled to take part in the discussions on this bill in all its stages in the House of Commons.

Obiter Dicta.

FIGHTING DEATH.--Dodge v. Coffin, 15 Kan. 277. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING.-Penny v. Little, 4 Ill. 301. ANTAGONISTIC.-In Stanley v. Greenwood, 24 Tex. 224, the court holds that a law office is not a homestead.

A KEEN JUDGE IN A KEEN CASE.-"My experience has been, my observation has been, that a woman is not liable to be seduced without she contributes a little in some way to the general purposes of the case." See Keen v. Keen, 49 Oregon 362.

THEORETICALLY?-"Now, the quality of justice or injustice in a given transaction does not depend upon or vary with the name or character of the court under whose jurisdiction it is brought for consideration." See Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Bouvier, 79 N. J. Eq. 174.

THE VIEWS OF THE NEIGHBORS.-"A mass of affidavits has been filed, containing much irrelevant material. The climax of absurdity in that regard is reached by the filing of a petition signed by a number of neighbors, giving their opinions as to the proper custody of the child. This will be taken off the files. The court does not decide cases according to the wishes or views of neighbors, however respectable; and the solicitor should have known better than to offer such a document." Per Riddell, J., in Re Hutchinson, 26 Ont. L. Rep. 601.

NOT A SAFE PRECEDENT.-It seems to be more or less dangerous to cite the Bible as a precedent. For example, witness the following: "The respondent in his brief raises the question as to how the plaintiff could know, 'how can anybody know,' that the wind blew the mustard seed from the defendant's land upon plaintiff's land, citing authority to the effect that 'the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou canst hear the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth.' This objection, however, would more properly be addressed to the character of evidence which may be introduced in proof of damage, if such a cause of action be maintainable, but is not properly before us on the demurrer, nor should we concern ourselves with the proposition; for, as the same authority has said, 'sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.'' See Langer v. Goode, 21 N. Dak. 462.

SOME SYLLABI.-Absence of Companionship. The evidence in this case shows that the husband instead of treating his wife like a companion seemed to look upon her as a tool or piece of machinery brought into the house to add to his pleasure. See 147 Ky. 409.

Undertaker Furnishing Carriage-Negligence of DriverHorse Running Away—Injury to Occupant-Liability.— Where an undertaking concern, in conducting a funeral furnished a carriage and team in which a lady was taken to the funeral, and, on returning therefrom the team by the negligence of the driver which was left unhitch and unattended at a cafe, ran away and injured her, the undertaker is liable to her for the damages she sustained. See 147 Ky. 506.

JUDGE LAMM ON LOGIC.-"Speaking of logic in connection with legal exposition, it will do to say that no argument against the use of a thing can be drawn from the abuse of the thing (ex

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abusu non arguitur ad usum) and yet the use of logic may be abused, and care is due on that score. For instance: Logic was logic in the poetical story of the 'Deacon's Masterpiece, or, the Wonderful One-Hoss Shay' (q. v.). But the result was not satisfactory, as the whole bar of Missouri know. Logic has its uses in administering law-high uses and many of them. But, after the last word is said, 'the life of the law has not been logic. It has been experience.' [Holmes, Com. Law, p. 1.] Law, having to do with the practical, everyday affairs of mankind, should subserve the ends and purposes of good sense and broad justice, not those of mere logic, though when the two go hand in hand they are a helpful and pleasant pair of judicial handmaidens, and peradventure, when they sit smiling as they often do on either side of a good judge at labor he feels restful." Star Bottling Co. v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 240 Mo. 640.

A PROMPT ADMISSION.-Lee Friedman was arguing in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday, says the Boston Globe, before Judge Putnam and Judge Bingham, the latter the recently appointed justice from New Hampshire.

"Suppose I claimed that a man was insolvent, and the man claimed to own the State of New Hampshire, would I not be entitled to show that he owned a house?" said Mr. Friedman.

"Suppose I were to say," Judge Putnam replied, "that my associate, Judge Bingham, owned the State of New Hampshire." "Probably I would admit that, your honor," promptly responded the lawyer.

