does not even amount to one which is venial.(Tom. II. Lib. xviii. c. 7. Sect. 1. n. 90.)

Qu.---Whether it is lawful to conceal the truth by speaking ambiguously?... It is lawful. And the ambiguity by which the truth may be concealed without a falsehood is such, that what a man utters shall be true according to his own meaning, although it may be false according to the sense of his hearer, and the common acceptation.--(Lib. xxiv. c. 1. Sect. 4. n. 9.)

The equivocation which is here spoken of, is not only that which arises from the different significations of words... but that which also happens when words are pronounced which are indeed false when uttered aside and taken separately, but are true with certain additions which are understood by the speaker.15

LEONARD LESSIUS.

De Justitia et Jure. Parisiis, 1628. (Antverpiæ, 1621. Ed. Coll. Sion.)

If a judge examines concerning an action which has been committed without sin, at least without mortal sin, the witness and the accused are not

15" Adverte autem amphibologiam de quâ hic agitur, esse non tantùm eam quæ contingit ex diversâ verborum significatione,... sed etiam quæ contingit, cùm verba prolata sunt quidem falsa seorsìm per seque sumpta; sed vera sunt aliquibus adjunctis, quæ à dicente subintelliguntur.” — Lib. xxiv. c. 1. Sect. 4. n. 10.

16

obliged to answer according to the meaning of the judge. For instance, you have killed your assailant Peter, having observed a reasonable forbearance, or refrained from any considerable excess. You are not bound to acknowledge that you have killed him, although the report of your having done so has been spread; neither is the witness bound to give evidence of it. For the judge tries you for murder: and if you should confess it and could not prove that you had done it in necessary self-defence, he would condemn you of homicide upon a false presumption.---(Lib. ii. c. 31. dub. 3. n. 14.)

Hence it follows, that there is no compulsion to swear according to the meaning of the judge, but that equivocation and mental restriction may be used.17

A priest should not oblige his penitent to confess the truth, while there is a hope of escaping... But when there is no hope of escape (as if the criminal should perceive that his crime may be readily and fully proved), then he is bound to confess the truth, because there is no longer reason for concealing it.-(Ibid. n. 18.)

16 "Si judex quærat de facto, quod absque culpâ, saltem lethali, patratum est, testem et reum non teneri respondere ad mentem judicis."--Lib. ii. c. 31. dub. 3. n. 14.

17" Ex dictis sequitur primò, non teneri jurare ad mentem judicis, sed posse uti amphibologia, vel mentali restrictione ..." Ibid. dub. 3. n. 17.

О

VINCENT FILLIUCIUS.

Moralium Quastionum de Christianis officiis et casibus conscientiæ, Tomus II. Lugduni, 1633. (Ursellis, 1625. Ed. Coll. Sion.)

1. I ask, whether it is wrong to use equivocation in swearing? It must be premised, that equivocation is nothing more than this, that the swearer understands the words in a sense different from that in which another person receives them.— (Tom. II. Tr. 25. c. 11. de Juram. n. 321.)

I answer, 1st, that it is not in itself a sin to use equivocation in swearing... This is the common doctrine after Suarez. 2dly, That it may often be a sin to use equivocation, as, when it is done without a reasonable cause, or in order to deceive: in which sense some holy fathers are to be understood.--(Ibid. n. 322.)

2. Is it perjury or sin to equivocate in a just cause? It is not perjury: as, for instance, in the case of a man who has outwardly made a promise without the intention of promising: if he is asked whether he has promised, he may deny it, meaning, that he has not promised with a binding promise; and thus he may swear: otherwise he might be compelled to pay a debt which he did not owe.-(Ibid. n. 323.)

3. If the equivocation be only mental, is the oath lawful?-I answer, 1st, that it is a probable

opinion that it is not lawful to swear in such a case... I answer, 2dly, that it is more probable that it is lawful.--(Ibid. n. 325, 326.)

4. With what precaution is equivocation to be used?-When we begin, for instance, to say, "I swear," we must insert in a subdued tone the mental restriction, "that to-day," and then continue aloud, "I have not eaten such a thing;" or," I swear," then insert," I say," then conclude in the same loud voice, " that I have not done this or that thing:" for thus the whole speech is very true.18

SECT. XII.

COLLUSION OF JUDGES.

HONORATUS FABRI.

Apologeticus Doctrina Moralis Societatis Jesu. Lugduni, 1670. (Coloniæ, 1672. Ed. Coll. Sion.)

Is a judge bound to restore that which he has received as a bribe for passing an unjust sentence? Some affirm that he is...

18" Cùm incipit, verbi gratiâ, dicere Juro, interponere submissè restrictionem mentalem, ut me hodie, et deindè addere altâ voce, non comedisse rem illam; vel, Juro, et interponere, me dicere, tùm absolvere altâ item voce, quod non feci hoc vel illud; sic enim verissima est oratio tota."-Tom. II. Tr. 25. c. 11. de Juramento, n. 328.

The reason is, that a judge cannot receive any thing, either for a just or an unjust sentence. Yet he is bound to restore that which he has received for a just sentence, because the donor is supposed to have given it by compulsion, since he had a right to the just sentence. But it is otherwise with him who has procured an unjust sentence to which he had no right: for then the judge is not bound to restore, at least until required to do so by a judicial sentence!19

JOHN BAPTIST TABERNA.

Synopsis Theologiæ Practica. Coloniæ, 1736.

Qu. 5.- Is a judge bound to restore the bribe which he has received for passing sentence? If he has received the bribe for passing an unjust sentence, it is probable that he may keep it... This opinion is maintained and defended by fifty-eight doctors.20

Qu. 6.-May a judge receive presents?

...

. Scripture... and justice forbid the recep

19" Secùs tamen qui obtinuit injustam, ad quam nullum penitus jus habebat; igitur restituere hic non tenetur, saltem ante judicis sententiam."- Anonymus adversus Anonymum,

c. 30.

20 66 Si autem pro injustâ sententiâ pretium acceperit, probabiliter retinere potest... Hanc sententiam tenent et defendunt quinquaginta-octo doctores."- Pars II. Tr. 2.

c. 31.