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amount. The bearer of the check put the same on a counter in defendant's place of business, within reach of defendant's agent, and, having spoken to such agent concerning it, immediately left. The agent was at the time hurriedly engaged in other matters, and did not hear what the messenger who left the check said, and knew nothing about its being left. Held, a sufficient delivery was not made, and that defendant was not liable for the purchase price of the gold. Ib.

SHERIFFS.

1. Acts of deputy, when official. - A deputy sheriff is entitled, in respect to liabilities incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, to the benefit of the short statute of limitations (Code, § 92, subdivision 1). He is a public officer, and comes under the general denomination of “a sheriff," and can claim benefit of statutes regulating actions against sheriff. Cumming, ex'r, v. Brown. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. The taking, by virtue of an attachment, by a deputy sheriff, of property supposed to belong to the debtor, and its sale under execution to satisfy the judgment in the action, are official acts, and the liability incurred to the true owner of the property is one incurred by the doing of an official act. Ib.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Non-resident debtor.-Action was brought upon a draft which had been due more than seven years. Defendant pleaded statute of limitations. During all the time since the draft had been due defendant was a resident of Jersey City, but did business and spent the day-time, every day, in New York city. Held, that the plea could not be sustained, and that, at most, defendant could only claim that the time he passed in this state (about ten hours daily) should be allowed for the running of the statute. Bennett v. Cook. Opinion by Peckham, J.

See Sheriff.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

1. Part performance of: verbal contract for sale of real estate. Where a verbal agreement is made for the sale of real estate, payment of part of the purchase-money does not take the case out of the statute of frauds. Cagger v. Lansing. Opinion by Grover, J.

2. The placing of a deed conveying the land into the hands of a third person, to be given to the purchaser on payment of the purchase price, does not pass the title out of the vendor, nor can such a deed be considered a contract for the sale of the estate. Ib.

3. A delivery in escrow of a valid subsisting contract for sale of real estate cannot bind a purchaser, although he verbally promises to fulfill its conditions, and until performance and acceptance by the purchaser he is at liberty to abandon the contract. Ib.

4. Even taking possession of land under such a contract does not estop the purchaser from availing himself of the statute. Ib.

STATUTES.

1. Construction of: corporate aid to railways. When, by statute, a special authority is delegated to particular persons, affecting the property of individuals, it must be strictly pursued, and appear to be so on the face of the proceedings. People ex rel. Averill v. Adirondack Co. Opinion by Allen, J. 2. Application was made to the county judge of St. Lawrence county, under chap. 907 of laws of 1869, for an order appointing commissioners, and authorizing the issuing of bonds of the city of Ogdensburg in aid of the Adirondack company. The object of these bonds was to enable said company to complete its road through the county of St. Lawrence. The company was organized in 1853, and was, by chap. 250 of the laws of 1865, authorized to amend its articles so as to enable it to extend its road through the county of St. Lawrence, but it had never done any thing under that act. Held, that the company, not having availed itself of the permission given in 1865,

had not the power to accomplish the work contemplated by the applicants, and was not competent to accept the aid intended, and that the order of the county judge, appointing commissioners and authorizing the issue of bonds for the stock of said company, was unauthorized by the application. Ib.

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.

When judgment of general term final. -The judgment of the general term, in cases of summary proceedings, under $47, tit. 10, chap. 8, part 3, R. S. (2 R. S. 516), as amended by the laws of 1868 (chap. 828, § 5), is final, unless an appeal therefrom is allowed by the general term. People ex rel. Sheridan v. Andrews. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

TAXATION.

1. Of non-resident debtors: power of town assessors.-The law of 1851, chap. 371, making debts due by persons residing in this state to non-residents of the United States taxable in the town where the debtor resides, and requiring any resident agent of non-residents to furnish, under oath, to the county treasurer of the county where the debtor resides, a statement of such debts, and that the county treasurer shall make and furnish, to the assessors of the town where the debtor resides, a copy of so much of the statement as refers to that town, does not deprive the town assessors of the right to assess the debt of a non-resident creditor, having an agent, even though the county treasurer may fail to furnish the statement required. People ex rel. Osgood v. Brownell. Opinion by Grover, J.

