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LIFE INSURANCE.

Policy: construction of: forfeiture. - A foreign life insurance company, through its local agent in this state, issued a policy on the life of A., which stated, that "in consideration of" a certain sum "to them paid by" A., " of," etc., "being the assured in this policy, and of a like sum to be paid to them by said assured on or before the 12th of March in every year during the continuance of this policy," the company insured the life of A. in a certain amount for the term of his life; that "in case of the forfeiture of this policy, the insured shall not be entitled to any return of premium or share of the surplus funds;" that "in case any premium on this policy shall not be paid at the date when payable, the policy shall thereupon become forfeited and void :" that "this policy and any sums that shall become due thereon from said company are pledged and hypothecated to said company, and they have a lien thereon to secure the payment of any premium on which credit may be given, and of any note or security therefor; but this pledge and hypothecation shall in no respect affect the provisions respecting the forfeiture of this policy." Said agent, for the first year's premium, took from A. goods to the amount of one-fourth thereof, a note for the same amount, due in six months, and a note for the remaining half, due in five years, both notes payable to the company and bearing interest from date, the interest on the latter payable annually. The latter note provided that it was embraced in said condition of forfeiture, but the former note did not contain such a provision. The agent remitted to the company the amount paid by A., less his per cent as agent, together with said notes. The six months' note was returned to the agent before it became due, for collection, and was not paid at maturity. The policy was dated March 12, and A. died in October of the same year. Suit by the administrator of A.'s estate upon the policy. The company's charter was not set out in the pleadings or given in evidence. Two rules of the company were set out and proved, as follows:

"Rule 9. A tariff of premiums shall be fixed by the directors, below which no risk shall be taken; but the president shall, in doubtful cases, consult the committee of finance, or any two of the directors, on any advance for particular risks. The premiums shall be paid, in conformity to the rules of the company, before the policy is issued, and the president and secretary shall each be liable for the amount of premium on policies delivered at the office of the company.

"Rule 10. A part of any annual premium may be taken in one or more promissory notes on interest, secured by the condition in the policy; but every such note shall be made payable, before or at the beginning of the period of the risk for which the note is given, so that the company shall not run the risk for any time for which the premium shall not have been actually paid."

Rule ten was not a pa t of the contract, but A. had notice of it. Held, that the six months' note was not within the condition of forfeiture in the policy. Held, also, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount of the policy, less the amount of said two notes. The New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hasbrook's Administratrix.

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2. Forbearance by assignee. - The assignee of a promissory note, not governed by the law merchant, to whom it was assigned before maturity, after it became due agreed to extend the time of payment for a definite period, and did so, upon the promise of the maker, that, if the assignor would so forbear, he would pay it at the expiration of such period. Held (Gregory, C. J., dissenting), that this promise of the maker constituted a new contract, binding in law and capable of enforcement, though the maker had a good defense to the note before its assignment by the payee. Ib.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. Forfeiture: notice. A contract for the sale and conveyance of real estate contained a stipulation that a non-compliance with the terms of the contract, or any of them, by the vendee should work a forfeiture of all right under the contract, at the option of the vendor, but upon previous notice, of a specified period, to the vendee, demanding a fulfillment and specifying such feature or features as it should be deemed had not been complied with. Held, in an action by the vendee, who had partly performed the contract on his part, against the vendor for wrongfully declaring a forfeiture and thereby putting it out of the power of the vendee to further carry out the contract according to its terms, that the stipulation for said notice was for the benefit of the vendee, and a strict compliance with it by the vendor was necessary before declaring a forfeiture. Case v. Wolcott.

2. Held, also, that where the vendor, after giving to the vendee a notice not in strict compliance with said stipulation, and while the contract was therefore in full force, by declaring a forfeiture put it out of the power of the vendee to carry out his part of the contract, the vendee was not required to perform or offer to perform, but might have his action for being so prevented. Ib.

3. Measure of damages. — Where, after part performance of a contract for the conveyance of real estate by the vendee, the vendor by his own wrongful act puts it out of the power of the vendee to fully comply with the provisions of the contract, the measure of damages in an action by the vendee against the vendor, for such breach, is the difference between the unpaid purchase-money and the actual value of the lands at the time of the breach. Ib.

