2. That as the laws of this state forbid, under penalties, any violation of the Lord's day by the transaction of any business, trade or calling, a note made upon the Sabbath day, in pursuance of trade or business, will not be enforced by the courts of this state under the laws of this state, as such a contract is void. Ib.

TRUSTS.

Investment of trust fund by trustee.-When a bill was filed by the complainants as legatees against the defendants as executors, alleging mismanagement of the estate in their hands, and a breach of trust on their part, praying for an account, and the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the trust funds; and, on the trial of the cause, it appeared in evidence that the executors sold the estate, in 1860 for cash, with which they charged themselves in their return to the ordinary, but attempted to discharge themselves, on the ground that the money, or a considerable amount thereof, had been converted by them into confederate money, which became worthless in their hands; the jury found a verdict for the complainants for the sum of five thousand and five hundred dollars, to be paid to the receiver when appointed, and dismissed the executors from their executorship of the estate. A motion was made for a new trial, which was overruled by the court. Held, That it was incumbent on the executors, in order to discharge themselves from accounting for the money received by them, by the sale of the testator's property, to show, to the satisfaction of the court and jury, that the money in their hands had, in good faith in the performance of their duty as trustees, been received and invested by them, in confederate money, at a time when a prudent man would have done so in the management of his own affairs, and that the question, whether the defendants had so acted, was a question for the jury under the charge of the court. Smith v. Byers.

ATTORNEYS' LIENS.

In the supreme court of the United States, Mr. Justice Bradley delivered, on the 24th ultimo, the unanimous opinion of the court in the matter of the two rules of Texas against Geo. W. Paschal. The following is a succinct history of the whole case. When the rebellion commenced, Texas was in possession of $700,000 of bonds, called the Texas indemnity bonds. These were unindorsed by any governor of Texas. But the military board of that state took possession of the bonds, and placed them in the hands of different agents, who negotiated $500,000 of them in Europe and New York, and other places. Provisional Governor Hamilton, in 1865, employed Judge Paschal to prosecute the rights of the state to these bonds, and he commenced a suit in Texas against White & Chiles; but, not being able to get service, Paschal left his home in Texas, where his practice was then lucrative, and removed his operations to Washington. By elaborate argument before the treasury departinent, he arrested the payments until suits could be commenced in this and other courts. These suits had been prosecuted, by the respondent, with great ability. Upon one of the suits he had received $47,325, but he had disbursed for the state, for costs, and to other counsel employed by Governor Throckmorton, $13,355.98, leaving a balance in his hands of $33,939.02.

The first rule was for Paschal to show cause why he should not pay the whole $47,325 into court. Against this rule, Paschal showed for cause his several years of services in prosecuting the rights of the state for the half million of dollars, his success in establishing the precedents, and the fact that, at the time Gov. Davis interfered, he was bringing to a close a successful negotiation for the settlement with Peabody & Co. and Droege & Co., by which the state would have received over $300,000. This suit he was prosecuting upon a fee of 25 per cent. In the case against White & Chiles, Gov. Pease had writ

ten, "I shall feel authorized to let you retain your compensation out of the amount collected."

Paschal also showed that the state is indebted to him in the sum of $17,557, for reports delivered to Texas, which he had reported and published, as the reporter of the supreme court, and for which Gov. Davis had refused to pay, so that there only remained in Paschal's hands, applicable to his charges for fees, a balance of $14,393.02; and against this, Paschal also claimed $1,000 for prosecuting two suits in the district and supreme courts of Texas, as well as his fees and commissions for prosecuting the claim of Texas for over a half million of dollars. The court held:

First-That Gov. Pease had the right to make such a contract as his letters and power of attorney implied. Second-That no rule would lie against Paschal if he acted in good faith.

Third-That he had a right to retain the money and effects in his hands until his fees were settled. Fourth-That the attorney has a lien upon the money and securities in his hands until his fees be paid. Fifth-That if the State be dissatisfied with the amount of its attorney's charges it must resort to a suit for money had and received; in which suit the defendant's offsets will be considered. This rule was, therefore, discharged. Upon the rule to substitute Thomas J. Durant as solicitor in the case against George Peabody & Co., and others, the court held that Gov. Davis had the right to change the counsel for the state; the state taking the responsibility of being answerable to Judge Paschal's past charges for fees, either the whole $75,881.25, or such amount as should hereafter be settled in another proceeding. For that purpose, Judge Paschal would have the right to retain any balance in his hands.

