the law of fixtures, considered in the abstract, had become as definitely and fully stated and known as it is at present, and accordingly the point in dispute thenceforth has been, and now is (as it then partly was), some fact or thing external to the law itself, being some peculiarity of circumstances - either (1.) In the method and measure of the alleged annexation to the freehold; or (2.) In the construction of some written document, which by the act of the contending parties themselves or otherwise has been made to govern or regulate their rights; or (3.) In the effect which is to be given to certain derivative rights, the consequences of certain derivative relations, which have come (in whatever way) to be vested in and established between the contending parties.

In considering the subsequent decisions, it is, however, still most essential and necessary, not merely with a view to the consistency of our scheme, but also by way of a preservative against incorrectness in practical opinion and decision, to bear in mind the precise relation in which the modern law stands toward the ancient one in this matter of fixtures, and, in particular, first of all to settle with ourselves whether the particular alleged fixture is of such a nature as to fall within the rigors of the old law; secondly, to ascertain what is the quality of the inheritance in each particular case, and whether, therefore, the particular alleged fixture has or has not such a correspondence with or affinity for the inheritance as to have become not only actually but indissolubly united with it; and then, thirdly, or lastly, and always in subordination to the matters firstly and secondly mentioned, to consider the weight which is to be attached to any one or more, or to all, of those three external matters to which we have just referred, that is to say, the mode of the outward and visible annexation, the contents of some particular document, or the derivative positions of the contending parties. For it is only by keeping in mind all these numerous matters, and by observing their respective due priorities of importance, that we can either estimate new cases as they arise, or test the consistency of the existing cases, either with each other, or (and more especially) with the earlier decisions.

By way of illustrating the application of this somewhat complex rule of decision, we may refer to the following cases (being all of them cases which have been already mentioned supra in a different respect or for a different purpose): 1. To the case of Elwes v. Mawe, as an instance of the application of our rule having stopped short at the first part of it, the fixtures in that case having, in fact, been caught and stopped in the first sieve, by having been determined to be of the old or strictly agricultural kind. 2. To the case of Lawton v. Salmon, and to the case of D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, as two instances of the application of our rule having proceeded as far as to the second part of it, the fixtures in these latter two cases having safely passed through the first sieve, but having been caught and detained in the second one, by having been determined to be fixtures of the modern class (whether trade proper or ornamental), but to have at the same time presented that species of affinity for the res principalis, or inheritance, which caused them to become straightway united in a chemical and indissoluble union with it. 3. To the case of Hellawell v. Eastwood, as an instance of the application of our rule having been carried to its furthest stage, the fixtures in that case having passed through both the first and the second sieves, and having had their character determined for them

by the first one of these subsidiary external considerations before enumerated, to wit: by the mode of their annexation to the freehold; and we may here mention that the rule in this last-mentioned extent of its application will find constant illustration (alone or in combination with other ingredients) in the cases which are yet to be set forth in the sequel of our article.

THE TICHBORNE CASE.

