ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS

I

INTRODUCTORY

So long as the rule of capture of private property at sea exists unimpaired, states with mercantile marines of any importance will find that one of the problems they have to face in war is to defend their sea-borne commerce, and to attack that of their adversary. On the 26th March, 1913, Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, made an important statement in the House of Commons regarding the methods proposed by Great Britain for the protection of trade. As reported in the Times Mr. Churchill's speech was as follows:

I now turn to one aspect of trade protection which requires special reference. It was made clear at the Second Hague Conference and the London Conference that certain of the great Powers have reserved to themselves the right to convert merchant steamers into cruisers, not merely in national harbours but if necessary on the high seas. There is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of foreign merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed ships by the mounting of guns. The sea-borne trade of the world follows wellmarked routes, upon nearly all of which the tonnage of the British mercantile marine largely predominates. Our food-carrying liners and vessels carrying raw material following these trade routes would, in certain contingencies, meet foreign vessels armed and equipped in the manner described. If the British ships had no armament they would be at the mercy of any foreign liners carrying one effective gun and a few rounds of ammunition. It would be obviously absurd to meet the contingency of considerable numbers of foreign armoured merchant cruisers on the high seas by building an equal number of cruisers. That would expose this country to an expenditure of money to meet a particular danger altogether disproportionate to the expense caused to any foreign Power in creating that danger. Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be covered and met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an armed merchantman is another merchantman armed in her own defence. This is the position to which the Admiralty have felt it necessary to draw the attention of leading shipowners. We have felt justified in pointing out to them the danger to life and property which would be incurred if their vessels were totally incapable of offering any

defence to an attack. The shipowners have responded to the Admiralty invitation with cordiality, and substantial progress has been made in the direction of meeting it as a defensive measure by preparing to equip a number of first-class British liners to repel the attack of an armed foreign merchant cruiser. Although these vessels have, of course, a wholly different status from that of the regularly-commissioned merchant cruisers such as those we obtain under the Cunard agreement, the Admiralty have felt that the greater part of the cost of the necessary equipment should not fall upon the owners, and we have decided, therefore, to lend the necessary guns, to supply ammunition, and to provide for the training of members of the ship's company to form the guns' crews. The owners on their part are paying the cost of the necessary structural conversion, which is not great. The British mercantile marine will, of course, have the protection of the Royal Navy under all possible circumstances, but it is obviously impossible to guarantee individual vessels from attack when they are scattered on their voyages all over the world. No one can pretend to view these measures without regret or without hoping that the period of retrogression all over the world which has rendered them necessary may be succeeded by days of broader international confidence and agreement than those through which we are now passing.

On the 15th April, 1914, it was stated in the Morning Post that a bill for the establishment of a mail line of armed vessels to South American ports had been introduced into the United States Senate, with the approval of Mr. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy. It would appear that the United States is going further even than the British Admiralty in establishing a state-owned line of armed mail steamers, and it is of interest to note that that Government is also turning its attention to the South American trade routes, as it was on ships of the R. M. Steam Packet Company on this route that guns for defence were first placed. There are now between 40 and 50 British merchant ships carrying guns for defence and others are in progress of being equipped. It has also been stated that German merchant ships are being similarly armed.1

The reasons for this reversion to a means of defending commerce by arming the ships engaged in trade, a development justly characterised by Mr. Churchill as regrettable and retrogressive, are to be found in the methods in which states have, since the abolition of privateering, arranged to increase their fighting forces on the outbreak of war by the

1 See Morning Post, 16 April, 1914, "Merchantmen in war time," where a list of British ships already armed is given.

conversion of certain specially built merchant ships into fast cruisers, and to the fact that several important naval Powers maintain the right to convert these merchant ships into ships of war on the high seas. There are, therefore, on all the great trade routes of the world, merchant ships which may at a moment's notice, on receipt of a wireless message, change their peaceful character and from being commercial vessels become commerce destroyers.

This is not the place to deal with the arguments for and against the legality of such conversion. We can only take note of the fact that the Hague Convention of 1907, for the conversion of merchant ships into war ships, and the London Naval Conference of 1908-9, left the whole question of the place of conversion open. The possibility of conversion on the high seas is undoubtedly a serious menace to great trading states such as Great Britain and the United States, both of whom deny the legality of such conversion. They have, however, to face the facts and take such measures in the defence of their sea-borne trade as shall best ensure its continuance in time of war. Already the naval charges of many states impose burdens on their peoples of increasing hardship, and instead of a great increase of cruisers for commerce protection, Great Britain, reverting to a practice common in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, is arming her merchant ships in order that they may offer resistance to, and defend themselves against, the converted merchant cruisers of her potential adversaries. Mr. Churchill expressly stated in the House of Commons in introducing the Naval Estimates for the present year that instructions are given to the armed merchant ships to attempt no resistance to the ordinary ships of war, but only to endeavour to ward off attacks of the converted merchant cruiser. The armed merchant ship is therefore armed solely for defence, not for attack.

II

USE OF MERCHANT SHIPS IN WAR

The laws of naval warfare are drawn almost entirely from the practice of states in the past. In considering, therefore, the position of the de2 See "The Conversion of merchant ships into war ships" in the writer's War and the Private Citizen (1912), 113–165.

fensively armed and uncommissioned merchant ship, it is the customary law of nations that is of chief importance. The position of these ships and their treatment in the past must therefore be first considered.

Three Classes to be Distinguished

Three classes of armed merchant ships may be distinguished in the naval wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

(1) Merchant ships hired or bought by the state for incorporation temporarily or permanently into the navy. From time to time states made up deficiencies in their naval forces by hiring or purchasing strongly built and fast sailing merchantmen. The Dutch in 1652 made up this deficiency in their navy by hastily arming merchantmen, the French did the same in the eighteenth century, and this was also done by England. The merchant captains were frequently left in command and were often part owners, with the result that they were reluctant to risk their ships. This reluctance was in no small degree responsible for the defeat of the English fleet off Dungeness on the 30th November 1652. To remedy this the Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea published on the 25th December 1652 (the first Articles of War to which the English Navy was subjected) rendered the captains and ships' companies displaying reluctance to engage, and those guilty of slackness in defending a convoy, liable to the penalty of death. It was further ordered that captains of hired ships should be "chosen and placed by the state," and other officers were "likewise to be approved of." These vessels were in all respects men-of-war and call for no further consideration.

(2) Privateers. The terms "privateer" or "private men of war," and "letter of marque ships" were in the latter part of the eighteenth century convertible. "Privateer" does not appear in use till the time of Pepys, and in 1718 it is not used in the issue of "Instructions for such merchants and others who shall have letters of marque or Commission for Private men of War against the King of Spain." There was at one time in England a distinction between privateer and merchant vessels furnished with letters of marque "the one being entitled to head money, and the other not, but" said Sir W. Scott in the Fanny (1814) “that distinction 3 J. R. Tanner in Cambridge Mod. Hist., IV, 474.