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chants. "The provision requiring vendors of cream and milk to register with the health commissioner and pay a registration fee," said the court, "was clearly a valid police regulation, looking to the protection of the health and administering to the welfare of the public, and came strictly within the charter powers of the city of St. Louis, giving authority for the inspection of milk, and license from the inspector is a guaranty to the community that they can with safety purchase milk from the dealer thus registered and licensed. This provision was clearly not a tax, but merely as an inspection fee, designed as a compensation for the service rendered. The fact that the selling of milk is a lawful trade or business does not exempt it from reasonable police regulations. In Gundling v. Chicago the Supreme Court of the United States tersely stated the recognized rule on this subject: Regulations respecting the pursuit of a lawful business or trade are of very frequent occurrence in the various cities of the country, and what such regulations shall be, and to what particular trade, business or occupation they shall apply, are questions for the city to determine, and their determination comes within the proper exercise of the police power of the city; and unless the regulations are so contrary, unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the property and personal rights of the citizens are unnecessarily and in a manner wholly arbitrary interfered with or destroyed without due process of law, they do not 1 St. Louis v. Grafeman Dairy Co., 190 Mo. 492, 89 S. W. 617, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 937; citing St. Louis v. Fischer, 167 Mo. 654, 67 S. W. 872, 64 L. R. A. 679, 99 Am. Rep. 614; affirmed 194 U. S. 362, 24 Sup. Ct. 673, 48 L. Ed. 1018; Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S. W. 717, 99 Am. St. 918, 62 L. R. A. 771; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725; State v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 Pac. 1095; State v. Bixman, 162 Mo. 1, 62 S.

W. 828; St. Louis v. Polinsky,
190 Mo. 516, 89 S. W. 625; St.
Louis v. Schuler, 190 Mo. 524, 89
S. W. 621, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 928.

In St. Louis v. Grafeman Dairy Co., supra, it was also held that a provision in the ordinance requiring payment of a fee to the "city collector" was not void, the statute designating the one who is to receive it or the "license collector." 2 177 U. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 44 L. Ed. 725.

extend beyond the power of the State to pass. When it is considered that no article of food is more universally used by the public, and that no other article is perhaps so sensitive to atmosphere and vegetable infiuences as milk, and that it is within a common knowledge that impure milk is a fruitful source of disease and disorders, especially among children, it needs no discussion to show that the milk business is one which particularly falls within the power of the State and its municipality to regulate, and that the imposition of one dollar a year for registration is in no sense an onerous or unjust burden, and is intended as a pure police measure to cover in part the cost of inspection of milk and cream, is too plain for discussion.""

A statute which requires a registration with the live stock sanitary board of all herds or cattle of persons selling milk for consumption in municipalities is a valid exercise of the police power of the State, and it does not deprive milk dealers of their property without due process of law. If it applies to all persons so supplying milk it is valid, even though it does not apply to every person who may occasionally sell milk in the country. And, as has been said before, a statute which prohibits the sale and shipment of milk to supply municipalities from premises found in an unsanitary condition, until they conform to reasonable sanitary regulations is a valid exercise of the State's police power, although it interferes to some extent with property rights.*

3 St. Louis v. Grafeman Dairy Co., 190 Mo. 492, 89 S. W. 617, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938.

Licenses for the sale of milk have been upheld in other states. Littlefield v. State, 42 Neb. 223, 60 N. W. 724, 47 Am. St. 697, 28 L. R. A. 588; Chicago v. Bartee, 100 Ill. 57; Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S. E. 717, 62 L. R. A. 771, 99 Am. St. 918; State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N. W. 1066, 34 L. R. A. 318, 61 Am. St. 399.

An ordinance granting the power

to the mayor of a city to issue licenses to sell milk to such persons as he thought proper is valid. People v. Mulholland 19 Hun 548.

But an ordinance exacting a license to sell milk except from the owner of two cows only, peddling milk by hand, has been held invalid. Pierce v. Aurora, 81 Ill. App. 674.

4 State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 Atl. 771, 45 L. R. A. 433, 45 Am. Rep. 433; State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N. W. 1066, 34 L. R. A. 318, 61 Am. St. 359.

§ 42. License Tax on Dairy Business Measured by Number of Cows Kept or Wagons Used in Business.

It is not only permissible to exact a license of dairymen selling milk within a municipality, but the amount of the tax may be measured by the number of cows he employs in his business. In one particular case the tax was fifty cents per cow; and this tax was imposed by an ordinance. A power given a municipality to license, tax and regulate all kinds of business, and providing that this power "may be used in the exercise of the police powers as well as for the purpose of raising revenue, one or both," authorizes the adoption of such regulations. Such an imposition is a license tax on the occupation of carrying on a dairy and not on the property vested in the business. Such a tax is not unreasonable, and it is uniform in its operation. It is a proper classification.1

1 Birmingham v. Goldstein, 151 Ala. 473, 44 So. 113, 125 Am. St. 33, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 568; Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S. E. 717, 99 Am. St. 918, 62 L. R. A. 771.

An ordinance imposing a license fee upon every livery stable keeper in proportion to the number of horses or carriages kept is valid. Howland v. Chicago, 108 Ill. 496; Wilson v. Lexington, 105 Ky. 765, 49 S. W. 806, 50 S. W. 834, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1593, 1980; Smith v. Louisville, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 779, 6 S. W. 911; Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga. 645; Burlington v. Unterkircher, 99 Iowa 404, 68 N. W. 795; Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488; Gibson v. Coraopolis, 22 Pittsb. L. J. (N. S.) 64. Contra Cullinan v. New Orleans, 28 La. 102; Williams v. Garignes, 30 La. 1094.