2. The penalty incurred by the agent is not intended as a substitute for the tax imposed in the debt. Ib.

3. The design of requiring the verified statement is to assist the assessors in arriving at a correct conclusion as to the amount of indebtedness, and not to limit their power to a mere entry upon the roll of the amount contained in the statement. Ib.

TENANCY BY CURTESY.

1. Estate required to support. - It is a general rule that, to support a tenancy by the curtesy, there must be an actual seizin of the wife. There are exceptions to this rule. Possession of lessee under lease reserving rent is an actual seizin, so as to entitle husband to estate in land by curtesy, though he has never received or demanded rent during life of wife. Wild, unoccupied lands may be constructively in wife's possession. Recovery or ejectment has been held equivalent to actual entry, and where wife takes under deed, that actual entry is not necessary. Ferguson, ex'r, v. Tweedy. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. But it is settled that if there be an outstanding estate for life, the husband cannot be the tenant by the curtesy of the wife's estate in reversion or remainder, unless the particular estate be ended during the coverture. Ib.

TRUSTS.

1. Effect of breach by trustee. · A trust created by the conveyance of land to the trustee, with power to sell the land and convert the subject-matter of the trust from real into personal property, is a valid trust. Abbot, ex'r, v. Olds. Opinion by Grover, J.

2. The interest of a cestui que trust in the trust fund is a vested right, and neither the trustee nor his grantors, separately or collusively, can deprive the cestui que trust of such interest. And a breach of the trust by the trustee gives the grantor no right to revoke the same. Ib.

WILLS. See Executors and Administrators, 2.
WITNESS. See Larceny, 2.

The United States senate has confirmed Hon. Richard Crowley as U. S. district attorney for the northern district of New York.

RATIFICATION OF A FORGERY.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.

BROOKE v. HOOK.

Promissory Note-Forgery-Ratification - Estoppel. Action on a joint and several promissory note for 201., three months after date, purporting to bear the signatures of the defendant and J.

The plaintiff had received the note from J. on the day of its date, and before the expiration of the three months he had an interview with the defendant, and showed him the note. The defendant denied that the signature was his, and said it must be a forgery of J.'s; upon which the plaintiff said he should consult a lawyer with a view to proceeding criminally against J. The defendant said rather than that he would pay the money; and thereupon he signed the following paper: "Memorandum, that I hold myself responsible for a bill dated Nov. 7, 1869, for 20., bearing my signature and J.'s, of Mr. Brooke.-RICHARD HOOK." Held, per Kelley, C. B., Channell and Pigott, BB., that the act of J.-i. e., the signing defendant's name to the note, being illegal and void, was incapable of ratification; and, further, that the paper, taken together with the previous conversation, was not a ratification, but amounted, in effect, to a corrupt and illegal agreement by the defendant to admit that the signature was his own, in consideration that the plaintiff would not prosecute J. for forgery, and that it worked no estoppel precluding the defendant from showing at the trial that the signature was a forgery.

Per Martin, B.: That the act of J. was not an act incapable of ratification, and that the memorandum was a ratification thereof; and, further, that the only question for the jury at the trial was whether the memorandum was the memorandum of the defendant.

This was an action upon a promissory note tried before Martin, B., at the last Bristol assizes, in August, 1870. The note was dated the 7th November, 1869, whereby the defendant and one Richard Jones (his son-in-law) jointly and severally, three months after date, purported to promise to pay the plaintiff or his order 20. for value received.