BOOK NOTICES.

Code Relating to the Poor in the State of New York, containing such laws of a general and special nature, in force in 1870, as relate to the support and maintenance of the poor. Prepared by Edward Wade, Counselor at Law. Albany: Weed, Parsons & Company. 1870. Heretofore the statute laws of the state relating to the poor have been scattered through so many volumes, and have been so often amended, patched and tinkered, that, next to the impecunious object of their provisions, the man who was compelled to look up and understand them was to be pitied. Several compilations have been made and issued "by authority," but any one who has had occasion to examine them can testify to their inaccuracy and general worthlessness. There seems to be in this state a sort of fatality, to put it mildly, about all official compilations. We have frequently had occasion to examine these emanations from the different state departments-Highway Laws, Tax Laws, etc.,—and have invariably found them worse than blind guides. Mr. Wade's compilation is not of this class. We have been to some pains to examine it, and have found it to be accurate, well arranged and well digested. A very full and carefully prepared collection of forms is also given. The several superintendents and overseers of the poor, and the members of the profession likely to be consulted on the laws relating to the poor, will find this a work of great and continuing value.

Rules of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, as amended to January 1, 1871, briefly Annotated by a Counselor at Law. John D. Parsons, Jr., Albany.

This is a companion, and, as it were, an appendix, to the "diamond" or vest-pocket edition of the code, which has become so popular as a vade mecum. It contains the rules of both the court of appeals and the supreme court, including the calendar practice, as they now exist, with brief references to explanatory cases, indications of recent changes, and a very full and satisfactory index. Its size and shape are such as to enable one to carry it with him

in his pocket without the slightest inconvenience - a virtue which ought to commend it to the profession. We happen to know that the annotations are the work of one of the best practitioners in the state; that they are accurate and judicious, we have satisfied ourselves by examination and comparison. All things considered, it is the best edition of the new rules that we have yet seen.

A JUDGE FINES HIMSELF.-The criminal court was adjourned at noon till 3 P. M. The judge, however, failed to appear at that hour, and about 4 o'clock he entered the court room, and, on taking his seat, said: "Mr. Clerk, enter a fine of $100 against Samuel Dodge, judge of this court, for being absent at the hour to which this court adjourned." The fine was entered by the clerk. While there seems to be something nonsensical in the presiding officer of a court fining himself for delinquency, there, nevertheless, is a high moral principle of honor involved, which is the more commendable the more we reflect upon it.-Galveston Bulletin.

TERMS OF COURT FOR FEBRUARY.

SPECIAL TERMS AND CIRCUITS.

2d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Rensselaer; Hogeboom.

2d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Rome; Foster.

2d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Ontario; Dwight.

24 Tuesday, special term, Oswego.

3d Monday, special term (issues), Kings; Gilbert.

3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Greene; Ingalls.

3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Chenango; Murray.

3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Belmont; Daniels.

3d Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Canton; James.

4th Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Malone; James.

4th Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Sandy Hill. Last Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Chemung; Murray.

Last Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Tioga; Boardman.

Last Monday, special term, Monroe; E. D. Smith.
Last Tuesday, special term, Albany.

LEGAL NEWS.

Hon. James S. Dewey is to compile the laws of Michigan.

A Virginia sheriff, disliking the idea of officiating at the whipping post, has resigned.

The impeachment of Judge James F. Maybee, before the Florida senate, has resulted in his acquittal.

A bill is pending in the Ohio legislature providing for the appropriation of the accumulated school fund for the aid of law libraries.

The impeachment trial of Judge Vernon, before the senate of South Carolina, has been brought to a sudden termination by the resignation of the officer impeached.

Congress has extended the use of the congressional library to the commissioners engaged in revising the laws of the United States.

In the New Jersey senate, on last Thursday, Senator Henry S. Little, of Monmouth, was unanimously confirmed clerk of the court of chancery.

New Orleans lawyers are raising a subscription for the family of the late Chief Justice Taney, reported to be in indigent circumstances.

Governor Randolph, of New Jersey, has sent the name of Hon. Mercer Bearsley to the senate as chief justice of that state.