WITNESS.

Character: impeachment: residence. - Where a certain witness had resided in a distant state for two years before he testified, and witnesses who resided in this state, and did not pretend to be acquainted with his character for truth in the neighborhood where he then resided, were called to impeach his character in this regard,-Held, that their evidence was inadmissible. Chunce v. The Indianapolis, &c. R. R. Co.

2. Impeachment: previous contradictory statements: code.Where a witness in a criminal case testifies contrary to what the party calling him had a right to expect, he may be crossexamined by such party as to what he had stated in regard to the matter on former occasions, for the purpose of refreshing his memory and giving him an opportunity to set the matter right, if he will, and to set the party introducing him right before the jury, but not for the purpose of discrediting the witness. Nor is such party allowed to prove such previous contradictory statements, if denied by the witness. The provision of the code (section 244) authorizing such impeaching evidence in civil cases does not apply to trials in criminal cases. Howard v. The State.

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2. Service. In proceedings or actions against defunct corporations, service of process upon the members of its last acting board of directors is sufficient, under the statute, to give the court jurisdiction. Ib.

3. Conditional subscription.- Where railroad stock is subscribed for with a proviso that the "road shall be built” în a specified locality, the permanent location of the road in the place designated is a sufficient compliance with the condition to make the subscriber liable for calls on his subscription. Ib.

4. Releasing subscriptions. The directors of an insolvent railroad company have no right to release subscriptions to its capital stock, to the prejudice of its creditors or of other stockholders liable for its debts. Ib.

MARRIED WOMEN.

Separate estate, how charged.-1. A married woman possessed of real or personal property may charge the same with her debts, at least to the extent that such debts may be incurred for the benefit of her separate estate or for her own benefit, upon the credit of her separate property.

2. That such power is incident to the absolute ownership of property, and is limited only by the terms of the instrument creating the separate estate, or by implication arising therefrom.

3. That her intention to charge her separate property at the time the debt is incurred may be either expressed or implied.

4. That such intention may be inferred from the fact that she executed a note or other obligation for the indebted

ness.

5. That courts of equity will enforce the payment of such charges against her separate estate through a receiver, 1. By appropriating the personal property; 2. By sequestering the rents and profits of the realty; and 3. By sale of the realty when the same is necessary.

6. That the jurisdiction of courts of equity in this behalf is not abridged or taken away by operation of the statutes "concerning the rights and liabilities of married women."

7. That the legislative intention in enacting these statutes was to modify the legal rights and liabilities of married

women.

8. That the statute providing "for the proof, acknowledgment and recording of deeds and other instruments of writing" is not incompatible with the equitable power of a married woman to charge her separate estate with debts, incurred within the scope of the rule herein stated. Phillips & Co. v. Graves and wife.

REMOVAL OF ACTION.

1. Order removing appealable: final hearing or trial.-An order removing a cause from the state court to the circuit court of the United States, under the act of congress of March 2, 1867, is a final order within the meaning of the civil code, and may be reviewed upon petition in error. Evans, et al. v. Kimball, et al.

2. The words "final hearing or trial" in said act are equivalent to "trial or final hearing;" and after a suit has been determined in the court of common pleas on its merits it is not transferable under the act of congress, although an appeal may have been taken to the district court, or a second trial allowed under the statute in the court of common pleas. Ib.

STATUTE OF LIMITATION.

1. Where a proceeding for the contest of a will is commenced within the statutory period of limitation, although only part of the persons interested in the contest are made parties thereto, the right of action is saved as to all who are ultimately made parties, notwithstanding some of them are not brought into the case until after the period of limitation has expired. Bradford v. Andrews and others.

2. The plaintiff cannot in such case by dismissing his petition defeat the contest, where either of the defendants, in his answer, joins in the prayer that the will be set aside as invalid. Ib.

SALE AND DELIVERY.

Contract executory: evidence. By the terms of a written contract the plaintiffs sold to the defendant eight

thousand bushels of corn to be delivered at a future time, at a place named, and to be paid for as fast as delivered at a specified rate per bushel. Held, 1. That the contract was wholly executory, and that no title passed to the purchaser until delivery. 2. That the contract cannot be construed as the sale of a specific lot of corn, containing eight thousand bushels more or less. 3. That parol evidence to show that at the date of the contract the plaintiffs owned and had the disposal of a greater quantity of corn than eight thousand bushels in cribs on a certain farm, and that the contract was for the sale of an undivided part of the entire lot, is inadmissible. Ormsbee v. Macher and another.