The Tichborne succession case, which is now being tried in the English court of common pleas, may safely be pronounced to be one of the most remarkable cases that ever came before a court of justice. The claimant to the Tichborne baronetcy and estates professes to be Roger Tichborne, the eldest son of Sir James Doughty Tichborne, Bart., who died June, 1862. Sir James had two sons-Roger, who was born in 1829, and James, who was born ten years afterward. The father and mother did not live very happily together, and the education of the children was somewhat neglected. Roger was born in Paris, and lived there until his seventeenth year, when he was sent to finish his education at Stonyhurst college. In 1849 he entered the army, and served for four years with the 4th dragoons. In January, 1853, however, his love of hunting and other manly sports led him to sell out and go to Valparaiso. There he enjoyed himself in hunting and shooting until April, 1854, when he embarked on board a ship called the Bella, at Rio Janeiro, bound for New York. The ship never reached her port; one of her boats was found bottom up in the Atlantic, and every body believed that the ship, and all on board her, had been lost. Lady Tichborne, it is said, still clung to the belief that her son was saved. In 1858 a sailor, who came to Tichborne house, begging, was questioned by her as to whether he had ever heard of the Bella, or of any of her crew being saved. The sailor replied that he heard a rumor while in Australia of some of the crew of "a ship, which he thought was the Bella," having been picked up at sea and brought to Melbourne. This story is said to have confirmed Lady Tichborne in her conviction that her son was saved and was living in Australia; and when her husband died, in 1862, she caused advertisements to be inserted in the Times, and in the Australian papers, offering a reward for the discovery of her eldest son, if he were still alive. In the mean time her second son, James, took possession of the titles and estates. In February, 1866, he died, and in May his widow gave birth to a posthumous son, Sir Henry Alfred Tichborne, whose guardians are now in possession of the Tichborne estates. At the very time, however, of Sir James Tichborne's death-in the spring of 1866-Lady Tichborne received a letter from Australia, purporting to be written by her long-lost son Roger, stating that he had been picked up by a passing vessel, after the loss of the Bella, and that he had since been living in Australia, and asking for money to take him to England. The letter was badly spelled, and seemed to have been written by an illiterate man. Toward the end of the year, Sir Roger (as he asserts himself to be) arrived in England, accompanied by a black man named Bogle, who had been for forty years his uncle's confidential servant, and had received at that uncle's death an annuity of £50 a year, and had emigrated to Australia. This man knew the whole history of the family, and it is alleged by the defendants that he is at the bottom of the plaintiff's appearance; that he saw Lady Tichborne's advertisement for

her missing son, and, having found some one to personate that son, brought him to England to prosecute his claims. Lady Tichborne was at this time in Paris, and thither Sir Roger went, and was recognized as her son by Lady Tichborne, who made him an allowance of £1,000 a year while he was prosecuting his claim to the family estates. Other persons of undoubted respectability also recognized the claimant as the Sir Roger Tichborne who left England in 1853, but others, again, took a contrary view.

Shortly after his mother's recognition of him, Sir Roger made a formal claim to the estates, and the question, after many delays and much litigation, has come up for trial on an action for ejectment.

The plaintiff admits that in appearance he bears hardly any resemblance to the son-in-law who was shipwrecked in the Bella; he acknowledges that during his life in Australia he lost the use of the French language, which had once been so familiar to him, as well as the education and manners of a gentleman. But it is urged in his favor that he has a most extensive knowledge of incidents in the early life of Sir Roger, which it would be almost impossible for an impostor to acquire; and his counsel, Mr. Sergeant Ballantine, in his opening speech mentioned a very singular test to which his client is ready to submit. When Roger Tichborne left England, he placed in the hands of Gosford, the steward of the estates, a sealed packet. This packet Gosford still holds unopened, and the plaintiff declares himself ready to state its contents, and abide by the result. The case of the defendants is, as has been stated, that the person calling himself Sir Roger Tichborne is an impostor; that his real name is Houghton, and that he is the son of a Wapping butcher's son; that he has been made use of by the servant Boyles to personate the lost heir, and that it is through this man that he has acquired his knowledge of the Tichborne family, and of the early life of the young man who was so long believed to be lost in the Bella. It should be mentioned that while in Australia Sir Roger, who went by the name of Thomas de Castro, married a domestic servant, an uneducated girl, and has by her had several children-two of them sons. He states that eight of the crew of the Bella were saved with him, but he cannot remember any of their names.

REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES
STATUTES.

From the following portions of a pamphlet letter, addressed by Messrs. Abbott and Barringer, of the revising commission at Washington, to the congressional committees having the work in charge, our readers may learn something of interest regarding its progress:

*

RESULTS THUS FAR ACCOMPLISHED.

"The three commissioners met at Washington, in the latter part of September, 1870, and have applied themselves, through the winter, to a systematic examination of the statutes at large, with a view to determine a system of classification for the revised statutes, and to prepare, in a thorough and comprehensive manner, convenient materials for drafting the laws upon each distinct subject.

