tended to delude for a time the people of the United States, with the industrious assistance of certain American newspapers and certain business interests that have discovered reasons of their own for helping the Spanish Government in its endeavors to mislead American public opinion. The plan by which in Cuba it was hoped that the bogus autonomy proposals might be used in a way to injure the insurgents ought also to be clearly understood. Instead of having these proposals submitted in a straightforward and proper manner to the central authorities, civil and military, of the Cuban republic, it was the plan of Governor-General Blanco to send emissaries into detached camps, with special inducements to the leaders of a great number of different bands of insurgents. These emissaries were carefully selected with reference to the leaders whose defection it was hoped to accomplish. Wherever possible the emissary was an old-time acquaintance or friend of the leader to whom he was sent. When these emissaries were dispatched as peace commissioners to the various insurgent camps, the pro-Spanish press was supplied with endless false dispatches announcing the actual or prospective ac. ceptance of the autonomy plan by one and another of the insurgent chieftains. The game as a whole was an extremely adroit one; and nothing more

SEÑOR MONTORO, LEADER OF THE AUTONOMIST PARTY IN

CUBA.

shamelessly mendacious was ever attempted. These detached Cuban leaders were all of them sworn to do battle in good faith for Cuban independence and to obey absolutely the orders of their superiors. This fact was well known by the Spanish governor-general and his emissaries. Nevertheless, the literary bureau of the governorgeneral was sending out false reports of the desertion of one after another of these Cuban chieftains from the patriot cause.

The Execu

onel Ruiz.

After awhile, however, the Spaniards tion of Col- were not able further to suppress the news that their emissaries were not returning; and in due time the world received the shocking announcement of the execution of General Blanco's aid-de-camp Colonel Ruiz, who had been sent to the camp of the insurgent chief Rodriguez. Ruiz had been tried by a Cuban courtmartial, condemned to death, and immediately shot. There has been a great deal of condemnation of the Cuban insurgents as barbarians in view of this action. It should be borne in mind, however, that deadly warfare exists in Cuba, and that the emissaries of General Blanco were not in good faith carrying peace proposals to the insurgents, but were using the bogus autonomy project as an ex

en

ish emissaries as spies. We have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that under all the circumstances Rodriguez and his court-martial were justified in condemning Colonel Ruiz, and that the fate which overtook other emissaries sent out by Blanco was equally justifiable from the standpoint of military necessity. In no other way with so little loss of life could the Cuban insurgents have convinced the world promptly and unmistakably that the Spanish authorities were gaged in a conspiracy of trickery and falsehood in their widespread reports that the insurgents were rapidly accepting autonomy, and that the insurgent chieftains were one after another gladly availing themselves of opportunities to obtain commissions in the Spanish army or civil offices under the proposed autonomist government. The juncture was a grave one, and the insurgent authorities could not afford to allow suspicion to be cast upon any of their leaders in the field. ery one must regret the death of Colonel Ruiz, precisely as the death of Major André will always be lamented. But the justification for the execution of Ruiz was more clear than that which led

Ev

our Revolutionary forefathers to execute André. Each of these officers was engaged in negotiations. to secure the treasonable defection of a military opponent. But in the case of Benedict Arnold, the British emissary had been actually invited into the corrupt negotiation; while Colonel Ruiz took his life in his hand at the behest of his superior, General Blanco, in a presumptuous attempt to bribe and corrupt an insurgent chieftain who certainly could not afford to have any suspicion cast upon his loyalty to the Cuban cause. The execution of such emissaries, like the execution of spies in time of war, rests upon grounds of military necessity that must exist until wars themselves are abolished.

American

Solicited.

lt

The Blanco administration in Cuba had Charity begun with the announcement that the starving reconcentrados should be immediately relieved; but the promise proved an empty one. Owing to the collapse of the Spanish treasury there was no pay for the soldiers; and the food supplies at General Blanco's disposal were wholly insufficient for his own troops. was impossible, therefore, to do anything worth mentioning for the Cuban peasants who had been driven from their fields and homes and were starving to death by the scores of thousands in the garrisoned towns. Under these circumstances the Spanish Government, through Minister De Lome at Washington, intimated to our Department of State that it would be agreeable to Spain if the charitable people of the United States should make contributions for the relief of these unhappy Cuban sufferers, and further assurances were given that it would be satisfactory to Spain if money and supplies sent from this country should be forwarded to the American consuls in Cuba and distributed under their surveillance. Accordingly the Secretary of State, by direction of President McKinley, gave public notice of the need that existed in Cuba, and an appeal was made to the charitably inclined to make their contributions. It had heretofore been a part of the pro-Spanish conspiracy in the United States to deny the reports of starvation among the Cuban peasants, but the appalling facts could no longer be suppressed. The deathrate for several months past has been so high that the majority of the reconcentrados have already passed beyond the need of help.

