bed and board for strangers traveling, but they cannot compel a man to do it against his will, simply because he has paid them for the privilege of doing so if he desires. There is no law to compel a man to exhibit a circus, or to peddle vegetables. An interesting metaphysical legal question has come before the courts. Several of the largest life insurance companies, have been prosecuted upon policies, where the assured committed suicide, while in a supposed state of insanity. The companies interposing the usual defense, the plaintiffs take the ground, that a man must necessarily be insane to kill himself, and, consequently, the companies must be liable in every case of suicide. We suspect that before this problem is settled, many of the judges, if not themselves driven to self-destruction by the profundity of the arguments, will heartily wish that the ingenious counsel would take themselves off. The Illinois constitution of 1870 provides that the judges of the supreme court shall receive, severally, a salary of $4,000 per annum, until otherwise provided by law. It is altogether probable that the legislature will fix the amount of the salaries during the coming session, and it is to be hoped that the legislation on the subject will be characterized by the same liberal and progressive spirit that has been exhibited in much of the legislation of that state. The people are beginning to understand that it is for their interest that the civil service of this country should receive a more adequate compensation, and the time is not far off when they will comprehend the wisdom, as well as the justice, of compensating the judiciary liberally. The grade of talent and amount of work required of any judge of any court of last resort in the country, would ordinarily enable him to make at the bar an income of from $10,000 to $15,000. Common honesty, at least, would dictate that he should not be required to sacrifice more than half of that amount on being elevated to the bench. The court of appeals judges of this state receive $7,000, and the chief justice $500 additional. The judges of Illinois should receive at least an equal sum. The Chicago Legal News has the following bit of information relative to "Lincoln's Fees:" "The largest professional fee that Lincoln ever received, was five thousand dollars paid him for twice arguing the case of the County of McLean v. The Illinois Central Railroad Company, reported in 17th Illinois, 291. The opinion of the court sustained his view of the case, holding that the provision in the charter of the company by which its property was exempted from taxation on the payment of a certain proportion of its earnings was constitutional. The company owned nearly two millions of acres of land, and the road passed through twenty-six counties, so that, had the decision been adverse to the company, a half million of dollars put at interest would scarcely have paid the taxes. Pending the payment of this fee, Lincoln wrote the following query, the affirmation of which embodies the practical rule which governed his attorney fees: 'Are or are not the amount of labor, the doubtfulness and dificulty of the question, the degree of success in the result and the amount of pecuniary interest involved not merely in the particular case, but covered by the principles decided, and thereby secured to the client, all proper elements, by the custom of the profession, to consider in determining what is a reasonable fee in a given case?'" An address was delivered in New York, on the 19th instant, before the association for the advancement of science and art, by David Dudley Field, Esq., upon international law, in which the speaker touched upon the subject of a European confederation, organized after the plan of the American system, as a means of preserving peace. The address is reported in the New York dailies of the 20th, and is worthy of perusal, as containing the ideas, upon a most important question, of a man who has done more, perhaps, than any other living person, to practically reform the law. We have always had an abiding faith that steam, electricity and popular education, might, in due time, render possible the fulfillment of what has been regarded as an enthusiast's dream, but we have had little hope that this century would witness "The federation of the world, the parliament of man." But every thing moves rapidly now, and men's ideas are no exception to this rule. The selfishness and prejudice of the common people still remain, indeed, but not in their ancient vigor. A narrow frith or mountain range no longer makes enemies, and, unless in times of excitement, an individual of one nation is well received by the people of every other. Nations less frequently than of old appeal to the wager of battle, settling most of their differences by arbitration, or by a congress of the powers inter ested. The time is rapidly approaching when it will be possible to assemble the great nations of the civilized world in convention, for the purpose of establishing a consistent and authoritative system of international law. Great