relationship, by consanguinity or affinity, to any party interested therein, so that he would be excluded from being a juror, or by reason of being a witness of any will, or having acted as counsel in such case, and there are no legal officers in such county to discharge the duties of such surrogate, or where such officer shall also be incapacitated from acting as such surrogate, by reason of the foregoing disabilities, in the case of the surrogate, the county judge of such county, or, in case of his disability for like causes, then the district attorney, shall possess the power and exercise jurisdiction in all respects in such case as the surrogate of such county would be authorized to possess and exercise were it not for such disability. The district attorney of such county, while acting as surrogate in such case, shall be entitled to receive the same compensation, pro rata, as the officer acting as county judge and surrogate of such county is entitled to receive, to be audited by the board of supervisors, and to be paid by the county treasurer, in the same manner as the salary of the county judge and surrogate shall be paid; and in counties where there is a separate officer to perform the duties of the office of surrogate, then the district attorney of such county shall receive the same compensation, pro rata, as such surrogate shall be entitled to receive in such county for the time said district attorney shall be acting as surrogate in such cases of disability, which shall be authorized by the board of supervisors, and paid as the salary of such separate officer elected to perform the duties of the office of surrogate is paid.

$9. This act shall take effect immediately.

CHAP. 911.

AN ACT to provide for the introduction of the American system of cable towage upon the canals of this state.

PASSED May 10, 1871; three-fifths being present. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Permission is hereby granted to James Richmond and William S. Farnell, of the city of Lockport, New York, their associates and successors, who may organize a corporation under the act entitled "An act to authorize the formation of corporations, for manufacturing, mining, mechanical and chemical purposes," passed February seventeenth, eighteen hundred and forty-eight, and any act or acts amendatory thereof, to introduce upon the canals of this state an improved system of cable towage, under a patent or patents to be held or acquired by said corporation, with the exclusive right to use the said system thereon, during the full term for which said corporation may be organized.

$2. The said James Richmond, William S. Farnell, their associates and successors, as heretofore specified, are hereby authorized and empowered to transport cargoes, and to tow boats and floats, loaded or unloaded, for hire, upon the canals of this state, at a rate of speed not exceeding four miles per hour, and which shall not work unusual and permanent injury thereto; and for such purpose may purchase, construct, erect and use thereon, such boats, boilers, engines, apparatus, chains, cables, structures and machinery, as shall be necessary to apply and operate said improved system of cable towage, in such manner as shall not interfere with navigation on said canals. Nothing, however, in this section contained, shall be construed as excluding other parties from the rights or privileges of propelling or towing any boats or floats upon the canals of this state, by the agency of steamboats, propellers, tugs, chains, cables, elevated railways, engines, or animal power, but simply to vest in the said James Richmond and William S. Farnell, their associates and successors, or corporation organized as aforesaid, the exclusive right to apply and operate the said improved system of cable towage.

§ 3. The machinery, engines and boilers, used in pursuance of this act, the boats carrying the same, and the fuel and materials necessarily used in propelling the necessary boats and machinery to operate said towage system, shall be exempt from the payment of tolls upon all the canals of this state, but in no case shall fuel or material be exempt from

payment of tolls except when on boats actually using the

same.

§ 4. In case the said James Richmond, William S. Farnell, their associates and successors, or corporation aforesaid, shall neglect or fail to introduce said system of towage on the Erie canal within eighteen months after the passage of this act, all rights and privileges herein granted shall cease.

5. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to exclude the system of towage hereby authorized from the supervision and control of the canal board, but the same shall be subject to all the rules and regulations established, and to be established, by the canal board for the navigation of the canals.

§ 6. The legislature may, at any time, repeal, alter or modify the provisions of this act.

§ 7. This act shall take effect immediately.

CHAP. 184.

AN ACT in relation to the publication of the laws of this state.

PASSED March 27, 1871; three-fifths being present.