A license fee on each room of a hotel or boarding house or a parlor or bedroom is valid. St. Louis v.

hack using a streets as a New York v.

Birches, 76 Mo. 431, affirming 7
Mo. App. 169. So is one of $60
on every billiard table kept for
hire. Meriam v. New Orleans, 14
La. Ann. 318 (Contra Knox City
v. Thompson, 19 Mo. 523, and State
v. Endom, 23 La. Ann. 663); or
$25 for each cab or
portion of the city
private hack stand.
Reesing, 77 N. Y. App. Div. 417, 79
N. Y. Supp. 331, affirming 38 N. Y.
Misc. 129, 77 N. Y. Supp. 82. So
a license is valid that imposes a
license fee of so much per boat or
skiff kept for him. Poyer v. Des-
plaines, 22 Ill. App. 576, and so is
one in proportion to the number
of wagons used in handling oil.
Spiegler v. Chicago, 216 Ill. 114,
74 N. E. 718, and one based upon
the number of sheep or lambs kept
by those engaged in grazing, herd-
ing and pasturing, usually being a
stated sum per hundred or thou-
sand head. Plumas County V.

So an ordinance imposing a license fee of fifty cents on each cow a dairyman has who sells milk within a municipality and two dollars on each milk stand he maintains therein is valid, even though the ordinance imposing it provides that the amount thus secured shall be used to pay the salary of a milk inspector. Nor is it any objection to such an ordinance that the cows are kept without the municipality, if he sells milk within its limits. "The means adopted seem to us to be reasonable. It was necessary to the end in view that there should be an inspector, that he should have the power to take samples of the milk and have them analyzed, and his duties involved expenses which it was proper that those engaged in the sale of milk should bear. A license from the inspector was evidence to the community that they could with safety purchase milk from the dealer to whom it was issued. He who is licensed should not complain, because he derives a direct and important benefit from it, for which he is required to pay a reasonable compensation. The dealer discovered in improper practices in the effort to foist upon the community milk unfit for use has no right to complain if he has been detected in such practices. What the dealers are required to pay by the ordinance is not for the purpose of revenue, and

Wheeler, 149 Cal. 758, 89 Pac. 909; affirmed 196 U. S. 562, 25 Sup. Ct. 316, 49 L. Ed. 509; Sierra County v. Flanigan, 149 Cal. 769, 87 Pac. 913. Ex parte Miranda, 73 Cal. 365, 14 Pac. 888. Contra Cache County v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 Pac. 303.) So is a license fee imposed on a street railway company in proportion to the number of cars they may operate. Byrne v. Chicago General R. Co., 169 Ill. 75, 48 N. E. 703, affirming 63 Ill. App. 438; Cincinnati St. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio N. P. 80; Cincinnati Inclined Plane R. Co. V. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 609, 44 N. E. 327; Newport v. South CovPURE FOOD-6.

ington, etc., R. Co., 89 Ky. 29, 11 S. W. 954, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 319; New York v. Third Ave. R. Co., 42 N. Y. Misc. 599, 87 N. Y. Supp. 584, affirmed without an opinion, 115 N. Y. App. Div. 899, 101 N. Y. Supp. 1116; State v. Hilbert, 72 Wis. 184, 39 N. W. 326; New York v. Forty-second, etc., R. Co., 52 How. Pr. 106; Union Pass. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 83 Pa. 429; New York v. Third Ave. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 406, 22 N. E. 755; Harrisburg v. East Harrisburg Pass. R. Co., 4 Pa. Dist. R. 683; New York v. Broadway & 8th Ave. R. Co., 97 N. Y. 275; Harrisburg v. Citizens' Pass. R. Co., 4 Pa. Dist. R. 687.

is not a tax, but is an inspection fee, designed as a compensation for the service rendered."?

All the cases, however, do not agree with those just cited. Thus where an ordinance provided that every dairy keeper within certain designated limits of a municipality should pay an annual tax of two dollars for each cow he employed in his dairy business, it was held that it was void, because it was a tax on property and not a license tax; and also because it did not apply equally to all those engaged in the dairy business within the limits of the municipality. So where an ordinance for the licensing of milkmen fixed the amount to be paid for the license, and then added fifty cents for each additional cow added to the licensee's stable, it was held void on the ground that the fee imposed for each additional cow exceeded the amount permitted by the municipal charter to be charged as a license fee.*

§ 43. Inspection of Dairies.

A State has power to require vendors of milk to submit to an inspection of their dairies by an official inspector before selling the milk; and if they are not up to a fixed standard which insures the purity of the milk there produced, to prohibit its sale. And a city, under its usual powers to require an inspection of milk, may adopt an ordinance requiring all vendors of milk within a city not only to submit their milk to an inspection, but also their dairies, even though such dairies lie beyond the city limits. Such an ordinance is

2 Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473, 44 S. E. 717, 62 L. R. A. 771, 99 Am. St. 918.

3 Orleans Parish v. Nougues, 11 La. Ann. 739.

4 In re Taylor, 11 Manitoba L. R. 420.

Municipal ordinances imposing a license fee for every wagon used by milkmen in retailing milk have been held void where the charter did not warrant their adoption.

Reading v. Bitting, 167 Pa. 21, 31 Atl. 359. But they have been held valid where the charter authorized their adoption. Walton v. Toledo, 23 Ohio C. C. 547; People v. Mulholland, 19 Hun 548; affirmed 82 N. Y. 324, 37 Am. Rep. 568.

A fee of one dollar per year on each wagon used is a reasonable amount. Walton v. Toledo, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 547.

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