difficulties stand in the way, to be surethe antagonism of races, the fears of small states, and the jealousies of great ones but the civilizing influences of the age are fast doing away with the first, and the demands of trade will soon overcome the others. If a single meeting of representatives from the governments of the civilized world could be held for the purpose, not of settling some impending difficulty, but in order to lay down, by a sort of universal treaty, certain rules for the observance of nations in peace and in war, we believe that it would accomplish more for the cause of peace and liberty than could be accomplished in any other way, and we know of no one better fitted by ability, experience and position, to bring about such a meeting than the gentleman whose name is above mentioned. Two days before the Hon. Henry Hubbard of New Hampshire became insane, the governor offered him a seat on the bench of the supreme court of that state. The Dublin Evening Post arraigns an Irish judge, "by no means the least eminent, either in function or in ability," for "compromising sneers, for printing judicial epigrams, and for anointing the barbs of the same with bitter bitterness as of a peculiar concentration." This is very bad. OBITER DICTA. An undoubted "court of errors "— a justice's court. The name of one of the parties in a case recently argued before the third department general term, was "Desdemona Cherrytree." The remark of an exchange, "that many of our successful lawyers commenced life as preachers," is gracefully corrected by one of the legal fientlemen referred to, who begs leave to state that he began life as an infant." A country justice of the peace, on having his attention called to the fact, as he was about to enter judgment in a certain case, that he had not jurisdiction on account of the amount involved being over two hundred dollars, promptly responded: "The court has thought of that, and discovered a remedy. The court will enter judgment for the full amount, and then issue two executions, each for a half." In a recent action against the corporation of Canterbury, England, to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff, he having been thrown from his carriage in the night-time by coming in contact with a pile of stones left in the highway, the somewhat singular defense was set up that "the accident would not have occurred in the day-time, and that, as darkness was the act of God, so was the accident." The lord chief justice is said to have ruled against this point with some warmth. Some years since, while a judge, who now occupies a very high judicial position in the state, was holding circuit in one of the western counties, a case of a trivial character was called on. His honor, somewhat "riled," remarked that such suits, instead of taking up the time of the court, would be more properly disposed of by submitting the same to a jury of old women. The plaintiff's attorney quietly replied, that, without taking exception to the opinion of the honorable court, he thought his cause could not have been before a more appropriate tribunal. The complaint set up that the defendant, through its agents, violently assaulted plaintiff," etc., and "lamed and disabled him to his great damage," etc. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that more than two years had elapsed since the cause of action arose. This was denied, and the jury gave a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. It was conceded, in the argument, that if this was an action for assault and battery, it was barred by the statute. But it is claimed that the plaintiff's case falls within the fifth subdivision of section 91 of the code, of "any other injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract, and not hereinafter enumerated." Held, that assuming that the liability of the defendant arises from the act having been done by their servant in the course of his employment, and not negligently or unskillfully, then it follows that it was a joint trespass for which a joint or several action against either could be sustained. But the action must be for the same cause, for what a master does by his servant he does by himself. Therefore, that the action was for assault and battery, and for such cause would have been maintainable against the defendant, all being principals in the trespass; but that not having been brought within two years, it was barred by the statute of limitations. Judgment absolute for defendant, with costs. Priest v. The Hudson River Railroad Co. Opinion by Monell, J. BANKRUPT LAWS. See Libel. BILLS OF LADING. The defendants contracted to ship twenty firkins of butter to New Orleans. The voyage was abandoned, and the plaintiff demanded his butter. The defendant refused to deliver it up, unless the bills of lading were surren dered, or a proper indemnification given to the defendant against them. Action was brought to recover its value. Judgment for the defendant, Held, that the plaintiff could not recover without complying with the demand of the defendant. Judgment affirmed. Shepard