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Chapter three hundred and forty-five of the art entitled "An act for the publication of the session laws in two newspapers in each county of the state," passed April twenty-seven, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, is hereby amended so as to read as follows: The publisher of each of the newspapers, so designated as aforesaid, shall be entitled to receive for such publication of all laws above specified a sum of fifty cents for each folio.

82. This act shall take effect immediately.

CHAP. 239.

AN ACT to amend the revised statutes in regard to surrogate's bonds.

PASSED March 31, 1871.

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Section eighty-seven, article six, title two, chapter twelve, part one of the revised statutes, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

$ 87. Every person hereafter appointed or elected to the office of surrogate of any county shall, within twenty days after receiving notice of such appointment or election, execute to the people of this state, with two or more sufficient sureties, being resident freeholders, a joint and several bond, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties, and for the application and payment of all moneys and effects that may come into his hands as such surrogate in the execution of his office. The bond of the surrogate of the city and county of New York shall be in the penal sum of fifty thousand dollars, and of the county of Kings shall be in the penal sum of twenty-five thousand dollars; and the bond of every other surrogate of the other counties of the state shall be in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars. Every surrogate's bond shall be properly acknowledged by all the persons who execute the same, and the sureties therein shall justify, in the aggregate, in double the penalty of the bond. Every such bond shall be recorded by the clerk of the county in whose office the same is filed in the record of deeds in his office, and such record, or a certified copy thereof, shall be evidence of the same force and effect as the original bond, in any action or proceeding against such surrogate or his sureties. Within thirty days after the passage of this act, and after his receipt of a copy of this act as provided for in the next section, every surrogate now in office shall execute a bond in conformity with the provisions of this section, and file the same with the clerk of his county, and in default thereof his office shall be deemed vacant.

§ 2. The secretary of state forthwith, upon the passage of this act, shall send to each of the surrogates in this state a copy of this act.

§ 3. This act shall take effect immediately.

TO OUR READERS.

The third volume of the LAW JOURNAL closes with this number. The index, etc., will be sent with the first or second number of volume four. Those wishing to have their numbers bound can do so at a cost of $1.50 sheep, or $1.00 half sheep, by sending them to Weed, Parsons & Co., Albany, N. Y.

Subscribers failing to receive the LAW JOURNAL promptly, should notify the publishers of the fact, giving their address. Irregularities of this nature arise mainly from the fact that the mailing books, containing the particular address, street and number, of the subscribers in the larger cities, were destroyed at the time of the recent fire.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JULY 22, 1871.

RESPONSIBILITY OF CARRIERS BEYOND THEIR LINE.

The courts of the several states have never been able to agree upon a general and uniform rule as to the responsibility of carriers receiving passengers or goods destined to a point beyond the terminus of their route. It is said by the text writers to be the "American Rule" that, in the absence of an express agreement, the responsibility terminates at the end of their line, but there are so many decisions the other way, that no one can say to a certainty what the rule is. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine the courts have held to this so-called "American Rule" with much rigor-have even excluded all presumptions or implication of a contract arising from the receipt of fare or freight money for the entire distance, or from an association or partnership between the connecting lines; while in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois and some of the other states, carriers have frequently been held liable for loss happening beyond their line, in the absence of any express agreement.

The English courts have uniformly held that carriers who receive goods for a place beyond their own line, are liable, as carriers, to the ultimate destination. The same doctrine has been very properly applied in the case of passengers. In the case of Thomas v. The Rymney Railway Company, L. R. 6; Q. B. 266, recently decided in the exchequer chamber, it was expressly held that where a railway company issued a ticket for a journey, which must be partly made over the line of another company, and whether the passage over the other line be under an agreement to share profits, or simply under running powers, the company issuing such ticket are bound to see that the passenger is carried with due and reasonable care from one end of the journey to the other. The same doctrine was laid down in Great Western Railway Co. v. Blake, 7 H. & N. 987.