The plea traversed the making of the note. The plaintiff was called as a witness, and stated that in July, 1868, Richard Jones applied to him for a loan of 501., and told him that the defendant Hook (who was his father-inlaw) would join him in a note as surety; that a note was given to him purporting to be signed by the defendant and Jones, which was renewed and partly paid off, and that upon the 7th November, 1869, there was 201. remaining due; that upon that day he received by post the note sued upon, and believed the signatures to be those of the defendant and Jones; that upon the 17th December, 1869, while the note was current, he saw the defendant and showed the note to him, and said that the note purported to be signed by him; that the defendant denied the signature to be his; that he said that if so it must be a forgery of Jones', and that he would consult a lawyer with the view of taking criminal proceedings against him; that the defendant begged him not to do so, and said he would rather pay the money than that he should do so; that he then said he must have it in writing, and that if the defendant would sign a memorandum to that effect he would take it, and that he then signed a memorandum as follows:

Memorandum-That I hold myself responsible for a bill, dated November 7, 1869, for 207. bearing my signature and Richard Jones' in favor of Mr. Brooke. RICHARD HOOK.

December 17, 1869.

That when he signed the document, he (plaintiff) understood the defendant denied the signature to be his; that he only knew the defendant from what Jones had said of him, and that he had no idea the note was a forgery until he saw the defendant. This was the plaintiff's case; and the learned counsel for the defendant proposed to call the defendant to prove that the note was a forgery, and that his name was forged. The judge stated that, in his opin

ion, that was an immaterial circumstance, and that if the defendant signed the memorandum of the 17th December, the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict upon the issue joined, and that it was for the judge and not for the jury to determine what was the construction of that docu- ́ ment. Thereupon the verdict was entered for the plaintiff, and the judge stayed execution until the fourth day of the following term. A rule having been obtained for a new trial upon the grounds, first, that the verdict was against the evidence; and, secondly, that the judge misdirected the jury in telling them that the only question for them was whether the memorandum of the 17th December was signed by the defendant.

Kingdon, Q. C., and R. D. Bennett, for the plaintiff, showed cause. The direction of the learned judge was right, for the memorandum of the 17th December rendered the defendant liable on the note, either (1) as amounting to a ratification, or (2) by way of estoppel. 1. The memorandum was a ratification. Acts done without any precedent authority whatever from the principal may be afterward ratified by him. Broom's Legal Maxims (5th ed.) 867: Wilson v. Tumman, 6 M. & G. 236; Wilkinson v. Stoney, 1 Jeb. & Symes, 509; Ashpitel v. Bryan, 3 B. & S. 474; 7 L. T. R. (N. S.) 706; S. C. (in error), 5 B. & S. 723; 11 L. T. R. (N. S.) 221. It is not necessary that there should be any consideration for the ratification of an act. A man may ratify or adopt a felonious act. In Reg. v. Woodward, 31 L. J. 91, M. C.; 5 L. T. R. (N. S.) 686, a wife, in the absence of her husband, and without his knowledge, received stolen goods, and paid money on account of them. The thief and husband afterward met. The latter then learnt that the goods were stolen, and he agreed on the price which he was to pay for them, and paid the balance to the thief; and it was held that the husband might be convicted of receiving the goods, knowing them to have been stolen. Wilde, B., said: "The wife's act was capable of being ratified by the prisoner." [Channell, B.; There the act of receiving by the wife was incomplete, and there was no complete receipt of the goods until the husband and the thief met. That is the ground on which Erle, C. J., bases his judgment. If a man received goods innocently, and afterward retained them with a guilty knowledge, he could not be convicted. Kelly, C. B. There the ratification remains a criminal act.] A man may also become a trespasser by relation back. Bird v. Brown, 4 Ex. 786, shows the extent to which the doctrine of ratification is carried. Rolfe, B., there says: "But the authorities go much further, and show that in some cases where an act which, if unauthorized, would amount to a trespass, has been done in the name and on behalf of another, but without previous authority, the subsequent ratification may enable the party on whose behalf the act was done to take advantage of it, and to treat it as having been done by his direction. But this doctrine must be taken with the qualification that the fact of ratification must take place at a time, and under circumstances, when the ratifying party might himself have lawfully done the act which he ratifles." Slight circumstances will suffice to raise a presumption of ratification. Story on Agency, sec. 253. The learned counsel for the defendant contended at the trial that the question of ratification was not for the court, but for the jury. But the jury cannot be asked to construe a written instrument. If, however, the surrounding circumstances are to be taken into consideration, the court may look at them now. Heffield v. Meadows, L. R. 4 C. P. 595; 20 L. T. R. (N. S.) 746, was a case on the construction of a written guarantee. The judge at the trial left nothing to the jury, but directed a verdict for the plaintiff; and a rule having been obtained to enter a verdict for the defendant, the court said that it was proper to look at what took place at the interviews between the parties and at the surrounding circumstances, in order to determine the scope and object of the intended guarantee. 2. Also, the memorandum of the 17th December operated by way of estoppel.

