case with the Duke of Cambridge and the small professional clique, a statesman like Mr. Hardy can have no wish to veil the actual facts about the army, what our forces are, what they ought to be, and how they are to be made what they ought to be. It may be very well to march valorously into the great European camp with one hundred and seventy-six thousand sharers in a French canal company, by way of buckler and sword. But if our army, which must always be a comparatively small one, is not only ostensibly small, but even smaller and more of a skeleton than it looks, we shall one day pay for our temerity and virtuous disinterestedness by faring extremely ill in the great European camp. The prevailing inclination to take more of a part in continental concerns, going along with the prevailing disinclination to accept the obligation of personal military service in any shape, marks a really perilous state of things. It is folly to talk of alliances, interventions, backing of representations, unless you are prepared to pay the price; yet the louder this talk becomes, the harder is it to find recruits for Militia and Line. Your foreign policy, we were told not many years ago on high authority, must govern your armaments. It would be a wholesome rule that nobody should be allowed to ask us to lift a finger in Europe, unless he is prepared to remedy the present dead failure of voluntary enlistment. To take another point of view. If it be true that our armed force is absolutely inadequate to resist 100,000 invaders of the best continental stamp, then our independence is in the last resort at the mercy of any great brigand who may again arise in Europe. Again, if things are not so bad as this, it is still true that our military instrument is enormously costly, and tends to become more so in proportion as the wages of pacific industry rise; that we shall get a constantly deteriorating class of recruits; and that we maintain a host of the community, prevented from marriage, devoid for the most part of industrial skill, and cut off from civil life. The maintenance of a force which is at once inefficient for its purpose, prodigiously expensive, and a demoralised element of social life, can scarcely be a permanent article of national policy. And such a force cannot be maintained. The figures are deplorable, and so are the men. But compulsion, we are told, is not to be dreamt of. The nation will never endure it. And just in the same way only three or four years ago we used to be told that the nation would never endure compulsion in the education of their children. Yet we see that the nation does endure it, and endures it cheerfully, and seeks its extension. The truth is that Englishmen are less foolish than timorous politicians think. They will bear whatever they have been persuaded is necessary and wholesome for the national good. Why will people not speak with some manliness in this matter? A conscription of German, or even of French, severity could no doubt only be borne in an extreme crisis of English destiny. This is not now possible, and it is not necessary. But there is a growing necessity-and perhaps not less a moral than a military necessity-to accept the principle of personal liability and obligation to serve in the militia, and in a militia of a much more effective and strenuous sort than our present system produces. Care would have to be taken that no shadow of privilege or exemption, within the limits of age, should attach to high rank or a long purse. That done, if the young mechanic had to bear the same burden as the young lawyer or young peer,

and if the case were fairly and frankly laid before the people, what reason is there to suppose that Englishmen would be less willing to do their duty in this than in other respects? There is nothing in the principle of a National as distinguished from a hired Standing army, with which a Liberal need quarrel, while there is much in the way of morality and discipline and patriotism which he may very eagerly embrace. One of the soundest Liberals that ever lived, wrote in 1871: "Militarism in some form we must have; and it seems to me, our wisdom will lie, not in holding up our hands and screaming against the inevitable, but in endeavouring to minimise, as far as may be, the necessary evil, and in extracting from it, while it lasts, whatever accidental element of good it may contain. This is what the scheme of national armies does accomplish. . . The popular principle by diffusing attenuates the evil, and making every man potentially a soldier, places the liberties of the country on the only sure foundation, the ability of all in the last resort to defend them." (J. E. Cairnes : Political Essays, 247.)

Compulsory training for home service will not help us over the difficulty of manning the regular army, with the drafts for India. The necessity of a garrison in India is probably one of the worst of the many drawbacks of the most tremendous task which μoîρa κрaratý ever imposed on a people. Indian service is at once one of the main causes of the weakness of our home battalions, and of the reluctance of our people to enlist. However, India has to be faced, just as an armed and restless Europe has to be faced. Only it is time to come out of the fool's paradise in which as to military affairs we have been longer content to remain, than is consistent with national self-respect.