The supreme judicial court of New Hampshire have recently delivered an important and well-considered judgment in the case of The Nashua Lock Co. v. The Worcester and Nashua Railroad Co., 48 N. H. 339 (and to be reported in 2 American Reports), in which it was held, where there is a continuous line of different carriers united by an agreement, under which they carry goods through the connected line for one price which they divide among themselves in proportions fixed in their agreement, if one of the parties receives goods to be transported on the continuous line, marked for any place in it, and takes pay for the entire distance, that

party is bound to carry the goods or see that they are carried to their final destination, and is liable for a loss happening in any part of the connecting line.

The opinion of the court presents the following elaborate review of the different decisions on the question, which may be serviceable to our readers:

Since the introduction of steam as the means of transportation by land and water, the general question raised in this case has been much considered in different jurisdictions, and there is no little confusion and contradiction of authority respecting the rule which shall govern the rights and liabilities of the parties, where goods are put in the course of transportation to distant places through connected lines associated in the business of common carriers. Where such lines are engaged in carrying passengers and their luggage the several parties to the continuous line incur, it would seem, the same liabilities for damage and loss of the luggage as in cases where they carry goods only. Darling v. The Boston & Worcester Railroad, 11 Allen, 295; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 312; Weed v. The Railroad, 19 Wend. 534; The Ill. Central Railroad v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332; Ill. Central Railroad v. Johnson, 34 id. 382.

In England and in several of the United States it has been held, that, when a railroad or other common carrier receives goods marked or otherwise directed for a place beyond the carrier's own line, this alone is prima facie evidence of a contract to carry the goods to their final destination, though the freight money for transportation through is not paid to the carrier that receives the goods, and though he is not shown to have any connection in business with other parties beyond his own line. Muschamp v. The Lancaster and Preston Railway, 8 M. & W. 421; Watson v. The Ambergate, Nottingham and Boston Railway, 3 L. & Eq. 497; Collins v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway, 11 Exch. 790; S. C., 7 House of Lords' Cases, 194; Coxon v. The Great Western Railway, 5 Hurlstone & N. 274. These and several other cases show that in England, after the fullest discussion in all the courts, the rule is firmly established that a carrier who receives goods marked for a place beyond his own line is prima facie bound to carry them as directed to their final destination, and it is there held that the contract in such case is entire, and with the first carrier alone; that until some connection in the business, which has the general nature, if not the technical character, of a partnership appears between him and the subsequent carriers, no action can be maintained against them by the owner, though the goods were lost or damaged on their part of the route.

I have not met with an American case in which the rule has been pressed to the extent of holding that the owner cannot come on any carrier, by whose default the loss or damage actually happened. There are, however, numerous authorities in the United States for the general rule of Muschamp v. The Railway, that the receipt of goods marked for a place beyond the line of the carrier who receives them implies a contract to carry them to their final destination, though no connection in business is shown with other carriers beyond, and though the price of transportation through is not paid in advance.

In Foy v. The Troy & Boston Railroad, 24 Barb. 382, the doctrine of the case is stated in the head note to be, that "where a railroad company receives for transportation property addressed to a person at a point beyond the terminus of the road, he will be understood, in the

