message to Congress, but he referred to the President as "weak and catering to the masses, An Insult to and besides a low politician, who deMcKinley sires to leave a door open to me and to stand well with the jingoes of his party.'

This letter was made public on Feb. 8, 1898. Señor De Lome admitted privately that he was the author of it, but it nevertheless put the government in Washington in an awkward position. Such an insult to the Chief Executive could hardly be passed over unnoticed, but it was hardly dignified for the government to take cognizance of a private letter undoubtedly obtained by surreptitious means.

1 Señor De Lome in this letter wrote:

"The message has undeceived the insurgents, who expected something else, and has paralyzed the action of Congress, but I consider it bad.

"Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness with which he repeats all that the press and the public opinion of Spain has said of Weyler, it shows once more that McKinley is weak and catering to the rabble, and besides a low politician, who desires to leave a door open to me and to stand well with the jingoes of his party.

"Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, it will only depend on ourselves whether he will prove bad or adverse to us. I agree entirely with you, - without a military success nothing will be accomplished there, and without military and political success there is always danger that the insurgents will be encouraged, if not by the government, at least by part of the public opinion."

Señor De Lome, however, forestalled action by either his own government or the United Resignation States by promptly cabling his resigof De Lome nation to Madrid. When the United States Minister in Madrid intimated to the Spanish government that Señor De Lome had become persona non grata to the United States, he was informed that the resignation of Señor De Lome had already been accepted. Señor De Lome in his despatch to Madrid stated that he was the author of the published letter, and that in consequence he found his position untenable. Premier Sagasta in the Cabinet Council commended him for "so bravely admitting" the authorship of the letter.

The Spanish government made Señor Du Bosc, Secretary of the Legation, its chargé d'affaires in Washington, and named Señor Polo de Bernabe to succeed De Lome. Minister Woodford insisted that the Spanish government make official disclaimer of the De Lome letter, and in a few days he was informed that the Cabinet entirely condemned the views expressed.

With this disclaimer the incident ended, but shortly afterward the imprudent remarks of Lieutenant Sobral, the naval attaché of the

Spanish legation in Washington, were the Imprudence subject of official inquiry. Three or of Sobral four days after the "Maine" was destroyed, Lieutenant Sobral in an interview expressed the belief that the explosion was an internal one, resulting from the lax discipline observed on the ship. He said also that if war should come, the knowledge he had acquired as naval attaché would be of great value to his government.

It was then recalled that Lieutenant Sobral had visited many of the fortifications along the Atlantic coast, and that only a few months before his extensive inquiries at Charleston had resulted in permission to visit the fortifications there being withdrawn. This convinced the United States that Spain had been quietly gathering all the information about the Atlantic coast defences she could. The Spanish chargé d'affaires in Washington hastened, however, to inform the State Department that Lieutenant Sobral had been detached as naval attaché in January, and that therefore his remarks were only those of a private citizen. There was nothing left for the United States but to accept this explanation.

CHAPTER XI

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR BEGUN

ALTHOUGH no open breach followed the De Lome and Sobral incidents, despite the official regret expressed by Spain for the " Maine" disaster, within a week after the destruction of the "Maine" both the United States and Spain began preparing for war. To outward appearances friendly relations between the two nations were still maintained.

General Woodford, the United States Minister to Madrid, on February 24 gave a banquet in honor of the newly appointed Minister to the United States. Nearly all the members of the Spanish Cabinet attended, and all drank enthusiastically to "Peace," the toast proposed by the host. Spain had, however, already started a fleet of war-ships to the Canaries on its way to Cuba. The United States had begun mobilizing the North Atlantic squadron at the Dry Tortugas. A bill to provide additional regiments of artillery was hurried through Congress, and men from Western

posts were being rushed to the Atlantic coast fortifications.

Hostile

Both nations began to scour the markets of the world for war-ships, at first not so much with the intention of purchase as of Preparations obtaining an option for as long a period as possible. The United States began sending guns and ammunition to its Atlantic coast and Gulf ports, particularly to Key West, Florida. Plans for extensive coal sheds at the latter place were also set on foot. The " Alfonso XIII." arrived at Havana with some Spanish troops, and the attention of Captain-General Blanco was devoted to strengthening the fortifications of the Cuban coast.

Meanwhile the United States was continuing to send food and other supplies to the starving Cubans, sometimes using naval vessels for the purpose, sometimes merchant vessels. Out of this arose an incident that threatened further complications in the relations of the United States and Spain.

The Spanish government gave United States Minister Woodford to understand that it Lee's Recall would like the United States to reasked for call General Fitzhugh Lee, the United States Consul-General to Cuba, and