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THE AMERICAN MONTHLY

VOL. XVII.

Review of Reviews.

NEW YORK, MAY, 1898.

No. 5.

Cuba's Charter of Freedom.

THE PROGRESS OF THE WORLD.

In the small hours of the morning of April 19 the two houses of Congress adopted a preamble and resolutions under the following title:

Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

The full text of the momentous declaration which bears the foregoing legal title may well be put on record herewith:

WHEREAS, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore be it resolved:

First-That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second-That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third-That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth-That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

April 19.

The resolution was signed by PresiA Memorable dent McKinley on the morning of the next day, April 20, the Cabinet having meanwhile advised him in the drafting of an ultimatum to Spain, which was immediately cabled. The ultimatum informed the Spanish Government of the nature of the joint resolutions, and gave three days within which Spain might decide to meet our demands and avoid a war. In any event, the passage of these resolutions marked the end of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba. The real independence day that the Cubans will celebrate in time to come will be the 19th day of April. It is true that there was no reason whatever to believe that Spain would yield to the ultimatum without at least some show of fight, and there can never be a show of fight without the danger of serious loss on both sides. Nor can any country that draws its sword against another foretell how soon it may turn again to its plowshares. Nevertheless, it is true for Cuba that the long-desired boon of independence was perfectly assured when Mr. McKinley signed the joint resolution declaring that the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. The events of the 19th and 20th of April came as the culmination of a period of many days' discussion that was at times exceedingly violent, yet which upon the whole disclosed a remarkable unanimity about the essential fact that Spain had inevitably forfeited Cuba.

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long ago as the year 1896.

The protests they were making in the month of April, 1898, ought to have been made when the Republican National Convention at St. Louis, in the summer of 1896, unanimously adopted the independence of Cuba as one of the planks in its platform; while the Democratic National Convention at Chicago committed itself almost, if not quite, as explicitly. Ever since the Cuban revolution broke out in the early weeks of the year 1895, there has been a growing determination in the minds and hearts of the American people that this time the Spaniards must go. They saw that we had erred in failing to liberate Cuba at some time in the course of the ten years' struggle that was ended twenty years ago under promises of reform on Spain's part which were never fulfilled; and they were inwardly resolved not to repeat the mistake.

The "Peace Men" Awoke a Year Too Late.

66

Even if the peace-at-any-price men had been justified in ignoring the actions of the great national conventions almost two years ago, there can be no excuse, from their own point of view, for the silence they kept when President Cleveland in his elaborate discussion of the Cuban question in his message of December, 1896, declared that he saw no prospect of an early termination of the Cuban struggle, and that the United States might in the near future have to recognize higher obligations" than the duty of neutrality to Spain, and intervene to save the island from absolute ruin. This, let it be remembered, was before the reconcentration policy of General Weyler had wrought its mature results. Since Mr. Cleveland's prophetic message, the situation has grown steadily worse; and the tide of moral indignation in the United States has risen higher and higher. And yet there are educated people in the United States-most of them, it would seem, residing in the city of New York-whose bewilderment and surprise in the middle of April, 1898, showed plainly that they had never for one moment been aware that the Cuban question had so much as existed for anybody in the United States except for the readers of what they were pleased to call the yellow journals "—which journals they had sedulously excluded from their clubs as well as from their homes. They were as ignorant, in fact, of the actual state of American opinion as were Marie Antoinette and the lighter element of the French court as late as June, 1789, that a really serious revolution was impending. particular sort of innocence did not, of course. play any influential part at Washington last month. The small group of men who struggled ably to the very last to prevent intervention were perfectly well informed and knew exactly what they

66

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of April 19-21 much sooner than we should otherwise have reached the point of intervention by force. This, however, may at least be questioned. We had sent our warships to the vicinity of Cuba in the middle of January, apparently with the intention of presenting an ultimatum at a very early day. The whole country-always excepting Wall Street and that peculiar element of educated persons who are apparently never able to understand things until they have receded into historical prospective was ready for action on grounds of humanity. As a preparation for a vigorous policy, the President had collected from our consuls in Cuba a great mass of reports confirming all the assertions of the newspapers about the starvation of the reconcentrados. gress had called for these reports, and the President was just on the eve of giving them to the Senate and to the world, when the news of th Maine explosion came. The excitement cause by that event led the President to defer making, public the consular reports. It was feared that the reports, plus the Maine disaster, would lead Congress to declare war on the instant. And so there followed the anxious period of suspense while the Naval Board was making its tedious inquiry. On March 28, more than forty days after the explosion, the President transmitted the report of the Naval Board to Congress, with a brief message, in which he said that he could not permit himself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation would dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two governments."

