"To this point the rule of Monroe should apply; beyond this point, it should not"? Who will say that a new national force created beyond any line that he can draw will stay beyond it and will not in the long course of time extend itself indefinitely?

The danger to be apprehended from the immediate proximity of hostile forces was not the sole consideration leading to the declaration. The need to separate the influences determining the development and relation of states in the New World from the influences operating in Europe played an even greater part. The familiar paragraphs of Washington's Farewell Address upon this subject were not rhetoric. They were intensely practical rules of conduct for the future guidance of the country.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

It was the same instinct which led Jefferson, in the letter to Monroe already quoted, to say:

Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs.

The concurrence of Washington and Hamilton and Jefferson in the declaration of this principle of action entitles it to great respect. They recalled the long period during which every war waged in Europe between European Powers and arising from European causes of quarrel was waged also in the New World. English and French and Spanish and Dutch killed and harried each other in America, not because of quarrels between the settlers in America but because of quarrels between the European Powers having dominion over them. Separation of influences as absolute and complete as possible was the remedy which the wisest of Americans agreed upon. It was one of the primary purposes of Monroe's declaration to insist upon this separation, and to accomplish it he drew the line at the water's edge. The problem of national pro

tection in the distant future is one not to be solved by the first impressions of the casual observer, but only by profound study of the forces which, in the long life of nations, work out results. In this case the results of such a study by the best men of the formative period of the United States are supported by the instincts of the American democracy holding steadily in one direction for almost a century. The problem has not changed essentially. If the declaration of Monroe was right when the message was sent, it is right now. South America is no more distant today than it was then. The tremendous armaments and international jealousies of Europe afford little assurance to those who think we may now abandon the separatist policy of Washington. That South American states have become too strong for colonization or occupation is cause for satisfaction. That Europe has no purpose or wish to colonize American territory is most gratifying. These facts may make it improbable that it will be necessary to apply the Monroe Doctrine in the southern parts of South America; but they furnish no reason whatever for retracting or denying or abandoning a declaration of public policy, just and reasonable when it was made, and which, if occasion for its application shall arise in the future, will still be just and reasonable.

A false conception of what the Monroe Doctrine is, of what it demands and what it justifies, of its scope and of its limits, has invaded the public press and affected public opinion within the past few years. Grandiose schemes of national expansion invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Interested motives to compel Central or South American countries to do or refrain from doing something by which individual Americans may profit invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Clamors for national glory from minds too shallow to grasp at the same time a sense of national duty invoke the Monroe Doctrine. The intolerance which demands that control over the conduct and the opinions of other peoples which is the essence of tyranny invokes the Monroe Doctrine. Thoughtless people who see no difference between lawful right and physical power assume that the Monroe Doctrine is a warrant for interference in the internal affairs of all weaker nations in the New World. Against this supposititious doctrine, many protests both in the United States and in South America have been made, and justly made. To the real Monroe Doctrine these protests have no application. ELIHU ROOT.

DIPLOMACY OF THE QUARTER DECK

The building of the Panama Canal has not been a one man's work by any means. In its inception, the preparation of the field, the elimination of impossible routes, and in the actual construction work, it has drawn forth some of the best brains of the country.

Noted engineers from civil life have had an important influence in determining the locality best suited for the purpose, and also in the plans adopted for building the canal; and the names of these men will go down in history as a part of its constructive force. But as the principal object of building the canal was to augment means for the national defence, it was eminently proper that the Army and Navy of the United States should have paramount influence in its establishment. For nearly forty years naval men have been engaged in surveying different parts of Central America and the Isthmus of Panama to find a practical route which should offer the fewest obstacles in cutting a channel between the two oceans. Finally, by a process of elimination, which brought the problem to a choice between the Nicaragua and Panama routes, the construction of a canal was actually begun by an American company on the Nicaragua line, and the work of construction put in the charge of naval officers.