tion. The dissatisfaction of this Spanish element at Havana with the autonomist proposals became so great that it finally expressed itself on January 12 in formidable riots, directed chiefly against the offices of two or three Havana newspapers which were supporting the autonomist plan. These riots were participated in very largely by men wearing the uniforms of Spanish military officers. It was feared for a time that the rioters would mob the American consulate; but Consul-General Lee's headquarters were promptly protected by an ample body of troops, and the suppression of the riot was a comparatively simple matter. The outbreak had accomplished no great harm, but as a symptom it was deemed a matter of the most serious import. All the circumstances indicated an intense desire in Havana to precipitate a crisis that would lead to some sort of a final solution, and it was considered by those best competent to judge that this preliminary rise of the mob might soon be followed by rioting of a more general and desperate character. The first rumors that reached the United States were so manipulated by the sensational newspapers as to sell large editions of socalled "war extras." These newspapers, appearing at very frequent intervals through several hours on January 13, informed their credulous readers that the whole Atlantic squadron of our navy had been ordered to get up steam immediately and sail for Havana.

Our Navy

in

Southern Waters.

The reports conveyed by these extras were not precisely accurate; nevertheless they rested upon a certain foundation of truth. Undoubtedly Consul-General Lee had informed the authorities at Washington that the situation was extremely critical, and that American interests in Havana required that a sufficient naval force should be immediately accessible. In any case, it had been decided by the Secretary of the Navy, with the President's approval, that our Atlantic squadron should rendezvous in the Key West neighborhood; and the southward movement of the ships, already arranged for, was expedited on account of the alarming situation in Cuba. It was publicly announced that the fleet would proceed to the Gulf of Mexico, sailing from Hampton Roads, Virginia, on January 15, to the Dry Tortugas, which will be the headquarters of the squadron for some time to come. We present herewith a little outline map which will remind our readers of the precise position of the Dry Tortugas with relation to Key West and Havana. From this harbor it would be possible to proceed to Havana on about six hours' notice. The fleet assembled in these southern waters is a very formidable one, and in fighting power is regarded as actually superior to the entire resources of the Spanish navy. Admiral Sicard is in command.

ron

Havana ?

Probably the presence of so Will the White Squad- powerful an American squadron in the vicinity of Havana will have some restraining effect upon the excited population of the Cuban capital. Nevertheless it would seem to us now as more than likely that the fleet would be compelled by circumstances in the early future to proceed from the Dry Tortugas to the Cuban coast. Much, of course, will depend upon happenings in Spain. The Sagasta cabinet is by no means secure, and it would not be strange if it should be overthrown before these

pages reach our readers. General Weyler is moving heaven and earth to attain political control in Spain, in order to ride rough-shod over his enemies. His remarkable protest addressed directly to the Queen Regent against the allusions in President McKinley's message has been given to the public. General Weyler must either take the chances of a court-martial or must succeed in producing a cabinet crisis and overthrow the Sagasta ministry. In the event of a new Conservative cabinet, dominated either openly or behind the scenes by General Weyler, a clash between Spain and the United States would be almost inevitable. The conviction is growing throughout the whole civilized world that the Cuban question must be settled very soon, and that the United

SENATOR MARCUS A. HANNA, OF OHIO.

States, in one manner or another, is destined to be drawn into the controversy. If in our presentation of the history of the month we have given an unusually large space to the Cuban contest, it is because for American readers the matter has at this time an exceptional importance.

The Senatorial Contest in Ohio.

The election of United States Senators has given occasion for many serious scandals in our recent politics. If Senators were elected directly by the people, the Legislatures would be relieved of a duty that is both distracting and demoralizing. Since, however, our institutions do not provide for the direct popular selection of Senators, the people in some States have undertaken to reach practically the same end by naming their senatorial preference in the regular party convention. This is done with the understanding that members of the Legislature will heed the party instruc tion, precisely as the members of the electora college invariably cast their votes in accordance with the presidential nominations made by the national party conventions. The Ohio campaign of last fall-though waged directly for the election of a governor and other State officers and a new Legislature was in reality led on the two