SURETIES.

1. Defenses: contribution among: when right of action accrues. In an action by a creditor of a deceased person against the heirs after the estate has been fully administered, the same defenses may be made as in an action against the personal representatives. Camp et al. v. Bostwick.

2. The right to contribution among co-sureties is not founded on the contract of suretyship, but is based on an equity arising from the relation of co-sureties. Ib.

3. The neglect of a creditor, whereby the estate of one surety is released, under the statutes of limitation, from its direct liability, does not discharge a co-surety from his liability for the whole or any part of the debt. Ib.

4. An estate so released from its direct liability to the creditor is, nevertheless, liable to contribute to a co-surety, who has paid more than his moiety of the debt. Ib.

5. The right of action for contribution among co-sureties accrues when one has paid more than his proportion of their liability. Ib.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. DECEMBER TERM, 1870.

CAMPBELL v. WILCOX.

Omission of stamp-when and how may be taken advantage of. The omission of a stamp does not invalidate an instrument unless the omission was with fraudulent intent. Such omission, if fraudulent, cannot be taken advantage of on demurrer; it must be set up by special plea, or urged at the trial.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court. The only question in this case arises upon the demurrer to the declaration. The action is upon four promissory notes of the defendants, and the declaration contains the usual averments according to the established precedents in such cases, but does not aver that the notes were stamped as required by the act of congress, either at their date or at any subsequent time. The demurrer is general, that the declaration does not set forth facts sufficient in law to constitute a good cause of action, but the omission of an averment in the particular mentioned constitutes the special ground of objection presented in the brief of counsel.

To the objection there are several answers. In the first place, the act of congress which requires promissory notes and other instruments to be stamped, only declares that they shall be deemed invalid and of no effect" when the stamp is omitted "with intent to evade the provisions" of the act - that is, with intent to defraud the government of the stamp duty. It is a fraudulent and not an accidental omission, at which the penalty of the statute is levied. Such fraudulent omission, if available at all to the maker of the note, can only be set up by special plea, or urged on the trial. It cannot be taken advantage of on demurrer. See act of July 13, 1866, amending internal revenue act of June 30, 1864, sec. 158, 14 Stats. 142.

In the second place, if a stamp were essential to the valid ity of paper of this kind, the averment in the declaration that the defendants had made and delivered to the plaintiff their promissory notes would imply that the instruments were in the form and condition required by law. It has been held that in a declaration upon a contract, some memorandum of which, under the statute of frauds, must be in writing, a compliance with the requisition of the

statute is implied in the averment that the contract was made, and that such compliance need not be specifically stated, although it must be proved if denied by the defendant. So in this case the existence of a stamp upon the notes, as in the case stated, the existence of a writing, is a matter of evidence and not of pleading. 1 Chitty Pleadings, 304.

In the third place, the filing of a plea to the merits after the demurrer was overruled, operated as a waiver of the demurrer. The pleading was thus abandoned, and ceased thenceforth to be a part of the record. Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wal. 42; Aurora City v. West, 7 id. 92; Young v. Martin, 8 id. 354; Brown v. Saratoga Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 495.

The defense is without merit, and the writ of error appears to us to have been prosecuted merely for delay. The judgment will therefore be affirmed with ten per cent damages.-Western Jurist.

ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR.

RULES AND REGULATIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE COURT

OF APPEALS.

STATE OF NEW YORK, 88.

The judges of the court of appeals, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 486 of the laws of 1871, ordain and establish the following rules and regulations in relation to the admission of persons hereafter applying to be admitted as attorneys, solicitors and counselors in the courts of this

state:

I. No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney, solicitor or counselor in any court of record in this state, without a regular admission and license by the supreme court at a general term thereof. To obtain such admission and license, except in cases otherwise provided for by said act, the person applying must be examined under the direction of the court. The time for the examination of persons applying to be admitted as attorneys, solicitors and counselors shall be Thursday of the first week of each general term in the several departments; and the time for taking the oath of office shall be on such day thereafter as the court may direct.

