thereby loses her American citizenship and becomes a citizen of France, adding, however, that to accomplish this result she must, by residence. abroad, or other equivalent act, express her intention to renounce her former citizenship by her marriage. Similar views were expressed in Trimbles v. Harrison, 40 Ky. 147. In Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 Fed. 556, decided in 1893, the court held that a native born woman who had married an alien subject of Italy, permanently residing in the United States and intending to continue therein, did not thereby lose her citizenship but remained a citizen of this country. The court said that the power to declare how the right of expatriation should be exercised, as well as that of naturalization, was exclusively in Congress, that expatriation could not take place without the consent of the United States, and that "Congress has made no law authorizing any implied renunciation of citizenship." It was mainly on this ground that the court rested its conclusion, although it was also said that in the absence of any law of Congress as to the method of expatriation, it could not be said to take place, unless it was manifested by a removal from this country and a residence elsewhere. (See also Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 49; Shanks v. Dupont, supra; Jennes v. Landes, 84 Fed. 74; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 197–8.) When an alien and a citizen intermarry, they not infrequently return to reside, either temporarily or permanently, to the country of the alien spouse, thereby giving rise to questions concerning their rights as citizens or aliens of the respective countries, from which there have ensued international disputes to be discussed and settled by diplomatic correspondence between the United States and the foreign country. The fact that the courts of this country have held variant opinions on some phases of the subject has caused some perplexity in the State Department and like diversity of opinions has appeared from time to time in the correspondence of that department. All the courts have agreed, however, that the entire subject of naturalization and expatriation, including the method by which each might or could be accomplished and manifested, is a matter within the exclusive control of Congress. Under these conditions, the United States Senate, on April 13, 1906, passed a joint resolution for the appointment of a commission to "examine into the subjects of citizenship of the United States, expatriation, and protection abroad," and make a report with proposals for legislation thereon. In June, 1906, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which this resolution had been referred, requested the Secretary of State to select three men connected with the State Department, familiar

with the subject, to investigate and make the desired report and recommendations. In pursuance of this request Honorable Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, directed Mr. James B. Scott, Solicitor for the Department of State; Mr. David Jayne Hill, then Minister to the Netherlands, and Mr. Gaillard Hunt, Chief of the Passport Bureau, to make an inquiry, report and proposals for legislation, as requested. These gentlemen proceeded and on December 18, 1906, they made an elaborate and exhaustive report of 538 pages, with recommendations for legislation covering all the phases of the subject except that of naturalization, which was already provided for. With this document before it, Congress framed an Act which became a law on March 2, 1907. (34 U. S. Stats. 1228.) This Act now controls the subject referred to, including that involved in this case. Section 3 thereof is practically decisive of the case before us and it is as follows:

That any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband. At the termination of the marital relation she may resume her American citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within one year with a consul of the United States, or by returning to reside in the United States, or, if residing in the United States at the termination of the marital relation, by continuing to reside therein.

There is no escape from the conclusion that, under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff in this case, when she married Gordon MacKenzie, a British subject, thereupon took the nationality of her husband and ceased to be a citizen of the United States. Just as an alien woman who marries a citizen becomes a citizen herself, whether she wishes it or not, as the cases we have cited declare, so a female citizen who marries an alien becomes herself an alien, whether she intends that result as the consequence of her marriage or not. She must bow to the will of the nation as expressed by the Act of Congress. Owing to the possibility of international complications, the rule has generally prevailed, from considerations of policy, that the wife should not have a citizenship, nor an allegiance, different from that of her husband. The section aforesaid was intended to put this general doctrine into statutory form. When, after Congress by this Act had declared that her marriage to an alien would accomplish her expatriation, and she thereafter married an alien, she is conclusively presumed to have intended thereby to renounce her citizenship of the United States and become a subject of Great Britain.

It is suggested that the object of the Act, as expressed in its title, was to legislate solely for the protection of citizens abroad and therefore

that it should not be construed to apply to women who marry here and continue to reside in this country, or who marry an alien permanently residing in this country. As has been stated in reciting the origin of the Act, such persons frequently remove to the country of which the husband is a subject, or to other foreign countries. It was the obvious purpose to provide a rule which should govern in cases of that kind. Furthermore, the language of the section shows that it contemplates that an American woman included within its terms will in some cases reside in the United States after contracting the marriage with the alien, and that it intends. that she shall continue to have the nationality of her husband during such residence here, so long as the marriage relation continues. The interpretation contended for would be contrary to this provision, and therefore it is not permissible.