In a case before Judge Cox, in Cincinnati, a few days ago, it was decided that where persons give local reporters items for publication, which prove to be untrue and libelous, the informer is liable.

A will, bearing date of 1855, has been proved fraudulent, in Providence, by the fact that the paper on which it is written contains the water-mark “A. P. Co., superfine," when no paper thus marked was sold before the year 1860.

A young Jersey City lawyer was arrested a few days ago, and found to be insane from starvation. He has a large number of friends, and was supposed to have a paying practice; but, on partially recovering, he stated that he had been without food for over four days.

A bill has passed the house of representatives at Washington which provides that the act of June 17, 1861, defining additional cause of challenge, and prescribing the oath of grand and petit jurors in the United States courts, shall apply only to petit jurors in cases where the United States are a party in name or interest.

Lord Penzance, of the probate court of England, has granted to Madame Lynch letters testamentary on the will of Ex-President Lopez, of Paraguay. The execution of the original will of Lopez was proved by the affidavit of Gen. McMahon, the former minister of the United States to Paraguay.

Hon. William P. Chilton, ex-chief justice of the Alabama supreme court, died on the 27th ultimo. Governor Linsday, of that state, in announcing the event to the legislature, says, that, "as a member of the legislature, as a member of congress, and as chief justice of the supreme court, he discharged his duties with devotion and zeal."

The judiciary committee of the U.S. house of repre sentatives on the 1st inst., reported a number of bills, which passed, among which were the following: Allowing discharges to convicts, sentenced to imprisonment and fine, when the term of imprisonment has expired and they make affidavit before a United States commissioner that they have no means of satisfying the fine: allowing cases to be appealed from the court of claims to the supreme court when consent from the former court is given; authorizing the appointment of an assistant attorney-general; directing the secretary of the treasury to pay judgments recovered against collectors of customs for money paid in excess of duties.

John Gaspar Bluntschli, a distinguished Swiss lawyer and writer on international law, and professor in the university of Heidelberg, has recently contributed an article on the Alabama claims to the Revue du Droit International. The conclusions at which Professor Bluntschli, after an elaborate argument, arrives, are, that the recognition by the British government of the Confederate States as belligerents, and the proclamation of neutrality, were not contrary to international law; but that Great Britain, by allowing the Alabama to depart, committed a fault, for which she owes satisfaction —not to the injured individuals, but to the government of the United States; and that the satisfaction should take the shape of the payment of a sum of money to be divided among the injured individuals by their government. He also says, that the payment of the money should be accompanied with a declaration of the principles to be observed in the future under like circumstances.

TO SUBSCRIBERS. The volumes of the LAW JOURNAL are strongly and uniformly bound at this office for $1.50 full sheep, and $1 half sheep.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, FEBRUARY 18, 1871.

THE CODIFICATION OF THE LAW, AS SUGGESTED BY MR. FIELD'S ADDRESS TO THE CALIFORNIA BAR.

(Continued from last week.)

Some of the characteristic views and conclusions set forth in that address have been already noticed. In resuming our remarks, we recur to Mr. Field's declaration that a code "would lessen the labors of

judges and lawyers, enabling them both to dispense with the larger number of those books which now incumber the shelves of their libraries."

It may seem, to some readers, that a mere contradiction of that declaration would be the appropriate answer. But, in view of the importance of it, in connection with the subject involved; of its imposing position as the centralized idea of that address, and of the positive and unqualified terms employed, we prefer to give it deliberate and respectful attention.

The degree to which that labor will be lessened is not stated. But the writer could rely, somewhat, upon the apprehension of his readers, and leave them to infer that the decline of labor may go, "hand in hand," with the decline of books.

It may be, however, that the declaration cited should not be taken in its most obvious sense. Some sections of the code of procedure cannot be so taken. Something may be left to construction, and we have a faint hope that a careful disintegration of that statement may tend to mitigate its extravagance.

Mr. Field promises a dispensation from labor, not from work. He may have intended to respect the shade of difference which lingers between those terms. If so, we, thus far, commend his discrimination. Mere labor is mechanical - a task imposed; work is artistic and voluntary. The one taxes the physical strength, and wears out the frame; the other taxes the intellectual strength, and secures a wholesome culture. The slave or the ox labors; only the man works.

like Jerry Keller's opponent, put his claws on the desired clause of the statute at any monent.