The examinations shall in all cases be public, and, unless conducted by the judges of the court, shall be by not less than three practicing lawyers of at least seven years standing at the bar, to be appointed by the court.

II. To entitle an applicant to an examination he must prove to the court:

1. That he is a citizen of the United States, and that he is twenty-one years of age, and a resident of the department within which the application is made, and that he has not been examined in any other department for admission to practice and been refused admission and license within three months immediately preceding, which proof may be by his own affidavit of the facts.

2. That he is a person of good moral character, by the certificate of the attorneys with whom he has passed his clerkship, but which certificate shall not be deemed conclusive evidence, and the court must be satisfied on this point after a full examination and inquiry.

3. That he has served the clerkship or pursued the substituted course of study prescribed by the rules, as requisite to an examination. The clerkship may be proved by the certificate of the attorneys with whom the same was served, or, in case of their death or removal from the state, by such other evidence as shall be satisfactory to the court.

The proof of any time of study allowed as a substitute for any part of the clerkship required by these rules shall be by the certificate of the teacher or president of the faculty, under whose instructions the person has studied, together with the affidavit of the applicant; the proof must be satisfactory to the presiding judge of the court, who alone shall make the order allowing a deduction from the regular term of clerkship by reason of such studies.

III. No person shall be admitted to examination as an attorney, solicitor or counselor, unless he shall have served

a regular clerkship of three years in the office of a practicing attorney of the supreme court, after the age of seventeen years.

IV. It shall be the duty of the attorney with whom the clerkship shall be commenced to file a certificate in the office of the clerk of the court of appeals, certifying that the person has commenced a clerkship with him, and the clerkship shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the filing of the certificate. A copy of the certificate, certified by the clerk of the court of appeals, with the date of the filing thereof, shall be produced to the court, at the time of an application for examination.

V. When a clerkship has already commenced, or shall have commenced before these rules shall take effect, the certificate required by the preceding rule, verified by the affidavit of the attorney, stating the time of the actual commencement of such clerkship, may be filed at any time before the first day of November next.

VI. It shall be the duty of an attorney to give to a clerk, when he shall leave his office, a certificate stating his moral character, the time of clerkship which he has passed with him, and the period which has been allowed him for vacation.

Not more than three months shall be allowed for vacations in any year.

The term of clerkship will be computed by the calendar year, and any person applying for admission, whose period of clerkship shall expire during the term at which the application shall be made, will be admitted to examination at the customary day of the same term.

VII. Any portion of time, not exceeding one year, actually spent in regular attendance upon the law lectures in the university of New York, Cambridge university, or the law school connected with Yale college, or a law school connected with any college or university of this state, having a department organized with competent professors and teachers, in which instruction in the science of law is regularly given, shall be allowed in lieu of an equal period of clerkship in the office of a practicing attorney of the supreme court.

VIII. Persons who have been admitted and have practiced three years as attorneys in the highest court of law in another state may be admitted, without examination, to practice as attorneys, solicitors and counselors in the courts of this state. But such persons must have become residents of this state before applying for admission, and must bring a letter of recommendation from one of the judges of the highest court of law in the state from which they came. IX. These rules shall take effect on the first day of June, 1871.

Dated ALBANY, May 1, 1871.
S. E. CHURCH,
W. F. ALLEN,
M. GROVER,

R. W. PECKHAM, CHAS. A. RAPALLO, CHAS. J. FOLGER,

CHAS. ANDREWS.

COMMISSION OF APPEALS-DECISIONS.

Isaac L. Wells v. Edmund Miller.

Daniel Morgan v. Sarah E. Harmas. Re-argument ordered.

JUDGMENT REVERSED.

Chas. H. Van Brunt, rec'r, v. David H. Applegate.
Elizabeth Hudson v. Leonard Carlisle.
Abraham Wise and ano. v. Hezekiah H. Chase.
George W. Crouch v. Willard Parker.

Abraham B. Wetmore and ano. v. Fred. Gebtzman.

Walter P. Allen, surv'r of Elijah Allen, v. The Mercantile Insurance Company.

Manley Loomis v. George M. Brown and ano.

Daniel Warner v. The New York Cent. Railroad Company. Mandna F. Fenner v. The Buffalo and St. Line Railroad Company.

