pality to exact a license tax, and to regulate all kinds of business, and conferring on it full power to inspect food products and dairies, and to require the payment of reasonable charges for such inspection, it has power to enact an ordinance imposing a license tax on dairymen selling milk or butter, at the rate of fifty cents for each cow used in the production of milk or butter. So under its usual powers a municipality may enact an ordinance requiring milk exposed for sale to contain a certain percent of butter fat, estimated by a designated process, and provide that in a contested analysis of milk butter fat shall be estimated in a manner described. Such an ordinance is not open to the objection that it prescribes a rule of evidence, or that it is too indefinite to be enforced. So a municipality may exact a license for the sale of milk. So an ordinance forbidding the sale of milk containing a preservative is within the power of a municipality to enact ordinances necessary or reasonably appearing to be necessary for the public health, even though a preservative not injurious to health be used. So under a power to inspect milk, to secure the general health, and to pass all ordinances expedient in maintaining the health and welfare of a city, its trade, commerce and manufacture, it may pass an ordinance forbidding the sale of milk and cream containing coloring matter, its purpose being to prevent deception on the public and unfair advantage over honest competitors. So an ordinance forbidding the sale of cream con 717, 62 L. R. A. 771, 99 Am. St. 918; Walton v. Toledo, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 547. Birmingham v. Goldstein, 151 Ala. 473, 44 So. 113. contrary to the Fourteenth Amend- St. Louis v. Bippen, 201 Mo. 528, 100 S. W. 1048; St. Louis v. Klausman, 213 Mo. 119, 112 N. W. 516; St. Louis v. Union Dairy Co., 213 Mo. 148, 112 N. W. 525. Such an ordinance does not deprive the milk seller of his liberty and prop8 St. Louis v. Polinsky, 190 Mo. erty without due process of law, 516, 89 S. W. 625. 7 St. Louis v. Schuler, 190 Mo. 524, 89 S. W. 621, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 928. taining less than twelve percent of butter fat is valid." Where a statute was enacted prescribing the percentage and standards of purity of dairy products fixed, with the exception of one of the elements of skimmed milk, a lower standard of strength and purity than that fixed by a State statute relating to the same subject, and, in addition, requiring certain ingredients and percentages thereof in whole milk. and skimmed milk not called for by the statute, it was held that the additional requirements of the ordinance did not render it invalid or inconsistent with the statutes, except as to the skimmed milk requirement, where the additional requirements were not in conflict with the statutory requirement, but were merely additional to and supplemental of the statutes in fixing the standard of purity, where the city charter expressly empowered the municipal council to establish standards of strength and percentages of purity of dairy products and the power to provide for their inspection.10 A city may enact ordinances supplemental and in addition to the State laws relating to standards of purity in dairy products and providing for their inspection.11 So a rule of the health department of a city requiring milk peddlers to provide a special room for storing milk and for cleansing utensils as a condition precedent to obtaining a license to peddle milk, has been held valid.12 Under a power to regulate and restrain the sale of milk, to tax, license, regulate and restrain vendors of milk, and to fix and regulate the amount of a license, a municipality has power to revoke milk licenses and to vest that power in the health commissioner, with the right to exercise the power summarily, and even without notice.13 Under a charter authorizing a municipality to regulate the 9 St. Louis v. Reuter, 190 Mo. 514, 89 S. W. 628. 10 St. Louis v. Klausmeier, 213 Mo. 112 S. W. 516; St. Louis v. Union Dairy Co., 213 Mo. -, 112 S. W. 525; St. Louis v. Ameln (Mo.), 139 S. W. 429; St. Louis v. Scheer (Mo.), 139 S. W. 434; St. Louis v. Kellman (Mo.), 139 S. W. 443; St. Louis v. Kruem peler (Mo.), 139 S. W. 446; St. Louis v. Schulte (Mo.), 135 S. W. 449. 11 St. Louis v. Klausman, supra; St. Louis V. Union Dairy Co., supra. 12 People v. Owen (N. Y.), 116 N. Y. Supp. 502. 13 State v. Milwaukee, 140 Wis. 38, 121 N. W. 658. sale of butter and all other provisions, to provide and regulate their inspection, to secure the general health, to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases, and to pass all ordinances and make all regulations necessary to preserve the health of the inhabitants, such municipality may adopt an ordinance regulating the inspection and sale of milk and making it an offense to sell milk within the city without a permit from the municipal food and dairy commissioner, notwithstanding milk is not specifically mentioned in the statutes as a subject of regulation, for it is included in the term "other provisions," as well as under the clause empowering the enactment of ordinances for the protection of the health of the city. Under its general welfare clause a municipality may regulate the sale of milk.15 Under a power to make regulations for the preservation of health, a regulation requiring sellers of milk to register each year before receiving a license to sell milk for one year is valid.16 But when a city charter forbade the council to pass any ordinance on any matter regulated by a general statute, and a general statute provided full regulations concerning the adulteration of milk, it was held that an ordinance forbidding the sale of pure milk, and requiring, among other things, that all milk dealers should obtain a license, was void, because beyond the power of the council to enact. Under its power to protect the public health a municipality may establish and control markets at which perishable food, such as fish, shall be sold; or it may regulate and control such markets established by private individuals and carried on as private enterprises; and it may also prevent the sale of perishable food, such as fish, except at the public markets and within certain limits. about them; but it may not entirely prevent the sale of such products within its limits.18 Under its general welfare clause, a municipality may prohibit the sale of ice cream which is 17 affirmed 70 N. Y. App. Div. 326, 75 N. Y. Supp. 245. 