absence of any proof to the contrary, to have agreed to deliver the property in the same order and condition in which it was received, to the consignee." The court say: "It was no part of the plaintiff's business to inquire how many different corporations made up the entire line of road between Troy and Burlington, or, having ascertained this, to determine at his peril which of said companies had been guilty of the negligence | which resulted in the injury to his wagon." In Schroeder v. The Hudson River Railroad, 5 Duer, 55, the agent of the defendants gave the following receipt at New York: "Received of Schroeder six boxes to be forwarded per Hudson River Railroad freight train to Chicago, Illinois;" and it was held that the defendants under this receipt were bound to transport the goods to Chicago. No connection in business with other carriers was relied on. In Kyle v. The Laurens Railroad, 10 Rich. (Law,) 282, the rule of Muschamp v. The Railway was approved. O'Neall, J., says: "The case of Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway states, I think, the true rule." The rule of Muschamp v. The Railway was approved and adopted in the Central Railroad v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332, in which it was held that "a railroad corporation selling tickets through over its own and other roads is liable for the safety of passengers and their baggage to the point of destination." The case was put on the same ground as when goods are received marked for a place beyond the line of the carrier that receives them. The court say: "We are inclined to yield to the force of the reasoning of the English courts, on principles of public convenience, if no other, and to hold when a carrier receives goods to carry marked for a particular place, he is bound to carry and deliver at that place. By accepting the goods so marked he impliedly agrees so to do, and he ought to be answerable for that loss." In the latter case of The Central Railroad v. Johnson, 33 III. 382, it was decided in the same state that, "when a carrier receives goods to carry, marked for a particular place, he is bound under an implied agreement from the mark or direction to carry to and deliver at that place, though it be a place beyond his own line of carriage." In The Detroit & Milwaukee Railroad v. The F. & M. Bank, 20 Wis. 122, the railroad gave a receipt for the goods directed to New York, but the receipt provided that the railroad should not be liable beyond their own road, and it was held that by an express agreement a carrier might limit his liability to his own road, when he receives goods marked for a place beyond it. The road was, in that case, discharged upon the ground of an express agreement that it should not be liable beyond its own line, from which the inference is plain, that, in the absence of an express agreement controlling the contract otherwise implied from the receipt of the goods marked for a place beyond its line, the road will be liable for a loss happening beyond. In Angel v. The Mississippi & Missouri Railroad, 9 Iowa, 487, it was decided that, "when a common carrier receives goods marked for a particular place beyond the terminus of his route, unaccompanied by any direction as to their transportation and delivery, except such as may be inferred from the marks, he is prima facie bound to carry and deliver them according to the marks."

St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. 660, is a strong authority for the rule, that, when goods are received by a carrier marked for a place beyond his line, he is bound to carry them to their final destination, if there is nothing to control the contract implied by the

receipt of the goods so marked. Nelson, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: "It appears to me such a contract is fairly to be inferred from the receipt of the captain in the absence of any explanation. The box was directed to J. Petrie, Little Falls, Herkimer county, indicating plainly to whom the plaintiffs were desirous of sending it, and was delivered on board for the express purpose of transhipment to him; and without any qualification or explanation the agent received the article and gave his receipt, in effect saying to the plaintiff, I will take and deliver it at the place of destination according to the direction.' So the plaintiffs must have understood the contract. It is the plain interpretation of the transaction. If the defendants had intended to limit their duty as common carriers short of the place of destination, they should in some way have indicated to the plaintiff this intent.” The judgment of the supreme court in this case was reversed by the senate (6 Hill, 157), upon the ground that the court should have received evidence of a custom controlling the general effect of the receipt of the goods marked for the place of destination, though the custom was not known to the plaintiff; leaving the doctrine untouched that the receipt of the goods so marked, in the absence of evidence to explain and control the transaction, would imply an agreement to carry to the place for which they were marked.

The American authorities above cited sustain the doctrine of Muschamp v. The Railway, that when a carrier receives goods marked for a place beyond his own line, he is, prima facie, and in the absence of other evidence, bound by an implied contract to carry the goods to the place for which they are marked, though he has no connection in business beyond his own line and though he does not receive pay for transportation through.

There is another class of American cases which hold that the mere receipt of goods marked for transportation beyond the line of the party that receives them is not evidence of a contract to carry beyond his own line, if he has no connection in business with carriers beyond; but that, if several carriers associate in a continuous line, carry goods for one price through, and divide the freight money among them in an agreed ratio, though they may not be technically partners, but only quasi partners, yet as to third persons who intrust goods to them for transportation they are jointly liable for a loss that happens in any part of the continuous line, though the freight money is not paid to the first carrier on delivery of the goods to him.