ORDER AFFIRMED. Charles A. Yates v. Henry M. North.

Judgment affirmed and costs of all parties on appeal to this court to be paid out of the estate. Polly Peck v. Daniel M. Redfield.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Eleazer Ayers v. Matthew O. Farrel et al.
Daird H. Buel r. Myron Cone.

Wm. McMonies v. John McKenzie.

Michael Delehanty v. Robert Seaman and ano.
John C. Vandevere, exec., v. John Smith.
Jas. C. Jewell and ano. v. Christian D. Emson.
Jos. Cavanagh and ano. v. Francis S. Beckwith.
Emanuel Consalus v. John Brothers.
Henry H. Morange v. Major G. Mix.

Wm. M. Goodrich et al. v. Jas. M. Thompson.

B. Noble Lord, surv., v. Wm. E. Fowler.

Caroline Abbey v. Abraham A. Deyo.

David M. Meeker v. Joseph S. Clegham.

John N. Patton v. Jas. C. Taylor.

Stephen C. Bedell v. Long Island Railroad Co.

Edward D. Rutle v. New York and Buffalo Electric Tele

graph Company.

First National Bank of Angelica v. Charles F. Hall, impleaded, etc.

Otis W. Wilcox v. John V. Howell.

Mary A. Flanning v. John Van Nostrand and another.
Calvan Witty v. A. E. Campbell, sheriff, etc.
Judah Lord et al. v. Patrick Dougherty.
Sylvester J. Sherman v. John D. Prince.
Barnabas Hammett v. John H. Linneman.

Walter S. Vose et al. v. J. H. V. Cockcroft et al.
Michael Saxton v. Bavier Zett.

The Black River Bank v. Orville Page and another.
Hannah Launen v. The Albany Gas Light Company.
Clarissa A. Gridley v. The N. Y. Central R. R. Company.
In rel. Chas. G. Miller v. Emanuel Levi.

Lorenzo Van Buren and another v. Sylvester Ferris.
Daniel G. Bradley and another v. Bethel S. Wheeler.
Chas. S. Newton and another v. Joseph Wales.
Samuel C. Reed v. Phillip Nussbaum.

Eli H. Fish v. Francis Cottenett.

The Bank of Commonwealth v. Benj. Mitchell.
J. J. Ryder v. John Smith.

Nicholas W. Brown v. John Smith.

Abram Voorhies v. John Smith.
Jas. Gascoyne v. John Smith.

Wm. M. Williamson v. John Smith.

Wm. Bush v. John Smith.

Ditwis Coe v. John Smith.

David Farrington v. John Smith.

John S. Brown v. John Smith.

Oliver Ryder v. John Smith.

Henry Suydam v. John Smith.

John Corey v. John Smith.

Wm. Bropley v. John Smith.

John J. Barre v. John Smith.

Garrett Applegate v. John Smith.

Jeremiah Ryder v. John Smith.

Albert E. Lord v. John J. Ostrander.

Judgment reversed and judgment ordered for the plaintiff on the verdict-Sally Ann Howell v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance Company.

Order of general term reversed, and judgment ordered for the plaintiff upon the verdict-Ann Savage v. Edward O'Neil.

Judgment reversed and judgment ordered for defendant -Edgar W. Chamberlain v. Western Transportation Co. Order affirmed and judgment absolute against the plaintiff-Henry Saunders and ano. v. Wm. Haynes.

Order of general term reversed by default and judgment of circuit affirmed -Jane Quinn v. Geo. B. Skinner.

Order of general term reversed and order of county court affirmed Henry L. Fish v. Chas. Emson.

Order of general term reversed and judgment of special term affirmed - Nathaniel Cowdry v. Wm. A. Coit.

Order of general term affirmed and judgment absolute for plaintiff ordered -David Bottsford v. Hector McClean. Judgment of the supreme court reversed and of the county court affirmed - Francis A. Allen v. Alonzo N. Godfry. Order of supreme court reversed and order of city court

of Brooklyn affirmed - Richard Sage v. Rhoda Blaine, impl'd, etc.

Order of general term reversed with costs and judgment upon the nonsuit ordered against the plaintiff - Stephen Mc Paddon v. N. Y. Central Railroad Company.