v. Heineken. Opinion by Monell, J. CASE AND EXCEPTIONS. See Practice. COMMON CARRIERS. Their liabilities. - Action against a common carrier to recover for the loss of merchandise. The receipt given by defendant, on receiving the goods for transportation, had no unusual stipulations. It was an agreement to carry the goods from Baltimore to New York, deliverable to order. The defense set up was, that the merchandise was deliverable at New York, "to order." That upon its arrival in New York it remained in the possession of the defendant for two weeks, without any demand being made therefor, when it was placed in store. That subsequently, and before any demand by the plaintiff, the merchandise was taken and removed by the sheriff, in actions against the defendant, by one T. and one W., to recover possession thereof, in which actions judgments were subsequently obtained for the delivery of said merchandise to the plaintiffs respectively in said actions. That defendant was not able to find plaintiff, to notify him of said actions, etc. On the trial, plaintiff proved that his agent came to New York, and called at defendant's office a few days after the goods had been shipped from Baltimore. That said agent saw there a person who acknowledged himself to be the defendant; that he informed such person that he was the agent of the owner and shipper; asked if the goods had arrived; was informed they had not; gave his name and address to the said person, who wrote the same on a slip of paper, and promised to inform the said agent when the goods arrived. The defendant introduced the pleadings, and proceedings in the two actions for the recovery of the property, and the court below held, that there was no question of fact for the jury, and refused to submit any. The court, also, refused to charge that the defendant was bound to give notice of the replevin suits to the plaintiff, and directed a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed Held, that a new trial ought to be granted, on the ground that the question arising under the evidence of the plaintiff's agent, as stated above, was a proper one for the jury, and that it was erroneous to withhold such question from them. That the jury should have been instructed, that if they believed the defendant knew the plaintiff's agent, and his authority to receive the goods, and neglected to give him notice of their arriva!, the defendant was liable for their value, notwithstanding they had been taken in the replevin suits, and their verdict should then be for the plaintiff for such value. Judgment reversed, and new trial granted. Mierson ▼. Hope. Opinion by Monell, J. DEMURRER. See Misjoinder of Actions. EVIDENCE. -In Particular facts not admissible to impeach witness. order to attack the credibility of the defendant Mittnacht, plaintiff offered in evidence a bail bond executed by said Mittnacht, for "his appearance before the court of sessions to answer any indictment which might be found against him upon a charge of perjury." The court below submitted the fact to the jury, and instructed them as follows; "It is for you to say, whether, under all the circumstances, this charge should effect the testimony of defendant." The defendant excepted to this ruling. Plaintiff had a verdict, and defendant appealed. Held, that this was evidence of a particular fact, and so was not admissible to affect the credibility of a witness. Judgment set aside, and new trial ordered. Berner v. Rittig and Mittnacht. Opinion by Monell, J. FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS. Action for the recovery of $4,500, damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, in consequence of a false representation made to him by defendant, in the sale or exchange of some stock. The representations complained of were contained in a printed pamphlet, published by the authority of the defendant, but which the referee found was not published for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding the public, or the plaintiff. Held, this action was not trought to rescind the contract, and recover back the stock given in exchange, but to recover damages for a false and fraudulent representation. The finding of the referee (which was justified by the evidence) in favor of the defendant, on the question of fraudulent intention, is fatal to the plaintiff's claim. Thomas v. Payne. Opinion by Freedman, J. JURISDICTION. See Surrogate's Court. LIBEL. 1. Privileged communications.