nothing which exists in the model can be wanting in the image. His expressions are as follows: "Must not God have a perfect conception of himself, (that is, one in which every thing is, that is in God himself?) Now would it be true, that this conception of the Deity comprehended all things existing in the Deity, if, of his necessary reality, as of his other attributes, there were only an idea, or possibility, and nothing more? Such a possibility might exhaust the other attributes; but would it be so, in respect to necessary reality? If not, it follows, either that God has no such perfect image of himself at all; or else, that such perfect image is as necessarily self-existent as he is himself." We find the same bypothesis set forth in Lessing's posthumous works, in a way which shows that it was intimately associated, in the author's system, with the doctrines of Pantheism. It is unnecessary to observe, that the cause of truth owes slender thanks to any one who would have recourse to the principles of Pantheism, in order to prove the divinity of the Aoyos. But it is easy to demonstrate, that from such a source, no aid can be derived in establishing our doctrine. of the Trinity. For, waving the palpable discordance of

* Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. Berlin, 1785. p. 68. See note B.

"God can think of himself only in two ways. He may either conisder his perfections in a mass, and himself as their aggregate or sum; or he may consider his perfections one by one. God has con. ceived himself, from eternity, in all his perfections; that is to say, he has created a Being from eternity, possessing all that he himself possesses. This Being is God himself, and cannot be separated from God; when we conceive of it, we conceive of God, and cannot think of it, but when we think of God, any more than we can think of God without God; or in other words, there could be no God, without this perfect conception of himself. This Being may be called the image of God; but it is an identical image."

(See also Jacobi über die lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, 1785. p. 41, 42.)

the latter with Lessing's notion of the Son of God, who does not see, that upon his principle, no valid reason can be given for believing simply in a pair or in a trinity of selfexistent beings, or for not believing in an infinite series of such beings? For if all things, that exist in God, exist also in this image, supposed to be formed by God, it is plain that perfect consciousness must be ascribed to it: and when that is once admitted, I can see no principle that would restrict the number of these images to any thing below infinity.

It is no part of my design, however, to give a full specification of the many similar attempts which have been made to derive the truths in question from mere abstract principles. Were such a detail included in my plan, it might easily be shown, that the result, in every case, is an ample confirmation of the fact before asserted, that this philosophical or abstract method of proving the divinity of Christ and the doctrine of the trinity, is absolutely futile. I shall, therefore, dismiss it altogether, and proceed at once to the consideration of the arguments derived from scripture: reviewing, first, those dicta of the apostles John and Paul, in which our doctrine is apparently inculcated-and afterwards inquiring what confirmation the inferences thence derived receive from the words of Christ himself.

1. That John is to be esteemed the highest authori'y upon. this subject, may be fairly inferred from the circumstance, that he enjoyed, in an especial manner, the affection and confidence of Christ; together with the no less important fact, that he composed all his writings, and especially his gospel, for the very purpose of expelling from the Church, an erroneous notion which had crept into it, highly derogatory to the dignity of Christ. He himself declares this to have been the case, in a passage near the close of his gospel, where he states, that it was written να πιστεύσωσι ότι Ιησές εστιν ο χριστος VIOS T8 88, that those who read it, might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God. To the same point goes the

testimony of Irenæus, which, so far as I can see, is unimpeachable. In his book against heresy, (B. III. ch. 11. § 1.)† he distinctly asserts, that the Gospel of John was written, to extirpate from the Christian Church, the errors of Cerinthus ; who, as Irenæus states, denied that the world was made, either by Christ, or by the Supreme God; while he held, that the former was superior to all the angelic spirits, but in essence different from God, and united himself with Jesus, a mere man born in the ordinary way, during the period which intervened between his baptism and his death, for the purpose of assisting him in teaching wisdom, and in working wonders.

