It is lawful to change a probable opinion which any one has once embraced, in reference to the same object, and to act according to the opposite opinion.--(Lib.i. Pars V. Quæst.2. Art.3. n.113.)

A confessor, or other learned man, may answer those who consult him against his own opinion, according to the probable opinion of others; provided only that it be not specially forbidden.(Ibid. n. 115.)

Any confessor, whether ordinary or delegated, may follow, or at least permit his penitent to follow, a probable opinion; although he may himself maintain the contrary opinion, or may even think that the opinion of his penitent is false; provided, however, that he knows it to be defended as probable by other persons of ability.---(Ibid. n. 116.)

Even in the administration of the sacraments, it is lawful to follow the less probable things, rejecting the more probable"... Because the same ministers still act prudently; and as long as they are not certain of the truth of the opposite opinion, they do not expose themselves to a greater culpable danger of rendering the sacrament of

probabilem, contra propriam probabiliorem, etiam retentam."Lib. I. P. 5. Quæst. 2. Art. 3. n. 112.

57Etiam in administratione sacramentorum licitum est sequi minùs probabilia, relictis probabilioribus..." Ibid. n. 118.

none effect, than if they follow the more probable.

Even at the point of death, it is lawful to follow a probable opinion, rejecting the more probable.58

SECT. II.

PHILOSOPHICAL SIN, INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE, &c.

The doctrine of Philosophical Sin is that which teaches, that an action the most criminal in itself, offends against reason, but does not displease God, nor deserve eternal damnation, if the agent who commits it knows not God, or does not actually think of him, or does not reflect that he offends him.

JOHN OF SALAS.

In primam secundæ D. Thoma. Tom. I. Barcinone, 1607. (Ed. Bibl. Archiep. Cant. Lamb.)

Invincible ignorance, is the ignorance of the man who does all he can and all he ought in order to surmount it. But it is vincible when he omits

58" Licitum est, etiam in articulo mortis, opinionem probabilem sequi, relictâ probabiliori.”—Ibid. n. 120.

voluntarily, and therefore with advertence, any of those things which he is able and bound to do. ... In like manner, if, after all the care which he has been able and obliged to exert, he has not succeeded in extricating himself from his ignorance, but still continues in it, either negatively or even positively, for some reason which he may think probable; his ignorance is morally invincible, and, in the latter case, it is called probable. But improbable ignorance is that which is only supported by slight reasons: and it is also called gross and supine, as is the negative ignorance of the man who scarcely makes any attempt to discover the truth.--(Quæst. 6. Art. 8. Tr. 3. Disp. 4. Sect. 1. Div. 5. n. 8.)

THOMAS SANCHEZ.

Opus Morale in Præcepta Decalogi. Venetiis, 1614. (Antverpiæ, 1624. Ed. Coll. Sion.)

I am of opinion that there is no deadly sin in the consent of the will, unless some thought or express consideration have preceded it... Therefore, for a man to sin mortally, he ought to consider either that the action itself is evil, or that there is danger of sin, or he should have some doubt upon it, or at least a scruple. But if none of these have preceded it, his ignorance,

inadvertence, or forgetfulness, are accounted perfectly natural and invincible.59

VALERIUS REGINALD.

Praxis fori pœnitentialis. Lugduni, 1620. (Coloniæ, 1622. Ed. Coll. Sion.)

If a man whose mind is occupied with some practical doubt, dwells upon it with delight, but does not reflect that it is not lawful to delight in it, while his will is entirely abhorrent from it, and he is resolved, as far as possible, to refuse the delight if the sinfulness of it should ever occur to him; he is evidently excused from sin, although he should think upon it with delight for a whole day. The reason is, that as long as the understanding does not reflect upon the wickedness of that which is offered to the will... the consent of the will is not a sin, because the sinfulness of it was not known; unless the inadvertence should have arisen from gross negligence, or in a depraved inclination to sin.

59" Quod si nihil horum præcesserit, ignorantia, inadvertentia, seu oblivio, censentur omninò naturalia et invincibilia."-In Præcept. Decal. Lib. I. cap. 16. n. 21.

60" Excusatur planè à peccato, quantumcunque per diem integrum cogitaret cum delectatione." — Lib. XI. cap. 5. Sect. 8. n. 46.

PAUL LAYMANN.

Theologia Moralis. Lutetiæ Parisiorum, 1627. (Ed. Coll. Sion.)

Suarez, Sanchez, and Vasquez are right, who maintain, that for an action to be imputed unto man for sin, which is sinful and forbidden by some law, it is necessary that the agent reflect, or should have reflected, upon the sinfulness of the action, or on the danger of the sin.1

I have said above, that a man never sins unless he actually reflects upon the moral wickedness of the action or omission ... As, if the mind in a violent transport of anger or grief, is so absorbed in the thought of what may be convenient or useful, that it either reflects not at all, or very slightly, upon the sinfulness and discredit of the action: in which case it will either be no sin, or only an imperfect and venial sin; which I think sometimes happens with those who are so completely absorbed in the excess of their sorrow, that they commit suicide.62

61 "Ut opus malum, et aliquâ lege prohibitum, homini ad culpam imputetur, necesse esse ut operans actu advertat, vel adverterit ad ejus malitiam, vel periculum malitiæ.”—Lib. I. Tract. 2. cap. 4. n. 6.

62❝ Quo casu vel nullum, vel duntaxat imperfectum ac veniale peccatum erit; quod arbitror interdum evenire iis, qui