-An action for libel. Upon an application by one Caldwell for a discharge under United States bankrupt law, the plaintiff was examined as a witness. Subsequently, the defendant, a creditor of Caldwell's, filed exceptions to his discharge, one of the specifications being, that the plaintiff had been induced "to testify falsely on his examination, as to material facts in the bankruptcy proceedings," as, "that the bankrupt was only a salaried employee of plaintiff's firm, and that the share of the assets, which really belong to the bankrupt, was the property of others." The complaint alleged that these statements were without probable cause, were immaterial to the matter in controversy, and were untrue, malicious and willful. The defendants denied want of probable cause, or that the statements were immaterial. Verdict, under order of the justice below, for defendant. Held, that the specifications were material, and therefore privileged. They were used in opposing the bankrupt's discharge, and were certainly material under the section of the bankrupt act, which makes "any fraud whatever, contrary to the true intent of the act," a ground for refusing a discharge. The specifications being absolutely privileged, it was immaterial with what motive they were written. The defense was complete, and there was no question for the jury. Judgment ordered for defendants, on verdict. Marsh v. Elsworth. Opinion by Monell, J. 2. Matter must be material. Words spoken or written in a judicial proceeding, by any person having an interest therein, are absolutely privileged, and no action will lie therefor, however defamatory or malicious they might be, provided the matter was material to the inquiry before the court. The onus is upon the person speaking or writing the defamatory matter, to show its materiality to the controversy Ib. MISJOINDER OF ACTIONS. 1. Demurrer to, when not proper. — Appeal from an order made at special term, overruling a demurrer to the complaint. The complaint alleged, that "the defendant, on or about the 14th day of August, A. D. 1869, by himself and his servants and agents, arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff against her will, and put her in charge of a police officer, and forced and obliged her to go along the public streets of the city of New York to a certain station, house, and charged her with the crime of petit larceny, and, without any warrant or legal process, caused her to be detained in a vile and filthy cell, without any comforts, conveniences, light, or food, all night, and again caused her to be taken next morning in custody, and, as a part of the same transaction, to a police court held at Yorkville, and, before a police magistrate, falsely and maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, made a complaint before such police court against the plaintiff, in which he falsely and maliciously charged the plaintiff with having committed the offense of petit larceny, and that, by such complaint and charge, and as a part of the same transaction, the defendant caused the plaintiff, by process of commitment, to be imprisoned in a cell, in the house for detaining prisoners, for all that day and night." Then follows a statement, by way of aggravation of damages, of the character and duration of the imprisonment. A further allegation is, "that by reason of such false and illegal arrest and imprisonment, and of such false and malicious charge, complaint, and prosecution, the plaintiff" has been greatly injured, etc. The defendant demurred that several causes of action are improperly united. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant appealed. Held, that demurrer is not the proper remedy. The facts stated in the complaint, if separated, are sufficient to constitute two causes of action. The facts first stated constitute a cause of action for a false imprisonment, and those secondly stated constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The damages sought to be recovered are for the false imprisonment as well as the malicious prosecution. The facts thus firstly and secondly stated are so blended and run into each other as to constitute the narration of an entire transaction, commencing with an illegal arrest, followed by a false and malicious charge, and concluded by a further imprisonment. Under our present system of pleading it has always been a vexata quæstio, whether facts should be stated according to their legal effect, or as they actually occurred or existed. The pleader in this case has followed the latter course, and given a connected narration of facts which he claims constitutes the cause of action. Henderson v. Jackson, Opinion by Monell, J.; McCunn, J., dissentiente. 2. In abolishing all forms of pleading, the code did not quite leave the pleader to exercise his own judgment, as to the manner of framing his pleading. The code requires, that it shall contain a "plain and concise statement of facts." If two causes of action are united, they must be separately stated (code, 167); and by rule of court, must be plainly numbered. (Rule 19.) Ib. 3. These regulations are not exclusively for the convenience of parties, or to merely furnish them with information concerning the action or defense. They are, also, for the convenience of the court. Ib. 4. Until the complaint is made to conform to the requirements of the code, and rules of the court, we will not take upon ourselves the labor of ascertaining whether two causes of action are in fact stated in the complaint. That question must be determined, before we are authorized to say there is a misjoinder, and there should not be left any room for doubt on that subject. Therefore, as a preliminary, and to enable the question of misjoinder to be made certain; a motion should be made, to require the causes of action to be separated, and numbered. If any matter in the statement of facts is irrelevant or redundant, a motion should be made to strike it out. If it is indefinite or uncertain, it should be amended definitely, and certainly. Ib. 5. These are the appropriate remedies of this case, and until they are resorted to, and the causes of action are so definitely and clearly stated in the manner prescribed, that the court can at once see that there are two distinct causes of action, a demurrer is not a proper, or if a proper, not the only remedy. Order appealed from should be affirmed. Ib. PLEADINGS UNDER CODE. See Misjoinder of Actions. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. See Libel. PRACTICE. 1. Case and exceptions.—Where a case presents only questions of law upon exceptions, and they are not reserved for argument or further consideration, or ordered to be heard at general term in the first instance, it is not necessary that they should be heard before judg. ment at the special term, by way of a motion for a new trial, but the defeated party may prepare his exceptions and have them settled, await the entry of judgment, have the exceptions attached to and form part of the judgment roll, and appeal to the general term from the judgment. Ward v. The Central Park and E, R. R. R. Co. Opinion by Freedman, J. 2. The making of a case or bill of exceptions, the extending of time for making it, the proposing of amendments, the extending of time for proposing, for noticing for settlement, the settlement itself, the extending of time for filing after settlement, are all matters of detail of practice for getting the cause in proper shape to present to the general term the questions to be reviewed, and are to be disposed of at special term. The business of the general term is with the papers as previously prepared for its action. Phelps v. Swan. Opinion by Jones, J. REFERENCE. See Fraudulent Representations. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See Assault and Battery. SURROGATES' COURTS. 1. Their powers. A proceeding to remove an executor is wholly a new and original proceeding, and is not aided by any acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter. The precise grounds upon which the surrogate may move, and the manner of proceeding, are specifically prescribed by statute, and must, in all cases, be strictly observed. An omission to prove the service of a citation upon the executor makes the proof of jurisdiction defective. The People ex rel. Mayor v. Hartman. Opinion by Monell, J. 2. When jurisdiction is presumed.- Where a court or an officer of limited jurisdiction has once acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter, every intendment and presumption thereafter will be in favor of the jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings. Ib. TIME, EXTENSIONS OF. See Practice. FOURTH DEPARTMENT.* SUPREME COURT-SEPTEMBER TERM. ACTION. To recover money paid as fine in compliance with an irregular sentence.-Action for money had and received. The plaintiff's assignor was arrested on a warrant issued by the defendant, as a justice of the peace, charging him with the commission of an assault and battery. After examination he elected to be tried before the defendant as a court of special sessions. On the trial he was convicted of the offense, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $200, and to stand committed until it was paid. He paid We have in hand, and shall publish next week, abstracts of this and other departments for November and December terms. We have also abstracts of the decisions of New York common pleas general term for December. - ED. L. J. the fine to avoid being committed. The defendant soon thereafter, and before this action was brought, paid the amount of the fine over to the County Treasurer, for the use of the county, according to law, after deducting the sum allowed for costs and charges. Held, that the action could not be maintained; that although the defendant, as a court of special sessions had no power or authority to impose a fine of that amount, yet having jurisdiction of the party, and the subject-matter, and the right to impose a fine, though for a less amount, his act was not coram non judice, and void, but a mere error in the exercise of his jurisdiction, an excess of authority, and voidable, and therefore valid until avoided. That the remedy of the plaintiff's assignor was to have the judgment and sentence reversed by the court of sessions of the county, on certiorari, under the provisions of chap. 339 of session laws of 1859. Clark v. Holdridge. Opinion by Johnson, J. See, also, Covenant of Title. ACTION AGAINST ASSESSORS. See Taxes. APPEAL FROM ORDER of COUNTY COURT GRANTING NEW TRIAL. See Practice. ASSESSMENTS. See Taxes; also, Plankroads. CERTIORARI TO REVIEW ASSESSMENTS ON PLANKROADS. See Plankroads. COMMON CARRIERS. Contract for transportation of cattle: delay in transportation. The action was brought to recover damages for injury to a lot of cattle, which