The drawee of a bill, by accepting it, admits the signature and capacity of the drawer, and cannot, after thus giving the bill currency, be admitted to prove that the drawer's signature was forged. Byles on Bills (10th ed.), 199. And in a case there cited (p. 200), Leach v. Buchanan, 4 Esp. 226, it was held that if a party on a bill on being asked if it was his own handwriting answered that it was, and would be duly paid, he could not afterward set up a defense of forgery of his name, for he had accredited the bill, and induced another to take it. Here currency was given to the note, for it was payable to the plaintiff or order. I submit that the position of the plaintiff was altered by the act of the defendant in signing the memorandum, because he might have negotiated the instrument, even although he did not actually do so. If he was thereby induced to keep the note, it may be said that his position was altered. With regard to taking criminal proceedings against Jones, his position was altered. [Kelly, C. B., I do not see how; he may still take criminal proceeding.] If the effect is that he hesitates to take criminal proceedings, his position is altered.

Lopes, Q. C., and A. Poole, for the defendant. I do not dispute the abstract propositions as to ratification laid down by my learned friends. But they do not apply here. This note was given by Jones to the plaintiff as a note bearing the genuine signature of the defendant; but it is essential to ratification that the relationship of principal and agent should subsist between the parties. The authorities are clear upon this point. "A ratification can only be effectual between the parties when the act is done by the agent avowedly for or on account of the principal, and not when it is done for or on account of the agent himself, or of some third person." Story on Agency, sec. 251 a.

The proposition extracted by my learned friend from Wilson v. Tumman does not apply, because it is an essential part of that proposition that the act upon which the ratification operates must be done by a person "not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person." Saunderson v. Griffiths, 5 B. & C. 909, was an action by A., his wife, and B., on an agreement made by an agent for A.'s wife and B. only. Holroyd, J., said: "It was argued that A. at a subsequent time assented to the agreement, and that such subsequent assent made it his agreement ab initio. There might have been some weight in that argument, if the agent at the time when he made the agreement had professed to have authority to act for the husband, because then the subsequent ratification would have been a recognition of the authority which the agent assumed to have when he made the agreement. But here the husband never previously authorized the agent to make the agreement on his behalf, nor is he named as a party for whom the latter professed to act." My case is that Jones, when he gave the note, was not acting or assuming to act for the defendant. Routh v. Thompson, 13 East, 274; Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 M. & S. 485, are authorities on this point. [Martin, B.: Would it have been the same if the note had purported to be signed by the defendant only?] I think that would make no difference. Again, a man cannot ratify a felonious act or a void act, and "this principle is applied with far more justice and propriety to cases of contracts and acts which are illegal, or immoral, as against public policy; for in such cases the original contracts or acts, being void, ought not to be allowed to acquire any validity from their being subsequently confirmed, since the same noxious qualities adhere to the ratification as existed in the original transaction." Story on Agency, sec. 241. The act here which is alleged to have been ratified was the making a forged note an act, in itself, illegal and void. As to the second point of estoppel. The doctrine of estoppel in país is laid down by Lord Denmam, in Pickard v. Sear, 6 Ad. & E. 469, as follows: "The rule of law is clear, that where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him