The chief object of popular interest has been the Fugitive Slave Circular. Whether the instructions recently issued by the Admiralty to the captains of the Navy are in accordance with the best traditions of English policy may be brought to a simple test. In admitting fugitive slaves on board English ships on the high seas, the Admiralty is hampered by no international obligations. On the high seas, an English ship knows no law but the law of England. On the high seas we are free to indulge our hatred of slavery, "the sum of all villainies," and even if our prejudice in favour of freedom were less respectable than it is, we have a right to enjoy the luxury without exposing ourselves to any legitimate ground of complaint. The effect of admitting a slave on board an English ship of war on the high seas is the same as allowing him to touch the soil of England,—he immediately becomes free. This was settled in the case of Forbes v. Cochrane in 1824. An English captain, therefore, in admitting a fugitive slave on board his ship confers on him the boon of liberty. By what principle should a captain be guided in exercising this privilege? Should he, in favour of freedom, admit fugitive slaves so far as consistent with the discipline and convenience of his vessel? Or should he out of tenderness to the interests of his master refuse an asylum to the slave? The answer given by the Second Circular is as follows:-" When any person professing or appearing to be a fugitive slave, seeks admission to your ship on the high sea, beyond the limit of territorial waters, and claims the protection

of the British flag, you will bear in mind that her Majesty's ships are not intended for the reception of persons other than their officers and crew. You will satisfy yourself, therefore, before receiving him on board, that there is some sufficient ground in the particular case for thus receiving him." It is worthy of remark that this instruction lays down no clear or intelligible rule; it does not say when a fugitive slave should be admitted and when he should not; but it throws on the captain the burden of showing cause why he should in the particular case admit the slave. What is the meaning of this churlish and inhospitable order? That may be learned from Circular No. 1. That circular affirmed as "a broad rule," that " a fugitive slave should not be permanently received on board any description, of ship under the British flag, unless his life would be endangered if he were not allowed to come on board." The reason for this rule is then stated. "A contrary rule would lead to endless disputes and difficulties with the legal masters of slaves; for it might happen, to take an extreme instance, that the whole slave portion of the crews of vessels engaged in the pearl fishery in the Persian Gulf might take refuge on board British ships, and, if free there, their masters would be entirely ruined, and the mistrust and hatred caused in their minds would be greatly prejudicial to British interests."

The chain of reasoning that has led the Government to abandon the traditions of English policy is thus apparent. If a slave gets on board an English vessel he will be free; if he is free, his master will be deprived of his services; if his master is deprived of his services, he will be angry with us; if the master is angry with us, it will be prejudicial to our interests. The conclusion is inevitable. The door is to be shut in the face of the slave because it is the gateway of freedom. To this pusillanimous conclusion, through the steps of an ignoble sorites, are we led by "the spirited foreign policy" of the Government.

It is to be hoped that the Government will not be allowed to ride off from the plain issue raised in the first part of the circular, under cover of the questions of international law contained in the second part. In the reception of fugitive slaves on the high sea, unfettered by any international obligations, the Admiralty instructs its subordinates that they are to use the privilege of hospitality not for, but against the slave; not against, but for the master. A fugitive slave on board a ship on the high seas is to be a rara avis; but when the ship is in a port of a slaveholding State, or anywhere within three miles of its shores, the exclusion of slaves is to be peremptory and absolute. "If while your ship is within the territorial waters of a State where slavery exists, a person professing to be a fugitive slave seeks admission into your ship, you will not admit him unless his life would be in manifest danger if he were not received on board. Should you, in order to save him from this danger, receive him, you ought not, after the danger is past, to permit him to continue on board."

It will be difficult to reconcile the country to this harsh and unbending rule, unless it be conclusively shown that the requirements of international law leave the Government no alternative. If a captain, without violating the law of nations, can give shelter to a slave, and he voluntarily sends the man back to slavery, he is made an accomplice in the crime of robbing him of his

liberty, which English judges tell us is originally the gift of nature. If, moreover, it appears that in order to find an excuse for refusing shelter to slaves, the circular introduces a new rule of international law, and tampers with our rights, the Government will deserve and obtain the severest condemnation.