defendant had undertaken to transport in its cars, for plaintiff, from Goderich, in Canada, to Buffalo, in this state. There was a special contract, by which the owners undertook "all risk of loss, injury, damage, and other contingencies, in loading, unloading, conveyance, and otherwise." By another provision, it was stipulated, that the company did "not undertake to forward the animals by any particular train, or at any specified hour, neither are they responsible for the delivery of the animals within any certain time, or for any particular market." One car load was shipped on the 15th of March, 1866, and two other car loads on the 16th of the same month. In the usual course of transportation, the stock would have arrived at Buffalo the night of the shipment. When the cars reached Brantford, on their passage, they were stopped by a peremptory order from the superintendent of the road between Goderich and Buffalo, who had charge of the passenger and freight business, and preference given to other freight, which would, in two or three days thereafter, become subject to duty to one government, by reason of the expiration of the reciprocity treaty between Canada and the United States. In pursuance of this order, the cars containing the plaintiff's cattle were switched off on a side track, and left in a place where the cattle could neither be unloaded, nor fed, nor watered. They were suffered to remain in that situation until the evening of the 18th of March, when they were forwarded to Buffalo, and arrived on the morning of the 19th. Several of the cattle died in consequence of this detention, and were left at Brantford, and the others were greatly reduced in flesh, and otherwise injured. Held, that the detention did not arise from any negligence or want of care on the part of the defendant's agents or servants, but from an intentional refusal to go on and complete the performance of the undertaking begun, until new and other undertakings could be performed in preference, and that the injury and damage did not, therefore, come within any of the risks assumed by the owner of the cattle, nor any of the exemptions secured to the defendant by the contract, but was a mere intentional refusa to perform, and a plain breach of the contract, which rendered the defendant liable. Keeny v. The Grand Trunk Railway Company. Opinions by Johnson and Talcott, JJ COVENANT OF TITLE. Action for breach of: eviction in fact and law necessary: negligence of grantee: adverse possession. The action was upon an alleged breach of a covenant of warranty in a deed. The defendant, in May, 1852, conveyed to Horace Frizelle certain premises in Erie county, in this state. The grantor, in the conveyance, undertook and covenanted with the grantee to "warrant, and by these presents defend," "the above described and hereby granted and bargained premises, and every part thereof," to him, his heirs, and assigns, "against all persons lawfully claiming the same." The plaintiff derived title by sundry mesne conveyances from Frizelle. At the time of the conveyance to Frizelle, other persons were in possession of the premises claiming under some title which was invalid as against Frizelle's. Neither Frizelle nor any one claiming under him was ever in possession, in fact, of the premises. In September, 1866, the plaintiff, in the name of the defendant, commenced actions of ejectment against the several persons who were in possession at the date of Frizelle's deed, or those deriving title from them; but they, or those under whom they claimed, had then been in possession over twenty years under claim of title, and it was held in those actions that, although their title was originally invalid as against Frizelle, yet having held under it for more than twenty years, it had ripened into a good title, as against the plaintiff under Frizelle's title. The plaintiff then brought this action. Held, that the covenant was a mere covenant for quiet enjoyment, and nothing more; and that, as neither the plaintiff nor any one under whom he claimed had ever been in possession, there could have been no eviction; that the action on such a covenant cannot be maintained, unless there has been an eviction in fact and law. Held, further, that, as the plaintiff had laid by and suffered a defective title to ripen into a title paramount to his own, it was his own fault that he had lost the premises, and he could not maintain an action based upon his own negligence and inattention to his rights. Rindskopf v. The Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. Opinion by Johnson, J. EVIDENCE. 