LOOKING FOR BUSINESS.-The following communication, recently received by attorneys in Chicago, seems worthy of publication, letter-head and all:

JUSTICE COURT

I wish to inform you that I have been re-elected to the office of Justice of Peace and the Chicago papers printed articles stating that I was defeated.

If you have any business out side of the City of Chicago, in Cook County in my line I would be pleased to start any suits that you may send me for the next four years.

I have several good constables and am prepared for any thing that comes my way and can assure you a square deal. I beg to remain, Yours respectfully,

JOSEPH J. ZBETOVSKY,

Justice of the Peace.

QUITE USED TO "CUSSING."-"It is unnecessary to discuss the propriety of the second issue as tendered by the plaintiff as a matter of law, for there is no evidence whatever in the record tending to prove that Mrs. Thomas was either frightened or injured by the defendant's 'cussing.' On the contrary, we judge from reading the evidence in this case that the feme plaintiff would be quite a match for the defendant, or any other ordinary man. She says that she has always been a stout woman, that she has never taken but one dose of medicine in her whole life, and that she never had a doctor to attend her except at the birth of her children, and that she did all of her housework, cooking, washing, ironing, etc. That 'cuss' words were not at all unfamiliar to her, and not calculated to frighten her, is manifested by her own testimony. She says: 'I have often heard my own brother Josh and my other brothers and all of my sisters curse. I have also heard my mother curse. It does not scare me to hear people curse.' See Thomas v. Asheraft, 158 N. Car. 496.

THE RECALL OF AN UMPIRE, ETC.-Recall of judicial decisions had its first trial in Omaha yesterday at the field day sport of the Bar Association. Judge James P. English was umpire at the lawyers' baseball game. His decisions did not meet with the approval of some of the lawyers; he called too many balls. So he was recalled and succeeded by Judge Sears.

Happy Hollow Club was crowded with lawyers and judges all afternoon and evening. There were 118 of them.

L. J. TePoel started trouble in the ball game when he did then and there steal, take, and carry away two or three bases, contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the Official Guide. Then he altogether failed and refused to touch the home plate, setting up as his defense that he could not see the

same.

TePoel moved to make the home plate more definite and certain, Judge English handed down an opinion declaring him safe, and Tom Lynch filed notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile a motion to set aside the judgment and a motion to quash the ball were overruled.

The case of Lawyers v. Lawyers was in its third trial when English was succeeded by Sears, who grimly overruled all motions. W. J. Fraser moved to strike, and struck-out. T. W. Blackburn asked for a change of venue to a tennis court, which was denied. Harry Palmer objected to Sophus Nebel's pitching as incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, not the best of pitching, and not within the issues of the case. Objection sustained.

Habeas corpus proceedings were resorted to three times to get the ball out of a deep canyon, and at the end of the seventh trial the cause was left, status quo, and is still pending. Omaha (Neb.) News.

Correspondence.

RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN SOUTH CAROLINA.

To the Editor of LAW NOTES.

SIR: I have followed with a great deal of interest the article on "Man made law" and the letters about the same. I think that after all the question of the present rights of women is more a question with the separate states than anything else. Personally I am in favor of granting to women as many rights and privileges as they want and will use wisely but to my mind that is the question for decision. I think that where the woman is the head of the family she should have all the rights of the head of the family. That is to say I think that the privileges which should be granted to any one class should be in proportion to the burdens borne by that class.