"It is well known that the work of revision was commenced by a former board of commissioners. Our board was therefore able to determine many prelim

inary questions by aid of a simple reference to the labors of our predecessors. Among other things, the former board had framed a 'provisional scheme' of classification, or list of titles, contemplating the arrangement of the entire body of the general and permanent laws; which, with some modifications, the present board adopted as their guide.

"The principal steps in the work of preparing the materials for the revision were, therefore, the following:

"First. Instead of immediately apportioning the subjects, and separating to draft the laws individually, the commissioners sat together, from day to day, examining the statutes at large, section by section, to ascertain, as to each provision, whether it affected any previous act by way of repeal or amendment; whether it was of a general or permanent nature, and ought, therefore, to be included in the revision; and, if so, under what head or title in the new order of classification it ought to be placed. Their decision as to each section was marked upon the margin of the statute book, as made. In this work they proceeded from the most recent statutes backward to the earliest, because later statutes contain, often, references to earlier ones repealed or amended, which are of aid in determining the existing state of the law. In this manner all public acts and public resolutions have been examined and classified.

"Second. The entries made by the commissioners upon the margins of their volumes of the statutes at large were transcribed upon alternate pages of two additional copies of the statutes, by clerks employed for the purpose. These copies have since been cut apart, section by section. Every provision marked for revision has been separately pasted on a leaf of writing paper, has had a memorandum written upon it, stating the date of its passage, the chapter and section whence it was taken, and the volume and page of the statute at large where it may be found. And the large mass of papers thus arising have been assorted to the heads or titles in the proposed revision to which they belong, and have been numbered throughout, and put up in convenient portfolios. In the execution of this task a number of clerks were employed, though the clerical work was performed under frequent and careful supervision from one member of the commission, to whom it was, by vote of the board, particularly intrusted. During a considerable time the desire of the commissioners to hasten the completion of this preliminary labor, which, as is obvious, delayed the revision of any particular title of the laws, induced them to employ a double force of clerks, one set working during ordinary business hours, and the other set in the afternoon and evening.

"Third. Some auxiliary labor has been performed, the results of which may be helpful in the ultimate execution of the work. A tolerably complete list of adjudications of the national courts, illustrating the construction or operation of acts of congress, has been prepared, under a chronological arrangement, enabling the reviser of a particular statute to ascertain quickly whether it has been construed by the courts. A considerable number of leading cases, on the meanings of terms employed in statutes, have been indexed conveniently, as a guard against inadvertent changes in the phraseology of laws, contrary to the course of judicial decision. Duplicates of some of the more important writings of the commission have been prepared, as a guard against loss by fire. Arrangements have been

made, without reducing the fund appropriated for incidental expenses, for the receipt and examination of all the current national and state reports; that is, those which were issued during 1870, or shall be issued during the coming years occupied by the task.

"In answer to a request that the legal journals and magazines would, in aid of the revision, exchange their issues with the reports of the commissioners, the editors and publishers of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, the American Law Register, the American Law Review, the Bankrupt Register, the Bench and Bar, the Chicago Legal News, the Internal Revenue Record, the Legal Gazette, the Legal Intelligencer, the Pacific Law Reporter, the Pittsburg Legal Journal, the New York Transcript, the Western Jurist and the United States Jurist have sent those periodicals. They contain many decisions of the courts in advance of official reports, and many which are not officially reported, and also present many pertinent and valuable suggestions on statute revision; and these have been examined.

"Inasmuch as there are many subjects upon which the laws of the union and those of the states meet, it seems not imprudent for revisers of the phraseology of the national laws to observe, as far as the time and means at their command admit, the course of state legislation; hence a correspondence has arisen between one of the commissioners and the secretaries of state of many of the states, and considerable information relative to the present condition of the statute law of the states has been collected. Many of these gentlemen have answered letters of inquiry as to the progress of ❘ legislation in their respective states, and have furnished copies of state laws in aid of the duty of the board.