The LongAwaited Message.

It was understood that the transmission of this report of the Naval Board, which pointed to culpable negligence, if not direct complicity, on the part of the Spanish authorities, would soon be followed by an elaborate and vigorous message from the President dealing with the whole Cuban question. Date after date was set for the sending in of his message, and again and again some excuse was given for its postponement. The impatience of Congress was simply a reflex of the anxiety and impatience of the country at large. Congress and the country showed, however, a most extraordinary patience, while the President was occupied with well-meant

PRESIDENT WILLIAM M'KINLEY.

(As he appeared to De Lipman, of the Journal, in April.)

but futile schemes of diplomacy. Finally, on Monday, April 11, the belated message actually arrived. The nervous excitement of the country had only become the more intense by reason of waiting, and the message fell short of the wishes of those whose overwrought feelings demanded vehement and burning expressions. It was, nevertheless, a wise message, and its conservatism was not of a kind to thwart the development of a strong policy by Congress. It set forth the attempts that had been made to deal with Spain by negotiation and admitted that nothing further in that direction could be done. It recited the horrors of Spanish methods in Cuba and declared that the war must stop. It argued against the recognition of Cuban independence, upon the wellestablished ground that recognition should follow rather than precede the accomplished fact. The policy that it recommended to Congress was "the forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity." The President's long argument and review led up to the following conclusion and advice:

The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American in

terests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens, as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

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Congress.

It is to be noted that the message did Action in not explicitly side with the insurgents in their demand for independence, although there was little reason to believe that the President's policy could result in anything but the extinguishment of the Spanish title. The President, however, declared himself ready to execute any policy that Congress might adopt. The question was at once taken hold of by the proper committee in each house. At length, on the 13th, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives reported a resolution which was adopted on the same day by a vote of 322 to 19. This resolution directed the President to intervene at once in Cuba, authorized him to use the

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army and navy, and further directed him to establish in the island a free and independent government of the people. Thus it was made certain that pacification should not be followed by a compromise which would retain even a nom

SENATOR CUSHMAN K. DAVIS.
(Author of the Senate committee's report.)

inal Spanish sovereignty. In the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee reported on April 14 resolutions identical with those printed on our opening page (except the last section, afterward unanimously added as an amendment). They were accompanied by a powerful and brilliant report prepared and presented by Senator Cushman K. Davis, chairman of the committee, which, next to the President's papers, is to be regarded as the most important of the documentary records of the month. The Senate has no machinery for shutting off debate; but the committee's resolu tions would have been adopted in short order but for the introduction of an amendment recognizing the existing provisional government of the Cuban republic. The most conspicuous advocates of this amendment were Senator Foraker on the Republican side and Senator Turpie on the other. The Democrats formed by far the greater part of the supporters of the amendment. On the 16th the recognition amendment was voted upon, and it was carried by a majority of 51 to 37. The resolutions as thus amended were then adopted by a vote of 67 to 21. This was on Saturday.

The

Question of

It was well known that the House would not readily concur in recog "Recognition." nizing the provisional republic, and it was feared that a protracted deadlock might ensue. Patriotism, however, was triumphant over preference; and after a fourteen hours' session, which extended from the time of assembling on Monday until nearly 2 o'clock on Tuesday morning, the report of a joint conference committee was accepted by both houses. This report substituted the Senate resolutions for those of the other chamber, but omitted the clause recognizing the present Cuban Government. The plan as adopted had the fullest approval of the Presi dent, and would seem by all means to have been the wiser and safer one for the country to pursue. Recognition of the Masso government may indeed follow at a very early day, but at the outset of armed intervention the United States ought not to be hampered. Under the circumstances, our demand that Spain should withdraw her troops and relinquish sovereignty in Cuba can mean nothing except that she is to relinquish authority to the United States. We are in the position of a court which assumes temporary control of an estate with a view to its proper disposal. We distinctly avow that in taking it upon ourselves to expel Spain from Cuba we also assume the duty and responsibility of restoring order in the island and of protecting the lives and rights of all elements of the population. We have further pledged ourselves explicitly in our turn to relinquish authority just as soon as we shall have been able to supervise the establishment of an independent Cuban republic. This, doubtless, will mean the extension of the existing

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