In this state, South Carolina, the woman is protected and given many rights that she is not allowed in any other state. She can dispose of her property by will without the consent of her husband and without leaving him a cent. She can claim the right of dower in any piece of property that her husband is seized of during coverture and on the other hand the right of curtesy has been abolished by a decision of the Supreme Court. The doctrine of coercion still holds good in this state though it is possible for the wife to commit a crime in the presence of her husband without being coerced by him. The wife can have a separate estate which is not subject to the debts of her husband. She can contract in any line of business that she may go into as a femme sole. She can dispose of her property without the consent of her husband while he has to have her renounce dower on all of his property. She is exempt from all poll taxes and when she is the head of the family she has the right to have the homestead exemption set off in the same manner that a man has. There is no divorce in this state but a legal separation may be granted. In this case alimony may be allowed to the wife by the court and the court in some cases has placed the husband under arrest for failure to supply the amount of alimony provided for. In case of separation the custody of the children is in the hands of the court in all cases and it is not unusual for the court to give them to the mother. The husband is liable for the necessities of his wife that she contracts for even though she has left him, provided that he has not offered here a home back with him and published the fact to those whom she deals with. The criminal laws of the state jealously guard our women in every respect. My frank opinion is that in South Carolina the average woman would not be willing to give up her present position in the law for equal rights with the men. Columbia, S. C.

C. T. GRAYDON.

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T HE institution of impeachment proceedings against the governor of New York at a special session of the legislature, if the attempt is legal, shatters what has been considered by many to be a settled principle of constitutional law. That the power of the legislature when convened in special session is subject to such limitations as are imposed by the state constitution cannot of course be doubted. And the New York constitution is not unlike the constitutions of other states in providing that "at extraordinary sessions no subject shall be acted upon, except such as the governor may recommend for consideration." It is also to be noted that the power of impeachment is vested in "the assembly" and not in the assemblymen. The existence of the power of impeachment at a special session, in the absence of a recommendation of the governor (if such a thing is to be conceived), is the question which will soon be determined.

tion of the proclamation calling the special session. While there is no direct authority to the effect that a proclamation for a special session may be revoked after the legislature had convened in pursuance of the call, the language of the judges in Tennant's Cese, 3 Neb. 409, a case of revocation before the legislature convened, is broad enough to cover such a case. Crounse, J., in that case, said: "The proclamation is but a command. This command is based on the judgment of the governor, acting for the people, who assumes that an emergency exists, demanding a meeting of the legislature. If the emergency does not exist, this judgment is erroneous, and is changed, and the expression of this change is communicated through the revocation. The several proclamations are but the expressions or announcements of these different conditions of affairs, and are binding on the legislature." And in the same case Lake, J., said: "If, for any good and sufficient reason, the executive shall become satisfied that the necessity which induced the call has passed, or that it was unadvisedly made, it is not only his right but his duty to revoke the same, that the people may be saved the expense which would otherwise be laid upon them." This sounds rather extraordinary, and it may be that the language of the judges should be confined strictly to the case in hand.

Remedy for Impeachment by Illegally Constituted Legislature

WHETHER, in the event that at a special session with

out legal authority, a governor should be impeached, the courts have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the impeachment, may be considered as a question of some moment. And yet, from analogous cases, it may well be This would seem argued that the courts have such power.

to follow from the cases holding that in the case of two conflicting legislatures the court may determine which is the regularly constituted body. Holding that the court had jurisdiction of such a controversy, Chief Justice Beasley, in State v. Rogers, 56 N. J. Law 616, said: "It will be understood that in this vindication of what is esteemed to be the undeniable prerogative of this court, there is not the slightest suggestion of the existence of a judicial capacity to control the legislative authority when exercised within its appropriate sphere. If the question here presented had been whether this senatorial body had been organized in the accustomed mode, or in open violation of its own practices and rules, a totally different subject of inquiry would have been sub judice, and it may well. be that the decision of such senatorial body itself would have been received as conclusive and entirely beyond the power of this tribunal to review. This court does not claim the slightest legal faculty to supervise or interfere with such transactions. All that is asserted is that when the inquiry is whether the legislature or any other body or officer has violated the regulations of the constitution, it is entirely plain that the decision of that subject must rest exclusively with the judicial department of the government. Nor can we for a moment forget that, in entering upon the inquiry that is now imposed upon us as a duty, we have to do with a subject of great importance and delicacy, and that before the restraining power of this court can be exerted to interfere with the action of a coordinate branch of the state government, we must be as certain as care and diligence can make us that the