[Duke of Richmond's scheme for fortifying the dock-yards.] servations in a new light, without any fresh argument; and no general debate having ensued, the address was carried without a division.

sure.

The first important object that occupied the deliberations of parliament, was a measure which originated with the duke of Richmond, master-general of the ordnance. Intelligent and ardent, this nobleman had paid peculiar attention to mathematics, as a ground-work of military skill, especially gunnery and fortification, and desired to rest a great portion of the national defence against the approaches of an enemy, on the abilities and exertions of an engineer. In these sentiments he was confirmed by his conception of recent events. The late war had seen the Bourbon armadas hovering on our coasts: accident only (he thought) secured us from the danger with which we were menaced: our country might have been attacked, our docks and harbours destroyed. Under this impression, the duke from the time he became master of the ordnance, had been uniformly eager for adding to our defences a plan of fortification; and, as we have seen, had inculcated this doctrine upon ministers. In the former session, a scheme of his grace for fortifying the dock-yards of Portsmouth and Plymouth was incidentally mentioned in the house of commons, without being introduced in a regular motion: the house expressed an unwillingness to apply the public money to the execution of such a scheme, until acquainted with the opinions of persons most competent to decide on the wisdom and utility of such a meaThat the desired information might be obtained, his majesty appointed a board of military and naval officers to take the project under consideration, and to meet for that purpose at Portsmouth, with the Duke of Richmond as their president. The instructions issued to this council propounded six hypothetical positions as themes for discussion, and annexed heads and questions for directing the application of the assumptions to the objects of inquiry.* The hypothesis on which the proposition was grounded was, that the fleet should be absent, or for some other cause prevented from affording its protection to the dockyards. In the first and second problems, this case was assumed and submitted to the council: the unanimous answer was, that if the dockyards were not defended by the fleet, fortifications would be necessary.† The four subsequent heads of consultation were grounded upon this basis; and presupposing the absence of the fleet, examined the probable force with which an enemy might invade Britain during such absence of our navy, the troops that might be expected to be ready, the time in which the strength of the country could be collected, and the insufficiency of the present works to hold out until an army were assembled to oppose the invaders. Concerning these subordinate questions, there was considerable diversity of opinion; the greater number, however, delivered a report, which approved the scheme of fortification as requisite for the supposed emergency, but gave no opinion on the probability that such a crisis would arise. Lord Percy and General Burgoyne, with several naval officers, went beyond the given case, and represented the hypothetical event as so extremely unlikely to happen, that it was neither wise nor expedient to provide against it by the expensive system

See instructions transmitted to the board of officers, dated April 13th, 1785, with extracts from the reports of the board, as laid before the house of commons on the 27th of February, 1786.

See opinion of officers on the first and second data.

[Is submitted to Parliament. Arguments in favour of the plan.]

which was proposed. Admirals Milbanke and Graves, Captains Macbride, Hotham, Jarvis, and some others, explicitly affirmed the fortifications to be totally unnecessary. The opinion of the majority of land officers did not amount to an approbation of the scheme, as actually right to be executed in the present state of the country; but was merely an assent to the alleged necessity of fortifying the docks, if the country afforded no other means of defence, and no more than an admission of a conditional proposition as true, in the circumstances which its author supposed. So bounded an acquiescence was construed by the duke of Richmond to authorize the immediate adoption of his plan; to which the cabinet ministers acceding, a board of engineers was directed to make an estimate of the expense, and the requisite sum, as stated by these gentlemen, amounted to 760,0971. After preparatory motions for the production of papers, Mr. Pitt, on the 27th of February, introduced the plan in the following general resolution: "It appears to this house, that to provide effectually for securing his majesty's dock-yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth by a permanent system of fortification, founded on the most economical principles, and requiring the smallest number of troops possible to answer the purpose of such security, is an essential object for the safety of the state, intimately connected with the general defence of the kingdom, and necessary for enabling the fleet to act with full vigour and effect for the protection of commerce, the support of our distant possessions, and the prosecution of offensive operations in any war in which the nation may hereafter be engaged."