17 State v. Tyrrell, 73 Conn. 407, 47 Atl. 686. 18 State v. Perry, 151 N. C. 661, 65 S. E. 915; Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala. adulterated or contains any deleterious substance, or is otherwise impure or unwholesome; but it can not arbitrarily prescribe that ice cream containing less than a certain percentage of butter fats shall not be sold at all, if the percentage be placed so high as to be unreasonable, where it excludes ice cream which is as wholesome as that of the prescribed percentage would be.19 But where a statute provided that, before any person can sell oleomargarine, he shall mark the packages in bold-faced English letters, and prescribed a punishment for a violation of the Act, it was held that the sale of oleomargarine in unmarked packages, being an unlawful occupation, cities having the power to license all lawful occupations carried on within their limits could license and regulate the sale of oleomargarine therein irrespective of such Act.20 A statute empowering a city "to regulate the vending of meats, vegetables and fruits, pickled and other fish, and to prescribe the time and place of selling the same, and to regulate the sale of coal, and any other commodity exposed or intended to be exposed for sale in the city," does not authorize an ordinance imposing a fine for the sale of "putrid meat, poultry or other provisions."'21 It is a valid exercise of the police power for a city to prohibit the sale of skimmed milk, though having a commercial value and not 17, 4 So. 397, 5 Am. St. 328. A city can not absolutely prohibit the sale of useful and valuable commodities not coming up to a prescribed standard. Rigbers v. Atlanta, 7 Ga. App. 411, 66 S. E. 991. 19 Rigbers v. Atlanta, 7 Ga. App. 411, 66 S. E. 991. 20 Haines v. People, 7 Colo. App. 467, 43 Pac. 1047. See also Walton v. Toledo, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 547. A provision in a statute authorizing a city to regulate the sale of meats and vegetables empowers that city to pass an ordinance prohibiting the peddling of fruits and garden or farm products in the public streets between the hours of five in the morning and one in the afternoon. Buffalo v. Schleifer, 2 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 216, 21 N. Y. Supp. 913; Morano v. New Orleans, 2 La. 217. A city may prohibit the sale of and delivery of milk from vehicles in the streets by unlicensed persons, and may declare the violation of such ordinance a misdemeanor. It may even prevent a chartered association from so delivering milk. People v. Mulholland, 82 N. Y. 324, 37 Am. Rep. 568. 21 Rochester v. Rood, Hill & D. 146. unwholesome for adults.22 So an ordinance providing that bread shall be manufactured into loaves of one, two and four pounds, and no other, and prohibiting the sale of bread deficient in weight, has been upheld.23 A municipal charter which makes it the duty of the council to prevent the sale of adulterated food, enables it to enact an ordinance prohibiting the adulteration of milk.24 So a charter authorizing the enactment of an ordinance to preserve the health of the city, and for the proper inspection of milk, authorizes the enactment of one for the destruction of milk found upon inspection not to come up to the standard prescribed.25 § 82. Regulation and Sale of Drugs and Poisons. The regulation of the practice of pharmacy and of the sale of drugs and poisons comes peculiarly within the province of the police power of the State.' 22 Kansas City v. Cook, 38 Mo. App. 660. 23 Such an ordinance does not authorize the seizure of shortweight bread, and the prohibition is not the taking of private property without compensation. People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 49 N. W. 609, 13 L. R. A. 286, 24 Am. St. 141. 24 State v. Stone, 46 La. Ann. 147, 15 So. 11. 25 Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 164, 30 Atl. 648, 26 L. R. A. 541, 45 Am. St. 339. An ordinance providing for the inspection of milk coming from outside the city and requiring the tuberculin test and certificate of freedom from disease of cows producing the milk is not invalid because it singles out milk dealers outside the city, and does not apply to dealers within the city, where dealers within the city are subject to the supervision of its Board of Health. Adams v. Milwaukee, 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518. A municipality may prescribe lower but not higher requirements concerning the percentage of fat in milk. St. Louis v. Schulte (Mo.), 139 S. W. 449; St. Louis v. Scheer (Mo.), 139 S. W. 34. 1 State v. Kumpfert, 115 La. 950, 40 So. 365; Bertram v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 902, 62 S. E. 969; State v. Lee, 137 Mo. 143, 38 S. W. 583 (regulating sale of opium); Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 475; Luck v. Sears, 29 Ore. 421, 54 Am. St. 804; Charleston v. Werner, 46 S. C. 323, 24 S. E. 207; Newton v. Joyce, 166 Mass. 83, 44 N. E. 116, 55 Am. St. 385; Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 587, 58 N. E. 616, 52 L. R. A. 287, 79 Am. St. 238; Sadler v. People, 188 Ill. 243, 58 N. E. 906; State v. Abraham, 78 Vt. 53, 61 Atl. 766. |