But is that what was really intended? On reflection, we fear not. Such relief service, so much akin to that of "the ready reckoner," or of books known as "lifts to the lazy," would be quite too formal, and in value and importance too subordinate, to justify the emphasis with which Mr. Field promises the reduction of labor. That being so, what reading can be adopted which shall justify that promise? The difficulty is not, simply, that he does not pause to fix limitations, although the nature of the subject demanded limitations, but that the labor to be lessened, and the great mass of books to become useless, under the code, are so combined as to defy all attempts at a severance. It would seem to follow, that the whole declaration must be accepted as an inspiration, or rejected as a heresy.

But we are admonished by a modern logician, of great weight and solidity in fiction, that "the value of an observation depends upon the application of it." We turn, therefore, to a field of judicial and professional effort to which Mr. Field did not intend to apply his prophetic observation; that is, to the labors of judges and lawyers in the performance of the most grave and important duties devolving upon them.

We pause to enforce and illustrate this qualification, again assuming, for that purpose, that the code is in use. With that view, and after the method of a sympathetic writer, who, to illustrate the horrors of slayery, took a single captive and shut him up in a dungeon, we take a single case, somewhat special and complicated. We are in court, interested spectators. The hearing proceeds, and, at once, the question is up whether the law of the case, to any, and, if ec, to what, extent is in the code? That invol‹ es a construction of some provision of it, considered in reference to its terms, spirit, intent, and, in a yet broader scope, its sense as part of an extended design. As mere transformation does not change the law, that provision of the code, or something like it, is traced back into the older statutes, and, again, the same, or a like principle, back into the domain where it once stood as portion of the unwritten law, and judicial applications of them to special relations rehearsed. There is an earnest effort, on the one side, to compress the case within the limits of the code. That failing, the question is, whether analogies, according to existing rules of the code, exist. None are found. The next inquiry is as to some old rule of law applicable, but not contained in the code, and, such rule being readily found, it would seem to be inconsistent with the code-its use prohibited. At each step in the progress of the hearing questions have been discussed, appeals made to the reason of the law, authorities cited. For that contest, what evidence of laborious preparation by counsel! How much, in argument and illustration, they are indebted to the spirit and use of the old laws! How obvious it is that the counsel familiar with the unwritten law, as well as with the code, has the advantage! The presiding justice, intent and earnest throughout, has been much perplexed, notwithstanding his great learning and twenty years of judicial experience. But the questions involved are necessarily decided; excep

sure to follow. Thus the old, old, warfare over statutory laws is renewed in a new and extended field. Have the labors of the judge and lawyers been lessened in such an instance? Will they be lessened in any like instance? Surely not. In addition to the real and intrinsic difficulties inherent in such a case, independently of the code, other special and difficult questions have been added by the code. We conclude, therefore, that Mr. Field's theory of reduced labor may have, at least, this important qualification.

What books, useful before the code, can the judges and lawyers dispense with? None. Those books must be had; full attention must be given to them, not only because they are the repositories of rules of law which may not be in the code, to be resorted to in aid of the code, but for additional reasons. It is not proposed to change the law by the code, but to give a clearer and better statement of it. That being so, rules and principles which had been, and those which had not been, declared in statutes, and, in either condition, had been judicially noticed, are, expressly or impliedly, swept into the code. Is that judicial labor lost? No; we shall be left "with all the old helps about it, the old lights burning." The doctrine of the statute of frauds, of our statutes as to trusts and powers, go into the code. Shall we not have occasion to advert to what has been judicially said of those doctrines? Where shall the law on questions of insurance, and on other leading subjects, be found? First, in the code secondly, in reported cases, and in treatises devoted to the exposition. Would a lawyer feel at home in the domain of medical jurisprudence, groping his way with no "lights burning" save such as the code might supply?

Mr. Field regards the adoption of the code as the advent of stability, certainty, and repose in the law ! The promised land smiles invitingly before him, but he forgets the forty years sojourn in the wilderness. Thus the mirage reflects objects, and beguiles the spectator. It seems proper to remind him that every material provision of the code would, necessarily, receive judicial construction and application; that, while that work may be going on, the spirit of conflict and unrest would take possession of the law. The ploughing up of the law to reap immediate benefits; the convulsive dismemberment and replacing of the parts of the system, to be followed by health and repose, contradict all nature and experience. If you could clear away the forests, and plant seeds and shoots of a better sort, you could not live to witness the mature growth; might see the bud and flower, but never pluck the fruits.

