lutely true, may be relatively untrue. Now it will appear on consideration, that though it be absolutely true that future punishments will have an end, yet scripture, which is a book designed for the instruction of the people, has truly and rightly taught that they will have no end. Moreover, there is a difference in this respect, between those passages of scripture more particularly addressed to the people, and those which are deeper and contain allusions to the mysteries of truth. But we are prepared to show, that, had scripture popularly declared this absolute truth, it had thereby only dangerously deceived the people, and therefore been chargeable with untruth. There are, however, some other questions which demand a prior consideration.

CHAPTER XX.

OF THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

IT has been shown, that, God's design being to remove evil both moral and natural from his universe, rewards and punishments are right and proper instruments for this end. But how comes evil to exist at all? If all events come to pass according to fixed laws of nature, — if God has originated the whole series of causes and effects which are now in operation, - if the sovereignty of his providence be over the human will, as well as over every thing else,-if neither man, nor any other created being, acts independently of God, but all are subject to the physical laws of mind which are equally certain with those which regulate matter, then is not God the ultimate author of all the evil which exists, or must we not, at least, weigh the evil with the good, and attribute the whole to him?

Some have attempted to remove this difficulty, by supposing that moral evil is appointed by God

with a view to ultimate good. This supposition, however, savours somewhat of the principle of doing evil that good may come, or that the end will justify the means. At the same time, a distinction has been drawn between God's appointing evil, and his actually and personally doing it: And, the Divine purpose being good to the whole creation, it has been argued that the evil in no respect pertains to him. There may be some truth in these reasonings, but it does not very forcibly commend itself to ordinary understandings; besides, at the best, it is only showing what may be, and not at all what is the case.

Others have entered into many and long speculations as to what may be the best possible system on the whole, and contend, that, for aught we know, a greater amount of good is produced by the present system, than could have been on any other; in which case they judge that the present system, with all its imperfections, was to be preferred to another, which, with no positive evil, realized a less amount of positive good. Such speculations, however, are not to be regarded as any thing more than mere unfounded conjectures, and, if there be any thing in them which deserves the name of reasoning, it seems not very satisfactory.

Instead of entering at any length into the consideration of such hypotheses, I prefer to lay down this short and plain proposition, — That it

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was not possible for God to create a system in which there should be no inlet for sin. This, when it has been proved, will at once set the matter at rest, and vindicate the honour of the Creator, who will then appear as the orderer and disposer, but not in any sense the author of evil.

The proposition which we have thus stated may seem at first to intrench on the omnipotence of God: but it does not. For it is no denial of God's omnipotence, to say that he cannot work contradictions. He cannot make the same thing at the same time to be and not to be, - he cannot create a being who shall be self-existent, he cannot make a creature to be independent of him, — neither can he create an infinite Intelligence; but every created Intelligence must of necessity be finite. From hence our proposition follows by an easy consequence. For every finite Intelligence is subject to take limited views, precluding the possibility of the creature always attaining absolute truth: - a liability to err in judgment is, therefore, the necessary consequence, and wrong feelings and desires follow upon wrong judgments, and wrong conduct follows upon wrong feelings and desires. Therefore it was impossible for God to create a system, into which sin might not, and would not enter. For, the creature being designed for everlasting existence, the possibility that sin may enter, becomes the certainty that it will enter sooner or later :

for, although for a limited time the consequence might not follow, yet the longer the time, the greater the probability; and when the time is made infinite, the probability will then amount to a certainty that sin will enter.

We may illustrate this doctrine by the example of one sin, namely, that of pride, which is the root of many others. In this vast and boundless universe, will any one say that a creature like man can attain any right estimate of his own comparative importance in the scale of being? He sees but a little of the universe: he knows still less of the little which he sees: and distant objects sinking into comparative insignificance to human eyes - will any one say that an intellect like man's, however pure and sinless when first created, could rightly discern his own comparative nothingness? In the course of nature he could not but attach an undue importance to himself, and, ignorant as yet, by experience, of his own liability to err, he could not estimate justly the strength and weakness of his own mental powers, but would, from the same natural causes, overrate their consequence, and rely on them too much. Is it possible that such a being should live on to all eternity without going into error, first of judgment, then of feeling and desire, then of conduct? And error giving rise to error, and sin to sin, would not habits be formed, and the creature become permanently sinful, unless a