Owing to circumstances not necessary to mention here, this scheme was abandoned, and the Panama route, which had been first surveyed by Captain E. P. Lull, U. S. N., was finally decided upon. After many vicissitudes in starting the work, which had been begun with Admiral John G. Walker, U. S. N., as President of the Commission, the matter was turned over to the Engineer Corps of the United States Army, and it is now, as we all know, being brought to a successful ending. This was most fortunate; but for the engineering skill and military training of Colonel Goethals, as well as the remarkable sanitation work of Dr. Gorgas, U. S. Army, the canal could never have been finished within the time set. Scarcely less important to the work of constructing the canal,

than that of these great leaders has been the work accomplished by Lieut. Col. H. F. Hodges, U. S. A., Lieut. Col. D. D. Gaillard, U. S. A., Lieut. Col. William L. Sibert, U. S. A., Civil Engineer H. H. Rosseau, U. S. N., and Hon. Maurice H. Thatcher, Civil Governor of the Canal Zone, all of whom are members of the Isthmian Canal Commission, in charge of the canal construction.

It should be remembered that the canal is constructed upon land belonging to an alien government. While the United States has now been granted "all the rights, power and authority" over the "Canal Zone, which it would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory" for the purpose of constructing the canal, yet there were many questions to consider of an international character before this suzerain power became ours.

The treaties entered into between the United States and Great Britain, and the United States and the Republic of Colombia, in relation to the canal, have been productive of many difficulties and disputes; and our people who have gone along the even tenor of their ways have known but little of what has been taking place on the Isthmus of Panama or of the many questions forced upon the men who have had to carry into effect the obligations of these treaties.

Panama has been for the western world what Constantinople is for Europe, the seat of its principal diplomatic efforts to secure peace, and a source of never ceasing contention between states. Many questions of international jurisprudence have arisen for discussion since the Panama railroad was built by an American company in 1854; and to meet these questions of divided control between the countries having interests there granted by the treaties, the Navy of the United States has been constantly called upon to act. How this has been accomplished, I shall attempt here to relate.

Lord Salisbury once said that "international law depended generally on the prejudices of the writers of text books;" however that may be, the best that can be said of this branch of jurisprudence is, that the rules relating to the same are not so well ascertainable as are those of a scientifically codified system of law, and that branch of the subject that has to deal with the enforcement of remedies is quite deficient in postulates of a character to insure consistent action by those who are

charged with the dispensation of legal justice. If it is difficult to reach a justifiable decision on such matters of international law as ordinarily arise between nations, how much harder is the task when questions come up between the United States and such countries as Colombia, where the people may be said to have lived on a diet of revolutions. In the case of naval officers who have to handle such matters, in a location far away from the executive authority responsible for the policy of the government, deprived frequently of the means of communication with the home office by the very elements that call for their jurisdiction, the task is extremely difficult. The government is always loath to render decision on possible situations in advance, lest a slight change in conditions should render their decisions nugatory; and the result is that orders from the home government to the naval officer are usually restricted to the brief mandate "Protect American interests, we rely upon your judgment."

This necessity to meet questions of international law and render decisions at once, without time for the mature consideration of diplomatic usage, has brought into use a form of jurisprudence sometimes called "Diplomacy of the quarter deck," and its administration generally falls to the lot of the naval man. The warrant for such judicial action is so universally recognized, that in the older countries of the world, men who hold commissions as officers in the Navy, are entitled to seats on the platform of the judge in any court of the realm where they may happen to be present. Although this is not the case in America, the officers as a rule have greater responsibility, as far as the foreign relations of the state is concerned, than do those of any other country. American officers may be advised by the regular diplomatic agents abroad, but such agents cannot direct them what course to take, as is the case in foreign services. They are responsible for their acts directly to the commander-in-chief, the President, through the heads of their own executive department.

Reference to what is known as the "Barrundia affair," which took place in Central America a few years ago, illustrates this fact. Here the commander of a United States war vessel was relieved of his command by the Department, for action that was taken under the advice of the American Minister, but which did not meet with the approval of the official head in his own branch of the service.