The favourers of the measure founded their arguments on the report of the board of officers, which stated, that neither naval nor military force, nor even both united, could afford a security adequate to the importance of our dock-yards; fortifications were therefore absolutely necessary, in addition to both. They represented the duke of Richmond's scheme as the most eligible that could be adopted, since it was sufficient for the requisite defence, capable of being manned by the smallest force, demanded the least expense to erect, and afforded an increasing degree of security in the course of the construction. These works, moreover, would give greater scope to our fleets: because the dock-yards being thus protected, the navy would consequently be unfettered, and left at liberty to act as occasion might require, in whatever part of the world its presence might be necessary; and they would also reduce the standing army. Were an invasion threatened, and were we to trust only to our military force, there would be a necessity for augmenting to a most enormous degree that army on which the whole safety of the kingdom was to rest; but, if it were assisted with fortifications, a much smaller force would answer the purpose. An alarm had prevailed, that the measure was unconstitutional in its tendency, by laying a foundation for a standing army, and diverting into an useless and dangerous channel those resources which should strengthen our navy: far from rendering an increase of troops necessary, the proposed plan would actually tend to remove the necessi→ ty of keeping up so large a military establishment as otherwise must be maintained.

These arguments were by no means received without opposition and controversy; but the speaker who most peculiarly distinguished himself, was Mr. Sheridan, who was fast rising to very high oratorial fame and political importance. On the present question he exhibited the substance

[Arguments of Mr. Sheridan against it]

of all the reasoning that could be adduced against the scheme, and contended, that in itself and in its consequences, the project was dangerous and unconstitutional; that the nature and circumstances of the report made by the board of officers did not warrant or authorize the system; fortifications would not reduce the standing army, or if they did, they would still be constituents of strength to the crown, even should it interfere with the rights and liberties of the people. The possible existence of this case was implied in the provisions of the bill of rights, and in the salutary and sacred reserve with which, for a short and limited period, we annually intrusted the executive magistrate with the necessary defence of the country. The orator first viewed the question on the general ground of constitutional jealousy, respecting the augmentation of military force. This sentiment, so natural to Britons, implied no suspicion personally injurious to the individual sovereign, or even his ministers; it merely considered kings and their counsellors as actuated by the same passions with other men: princes were fond of power; from the constitution of the army it must obey the executive ruler, therefore it ought to be circumscribed as much as was possibly consistent with the puble safety. Soldiers were maintained for national defence and security, and were not to be multiplied beyond the necessity in which only they could originate. The minister had endeavoured to anticipate this forcible objection to the new plan, by persuading the house that the fortifications would lessen, instead of enlarging the standing army; but his arguments on the subject could not stand the test of examination. If it was proper to fortify Portsmouth and Plymouth, the reasons which justified such a measure would apply to every other port in the kingdom, which might be of sufficient importance to require defence. The plan as it now stood, proceeded upon two suppositions extremely improbable; the first was, That we should be so much inferior on our seas, as to permit the enemy to land secondly, That if they did invade Britain, they would choose to attack the only places we had fortified. Might they not, on such a supposition, land between Plymouth and Portsmouth; or in Sussex, Kent, or the eastern coasts, and strike at the heart of the empire? If fortification was to be our defence, there must be a circle of fortresses round the coasts; the completion of such a project would require a military establishment, extensive beyond all former example. The safety of England rested on our navy, the courage and enterprise of our people, and not upon ramparts and intrenchments. The proposed fortifications would not be our safeguard against an invasion; but though far from being beneficial, they might be efficacious: the garrisons requiring such an additional number of standing troops, in the hands of an ambitious prince or minister, might be employed against the liberties of the people. The proposition was not only unconstitutional, unnecessary and absurd, but unauthorized by the report of officers; mutilated as the statement was which had been submitted to the house, it did not contain grounds for justifying the scheme. The opinion of naval officers had been withheld, but the opinion of land officers was founded upon hypothetical and conditional suggestions, and upon such data as the master-general had proposed to them; for the truth or probability of which, the board invariably refused to make themselves responsible. In this part of his speech, Sheridan diversified his close and poignant reasoning by an interspersion of wit most happily appropriated to the subject. The report (he said)

[Scheme rejected. Bill for enlarging the authority of Military courts.]

had been so artfully framed, that the board of officers appeared to have admitted the data; whereas they only assented to conclusions, which in their opinion would ensue on the assumption of the data. The mastergeneral of the ordnance deserved the warmest panegyrics for the striking proofs which he had given of his genius as an engineer, which appeared even in planning and constructing the report in question; the professional ability of the master-general shone conspicuously there, as it would upon our coasts: he had made an argument of posts and conducted his reasoning upon principles of trigonometry as well as logic. There were certain detached data, like advanced works to keep the enemy at a distance from the main object in debate; strong provisions covered the flanks of his assertions, his very queries were in casements: no impression therefore was to be made on this fortress of sophistry by desultory observations, and it was necessary to sit down before it, and assail it by regular approaches. It was fortunate, however, he said, to observe, that notwithstanding all the skill employed by the noble and literary engineer, his mode of defence on paper was open to the same objection which had been urged against his other fortifications, that, if his adversary got possession of one of his posts, it became strength against him, and the means of subduing the whole line of his argument. No supporter of the bill undertook to refute the arguments of Mr. Sheridan: many who usually voted with administration, were averse to the present measure; even Mr. Pitt was believed not to be very eager for its success, and the event was certainly different from the issue of most of his propositions; for when the question came to a division, the numbers were equal, and the casting vote of the speaker negatived the motion.