opposing sides by the accredited party candidates for the United States Senate. The Republican State Convention, while granting a renomination to Governor Bushnell, designated the Hon. Marcus A. Hanna as its choice for the United States Senate. It will be remembered by our readers that when the Hon. John Sherman was appointed Secretary of State in President McKinley's cabinet, his vacated seat in the Senate was temporarily filled by Governor Bushnell's appointment of Mr. Hanna. Such an appointment by a governor holds good until the Legisla ture meets in regular session and elects a Senator. Mr. Sherman's unexpired term will have been served out on March 4 of the present year; and it became the duty of the new Ohio Legislature, which assembled on January 3, to elect a Senator for the remaining weeks of the present term and also for the full six-year term, beginning March 5. The Ohio election in November resulted not only in the success of Governor Bushnell, but also in the election of a Republican Legislature by a small but safe majority. The great struggle of the campaign had been for the control of the Legislature, and had been managed by Mr. Hanna on the Republican side and Mr. John R. McLean, the proprietor of the Cincinnati Enquirer, on the Democratic side. It was perfectly understood and agreed throughout the State that if the Democrats should gain the control of the Legislature Mr. McLean would be elected to the Senate; while Republican success would mean that Mr. Hanna should not only continue to serve through the few remaining weeks of the present term, but should also be chosen for the full succeeding period of six years.

A Custom

Law.

Mr. Hanna's victory was therefore Stronger Than considered by the country at large as entirely assured when it was learned that a Republican Legislature had been chosen. This assurance rested upon precisely the same grounds of American political custom as made certain Mr. McKinley's success when it was ascertained in November, 1896, that the Republicans had secured a majority in the electoral college. Nobody supposed for a moment that the friends of Speaker Reed, Senator Allison, or any other prominent Republican would endeavor to persuade a few Republican presidential electors to join with Democratic electors in the scheme to cast their votes in the electoral college for some other Republican, in order to defeat Mr. McKinley. There was, of course, no law to prevent their entering into just such an arrangement. In accordance with both the letter and the original intention of the Constitution, the electors could have cast their votes for any eligible American citizen at

their discretion.

But in this matter of electing Presidents the existing custom has become as accepted a rule as if it were embodied in the Constitution and statutes. In just the same manner it has come to be understood that where in any given State a legislative campaign is fought upon party lines and the party conventions have named senatorial candidates, the members elected to the Legislature are bound in good faith to vote for the party's senatorial nominee. Only such members of the Legislature as clearly and openly during the campaign had avowed an independent position on the question of the senatorship could be regarded as free to work and vote against the party's choice for the United States Senate. Ever since the memorable legislative campaign in Illinois, when Abraham Lincoln was the Republican choice for the United States Senate and Stephen A. Douglas the Democratic choice, the plan has at times been employed of selecting the senatorial candidate in party convention; and where such selections have been made they have been adhered to in good faith by the Legislatures.

Combination.

In view of these facts and considThe Anti-Hanna erations, it may well be imagined that Ohio was thrown into fierce excitement when it was discovered on the eve of the assembling of the Legislature that-under the leadership of Mr. Kurtz, the former chairman of the State Republican Committee, with the countenance and moral aid of Governor Bushnell-a strenuous attempt was being made to effect an agreement by which a handful of anti-Hanna Republican legislators should be supported by the entire body of Democrats in the Legislature, to defeat Mr. Hanna and elect a Republican belonging to the other faction of the party. Mr. Kurtz played this unprecedented political game with an

MAYOR M'KISSON.

amazing energy, and his combination seemed at first to be sure of success. The Ohio Legislature contains thirty-six members in the Senate and one hundred and nine in the House, a total on joint ballot of one hundred and forty-five. On January 3 Mr. Kurtz' combination defeated the regular candidates for presiding officers in both houses, and elected anti-Hanna Republicans. All that was needed for the defeat of Mr. Hanna on joint ballot of the houses was eight Republican votes, with the solid concurrence of the sixty-five Democratic members. The excitement became intense, and the leading Republicans from every part of the State flocked to Columbus, while the Ohio Congressmen also deserted Washington to participate in the struggle. Charges of bribery and other improper methods were freely made by both sides. The half dozen Republican legislators who had secured the antiHanna organization of both chambers were besieged by hordes of indignant constituents from their home counties, and subjected to intense pressure by the principal leaders of both sides.

Victory.

Several of them wavered, and finally Mr. Hanna's went back to the Hanna camp. A great effort was being made, meanwhile, to induce two or three of the Democratic members to desert the combination and throw away their votes by casting them for Democrats who were not actual candidates. The plan at length succeeded, and Mr. Hanna was elected by the barest possible majority. The tactical weakness of the anti-Hanna combination was due to its failure to have a strong candidate ready. It seemed to be understood that Mr. Kurtz himself was to be the man; but at the last moment Mayor McKisson, of Cleveland, was substituted. Whatever may have been the motives of individuals, the anti