to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time." Here the position of the parties has not been altered, and my friend's contention on this point fails. The plaintiff can still take either civil proceedings or criminal proceedings against Jones. Moreover, there was no representation by the defendant that the note was his; on the contrary, he said it was a forgery. This case, therefore, differs from Leach v. Buchanan, where the person whose name was forged as acceptor on a bill stated that the handwriting was his own, and thereby, during its currency, induced a third person to take it. See Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 586. It should have been left to the jury to say quo animo the memorandum was made, whether it was intended as a ratification or as a guarantee. [Pigott, B. The intention cannot alter the true construction of a docu-. ment; the surrounding circumstances may.] The jury should have been directed to take into consideration all the circumstances. Wilkinson v. Stoney, 1 Jebb & Symes, 509. [Martin, B. If a man writes a document purporting to be complete, the only question for the jury is whether he signed it.] Cur, adv. vult.

January 27.- The following judgments were delivered: The judgment of Kelly, C. B., Channell and Pigott, B. B., by Kelly, C. B. (after stating the facts): Upon this evidence it has been contended, on behalf of the plaintiff, that this paper was a ratification of the making of the note by the defendant; and upon the principle omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur, the jury were directed to find that the note was the note of the defendant, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict. I am of opinion that this verdict cannot be sustained, and that the learned judge should have directed a verdict for the defendant, or at least have left a ques tion to the jury as to the real meaning and effect of the memorandum and the conversation taken together. And this, first, upon the ground that this was no ratification at all, but an agreement upon the part of the defendant to treat the note as his own, and to become liable upon it, in consideration that the plaintiff would forbear to prosecute his son-in-law, Jones; and that this agreement is against public policy, and void, as founded upon an illegal consideration. And, secondly, the paper in question is no ratification, inasmuch as the act done - that is, the signature to the note-is illegal and void; and that although a voidable act may be ratified by matter subsequent, it is otherwise when an act is originally and in its inception void. Many cases were cited to show that where one sued upon a bill or note has declared or admitted that the signature is his own, and has thereby altered the condition of the holder to whom the declaration or admission has been made, he is estopped from denying his signature upon an issue joined in an action upon the instrument. But here there was no such declaration and no such admission. On the contrary, the defendant distinctly declared and protested that his alleged signature was a forgery; and although in the paper signed by the defendant, he describes the bill as bearing his own signature and Jones', I am of opinion that the true effect of the paper, taken together with the previous conversation, is that the defendant declares to the plaintiff: "If you will forbear to prosecute Jones for the forgery of my signature, I admit, and will be bound by the admission, that the signature is mine." This, therefore, was not a statement to the plaintiff that the signature was his, and which, being believed by the plaintiff, induced him to take the note, or in any way alter his condition; but, on the contrary, it amounted to the corrupt and illegal contract before mentioned, and worked no estoppel precluding the defendant from showing the truth, which was that the signature was a forgery, and that the note was not his note. In all the cases cited for the plaintiff, the act ratified was an act pretended to have been done for or under the authority of the party sought to be charged;

and such would have been the case here, if Jones had pretended to have had the authority of the defendant to put his name to the note, and that he had signed the note for the defendant accordingly, and had thus induced the plaintiff to take it. In that case, although there had been no previous authority, it would have been competent to the defendant to ratify the act, and the maxim before mentioned would have applied. But here Jones had forged the name of the defendant to the note, and pretended that the signature was the defendant's signature; and there is no instance to be found in the books of such an act being held to have been ratified by a subsequent recognition or statement. Again, in the cases cited, the act done, though unauthorized at the time, was a civil act, and capable of being made good by a subsequent recognition or declaration, but no authority is to be found that an act which is itself a criminal offense is capable of ratification. The decision at nisi prius of Crompton, J., referred to in argument, is inapplicable, it being uncertain whether the plaintiff in that case knew that the alleged signature of the defendant was forged, and there being no illegal contract in that case to forbear to prosecute. The same observation may be made upon the case from Ireland, cited upon the authority of Burton, J. I am, therefore, of opinion that the rule must be made absolute for a new trial, and that upon this evidence the jury ought to have been directed to find a verdict for the defendant, or, at all events (which is enough for the purposes of this rule), that if any question should have been left to the jury, it ought to have been whether the paper and the conversation taken together did not amount to the illegal agreement above mentioned. My brother Channell and my brother Pigott concur in this judgment.