"Returning, now, from this brief mention of matters which have been deemed merely auxiliary to the proper work of the board, and not entitled to engross time which could be utilized in immediately advancing the revision, and resuming the description of what has been done upon the main course of the task, the result of the winter's labor may be thus stated: A system of classification, comprising seventy-six titles or heads of statute law, formed, indeed, upon an outline drafted by the former board, has been adopted, after a careful examination of its application to all the statutes; and a distinct collection has been made in convenient form for expeditious revision of every existing provision of law deemed appropriate to each head or title of the classification. These collections stand arranged in independent portfolios, and any one of them may be taken as the basis for drafting a title of revised statutes upon the subject which it includes, with a good degree of confidence that it will present or bring to the notice of the draftsman all laws necessary to be considered in framing that title.

"Thus, although no one title has been completed, an equal and considerable progress has been made upon every one of the SEVENTY-SIX titles under which the commissioners propose to arrange the entire work.

"Since this preparation of materials has been completed, each commissioner has taken in hand the portfolio comprising the laws arranged under one of the subjects, and has commenced drafting a corresponding title for the revision.

FUTURE PROGRESS OF THE WORK.

Under this head the writers suggest some measures for shortening the labor involved in the undertaking,

so as to admit of bringing the revision before the present congress for enactment, instead of its standing over for the action of the forty-third congress, as contemplated by the existing law governing the commission. In support of this view they urge the following reasons:

First. The revision is needed. From every quarter assurances are received that the United States revised statutes are desired now; not five or six years hence, but, if it were possible, immediately.

"Second. Any extension of the term involves an actual increase in the aggregate labor to be performed, from the advance in legislation. The statutes passed at each session must be embraced in the revision; and they come up for consideration in a way which much increases the difficulty of dealing with them. As between an undertaking to revise the laws within two years and an undertaking to revise them in five, the additional three years of legislation would fill, very probably, one of the years.

"Third. If the main body of the laws be promptly revised at the outset, reserving auxiliary matters, the preparation of indices, the reprinting of acts that cannot be revised, etc., to occupy the later portions of the term, and the report of the commission embodying the laws as newly to be enacted can be brought before the forty-second congress at its session commencing December, 1872, the result will be that the same body of legislators which will direct the initial labor of revision will have an opportunity to pass upon the result. This will avoid the disadvantages which so often have proved fatal to extensive plans of law reform, arising from changes in the composition of the legislature. What arrangements congress will be pleased to make for the consideration of so extensive a measure of legislation as the one now contemplated, we do not anticipate. Whatever they are to be, they are simplified by expedition. The convenience of congress and the ultimate adoption of the work would probably be promoted by the commissioners reporting the various titles as rapidly as practicable, submitting the last one as early as the opening of the last session of the forty-second congress - December, 1872."

CURRENT TOPICS.

In compliance with the request of many of our readers, we print, to-day, the case of Marsh v. The Supervisors, etc., noticed by us on page 299. The case establishes no new principle of law, but will be found useful as a precedent on a question always likely to arise, and of more than ordinary interest.

That the income tax law has remained for so many years on the statute book without once having its constitutionality tested, may, perhaps, be considered an argument in favor of the fealty of the people. Lawyers of undoubted ability have expressed their opinion against its constitutionality, and numerous obiter dicta have been thrown out by the courts pro and con., but it is only recently that the direct question has come up for adjudication. Last week a case involving the question was very elaborately argued before Judge Strong in the United States circuit court at Philadelphia, and on Friday last that judge delivered his opinion sustaining the law. The case is to be carried to the supreme court, but it is quite probable that the law will be abolished before a decision is reached.

The decision of the court of appeals printed hereafter is important as settling a question which has not heretofore been very thoroughly illuminated by | judicial wisdom. Cases somewhat similar in character have been before the English courts, but, so far as we now remember, this is the first case in which it has been directly held that the owner of a peculiar product of nature can be protected in the exclusive use of a name belonging to it alone, and employed by him as his trade-mark in his sale thereof.