Judgment affirmed without costs to either party in the court of appeals, provided the plaintiff shall, within thirty days after the entry of this order, serve on the defendant's attorney a stipulation deducting from the payment of April 6, 1863, as of that date, the sum of $2,407.43. If such stipulation be not served, then the judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered Jas. H. Wells v. George Yates. The court adjourned sine die.

NOTES.

The lecture delivered by Mr. William Allen Butler, before the law school of the University of New York, on "Lawyer and Client," has been published by the Appletons.

Mr. Heard's "Curiosities of the Law Reporters" has been published.

The Pittsburg Legal Journal has been reduced in size from an eight page to a four page paper.

With the number for May 6th, our able English contemporary - The Law Times - entered upon its fifty-first volume. Its editorials are now printed in larger type, and in two instead of three columns. Its miscellaneous matter appears in the small type and three columns, as of old.

PERSONAL.

Sir John Stuart has retired from the office of vice-chancellor. He was appointed in 1852.

A report is in circulation, which, for the honor of the gentleman implicated, we hope is not true, that Rulloff's counsel professes to have in his possession Rulloff's confession. As up to his last moments the murderer vehemently denied having made a confession, any that may be put forth will be very generally looked upon as apocryphal.

The Lewis County Journal and Republican, speaking of Judge Henry A. Foster, says: "Judge Foster, with the vigor and intellectual promptness for which he has ever been remarkable, will reach 71 years of age in about one week. Just from the exhausting labors of the three weeks' circuit in Jefferson county, the endurance, unabated natural force, and mental perfections exhibited by the man are somewhat remarkable. On his retirement from the bench, which will take place on the first of January next, owing to the expiration of his term of office, and a requirement of the amended constitution preventing re-election after the age of 70, we understand he resumes the practice of his profession."

The United States senate has confirmed the nomination of Hon. Joseph R. Lewis, late associate justice of the supreme court of Idaho, as associate justice of the supreme court of New Mexico.

Jules Favre was Bismark's lawyer when the latter was Prussian ambassador to Paris.

THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

It may be said, I think with some truth, of the profession of the bar, that in all political systems and in all times it has seemed to possess a two-fold nature; that it has seemed to be fired with the spirit of liberty, and yet to hold fast the sentiments of order and reverence, and the duty of subordination; that it has resisted despotism, and yet taught obedience; that it has recognized and vindicated the rights of man, and yet has reckoned it always among the most sacred and most precious of those rights to be shielded and led by the divine nature and immortal reason of law; that it appreciates social progression and contributes to it, and ranks in the classes and with the agents of progression, yet evermore counsels and courts permanence, and conservatism, and rest. - Rufus Choate.

LEGAL NEWS.

The death penalty has been abolished in Mexico. The number of law books published in this country during the year 1870 was 151.

At the twelfth annual commencement of the Columbia college law school, held on the 17th inst., the degree of bachelor of laws was conferred on ninety-eight candidates.

The lord chancellor, says the Pall Mall Gazette, declines to appoint to the magistracy of Bradford one Thompson, because he is connected with the brewing trade.

The following gentlemen have been elected officers of the New York law institute: Charles O'Connor, president; Joseph S. Bosworth and Benjamin D. Silliman, secretaries. Hon. William Brown, for many years a leading member of the bar of Central Illinois, died at Jacksonville on the 6th inst.

The supreme court of California has decided that the law allowing counties to vote subsidies to railroads is unconstitutional.

Justice John M. Read, of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, is about to resign his seat on the bench, on account of advanced years and broken health.

The friends of the late Governor John A. Andrew propose to endow a professorship, in the law department of Harvard University, to bear his name.

Parisian law courts will have something to do when other matters get straightened out over there. Over 35,000 suits are said to be now pending and awaiting trial.

J. Q. Dickinson, clerk of the Florida state court and deputy United States marshal, was assassinated on the 5th inst. at Mariana in that state.

Mr. Kenelen E. Digby, barrister-at-law of Lincoln's Inn, has been re-elected to the Vinerian professorship of law in the University of Oxford.

Governor Claflin, of Massachusetts, following in the wake of some of the western states, has appointed Julia Ward Howe and Mrs. Stevens, of Cambridge, justices of the peace for Suffolk county.