Plaintiff's counsel also contends that the Act of Congress is contrary to the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declaring that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." In support of this position they cite In re Look Tin Sing, supra, and United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. In the first mentioned case, which was decided in 1884, Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court, writing the decision for the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, held that a person born in the United States, of Chinese parents residing therein at the time of his birth and not members of the diplomatic force of China, was a native citizen of the United States and was not subject to the Act of Congress forbidding the re-entry into this country of Chinese who had returned temporarily to China, except where they had obtained a certificate allowing such return. This decision declares that a native born person of any race is a citizen, under the aforesaid provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it follows the familiar rule that such person remains a citizen so long as he chooses, provided he does no act which under our laws will have the effect of renouncing or forfeiting such citizenship. The Chinese Exclusion Act, it was held, did not affect the right of citizenship. But the quotation we have already given from this case shows that the court did not intend to hold and did not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids expatriation, or takes from Congress the power to legislate concerning it. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the same question was involved and the same conclusion was reached. In the

course of its very elaborate discussion of the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the "ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory" (p. 693), the court said (p. 703): "The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away." From this remark it is argued that a native born citizen cannot, since the adoption of that amendment, renounce his citizenship. But this by no means follows: The court in the quoted sentence was speaking of the power of Congress to deprive a person of his citizenship without his consent and for no sufficient or reasonable cause. In the next paragraph of the opinion the court says (p. 704):

Upon the facts agreed in this case, the American citizenship which Wong Kim Ark acquired by birth within the United States has not been lost or taken away by anything happening since his birth. No doubt he might himself, after coming of age, renounce this citizenship, and become a citizen of the country of his parents or of any other country.

Thus the opinion relied on itself recognizes and declares that citizenship may be renounced, notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. As we have held that the act of the plaintiff here in marrying an alien was in effect a renunciation of her citizenship, it follows that she is not prevented from committing this act of expatriation by the aforesaid provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We think it advisable to state here that the question of the effect of the marriage of a native female citizen to an alien, where such marriage had taken place before the passage of the Act of 1907 aforesaid, is a question not involved in this case. It is not therefore to be deemed as a decision upon the question whether the section of the Act of Congress above quoted was applicable to and operated upon citizens of the United States who were at that time married to alien husbands. From what we have said the conclusion is clear that the plaintiff here is not now a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the Act of Congress above quoted, and as that act controls the question of her citizenship, and her right to vote is made by our Constitution, as amended in 1911, dependent upon her status as a citizen of the United States, and does not exist unless she is such citizen, she is not entitled to the exercise of the privilege of suffrage and cannot demand registration as a voter. It is ordered that the writ applied for be denied.

BOOK REVIEWS

Commentaire de la Loi du 17 Juin 1909, ayant pour objet l'Acquisition et la Perte de la Nationalité Belge. By Fernand Glesner. Namur: Jacques Godenne. pp. 185.

In an introductory chapter M. Glesner traces the history of the legislation of his country relative to nationality, beginning with the union of the Provinces with France in 1794, indicating the effect of the political events following the occupation of Belgium by the Allied Powers in 1814, and the Belgian revolution of 1830, and showing the impress made by the French Civil Code. The result of these various influences was to impose upon the country somewhat diverse systems of nationality. The design of the law of 1909 was to remedy this defect and make the law more definite.

The author analyzes each provision of the law and points out where modifications have been made in the preëxisting law. He also makes comparisons with the French law and in many instances with the law of other countries.

The first article of the law, as M. Glesner states, "consecrates the principle of jus sanguinis," declaring that Belgian children, wherever born, to a Belgian father or to a Belgian mother if the father has no determined nationality, are Belgians. But while the law thus declares the principle of jus sanguinis, it departs from this principle in Article 7, which states that the child born in Belgium of foreign parents of whom one was also born in Belgium, or was domiciled there for a specified period, is Belgian, unless before the expiration of his twenty-second year, during which he shall have had a domicile in Belgium, he shall have elected foreign nationality. This is the jus soli. In relation to this matter, the author says:

This is not the reëstablishment, pure and simple, of jus soli, since there are required besides birth, certain conditions of sojourn and stability, of a nature to indicate that the individual has dwelt among Belgians and acquired their mentality. But it is surely an important victory for that principle.

He adds that the framers of the law had a difficult task, as it was necessary, in order to prove Belgian nationality, to establish filiation far