1. Value of credit and brokage. In an action to recover compensation by the plaintiff, for obtaining discounts for defendant of defendant's notes, indorsing his notes and thus aiding him with his (plaintiff's) credit, and time spent in going to distant banks to procure loans and discounts, the plaintiff was allowed to prove, by a witness who was a banker, against the defendant's objection, what, in his opinion, such services, including use of credit, were worth. Held, incompetent, and not the subject of proof by the opinion of witnesses, however skilled and competent. Because, first, the compensation for the brokage is fixed by statute (1 R. S. 709, 1), and can not be enlarged, even by agreement; and second, the loan and use of one's credit to another is matter of special agreement, without which no recovery can be had. That the law implies no promise to pay an accommodation indorser for the use of his name and credit. And in the case of a general promise to pay, without specifying any price, there is no standard by which an opinion can properly be found and expressed as to the value of such credit in any given case. Perrine v. Hotchkiss. Opinion by Johnson, J. 2. Of letters to plaintiff's intestate. In an action by administrators for money had and received, by the defendant, from the intestate,- Held, that the defendant was an incompetent witness to prove letters, written by himself to the intestate in his life-time, stating the amount of receipts and payments and the balance due from time to time, and that such letters were found by the defendant among the papers of the intestate after his decease. Held, further, that, if the letters were properly received in evidence, they were not sufficient to establish the admission of the intestate that the statements therein were correct, without some evidence tending to show that such statements had never been controverted by the intestate. Rossequie and another, adm'rs, etc., v. Mason. Opinion by Johnson, J. MECHANICS' LIEN. 1. Lien for material: running account: expiration of lien at end of a year. The proceeding was to establish a lien for materials furnished for repairing the defendant's house, in the city of Buffalo, under chap. 305, § 1, of session laws of 1844, and chap. 517 of session laws of 1851. There was no special contract. The lumber was furnished by the plaintiffs, who were lumber dealers, to the defendant, from time to time, as called for, and charged in a running account commencing September 2, 1867, and ending June 3, 1868. The last item was for $1.68, only, June 3d, and the last before that was dated May 6, 1868. The specification was not filled and notice given until June 24, 1868. There was no proof as to when repairs were completed. The proceedings to establish the lien in the county court were commenced February 24th, 1869, and were pending and undetermined in that court until April 14th, 1870. Held, Ist. That, there being no special contract, and the materials having being furnished upon a general credit or upon a merchant's account, no lien could be created under the statute on account of such materials. 2d. That, if the lien could have been created for materials thus furnished at the time the specification was filed and notice given, the lien could have been for the last item of the amount only, as more than thirty days had elapsed after the furnishing of all the other items before the filing of the specification. 3d. That, in any event, the lien expired at the expiration of one year after the filing of the specification and giving notice, and could not be continued or prolonged by proceedings in the county court. Colie v. O' Keel. Opinion by Johnson, J. 2. Judgment within the year: priority of liens, — A mechanic's lien expires at the expiration of a year from the filling of the notice, unless judgment is recovered in the proceedings within that period. People ex rel. Hull v Lamb. Opinion by Talcott, J. 3. The defendants herein obtained judgment in proceedings to enforce a lien within a year from the filing of notice the relator claimed priority to defendant's judgment, on the ground that his notice of lien was filed before that of defendants, although his judgment was not obtained until after that of defendants, and after the expiration of the year from filing notice. Held, that the judgment of defendant was paramount. Ib. PLANKROADS. Assessments of taxes on: appeal from assessments: certiorari to supreme court. - The relator, duly incorporated, constructed its plank road from Addison, in Steuben county, to Elkland, in the state of Pennsylvania, a distance of between ten and eleven miles, prior to the year 1858. The road was maintained by the corporation, and tolls collected for the whole distance, until the year 1858, when the south seven miles were abandoned and given up, in pursuance of the statutes, leaving about two and a half miles in the town of Tuscarora, in said county, and a portion in the town of Addison, which it still maintains, and receives tolls for traveling over it. The entire original cost was $21,000, or about $2,000 per mile average. Up to 1858, the surplus annual receipts had never been equal to seven per cent upon the original cost, and consequently the road had never been assessed or taxed in the towns through which it passed. In the year previous to making the annual assessments for 1869, the surplus annual receipts for toll had exceeded seven per cent on the original cost of that portion of the road which the corporation still maintained, but not of the cost of the portion abandoned inclusive; and the assess |