The supreme court of Ohio needs some sort of reconstruction. Its business is said by a correspondent to be "at least four years in advance of it," and cases are accumulating rapidly. Considering the fact that it takes from two to three years for a case to reach this appellate tribunal, this delay amounts to little less than a denial of justice. There is something radically wrong in the constitution of every appellate court that cannot clear its calendar annually.

The court of appeals has adjourned until the 5th of September. The session has been continuous since the 19th of October last, with the exception of two or three recesses of a few days each, and a very large amount of business has been disposed of. Four hundred and forty appeals, exclusive of special motions, etc., have been either argued or submitted, of which less than fifty remain to be decided, and over three hundred written opinions have been delivered. The method adopted of deciding cases directly after argument has enabled the court to hear and determine at least thirty per cent more causes than it otherwise could have heard and determined; and it has also tended to render short and pithy the opinions delivered, and to cut off that nuisance which has so long infested our court of appeals reports-dissenting opinions. The session commencing September 5 will be for two weeks only; after which, September 19, the commission of appeals will have a sitting.

Judge Caton has an elaborate article in the June number of the American Law Register defending the decision of the supreme court of Illinois in the case of Kurtz v. Hibner, in relation to which case we gave some remarks at page 263. It will be remembered that the testator devised "the west half of the south-west quarter, section 32, township 35, range 10, containing 80 acres, more or less." There was a mistake in the description, which should have been section 33, instead of section 32. Proof that the testator owned no land in section 32, but owned just such a lot in section 33, was rejected. And this Judge Caton thinks was right. He says if we reject the words "section 32," "we have a description which applies alike to no less than 36 different lots, and nothing remains in the will to show, with reasonable certainty, which of the 36 tracts was intended." Precisely so, and this, it seems to us, is right where the office of parol evidence begins. Not to prove that a mistake was made, but to prove what land the testator had, and where, and then the court seeing that he had no land in 33, but had just such a lot in 32, would drop those words, and apply the rest of the description. Suppose the devise had been simply of 80 acres in township 35, would not the court have given effect to that description by admitting extrinsic eviIdence that the testator owned 80 acres in that township, and to show just where it was? Judge Caton insists that "the meaning of the description must at

last be found in the words which are inserted in the will." We agree to this, and think that plenty is left after rejecting the incorrect words. After a correct description of township and number of acres, any allusion to quarter, section or range seems superfluous. It seems to us that the judge has hit the mark exactly, when he says: "If, after the testator had left out what the court is asked to omit, the devise would have been held void for want of a description of the subject, then the maxim cannot apply." Can it be possible, that, after the admission of the ordinary parol evidence of identification of the testator's property, this devise would be "held void for want of a description?"

OBITER DICTA.

Willful men - Judges of probate.

Police judicial wisdom-"Let us speak of a man as we fined him."

Years ago the Dublin lawyers had their chambers in a locality called "Hell's Lane."

Titus Pomponius Atticus Bibb is the name of a gentleman who aspires to be register of land in Kentucky.

In the Tichborne case-on trial in the English common pleas the jury having intimated a wish to attend the Derby races, Chief Justice Boville remarked that Derby day being a "fast day" he would adjourn over. The Law Times should reprove the chief justice for his levity.

We learn from the Law Times that the honorable society of the Inner Temple has called to the bar the following named gentlemen: "Cuddalore Putta Lutchmeepathy Naidoo, Esq.," and "Woomesh Chunder Mazumder, Esq." "What's in a name?" There's a great deal in these.

“Guilty or not guilty,” said a judge to an Irish prisoner brought up to plead. "That's fur yer honor to tell; it's not for me to be dictatin' to yer honor," was the reply. "But," said the judge, "you must answer for yourself.” "And how can I tell, yer honor, till I have heard the ividence?" said Pat.