In Champion v. Bostwick, 11 Wend. 571; S. C., 18 id. 174, several proprietors of different sections in a connected line of stage coaches divided the receipts of the whole route, in proportion to the miles run by each; and it was held that they were jointly liable as partners for an injury to a third person, not a passenger, caused by the negligence of one of them. It is to be observed that in this case the receipts of the way, as well as the through, travel were brought into the account; and on this a distinction has been taken between that case and one where the receipts of the through travel only are divided; and for that reason it has been said that in a case like the present there is no partnership and no joint liability. But as to parties who deal with the through line, it is of no consequence how the other business is managed, or whether any other business is done by the associated carriers. At most, the distinction is merely technical, and has no substance. Nor am I acquainted with any legal principle to prevent one engaged in a general business from

having a partner in one distinct part of it, like the through business in this case, without bringing all his business of the same kind into the partnership account. I take it to be no uncommon thing for a trader to have a partner in his business done at one place, who has no concern in his business of the same kind transacted at other places; for attorneys to form partnerships limited to certain parts of their business, and merchants, in the voyages, or in a single voyage, of one ship.

Hart v. The Rensselaer and Saratoga Railroad is to the point, that "where three separate railroad companies, owning distinct portions of a continuous railroad route, between two termini, run their cars over the whole road, employing the same agents to sell passenger tickets, and receive luggage to be carried over the entire road, an action may be maintained against any one of them for loss of luggage received at one terminus to be carried over the whole road." Smith, J., delivering the opinion of the court in McDonald v. The Western Railroad, 34 N. Y. 501, 502, says: "We may judicially take notice of the fact that the vast business of inland transportation of goods is carried on mainly upon routes formed by successive lines belonging to different owners, each of whom carries the goods over his own line and delivers them to the next. Many of these routes extend over thousands of miles. Their proprietors unite and receive goods for transportation upon the promise, express or implied, that they shall be carried safely to the place of delivery. The owner has lost sight of his goods when he delivers them to the first carrier, and has no means of learning their whereabouts till he, or the consignee, is informed of their arrival at the place of destination."

In Wibert v. The Erie Railroad, 12 N. Y. 256, it was said, that, "where a carrier is in the habit of receiving and forwarding goods directed to any particular place, an agreement on his part to take them there has been presumed; but where these operations are entirely disconnected there is no partnership." In Bradford v. The Railroad Company, 7 Rich. (Law) 201, it was held that "an advertisement of a through line and the course of the business is evidence to charge all the roads engaged in the continuous line of transportation as jointly liable for carriage through the whole route." Redfield, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court in the F. M. Bank v. The Transportation Company, 23 Vt. 131, speaking of Weed v. The S. & S. Railroad, 19 Wend. 534, says: "That case is readily reconciled with the general rule that such carrier is only bound to the end of his own route, by the consideration that in this case there was a kind of partnership connection between the first company and the other companies constituting the entire route, and also that the first carrier took pay and gave a ticket through, which is most relied on by the court; and in such cases where the first company gives a ticket and takes pay through, it may be fairly considered equivalent to an undertaking to carry throughout the entire route." In a note to this case by Redfield, C. J., he says: "In that case (Weed v. The Railroad) the court seem to put the case more upon the fact of taking fare and giving a ticket through, which in practice is seldom or never done, except where there is a quasi partnership throughout the route." This would seem to be a strong authority, that where there is a connected line of carriers, and a quasi, though it may not be technical and legal, partnership, they are liable jointly for carriage through the whole connected route.

By the statute of New York, enacted in 1847, "when

ever two or more railroads are connected together, any company owning either of said roads receiving freight to be transported to any place in the line of either of said roads shall be liable as common carriers for the delivery of such freight at such place." This statute has received a liberal construction, and been held to make a railroad in New York liable for a loss on a road in the connected line beyond the limits of the state (Burtis v. The Buffalo and State Line Railroad, 24 New York 269); but not to discharge an intermediate carrier for loss caused by his own fault. Smith v. The N. Y. Central Railroad, 43 Barb. 225.