Miss Phoebe Cozzens, who is well known as a lecturer on woman's suffrage and kindred subjects, has just graduated as bachelor of laws at the law school attached to Washington University in St. Louis.

Judge Thomas J. Boynton, of the southern district of Florida, died in Bellevue hospital, New York, on the 3d inst. Judge Boynton was appointed by President Lincoln, in 1863, when only twenty-four years old, and at the time was the youngest judge in the United States.

Judge William H. Russel, who was impeached before the Texas legislature on the charge of high crimes and misdemeanors, has been acquitted. Four republicans and ten democrats voted in favor of his acquittal, and thirteen republicans against it.

The supreme court of California seems to entertain the opinion that a reasonable degree of legal knowledge is desirable in a candidate for admission to the bar. A few weeks ago an entire class presented for admission was rejected.

The provision allowing the per diem expenses of the court of appeals of this state was repealed by the recent legislature, and the sum of $2,000 given to each judge in lieu thereof, making the salary of the chief judge $9,500, and that of each of the associates $9,000.

The legislature of Indiana, upon the recommendation of Governor Baker, passed a new law, requiring that a person shall reside three years in that state before an action for divorce can be maintained, and that if the alleged acts forming the grounds for application were committed in another state, it must be shown that they would have been sufficient cause for a divorce under the laws of that state.

NEW YORK STATUTES AT LARGE.
CHAP. 274.

AN ACT to amend chapter four hundred and thirtytwo of the laws of eighteen hundred and seventy, entitled "An act to amend section six of chapter eight hundred fifty-five of the laws of eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, entitled 'An act to extend the powers of boards of supervisors, except in the counties of New York and Kings,"" passed April twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and seventy.

PASSED April 4, 1871; three-fifths being present. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Section one of chapter four hundred and thirty-two of the laws of eighteen hundred and seventy is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

§ 1. Section six of chapter eight hundred and fifty-five of the laws of eighteen hundred and sixty-nine is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

§ 6. The bills rendered by justices of the peace for services in criminal proceedings shall, in all cases, contain the name and residence of the complainant, the offense charged, the action of the justice on such complaint, the constable or officer to whom any warrant on such complaint was delivered, and whether the person charged was or was not arrested, and whether an examination was waived or had and witnesses sworn thereon; and the account shall also show the final action of the justice in the premises. At any time within fifteen days after the board of town auditors of any town shall have filled with the town clerk thereof the certificate of accounts audited, as required by law, any tax payer of said town may appeal from the action of said board of town auditors, in auditing the account of any justice of the peace, to the board of supervisors of the county. Said appeal shall be made by serving notice thereof, in writing, on the town clerk of the town, and on the clerk of the board of supervisors, within the time above limited. The said supervisors shall, thereupon, audit the accounts of such justices of the peace, and their decision in the auditing and allowing of said account shall be final.

§ 2. This act shall take effect immediately. (See Supervisor's Manual, 45.)

CHAP. 283.

AN ACT to amend an act entitled "An act to amend chapter nine hundred and seven of the laws of eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, entitled 'An act to amend an act entitled an act to authorize the formation of railroad corporations, and to regulate the same,' passed April second, eighteen hundred and fifty, so as to permit municipal corporations to aid in the construction of railroads," passed May eighteen, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine; passed May eighteen, eighteen hundred and seventy.

PASSED April 4, 1871; three-fifths being present. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Section four of chapter seven hundred and eighty-nine of the laws of eighteen hundred and seventy is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

$4. It shall be the duty of such commissioner, with all reasonable dispatch, to cause to be made and executed the bonds of such municipal corporation, attested by the seal of such corporation affixed thereto, if such corporation has a common seal, and, if not, then by their individual seals, and signed and certified by said commissioners, who are hereby authorized and empowered to fix such common seal thereto, and to sign and certify such bonds. Such bonds shall become due and payable at the expiration of thirty years from their date, and shall bear interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, and shall not exceed in amount twenty per cent of the entire taxable property within the bounds of said municipal corporation, as shown by said list, nor shall they exceed in amount the amount set forth in such petition. The said bonds shall also bear interest warrants, corresponding in number and

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