But Mr. Field seems, also, to forget that the increased judicial labor, provoked by the new form and expression of the law, would give us a large accession of law reports and commentaries; to forget the common experience of the people of this state under statutory law, of other peoples under the code. We make but incidental reference to what has transpired under codes, and simply with a view to the questions under consideration.

We ask him, then, to call to mind the fact that the early Roman code, the twelve tables, came down to the time of Justinian overladen with commentary;*

*Maines' Ancient Law, ch. 2, pp. 32, 33; Mackeldey's Civil Law, § 44.

the fact that Justinian, who, at first, believed in the perfection and sufficiency of his collections, was constantly changing or amending them ;* the fact that when the Prussian code was revised, judicial illustration and interpretation were found necessary, and the prohibition, already noticed, which had been imposed by Frederick the Second, was shaken off; the fact that, under the Code Napoleon, the body of laws, commentaries and condensed reports have swollen to an enormous magnitude;† the fact that in Louisiana, with a code of the civil law, a luxurious crop of reports has grown up, and the legal works of other countries, including those of France, incumber their law libraries.

But we need not wander abroad; the proofs are to be found at home. In reference to the New York code of procedure, Mr. Field gives us an exquisite hint of triumph and success; also the reason why hostility-the name he gives to want of confidence in the code-theory does not trouble him. He has seen that code treated "first, with derision, and then with hate; ridiculed, dreaded, misconstrued, but winning its way all the while, until the opposition to it has dwindled to insignificance."

The mere selection of terms is a matter of taste; but, even in this instance, something may be due to the facts. Mr. Field refers to the code as if it were now what it was when given to us in 1848! He forgets that the code, as first adopted, was immature and infirm; too weak and attenuated to stand alone: forgets that it has been improved and perfected, by constant nursing and attention, from that day to this. At each session of the legislature, from 1848 down, it has been amended. Many able lawyers, in each branch of the legislature, have given it their saving attention. Some of the changes have been made at the suggestion of learned judges who had been hampered and hindered, in the work of administration, by the conflicting and imperfect terms in which original provisions were framed. Now and then, at some special call or impulse, Mr. Field has solicited amendments. He mentions an instance in a late number of the Law Journal.

The great body of the judges and lawyers have lent their aid to the elucidation of the code. Thus, and not otherwise, has it won its way. It is true that parts of it have been misconstrued. But who shall utter reproaches? Where so much depended upon construction-the work so extended, various, and continuous how could errors be avoided? Many learned and patient judges, loyal to their duty and

"The other circumstance is that monument which still exists among us, and is a collection of the laws of this emperor, which, in the course of a few years, present us with greater variations than are to be found in our laws for the three last centuries of our monarchy." Works of Montesquieu, vol. 3, p. 154, London ed. 1777.

+ See Meyer's Esprit, Origine et Progres des Institutions Judiciaires des principaux pays de l'Europe. Vol. 5, pages 4 and 7. Paris, 1823.

See, also, M. Dupin's fifth edition (1832) of the Bibliotheque choisie des livres de Droit, by M. Camus, in which some account and enumeration of works proper to the law library are given the list increased with each edition the last comprising 3,700 articles, each article containing a notice of one or more works, some of them of several

volumes.

Also Butler's Life of D' Aguesseau, London, 1830, p. 60, et seq., in which he states the views of respectable jurisconsults, that "the bulk of the French faw is very great; that it immeasurably exceeds the size of the codes, and that it is on the increase."

friendly to the code, have given their days and nights to that work of construction; been at times baffled; often overruled. The amount of that toil cannot be estimated. Much of it rests in mere tradition, the unreported expression of the courts; but a large body of it has found its way into the reports. Thus it is that we have more than two hundred volumes of reports since the code, many of them devoted to mere questions of practice to mere construction. have, also, numerous annotations, treatises, and works of practice founded on the code.

We

These may be the books of which Mr. Field speaks with contempt, as incumbering the shelves of our libraries. Yet they are, to a great extent, the natural fruit of the code; have helped the code on its way.