Bearcroft deserves honorable mention as the author of one of the happiest witticisms ever gotten off at the bar. It happened in this wise: A young gentleman of good family had married a woman of the town, been deserted by his friends, and almost ruined in fortune by the extravagance of his wife. At last he mustered courage to defend an action for goods furnished her at an enormous price. Erskine was his counsel and made the wife's previous character a ground of appeal to the jury. He praised the amiable feelings of the husband, who had sought to restore his wife to the path of virtue, and inveighed against her base ingratitude to which the plaintiff had lent himself. "For her he gave up his family and sacrificed all his connexions." When Bearcroft came to reply, he treated Erskine's eulogium of his client's virtue and the demerits of his wife as mere burlesque: "My friend reproaches his client's wife with forgetfulness of the debt of gratitude which she owes to him, that for her he had given up all his connexions; but the balance of obligation will be found on her side, for, for him, she gave up all mankind."

Hon. John Van Lear McMahon, who was from 1827 to 1869 the leader of the Baltimore bar, died at Cumberland, Maryland, on the 16th ult., aged fifty-five. He was president of the national whig convention which nominated General Harrison, and was one of the originators of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. During the past ten years he has been partially blind.

DIGEST OF RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

AGREEMENT.

1. Lease: specific performance: injunction: damages. - A lease of a colliery contained an implied covenant on the part of the lessor to procure lands by certain compulsory powers, to enable the lessees to make a railway to a neighboring canal, without which they had no access to any available market. The lessor did not procure the land, but brought an action against the lessees for rent. The lessees, acting under the advice of their solicitor, paid the rent, and subsequently proceeded to arbitration under a clause in the agreement, and an award was made in their favor. The defendant having commenced a second action for rent, the lessees applied to the court of chancery for an injunction to restrain the action; for specific performance of the agreement to provide the land; for a declaration that the award was binding; and for a rectification of the lease if necessary. Held, that the colliery, being valueless without the land, and the provision of the latter being the basis of the agreement, the documents did not carry out the intention. The whole thing was a failure, and the parties, as far as possible, must be put back in their original positions. Acraman v. Price; Davies v. Price, Chan., 24 L. T. R. 487.

2. An injunction would be granted, the plaintiffs undertaking to proceed no further under the award, and the decree of the court below would be varied by striking out the part reserving to the plaintiffs the right to proceed for damages. Ib.

CARRIERS.

Delivery by, to fictitious order: usual course of business: nonexistence of consignees: liability of carriers: misdelivery: conversion: consignor and consignee: contract: estoppel, H., an agent of the plaintiffs for obtaining orders for their goods at Glasgow, sent fictitious orders to them therefrom, in compliance with which the plaintiffs bona fide, and being imposed on by H., addressed goods to "F. C. & Co., 11 Westhill street, Glasgow," and to "C. T. & Co., 71 George street, Glasgow" (the names and addresses furnished to them by H.), and forwarded such goods from Manchester, through T. M. & Co., carriers by canal, to Liverpool, with instructions to T. M. & Co. to forward them thence by steamer to Glasgow, whereupon T. M. & Co., having carried the goods to Liverpool, forwarded them thence by the defendants, as carriers by steamship between that place and Glasgow. The defendants accordingly carried the goods from Liverpool to Glasgow, and on their arrival at the latter place they sent, pursuant to their usual course of business, a notice by letter to each of the addresses appearing on the respective parcels of goods, requesting the removal of the goods and the production of the notice indorsed as a delivery order. Following out his fraudulent design, and having made arrangements for the purpose, H. contrived to receive these notices at the respective addresses, and, having indorsed them in the given names, "F. C. & Co." and "C. T. & Co.," respectively, presented them to the defendants, and thereby procured the delivery of the goods, in each case, to be made to himself. It appeared that the name of "F. C. & Co." was posted up outside the door of "11 Westhill street," though in reality there was no such firm; and that there was no such name or persons as "F. T. & Co." at "71 George street."

