in connection with the application of the intermediate rule. Complainants contend that under the intermediate rule the Peoria rate of 56.5 cents was applicable on traffic from Springfield as a point on the route of the Alton to Springfield and the Baltimore & Ohio beyond and that, by reason of the provision that the Springfield rate should apply from Godfrey, this 56.5-cent rate was available for use in connection with the 28-cent rate to Godfrey in making an applicable combination of 84.5 cents.

The propriety of considering the Peoria rate as applying from Springfield under the intermediate rule is questioned by defendants on the ground that "complainants have failed to prove that Springfield is intermediate to Peoria" over the route of the Alton to Springfield and Baltimore & Ohio beyond. It is clear that the route in question passes through the Springfield switching district and that the intermediate rule makes the Peoria rate applicable from points on that route within the Springfield district. Defendants' contention apparently is based merely upon certain decisions to the effect that an intermediate rule does not make the rate applicable at all points within the switching limits of an intermediate city through which the route passes.

Whatever may be its bearing upon a situation where a rate is being sought for application to an actual shipment from a specific point within the switching limits of a city, this contention has no bearing here. It must be remembered that in the instant case there has been no shipment from Springfield and that therefore there is no specific origin point in the Springfield district to be considered. The question is: When the tariff said to apply the Springfield rate from Godfrey, what Springfield rate did it mean? If there were only one rate from Springfield, the question would not arise. But if there were two equally available rates from different points within the Springfield district, applicable over different routes, the duty rested upon defendants to specify which of these rates it was intended to apply from Godfrey. In the absence of such specification, a reasonable interpretation of the direction to apply the Springfield rate from Godfrey would be to apply the lowest available rate over any route from Springfield. The sufficiency of the reference by which the Springfield rate purportedly was made applicable from Godfrey and the question of the availability of more than one rate from Springfield also are here in dispute.

Complainants insist, for some reason which is not apparent, that as Godfrey is an Alton point and Springfield is also being served by that railroad, the tariff direction to apply the Springfield rate from

Blumer Brewing Corp. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 210 I. C. C. 547, American Oil Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 231 I. C. C. 209.

Godfrey means to use the rate which would apply on a shipment from Springfield, considered as a point on the Alton, which would move out of Springfield over the Baltimore & Ohio. Defendants deny the correctness of complainants' contention that the Springfield rate of the Alton is the one which must be applied from Godfrey, but they contend that if complainants' view is correct their case falls because there can be no Alton rate from Springfield. It is their view, assuming that the intermediate rule makes the Peoria rate applicable from Springfield, that the rate so made for application from Springfield over the Baltimore & Ohio can be a rate only of that railroad. Although the point is not considered of importance here, it would appear that the intermediate rule makes a rate the same as from Peoria applicable from every point on the route of the Alton to Springfield, and of the Baltimore & Ohio beyond, from which a specific rate is not published, and that the rate so made is the rate of the railroad upon whose rails the traffic originates, regardless of whether the origin point is local to the originating carrier or is a point at which the two carriers connect.

The situation might be different if the rate were being made by specific tariff publication instead of by application of the intermediate rule, but there is no occasion at this time to consider that question. It should be noted also that complainants' contention that the rate to apply from Godfrey must be only the Springfield rate of the same railroad which serves Godfrey, namely the Alton, if consistently applied, would nullify certain other provisions of the tariff. For instance, from certain Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company points the tariff provides that Springfield rates shall apply. But the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy does not serve Springfield. Therefore, under complainants' contention, there being no Chicago, Burlington & Quincy rate from Springfield there could be no rate at all from the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy stations from which it is directed that the Springfield rate shall apply.

Defendants contend that because of insufficient cross-references there is no authorization for the use of any Springfield rate from Godfrey. This is based on the fact that, although from Godfrey the tariff shows that Springfield rates will apply, the item publishing the specific rates from Springfield and the rate from Peoria, which complainants contend applies from Springfield by intermediate application, does not indicate that such rates are to apply from Godfrey or any other points. In a few items in the tariff which publish specific rates on certain commodities from certain origins, the list of origins is followed by the words "and points taking same rates" as shown on designated pages. Defendants contend that, in the ab

sence of some similar provision in connection with the Springfield rate here considered, they could not be applied from Godfrey.

There is no basis for this contention. If a tariff states that the rate to apply from A is the rate provided therein from B, the rate from B applies from A and there is no technical rule or rule of reason that requires that in order to effect such application the provision naming the rate from B must also contain a provision to the effect that it applies "from A" or "from points taking same rates". Whatever may have been the reason for indicating in some instances that rates shown from base points should apply from points taking the same rates, and that matter need not be considered here, the publication as made in the tariff that Godfrey should take Springfield rates was sufficient without a further statement in connection with the Springfield rate that it should apply from Godfrey or "from points taking same rates". Furthermore, it should be noted that in the instant case the Springfield rate which it is sought to apply from Godfrey is not specifically published at all but is produced by operation of the intermediate rule in connection with the rate from Peoria. Apparently, according to defendants' contention, in order for this rate to apply from Godfrey it would be necessary for the intermediate rule to provide that the rate from the fartherdistant point would apply from the intermediate point and "points taking same rates" or some similar provision. No such necessity

exists.