That code covered the most simple subject that could be proposed for the experiment; the mere machinery of the law, providing how to bring suitors into court, and how to enable the prevailing party to profit by success. Yet the labors of judges and lawyers, and the books of the law, have been thus increased. It rests with Mr. Field to reconcile all that with the possibility of a reduction of labor and of books, under the code of our laws, the subjects of it so extensive, and including all that is special, difficult and metaphysical in the science of the law.

Dismissing, then, forever, as we believe the reader must have done, the untenable pleas for this innovation stated by Mr. Field; dismissing, especially the idea of dispensing with the books which now constitute our law libraries, all thought of disconnecting ourselves from the history and the reasonings of the past; holding fast to the necessity laid upon us of a complete legal culture, to master substantially all that has constituted the learning of our masters in the law, it may be true that the acquisition of this great body of jurisprudence might be facilitated by a code. Within that huge body of materials, to be, as it were, the great nervous center, insert a code, or a series of codes. From that central organization of the greater whole, lines of communication could reach out in all directions; and, thus, order and system, by the correlation of the parts, might be secured. This correlation might consist in the distinct elimination and clear digesting of the most essential elements and principles of the law within a limited compass, so that, from the reason of the law as seen in one case, or one department, the reason of the law in other cases, and other departments, even, might be logically deduced. Thus, a logical habit of mind, eminently important to the true jurist and lawyer, might be, from the start, and continuously, cultivated.

It is, perhaps, something of this kind which those who are learned in the civil law have discovered in it, and in respect to which they glorify its excellences, as compared with the common law. It may be that in the very idea of a code, as a system of principles rather than as of mandatory enactments, there is involved a tendency to logic, as to the abstract essence of right, more than to mere usage and authority. It may be, also, that the ingrafting of codification, with its pure and stoical exposition of the law of the law, upon the common law, more allied with the facts of history, and with its too exclusive appeal to authority and precedent, is the very road to that ulterior com

positeness and perfecture of system which could neither be attained by the common law alone, nor by the exclusive substitution, if that were possible, of codex and ethical digests. Codification might come to be the head or heart of the whole body of the law, but the body itself will ever remain,- the old and the new; that which is back in history, and which, so far as it has received judicial expression, can be outlined in a text-book; and that which is novel and exceptional, and cannot, for that reason, be prevised.

The lawyer of experience will remember how the clear conception of some elementary principle or rule of law, and of the reasons on which it rested, has, in the hour of peril, served the interests committed to his charge. Until he became thus fully possessed, he could neither marshal the elements of the case, nor disentangle its complications. Thenceforth, he could do both without effort. The moment he touched the very root of the matter came the illumination. Thus the vital contact with the spirit of the law served him as the touch of his mother earth gave strength to him who contended with Hercules. But no lawyer of such experience would admit that the mere knowledge of the rule or principle of law, as it might be found in a text-book, would have sufficed. It was the apprehenson of the spirit, essence, philosophy of the rule, that enabled him to reason from it and to enforce its application. Such a rule or principle may be well stated in a code. But much of the law which has to do with that rule or principle must remain outside of the statute.

Nor is a legislative enactment necessary. If we had, at this moment, a codification of the law as full and adequate as human strength and wisdom could produce (one worthy of adoption) it would come into use and receive assent in proportion to its merits. It would be well to give the practical test to such a collection before binding ourselves and our children's children irrrevocably to the observance of it. But, if it were in force with the legislative sanction, there is no reason to apprehend hostility. The courts, the profession, and the growing wisdom of the representatives of the state would deal with it kindly and fairly. It would be amended, from time to time; would be construed, illustrated and applied by the judges, and perhaps, after a hundred years of conflict, would stand forth in perfect strength and beauty. If we could be relieved from that probation of suffering there would be no objection to the code.

He must be a poor professional observer of the times, who is not proud of, and content with, the progressive amelioration of the law now going on in this state. The movement is slow, as nature, in perfecting her work, is slow, but sovereign and benign. Since the union of law and equity, the stern features of the common law have relaxed somewhat. The law, formerly so cold, has grown warm in the sisterly embrace, and, day by day, the courts inquire with greater freedom as to the very right of the matter in each given case. A strictly legal claim may now be defeated, or qualified, by a strictly equitable defense. Thus do elements, formerly wide apart, meet and mingle.

So, too, the student who laments the supposed uncertainty of the law, and does not find rules and principles clearly stated in the ancient books, may