Martin, B. (after stating the facts as above), proceeded : The rule for a new trial in this case was obtained upon the following grounds: First, that the verdict was against the evidence, and, secondly, for misdirection, viz.: that the judge misdirected the jury in telling them that the only question for them was whether the memorandum of the 17th December was signed by the defendant. The statement as to my direction is substantially correct, and, if I was wrong in holding that the signing and making by the defendant of the memorandum of the 17th December entitled the plaintiff to the verdict upon the issue joined, the defendant is entitled to have the rule made absolute, and to have a new trial. In the argument I asked the learned counsel for the defendant what he deemed to be the proper direction to the jury, and he stated it ought to have been as follows: "That having regard to what took place, and the circumstances under which the memorandum was given, the jury ought to have been asked whether the defendant intended to ratify and confirm what had been done by Jones in forging his name, or whether he intended to guarantee the payment of the note." Now, I am of opinion that I could not lawfully have submitted this question to the jury. In the first place, I am of opinion that when the defendant signed a memorandum professing to be an entire and complete writing evidencing a transaction, the true construction of that document, and not his intention other than shown by the writing, is the true test; and further, that it is a matter of law for the judge to construe the document, and its construction was not a matter to be submitted to the jury.

A case was cited from an Irish report (Wilkinson v. Stoney, 1 Jebb & Symes, 509), that under the circumstances in that case there was a question for the jury. I have no doubt that that case was rightly decided, but there the writing was a letter, and there were other facts bearing upon the transaction; but the present was the case of a single writing made for the purpose of evidencing a transaction, and I entertain no doubt that such a writing is to be construed by the judge and not by the jury. If it were not so, there would be no certainty in the law. And, in the second place,

I am of opinion that there was no evidence that the document was a guaranty, or intended to be a guaranty, but the evidence was merely that the defendant was responsible upon the note. I am, therefore, of opinion that I should have acted erroneously if I had submitted the above question to the jury, and I remain of opinion, that, under the circumstances of this case, the only question for the jury was, whether the memorandum of the 17th December was the memorandum of the defendant, and that my ruling was right, that, if it were, it was a ratification of the contract made in the name of the defendant, and binding upon him, upon the legal principle that “Omnis ratihabit io retrotrahitur et mandato æquiparatur." Co. Litt. 207 a. I apprehend that the circumstance of Jones being a party to the note is immaterial, and that the question is the same as if the note was several, and the defendant's name alone on it; and, in my view of the case, the facts may be taken to be that upon the morning of the 17th December the defendant was not liable upon the note, because his signature was forged, that the plaintiff took and held the note, believing that the signature was a genuine one, and that the contract to pay was the contract of the defendant, and that the defendant, upon the statement that a lawyer would be consulted as to the criminal responsibility of Jones, signed the document of the 17th December. In my opinion, this was a ratification within the meaning of the above maxim, and rendered the defendant liable to pay the note. A ratification is the act of giving sanction and validity to something done by another.