Whether, in the composition of this gospel, the apostle had not also in view those who held that John the Baptist was the Christ, is a question which does not admit so satisfactory an answer. It is a doubt which I am not prepared to solve; for although I am persuaded, that the gospel itself affords just as complete a refutation of the one heresy as of the other, I am not aware that the historical evidence is clear enough to warrant a positive decision. It is by no means certain, that, while John was living, there prevailed at all, or at least, among those to whom his writings were addressed, a notion that the Baptist, and not Jesus, was the true Messiah.

But whatever may have been the particular occasion,

* See Storr's remarks, in the Repertory of Biblical and Oriental Literature, P. xiv. p. 127: also, his work über den Zweck der Evangel. Gesch. und der briefe Johannis. 1786. p. p. 55, 176.

His words are these: "John wishing, by the explicit declarations of his gospel, to extirpate the error disseminated by Cerinthus, begins with declaring, that, in the beginning, &c.

↑ See note C.

{ See note D.

This is clearly proved by Storr, über der Zweck, &c. Abschn.

I. Haupst. A.

which gave rise to so careful and minute an exposition of the nature and character of Christ, as we find in the works of this apostle, it is certain that the whole New Testament contains no testimony to the Deity of Christ more clear and conclusive, than the introduction to John's Gospel. It is in these words Εν αρχή ην ὁ λογος, και ὁ λογος ην προς τον Θεον, και Θεος ην Aoyos. It will here be necessary to ascertain precisely the true import of these terms, and how far they go to prove that the doctrine which I am maintaining, is coincident with that of the apostle John.

There could be no difficulty in determining the sense of the word λoyos, were we possessed of authentic information respecting the source from which it was immediately derived, or any peculiar circumstances which may have led the apostle to make use of the expression. But as all such historical guides are wanting, we must find some other clue to the interpretation. It has been said, but never proved, that the term must be traced to the Chaldee language,* to the phraseology of Philo, or to that of the Cerinthians, in order to discover its peculiar import as used by the apostle. For my own part, I believe, that there are only two practicable methods of making the discovery. The first is, to appeal to the apostle's own authority, by comparison, and reference to other passages. The other is, to trace the idiomatic senses of the term, in the Hebrew, Greek, or Alexandrine dialect. I shall have recourse to both.

I. To begin with an inspection of the context;-it is clear from that criterion, that the apostle used the word λoyos to denote an essence—an intelligent and divine essence, truly different from the Father, and yet the same, which is otherwise called Christ. For the first three verses of the chapter, as well as the fourteenth and fifteenth, will not bear the meaning put upon them by interpreting the word to

See Doederlein's Institut. Theol. Christ, P. I. 105.

mean a mere attribute, or action, or exterior relation, or nominal distinction, or any thing, in short, but a distinctive Dame for Christ. To prove my point more clearly, I shall examine these hypothetical interpretations one by one.

In the first place, then, if we interpret λoyos as an abstractterm, the words, with which this gospel opens, will, if significant at all, have only such a meaning as is, at once, unworthy of the author, and foreign from his purpose. Admitting, for example, that it means, what it often means in Philo's writings, then or intellect of God, or the whole vis divina generally, how shall the apostle be defended from the charge of needlessly accumulating tautologies and truisms? or how can we account for his insisting with such earnestness, upon a truth, which those, for whom he wrote, had never doubted, much less disbelieved ?*

Or, suppose that λoyos comprehends not only the vis divina in itself, but its outward exhibition; and that John intended by it to express the power of God, so far as it appears in actual exercise. The first clause of the sentence would in that case, be appropriate enough to his design of refuting the Cerinthian heresy. Ev agxn, in the beginning (the very beginning of which Moses speaks in Genesis, i. 1.) v hoyos, the power of God exerted itself. But with what possible design, or in what imaginable sense could he have added what comes next, doyos nv wgos rOV DEV Xαι BE05 NV & λoyos; that is to say, upon the assumed hypothesis, the exertion of God's power was with God, and the exertion of God's power was God himself! No one, I suppose, would tolerate the following analogous expressions, "Peter's mind, so far as it is seen in outward action, and becomes conspicuous to others, is with Peter, pertains to Peter, is intimately united to Peter, is Peter himself!"

Another sense that has been proposed, is that of action,

*See note E.