All authorities agree that a ship of war within the territorial waters of a foreign State continues to "remain a part of the territory of her sovereign.” Mr. Justice Phillimore states the rule thus:- "Long usage and universal custom entitle every such ship [of war] to be considered as a part of the State to which she belongs, and to be exempt from any other jurisdiction." Nevertheless, the Second Circular, undeterred by the evil fate of the First, proceeds, with magnificent nonchalance, to cut down the right of extraterritoriality. The Government, on their own responsibility, introduce a restriction that appears to be unknown to the best writers and the recognised authorities on international law. The exception is thus expressed :"You are bound by the comity of nations not to allow her [your vessel] to become a shelter for those who would be chargeable with a violation of the law of the place."

Of all countries in the world England has the strongest interest in maintaining the extra-territoriality of her ships of war. If it be necessary to limit the right, considering the importance of the interests at stake, we ought to proceed with the greatest caution, and avoid committing ourselves to vague rules that may in future give rise to the most embarrassing controversies. Now every word of the new limitation seems to have been introduced for the express purpose of giving occasion to dispute. The phrase "comity of nations" may mean either "that kindness which emanates from a friendly feeling," or something "due between nations on the ground of right." In which sense the phrase is to be understood the circular does not inform us. But in whichever sense it be understood, it will place the Government in an awkward position. If the admission of persons chargeable with violating the law of the place would give "a just cause of complaint," we are landed in this difficulty. Would not the State having such a just cause of complaint be entitled to prevent by force a vessel that had incriminated persons on board from leaving her territorial waters? The right to depart unmolested is conditional upon the friendly conduct of the ship of war. If then she violates a law imposed by the comity of nations, is not the right forfeited? Are we then prepared to submit to the arrest and detention of a vessel of war on the ground that she has persons on board "who would be chargeable with a violation of the law of the place"? These are some of the consequences we must face if we admit that the exclusion of obnoxious persons is due as a matter of right. If then we take the other alternative, and affirm that their exclusion is to be done from "that kindness which emanates from friendly feeling," the Government is impaled on the other horn of a dilemma. Surely if the exclusion of slaves from our ships is not due by strict law, but only by courtesy, the people of England may claim that our kindness shall be shown to the victim, not to his oppressor,-to the slave that is robbed of his rights, not to the man that robs him.

Jan. 27, 1876.

THE

FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW.

No. CXI. NEW SERIES.-MARCH 1, 1876.

THE DISESTABLISHMENT MOVEMENT.

We have been reminded lately, with considerable emphasis, that the question of the Disestablishment and Disendowment of the English Church is "eminently a practical one," and that "it cannot be dealt with according to abstract theories." Thirty years ago, when the Disestablishment movement began, there was apparent ground for the suggestion that its leaders did not discriminate between the province of political speculation and the province of practical politics.

The movement had its origin in deep religious convictions-I might almost say, in fervent religious enthusiasm. Mr. Edward Miall and the men who were associated with him in founding what is now known as the Liberation Society, objected to the ecclesiastical Establishment because they believed that it was altogether out of harmony with the genius of the Christian faith. To them it seemed that the Establishment had succeeded in secularising the Church, and that it had failed in Christianising the State. They argued that the zeal of the laity is repressed when the maintenance of the institutions of worship is provided for by national endowments; that the system of patronage, which they contended is an essential part of the Establishment, must exert a pernicious influence on the spirit and on the efficiency of the clergy; and that when the creed and ritual of a Church are fixed by act of parliament, the Church suffers a loss of spiritual freedom, for which the alleged advantages it receives from the State can constitute no adequate compensation. All these arguments were illustrated and enforced by an appeal to notorious and glaring ecclesiastical abuses, nearly all of which have disappeared, and which to the present generation are almost incredible.

The movement was religious in its origin, and for many years nearly all who took a prominent part in it were actuated by religious motives. But as no practical results were possible apart from politi