Jones, purporting to utter an obligatory and binding security, had given to the plaintiff the note bearing the defendant's name, and the defendant, by the writing signed by him, declared that "he held himself responsible upon it it bearing his signature;" and, if that was not giving sanction and validity to the act of Jones in delivering the note, so signed, to the plaintiff, I am at a loss to know what a sanction or ratification is. To say it is not, seems to me a plain misconstruction of a written document-the denial of a self-evident proposition. Suppose nothing had been said as to criminal proceedings against Jones, and that the defendant, upon being shown the note by the plaintiff, had merely said "the writing is not mine, but I am responsible for it," can any one doubt that the maxim would have applied, and that the defendant would have ratified the transaction? It is so stated by Burton, J., in the case of Wilkinson v. Stoney before cited, and he was one of the most eminent of modern lawyers. Then does the circumstance that the plaintiff said that he would consult a lawyer in regard to criminal proceedings against Jones make any difference? I think not. A ratification of a contract is not a contract; it is an adoption of a contract previously made in the name of the ratifying party. The contract, if a simple contract, must have been made upon valuable consideration; if it were not, the adoption or ratification of it would be of no avail. This is the true meaning of the sections cited by Mr. Lopez from Story on Agency (secs. 240-242). If a contract be void upon the ground of its being, of itself and in its own nature, illegal and void, no ratification of it by the party in whose name it was made by another will render it a valid contract; but if a contract be void upon the ground that the party who made it in the name of another had no authority to make it, this is the very thing which the ratification cures, and to which the maxim applies that, "Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur." No words can be more expressive; the ratification is dragged back, as it were, and made equal or equipollent to a prior command. A ratification is not a contract, and requires no consideration. It was so said by Burton, J., in the cases referred to. It may be and is that a contract, that, in consideration that the holder of a promissory note would not prosecute a man for the felony of forging a name to the note, the defendant would pay the note, or guarantee the payment of it, would be illegal and

void; but there was no evidence of such a contract, even in words, in the present case, and if there were, there would be a legal principle to prevent its operation, for the written memorandum was made and signed for the purpose of evidencing the transaction; and there is not a word of contract in it, either on behalf of the plaintiff, or, indeed, of the defendant. It is what it was intended to be, a ratification or adoption by the defendant of the signature and contract made in his name, it may have been by a forger, or it may have been under circumstances which would not have justifled a conviction for that offense-for the purpose of my judgment I assume it was a forgery, for which Jones might have been convicted. The case of Wilson v. Tumman, 6 M. & G. 236, was cited on both sides. It is a case of great authority, and is a considered judgment. It is there laid down that an act done for another by a person not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without any precedent authority whatever, becomes the act of the principal, if subsequently ratified by him. In such case the principal is bound by the act, whether it be for his detriment or advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or a contract, to the same extent, and with all the same consequences, which follow from the same act done by his previous authority. Several other cases were cited to the same effect, but there is no doubt about it. Tindal, C. J., lays it down as the known and well-established rule of law, and, as it seems to me, it is conclusive in favor of the plaintiff in the present case. But it was said that a forged signature cannot be ratified. No authority was cited for this, and I believe none can be found. In one sense, perhaps, a forgery cannot be ratified or condoned as regards the forger, but there is no authority whatever to distinguish the ratification of a parol contract and of a written one made by one person in the name of another without authority. Tindal, C. J.'s expression is, "made without any precedent authority whatever," which would clearly include a forged docu

ment.

There is, in Mr. Broom's Treatise on Legal Maxims (5th ed. 867) a comment upon the maxim, and also in Justice Story's book on Agency (beginning at section 239), and in neither of these treatises is one word to be found drawing any distinction between the ratification of a written contract, which was, in its inception, a forgery, and one which was not of that character. The foundation of ratification of contracts is throughout deemed to be that the contract originally purported to be by and in the name of the person ratifying. But there is authority to the contrary. In the before-cited case of Wilkinson v. Stoney, Burton, J., clearly shows that he thought a forged acceptance of a bill could be ratified; and in Ashpitel v. Bryan, 3 B. & S. 492; 32 L. J. 91, Q. B.; 7 L. T. R. (N. S.) 706, the late Crompton, J., stated that a cause had been tried before him where a father was sued upon his acceptance forged by his son. The party who held the bill went to the father and said: "We shall proceed against your son; is this your acceptance?" and the father said, "It is," and upon this evidence he thought the rule as to estoppel, in Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654, applied, and that the father was liable. He says that a bill of exceptions was tendered to his ruling by a very learned person, but after consideration it was abandoned. He goes on to say that he was not sure whether the party had knowledge that it was not the acceptance of the father, but he says that, in his opinion, that was immaterial, and that the person making the statement must be considered as saying: "The instrument may be treated as if accepted by me." This case seems to me to be identical with the present, and with me no higher authority exists than the judicial opinion of Crompton, J. He put this case on the ground of estoppel. Ithink the doctrine of ratification the more applicable; but whether such a document as that of the 17th December operates by way of estoppel or by that of ratification, in my opinion it rendered the defendant liable. In my opinion, my rule at nisi prius was right, and the rule ought to be discharged. Rule absolute.-24 Law Times Report, 34.