Defendants further contend that the Peoria rate could not apply from Springfield under the intermediate rule because that rule comes into play only when there is no rate named in the tariff from the intermediate point, whereas here specific rates of 60.5 cents to Pittsburgh, for instance, are named over certain roads from Springfield. This contention ignores the italicized portion of the following excerpt from the intermediate rule:

From any point of origin from which a commodity rate on a given article to a given destination and via a given route is not named in this tariff, which point is intermediate,

The tariff names no specific rate from any point south of Peoria to and including Springfield on the route of the Alton to Springfield and the Baltimore & Ohio beyond. There is no doubt that the intermediate rule makes the Peoria rate applicable on shipments in connection with which the Baltimore & Ohio is the line-haul carrier from Springfield, and the publication of specific rates over other roads from Springfield does not affect the situation. The application of any rate higher than 56.5 cents from Springfield over the Baltimore & Ohio would create fourth-section violations, because there are points on the Alton south of Peoria, to which Springfield

is intermediate, from which the Peoria rate of 56.5 cents applied, by operation of the intermediate rule, over the route of the Alton to Springfield and the Baltimore & Ohio beyond. The Peoria rate, made applicable from Springfield over this route by operation of the intermediate rule, is just as specific and definite as the rates published from Springfield over the Illinois Central and other carriers. There were, therefore, two rates available from Springfield, and, in line with what is above stated, the shipper was entitled to use the lower of the two as the component beyond Godfrey in constructing the combination on that point.

The foregoing has reference to shipments to points of which Pittsburgh is representative. In the report on reargument, the same findings were made with respect to shipments to such points and to points in central territory. Upon further examination of the tariffs and of testimony with respect thereto presented at the last hearing, it develops that tariff provisions which resulted in making the Godfrey combination applicable to points of which Pittsburgh is representative do not apply in connection with traffic to centralterritory destinations.

The rates charged on shipments from the Missouri River to the central-territory destinations, of which Cincinnati, Ohio, and Indianapolis, Ind., are representative, were combinations composed of the rate of 28 cents to East St. Louis plus the applicable commodity rates from that point, of 31.5 cents to Indianapolis and of 38.5 cents to Cincinnati. The rates from Peoria to those points were 31 and 38 cents, respectively. It is apparent, therefore, that if the Peoria rates could be used to build combinations on some point to which the in-bound rate was 28 cents, such combinations would be 0.5 cent lower than those on East St. Louis.

An intermediate rule similar to that previously referred to applies in connection with the Peoria rates to these central-territory points, and it is contended that under this rule the Peoria rates apply from the intermediate points of Godfrey, Beardstown, and Edwardsville, Ill., to which the rate from the Missouri River is 28 cents. From Beardstown and Edwardsville, which are not served by the Alton, tariff provision is made for application of the East St. Louis rates. The intermediate rule comes into play only at points from which commodity rates are not otherwise provided. The provision for application of the East St. Louis rates from Beardstown and Edwardsville therefore prevents application of the Peoria rates from those points by operation of the intermediate rule. In connection with traffic to the central-territory points, there is no provision for application of Springfield rates, or any other specific rates, from Godfrey. The only way that the Peoria rates

216338m-40-vol. 235-14

could apply from Godfrey would be by intermediate application. Godfrey is intermediate to Peoria in connection with traffic to central-territory points only by way of the Alton to East St. Louis and connecting lines beyond. There are other routes over which the Peoria rates apply, in comparison with which the route through East St. Louis is grossly circuitous. Furthermore, to apply the Peoria rate from Peoria and intermediate points, such as Godfrey, over that route would result in fourth-section violations, because such rates are lower than those from an intermediate point, namely, East St. Louis.

In these circumstances, and following the principle of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Delmar Co., 283 U. S. 686, it may not be found that the Peoria rate applied from Godfrey to these destinations.

We affirm the findings in the report on reargument with respect to shipments to points of which Pittsburgh is representative, but with respect to shipments to central territory we find that the applicable rates were charged.

No order will be entered immediately, but the parties will be given an opportunity to adjust the charges in accordance with the findings herein.

MILLER, Commissioner, dissenting in part:

I disagree with the conclusions here reached by the majority insofar as they affirm in part the findings made by the Commission in its prior report on reargument. In my opinion those findings should be reversed in their entirety and the conclusions reached by division 3 in the original report, dismissing these complaints, should be affirmed.

I am authorized to state that COMMISSIONER LEE joins in this expression.

SPLAWN, Commissioner, dissenting in part:

I agree with so much of the report as finds that the rates charged to destinations in central territory were applicable. I dissent from the finding that the combination of a rate to Godfrey, Ill., and a rate published from Peoria, Ill., (found by the majority to be applicable from Godfrey) was applicable to Pittsburgh and other points in eastern territory.

I am authorized to state that COMMISSIONER MAHAFFIE joins in this expression.

COMMISSIONER ROGERS dissents.