In an action by the plaintiffs against the defendants as carriers, for misdelivery and conversion of the plaintiffs' goods, it was, on a special case, stating the facts, held, by the court of exchequer (Martin, Bramwell and Channell, BB.), giving judgment for the defendants, first, that the plaintiffs' contract was with T. M. & Co., and not with the defendants; secondly, assuming the action to have been properly brought, that the defendants having, in dealing with the goods, bona fide pursued their usual course of business, the custom of which must be taken as incorporated into the directions given by the plaintiffs, had obeyed such directions, and had not been guilty of misdelivery or conversion of either parcel of goods; and, thirdly, that the plaintiffs having accepted and acted on H.'s representations, were

estopped from saying that there were no such persons as "C. T. & Co." McKean and others v. McIver and others, Ex., 24 L. T. R. 559.

INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.

Confidential reports. - Defendants pleaded to an action by the assurers upon a policy of life assurance, fraud, in that the assured and the friends to whom he had referred falsely stated that he was sober and temperate in his habits. The defendants had demanded and obtained an extra premium, on the ground that the assured was not a first-class life. The confidential medical report, based upon the declaration of the assured, and the answers by his friends to the questions asked, were obtained upon a promise of secrecy by the defendants. No contract of secrecy, however, was established between the plaintiffs on the one side and the medical referee or the friends on the other. The court ordered, as a matter within their discretion, that these documents should be inspected by the plaintiffs. Mahony and another v. The National Widows' Life Assurance Fund (limited), C. P., 24 L. T. R. 548.

LEGATEE.

Not heard of for upward of seven years: presumption of death: proof that he survived testator: legacy claimed as residue: on whom onus probandi.-A legatee left this country in 1858, and was last heard of as being in Sydney in January, 1859. In 1860 his father died, having left to each of his children £4,000, and appointed J. his residuary legatee. In 1861 the fund was paid into court, and J. now petitioned for payment to himself. Held (affirming the decision of Malins, V. C.), that the onus of proving that the legatee survived the testator lay on his representative; that, failing such proof, the legal presumption, after seven years, was that he had died when he was last heard of, and the fund was accordingly ordered to be paid to the petitioner as taking the residuary estate. Re Lewe's Trusts, Chan., 24 L. T. R. 533.

PARTNERSHIP.

Liability of a partner: banking account opened in the name of other partner. -James Kearsley and the defendant had carried on business as coach makers, under the name of George Kearsley & Co., at York and Manchester. James conducted the business at Manchester, and he opened a banking account with the plaintiffs, in his own name, for the purposes of the firm. William Kearsley, the defendant, managed the business at York, and there was some evidence that he knew James Kearsley had an account with some bank at Manchester. James Kearsley's account was overdrawn, and the defendant repudiated all knowledge on his part of, or authority from the firm for, this account with the plaintiffs. Held, that a partner had, generally, no authority to bind his firm to liability on a banker's account opened in his own name instead of in the name of the firm, and that the facts did not afford sufficient evidence to leave to the jury the question whether the defendant ever authorized this particular account. The Alliance Bank (limited) v. W. Kearsley, C. P., 24 L. T. R. 552.

SALVAGE.

1. Appeal as to quantum awarded: division of salvage service.- Salvage services, rendered with very great danger, materially contributed to save property worth £46,000, and twenty-seven lives. The court of admiralty awarded £1,000 as compensation. Held (varying the judgment of the court below), that £2,000 would be a fair compensation; the salvors, under the circumstances, being entitled, on the rule stated in The Clifton (3 Hagg. 121), to a "large and liberal" reward. The Glenduror, Priv. Co., 2 L. T. R. 499.

2. In appeals as to quantum awarded, the difference ought to be very considerable (to the extent of one-third at least), in order to induce the court of appeal to interfere upon a question of mere discretion. The Chetah, 19 L. T. R. (N. S.) 622, followed and approved. Ib.

3. The defendants contended that the real meritorious service was on one night in saving life, and that what was done in the course of several subsequent days to the ship, in anchoring, unloading, pumping, and bringing her into port, consisted of ordinary services that any person might have rendered. Held, that it would not be right to split up