Soon after the defeat of a scheme which tended to increase military establishments, a bill was introduced for enlarging the authority of military courts, by subjecting to their jurisdiction officers who held commissions by brevet. This clause occasioned a strenuous opposition in both houses; the ground of disapprobation was the arbitrary nature of martial law, which was justified only by necessity, and therefore ought to be extended no farther than necessity required. Its object was to secure the discharge of duty on actual military service, therefore it ought not to ope rate out of that service. The supporters of the motion contended, that such officers might be invested with command, and therefore should be made subject to a court martial in case of professional misbehaviour; there were also many other military officers who were not mustered, such as governors and lieutenant-governors, who might eventually exercise command, and ought therefore to become amenable to the laws which bind other soldiers; persons choosing to have the advantage of military rank, should hold it on the condition of complying with military rules; and if they disliked the terms, they might ease themselves of their grievance by resigning their commissions. On these grounds the clause was carried in both houses.

On the 29th of March, Mr. Pitt brought forward his plans* for the reduction of the national debt. A committee had been appointed early in the session, in order to investigate and exactly ascertain the public in

The minister is believed to have availed himself of the financial ability of Dr. Price, who so thoroughly understood political arithmetic.

[Mr. Pitt's plan for reducing the national debt. Submitted to Parliament.]

come and expenditure, and strike the balance; the result of the investigation from the income of the year 1785, was,

So that a surplus of more than £.900,000 remained; and on this basis Mr. Pitt formed his scheme. He proposed that by taxes neither numerous nor burthensome, the balance might be raised to a million: by a succinct and clear view of our finances he demonstrated, that excess of income beyond expenditure was in the present and following years likely to increase; but in making his calculations, he had contented himself with concluding that it would not decrease. This million was to be appropriated unalienably to the gradual extinction of the national debt. Several savings of expense and increases of revenue, especially through the customs from the suppression of smuggling, would add to the national income: annuities would also fall into the same fund; the accumulated compound added to these sources would, in twenty-eight years, if properly managed, produce an annual revenue of four millions to the state. For the management of this fund, commissioners were to be appointed to receive two hundred and fifty thousand pounds quarterly, with the full power of employing it in the purchase of stock. In choosing persons to be intrusted, Mr. Pitt proceeded on his general principle, which had been already exhibited in his India bill; that in circumstances requiring new delegation of executorial power, the trust should be vested in men whose official situation presumed their competency to the execution of the commission; the speaker of the house of commons, the chancellor of the exchequer, the master of the rolls, the governor and deputygovernor of the bank of England, and accountant-general, were gentlemen whose nomination he recommended. After illustrating his calculations, and the advantages of his scheme, he compressed the substance into the following motion: "That the sum of one million be annually granted to certain commissioners, to be by them applied to the purchase of stock, towards discharging the public debt of this country; which money shall arise out of the surplusses, excesses, and overplus moneys, composing the fund commonly called the sinking fund." The policy of contracting expenditure within income, in order to liquidate debt, was so obviously just, that no one dissented from the principle, but various objections were made to the scheme. These are reducible to two general heads: first, that the alleged excess did not exist: secondly, that admitting its existence, the proposed mode of application was not the best that might be adopted. On this subject, Mr. Sheridan took a leading part in opposition; he moved a series of resolutions, declaring there were not sufficient grounds to establish the existence of the asserted surplus; that the calculations were founded upon one year peculiarly favourable, and not upon such a number of succeeding years as could constitute a fair average; and that in the existing accounts even of that year, at least in the report of the committee, there were certain articles erroneously stated to the credit of income, and others erroneously assigned to the diminution of expenditure. He, however, neither proved the alleged errors, nor the impropriety of calculating from 1785, the first year to which any reasoning on the reduced expenditure, or growing revenue of a peace establishment and rising trade, could apply. The objections