BOOK NOTES.

The Hon. O. L. Barbour has in preparation a new edition of his "Chancery Practice." This work has been out of print for some time, and copies have sold as high as twenty-five dollars. Mr. William Wait is at present engaged upon three new works: the first supplement to his Digest, an annotated code, and a work on practice. The code will probably be put to press shortly after the adjournment of the legislature. We understand that he contemplates preparing a work on "Actions and Defenses."- Messrs. Robert Clark & Co., Cincinnati, have in preparation an American edition of Saunders' Law of "Negligence," with notes by S. R. Matthews. The same firm will shortly issue "Fisher's Patent Reports," containing the cases decided in the United States supreme and circuit courts since 1850. The price will be $15 per volume for two or more volumes, and the edition will be limited. Messrs. H. O. Houghton & Co., Boston, announce "Leading Cases upon the Law of Fire Insurance, by Edmund H. Bennett and Melville M. Bigelow. The same firm has just issued a volume of reports by Mr. Bigelow, containing all the American life and accident insurance cases decided in the United States down to November, 1870, a most valuable book. We are glad to learn that the Hon. Edmund H. Bennett, of the Harvard law school, will hereafter act -Messrs. as editor of the late Mr. Justice Story's works. Lee & Shepard, Boston, have nearly ready "Curiosities of the Law Reporters," by F. F. Heard, of the Suffolk Bar, a work to which we look forward with much interest. A new edition of Stephens on Pleading, with notes by Prof. S. L. Tyler of the Columbia Law College, will shortly be issued by W. H. & O. H. Morrison, Washington. G. P. Putnam & Sons have in preparation "The Humorous Phases of the Law," by Irving Browne, of the Troy Bar.

BOOK NOTICES.

A Treatise on the Statutes of Elizabeth against Fraudulent Conveyances; the Bills of Sale Registration acts, and the Law of Voluntary Disposition of Property Independently of the Statutes. By Henry W. May, B. A., etc. London: Stevens & Haynes, 1871. Octavo, pp. 564. The statutes of Elizabeth against fraudulent conveyances are the 14 Eliz. c. 5, which relates to creditors, and provides, in substance, that all conveyances of property, real or personal, made with intent to defraud creditors, shall, as to such creditors, be null and void; and the 27 Eliz. c. 4, which was intended to protect purchasers, and declares void, as against subsequent purchasers, all conveyances, etc., made with the intent to defeat them or containing a power of revocation. These statutes are said to be in affirmance of the common law, and, being made before the settlement of this country, are considered by Kent as a part of the common law, which accompanied the emigration of our ancestors. Certain, it is, that these statutes, in one form or another, prevail all over the United States. They have been substantially re-enacted in New York (2 R. S. 134), and in many of the other states.

Considering the importance of the subject of these statutes, and their universal application, it is a matter of surprise that they have heretofore received such slight attention at the hands of text-writers. While they have been incidentally touched upon by several writers, both in England and in this country, this is the first exhaustive monograph that has appeared for nearly a century.

Mr. May has been successful, not only in the selection of his subject, but in his treatment of it. He has divided the work into six parts, and these are subdivided into chapters. Part first treats of the general operation of the statutes of Elizabeth, and the general distinctions between them. Part second treats of the rights of creditors under 13 Eliz. c. 5, and embraces eight chapters on

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