In The Cincinnati H. & D. Railroad v. Speat, 2 Duval, 4, it was decided that "where several parties are associated for the transportation of freight from Louisville to New York, executing through bills of lading and charging through freight, they will be chargeable as common carriers between those points; and in such cases public justice and commercial policy require a stringent construction against any intermediate irresponsibility as common carriers." Two points were decided in this case: that the defendants were liable as common carriers for transportation through to New York; and that on the facts of the case they held the goods as common carriers and not as warehousemen. The court say: "The facts conduce to prove that the appellants, associated as they were with steamboats and other carriers from Louisville to Cincinnati as joint transporters between those points, and jointly charging through freight and giving through receipts, were, in the popular and technical import, common carriers to the whole extent between those termini." This reasoning applies with full force to the present case.

In 2 Redfield on Railways, 104, the learned author sums up the result of the American cases on this particular point as follows: "The American cases upon the subject, with rare exceptions, recognize the right of a railroad company to enter into special contracts to carry goods beyond the line of their road; and where different roads are united in one continuous route such an undertaking, when goods are received and booked for any part of the line, is almost a matter of course." In the present case the defendants were united in a continuous line to New York; the goods were received marked, which must be equivalent to booked, for New York; and the case would seem to fall clearly within the rule laid down in Redfield as the result of the American authorities.

There is still another class of cases, in which it is held that the fact of a carrier receiving pay for transportation to a place beyond his own line implies a contract to carry to that place. In the case of Hyde v. The Trent & Mersey Navigation Company, 5 T. R. 389, decided in 1793, the marginal note is as follows: "Common carriers from A. to B. charge and receive for cartage to the consignee's house at B. from a warehouse there, where they usually unloaded, but which did not belong to them; they must answer for the goods if destroyed in the warehouse by an accidental fire, although they allow all the profits of the cartage to another person, and that circumstance were known to the consignee." The four judges delivered their opinions seriatim, and all agreed that the charge for cartage to the house of the consignee "put the case out of all doubt," and bound the carriers who made the charge to carry the goods to their final destination. In answer to the argument that the carriers acted as agents of the owner in forwarding the goods

beyond their own line, Mr. Justice Buller said: "According to the defendants' own argument great inconvenience would result to the public from adopting the other rule. According to their argument there must be two contracts, where goods are sent by coach or wagon. But I think the same argument tends to establish the necessity of three; one with the carrier, another with the innkeeper and a third with the porter. But, in fact, there is but one contract; there is nothing like any contract or communication between any other person than the owner of the goods and the carrier. But I rely on the charge which the defendants compelled the plaintiff to pay before they would engage to deliver the goods. The different proprietors may divide the profits among themselves in any way they choose, but they cannot exonerate themselves from their liability to the owner of the goods." This case, coming before the agitation of these questions on the introduction of steam as a motive power, and decided on the general principle applicable to the liability of carriers at common law, is certainly of very great weight. It decides that when a carrier receives goods to be transported beyond his own line and takes pay for carrying them to their final destination, he agrees to do what he has been paid for doing; and it repudiates the fanciful theory of an agency for the owner to forward the goods, and in his behalf procure them to be carried by others.

In Weed v. The Saratoga & Schenectady Railroad, 19 Wend. 534, the plaintiff's agent took passage at Saratoga in the Saratoga and Schenectady Railroad for Albany and paid his fare to Albany. The route to Albany consisted of the defendants' and the Mohawk and Hudson River Railroad. When the agent arrived at Albany his trunk containing money of the plaintiff was missing, and this action was brought to recover for the loss. One ground taken for the defendants was that there was no evidence the trunk was lost on their road. There was no evidence of a contract to carry to Albany except such as was implied from the fact that the two roads made a continuous line to Albany, and the defendants took the trunk for carriage to Albany and received the pay for carrying through. It was held that the payment and receipt of fare through bound the defendants as carriers over the other road through the whole continuous route.

Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610, is an authority to the same point, that receiving pay for transportation to a place beyond the line of the carrier who receives it, implies a contract to carry to that place. The court say: "Besides, there is a fixed sum which covers the whole charge; and it would be absurd to suppose that the defendant was to receive the whole sum for merely forwarding; that is, placing the goods on the vessels of some other party to be carried to their place of destination."

Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157, cited for the defendants, recognizes the doctrine of Weed v. The Railroad. In his opinion for reversing the judgment of the supreme court, the chancellor says: "In the case of Weed v. The Railroad the two lines were connected together by an arrangement between themselves, and the agent of the defendant took the pay in advance for the conveyance of the plaintiff and his baggage the whole distance. Or, if no actual connection between the two lines was proved, it at least appeared that the defendant permitted its agent to hold it out as a carrier of passengers and their baggage

for the whole distance by taking pay therefor." It thus appears that in Van Santvoord v. St. John, as in Hyde v. The Navigation Company, taking pay for carriage to a place beyond the line of the party that takes it is regarded as decisive of an undertaking to carry to that place. Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 315, is to the same point, that receiving pay for earriage through a continuous line imports a contract to carry through; and in Burtis v. The Buffalo and State Line Railroad, 24 N. Y. 269, 278, Sutherland, J., says: "It would appear to be settled by both the American and English cases, that when from usage in the particular business, or by receiving pay to the place to which the goods are addressed, beyond the railway company's road, or from any other circumstance, it is to be presumed that the undertaking of the railway was to deliver at such place, they are responsible for the delivery of the goods at such place, and are liable if the goods are lost after leaving their road."

In Choteaux v. Leach, 18 Penn. St. 224, furs were shipped at Cincinnati for New York. The defendants admitted that they were carriers on the canals and railroads of Pennsylvania, but denied that they were on the river Ohio. The furs were lost in a steamboat on that river. The court, Black, C. J., say: "They, the defendants, received the full freight from Cincinnati to New York; and this is wholly inconsistent with the notion that they were agents for the shipment of the furs, and not carriers from Cincinnati to Pittsburg, as well as on other parts of the route." To the same point is The Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Company v. Brown, 54 Penn. 77, which cites and approves The Illinois Central Railroad v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 338; The Illinois Central Railroad v. Johnson, 34 id. 382; and The Railroad v. Schwartzenburg, 9 Wright, 208. So in Cundee v. The Pennsylvania Railroad, 21 Wis. 582, where a railroad sells a through passenger ticket by a specified route to some point out of the state over lines belonging to other companies, it seems the understanding of the first company is to transport the passenger and his baggage to such place of destination. Carey v. The Cleveland & Toledo Railroad, 29 Barb. 36, is to the same effect, and also The Illinois Central Railroad v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332, in which it was held that a railroad selling tickets through over its own and other roads is liable for the safety of passengers and their baggage to the point of destination. Wheeler v. The Railroad, 32 Cal. 52, cites and apparently approves the doctrine as laid down on this point in 2 Redfield on Railways, 109. In Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 203, the defendants received fare and gave a ticket to a point beyond their own line; it was held that they were liable for a detention beyond their own line. Harris, J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: "When the defendants received the plaintiff's money and gave him a through ticket, they thereby became bound for his transportation over the entire line. The arrangement between the defendants and the proprietors of other portions of the line was a matter with which the plaintiff had nothing to do. He was no party to that arrangement, nor was he bound to look to any person for the performance of the defendants' undertaking but themselves."

Redfield (Railways, 109), sums up the result of the authorities on this point as follows: "It has generally been considered, both in this country and in the English courts, that, receiving goods destined beyond the terminus of the particular company, and giving a check or ticket through, does import an undertaking to carry