fulfil them. As the Pontiff grew warm in his discourse, and opened his mind with his secret misgivings and ideas, the difficulty became more evident of inclining him to the requests of King Charles Albert. In vain did the envoys point out, that he might live in secure reliance on the honour of the Sardinian Government, that both the presence of the Minister Pareto at Gaeta, and their mission, attested it; that the envoys sent to Florence and Rome were commissioned to ascertain the public feeling, and by no means to give into those schemes for an Italian Constituent of the sort propounded by the Tuscan Government, which ran counter both to the rights of the Princes and to the weal of their subjects; that Gioberti, the newly-appointed Minister of Sardinia, had the honour of having long before dispatched Rosmini to Rome to foster the Italian Federation, whence it might be taken for certain that the same idea would now be pushed with steady dispatch. In vain did the Envoys disclose their doubts whether foreign forces could re-establish the temporal authority of the Popedom, on the basis of love, harmony, and trust; nor did they keep back their fears lest the complaints of ancient times, imputing it to Rome that she it was who entailed upon Italy the curse of foreign armies, should be revived and aggravated. It was to no purpose: Pius IX. dismissed the envoys of Charles Albert, without affording a hope that he would accept their offers, or follow their advice. Nor did his tone vary, when they, a second time, discoursed on the same points. He lamented that Roman affairs should

have reached such a point as to make any restoration without the use of force questionable: he regretted the mischiefs Italy must undergo, should it be needful to appeal to the mercy and the power of foreigners; but, he added, it was little less than impossible to dispense with it, especially because the only Italian Governments possessing powerful armies, Naples and Piedmont, were on bad terms with one another. To this the envoys replied, that the prudence, with which the Sardinian Government had carried itself in the Sicilian question, furnished proof of its anxiety to maintain or restore that harmony among Italian Sovereigns, which alone could give stability to the several States, or independence to the Nation: and that although there might seem to be no friendship between Naples and Sardinia, yet neither was there any open enmity, or any actual proceeding that could stand in the way of arrangements for the benefit of the Pontiff and of Italy. They intreated His Holiness thoroughly to consider those unhappy consequences from foreign intervention, of which he had avowed his fear; unhappy, possibly, not in the temporal sphere alone, but also in the spiritual. Still the Pope was not moved by these fresh instances, and did not accept their renewed proffers at this second interview, nor, subsequently, at the third and last. Cardinal Antonelli, too, held such language, that the Sardinian envoys could not but conclude the Roman Court was fixed in the resolution to fall back upon arrangements with the foreign Powers.

The circumstances above related show what were

the spirit and the views of King Charles Albert and of Gioberti in regard to the Head of Catholicism and Sovereign of Rome, and to Italy; and how void of truth and justice are the accusations on this point, brought by writers who make their own splenetic suspicions, with party resentments and common gossip, the groundwork both of their charges and of history itself. The Government of Sardinia was not seeking, and never sought, to become master of Italy; nor did it ever occur to Charles Albert or to Gioberti to attack the temporal Sovereignty of the Popedom, or to favour the Roman rebellion: rather, they studied every means of bringing back the States of the Church to tranquillity and to the constitutional system, so as to procure a a good understanding with the Italian Sovereigns, and thereby prevent foreign invasions, while giving security to the thrones of Central Italy, and concluding the Federation. Of this I will supply a weighty proof, by printing the secret instructions to Count Martini, appointed Minister at the Court of His Holiness in lieu of the Marquis Pareto. Here they are.

"The Minister will be in relations of business with the de-facto Government now existing in Rome; but in relations of office with the Holy Father only, to whom he is accredited.

"The immediate objects of his mission are two: the one a reconciliation between the Holy Father and the Roman people; the other, the speediest possible conclusion of the Italian Federation.

"With a view to the first, the Minister will point out to the de-facto Government in Rome the necessity of the most

prompt reconciliation with the Holy Father, through the offer to him of conditions adapted to satisfy the delicacy of his conscience as Pontiff, and his essential rights as a Sovereign.

"Should the schism between the Holy Father and the people of Rome be prolonged, the States of the Church and the whole of Italy will incur the most serious hazard: for Foreign Powers will intervene in our affairs, to the grave detriment of our dignity and of our independence.

"If the Government in Rome wish for a mediator between themselves and the Holy Father, the Minister will tender the sincere and cordial aid of the Piedmontese Government.

"As respects the Roman Constituent, proclaimed by the Club of the People at Rome (differing totally from the Federative Constituent, proclaimed by Mamiani, and approved by this Government), the Minister will act according to circumstances. If not now too late to avert it by argument, he will use his best efforts to effect that purpose. He will point out to those in power at Rome, that, as the very designation of such an assembly throws a doubt on the sovereignty of the Pontiff, it may be construed by him as a manifest wrong and treason; and, besides other evils, it will offer an impediment to the Federation, which is of moment to all Italy.

"Again, should a tendency to extremes prevail in this Constituent, and the temporal authority of the Pope thus be curtailed, all must see that it would bring the stranger into our home, and, without gaining its own end, would put in peril all we have up to this time realised.

"If, however, the convocation of this Constituent should be a measure accomplished and beyond recall, the Minister will employ all his efforts to mitigate and limit the results. He will labour to give it a favourable turn, by bringing it to aim at a discriminating separation between the temporal and spiritual administration, while it shall bear intact the supreme authority of the Pontiff as a constitutional Prince. With this view, he will point out to the Romans, that, in a con

trary course, Rome could not have the support of Piedmont, while she would have against her, along with the residue of Italy, a moiety of Europe.

"Such will be the preliminary mission which, as matter of business, the Minister is to discharge in Rome. Having executed these instructions, he will repair to the Holy Father, will produce his credentials from hence, and will state to him that this Government earnestly desires the acceptance of its mediation by the Holy Father. If he shall have found a conciliatory, disposition on the part of those in power at Rome, he will make it understood before the Pontifical throne, and will leave no means untried of bringing about the desired harmony.

"It may be well to apprise the Minister in this place, that His Majesty's Government, a few days back, dispatched to the Holy Father an embassy extraordinary, to invite him to sojourn in the Sardinian territory. The Minister will renew the invitation and the offer, and will point out to the Holy Father that a residence in Piedmont would conduce more than any other to his dignity and safety, supposing that he does not at present intend to re-enter his own dominions.

"Above all, the Minister is to dwell on the reasons that should lead the Pontiff to try every mode of conciliation. Religion asks it, suffering as she does from the present estrangement, because her enemies take occasion from it to depict the Pope as an enemy to the freedom or the nationality of Italy. The weal of Italy asks it, because the prolonged absence of the Pontiff from Rome may impede the Italian Federation, and invite the stranger into our country. Moreover, this absence gives strength and hope to the extravagant sects, which aim at overturning the political institutions of the Peninsula, but which will lose their energy, so soon as the Supreme Father shall return among his children. On this account it may be said, that on the early return of Pius IX. depends in great part the destiny of all Italy, nay, I dare to add, of all Europe, considering its close relations with the Metropolis, and with the Head of the Catholic world.