"Infanta Maria Teresa's" fire main had been cut off by one of our first shots and that she was unable to extinguish the flames. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave us both fight and flight, and ran in on the beach-the "Infanta Maria Teresa " at about 10.15 a. m., at Nima Nima, six and one-half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the "Almirante Oquendo" at about 10. 20 a. m., at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

The "Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the "Cristobal Colon" had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The "Vizcaya was soon set on fire, and at 11.15 she turned in shore and was beached at Asserradero, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago, the "Indiana" had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Asserraderos the "Iowa" was signaled to "resume blockading station." The "Iowa," assisted by the Ericsson" and the "Hist," took off the crew of the "Vizcaya," while the "Harvard" and the "Gloucester" rescued those of the "Infanta Maria Teresa" and the "Almirante Oquendo." This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

Running Down the "Colon."

There remained now of the Spanish ships only the "Cristobal Colon;" but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the "Vizcaya" went ashore the "Colon" was about six miles ahead of the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon;" but her spurt was finished and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon came the "Texas," "Vixen" and "New York." It was evident from the bridge of the "New York" that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the Colon" and that she had no chance of escape. At fifty minutes past twelve the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon" opened fire and got her range, the "Oregon's "heavy shell striking beyond her, and at 1.20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the "Brooklyn," went on

board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the "New York," received his report, and placed the "Oregon" in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the "Resolute," which had followed the chase.

Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The "Cristobal Colon" was not injured by our firing, and was probably not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the "New York" bodily up on the beach-the "New York's" stern being placed against her for this purpose, the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment—and sank in shoal water. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water, and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt at daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the "Cristobal Colon."

Method of Blockading.

It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, there being but one entrance, and that a narrow one; and the deep water extending close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 1, the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon, and the coming of dark nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained, with fair conclusiveness, that the "Merrimac," so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3, did not obstruct it.

I therefore maintained the blockade as follows: To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro-dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere-they threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel and held it steadily there. This lightened up the entire breadth of

the channel for a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me; but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches, and at a little distance further out, three small picket vessels-usually converted yachts-and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected.

After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside the searchlight ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The "Massachusetts," which according to routine was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning.

When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it-the commodore in command of the second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. The fine speed of the "Oregon enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the "Cristobal Colon " did not give up until the "Oregon" had thrown a 13-inch shell beyond her.

"Oregon's" Brilliant Record.

This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battleship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class. The "Brooklyn's" westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with telling effect. The "Texas" and the "New York" were gaining on the chase during the last hour, and had any accident befallen the "Brooklyn" or the "Oregon," would have speedily overhauled the "Cristobal Colon."

From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and

distance gave her an average speed from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she run on shore at Rio Tarquino of 13.7 knots. Neither the "New York" nor the "Brooklyn" stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes, or four miles, in the chase.

Several of the ships were struck, the "Brooklyn" more frequently than the others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the "Iowa." Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the "Brooklyn." It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor at best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared.

The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels showed that the "Almirante Oquendo," especially, had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides were everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen, but the other Spanish vessels suffered almost equally, thus proving the great efficiency and accuracy of the American guns and the skill of American sailors in handling them.

T

LIFE AMONG THE PHILIPPINES.

BY DEAN C. WORCESTER,

(Member of the Philippine Commission.)

HE insurrection headed by Aguinaldo in the Philippine Islands having assumed proportions far beyond general expectation, with a possibility that it may not be speedily suppressed, interest naturally now centres in the character of the population which has come under the guardianship of the United States and in the opportunities which the occupation of this large and valuable territory offers to American enterprise. The McEnery resolution, passed by a small majority of the United States Senate,--the vote in its favor being less than one-third of a full Senate, would have been much more important in its influence on the future course of the United States, but for Aguinaldo's attack upon our army at Manila. Had the Philippine insurgents yielded to American authority peacefully, after the passage of such a resolution by the Senate, they might have claimed that it was, in a certain sense, a guarantee of independence for the Philippines. As it is, the resolution amounts only to a declaration of policy, without any binding force upon the United States government.

The people of the Philippine Islands are not all savages. The majority are semi-civilized, a few are civilized in the full meaning of that term, and a considerable number are still in a savage state. Nor are

Savages.

the civilized confined to the island of Luzon, on which Not All of Them Manila is situated, for influences of considerable political and social development are to be seen in sections of all the five largest islands of the group. In my tour of the islands I visited the somewhat remote town of Damaguite, in southern Negros, which to my surprise I found to be a typical Visayan place of the better class. Its shops are kept by Chinese merchants. The population, numbering, perhaps, eight thousand souls, is composed chiefly of natives, with comparatively few half-breeds, and still fewer Spaniards. The soil near the town is fertile, and the people seemed prosperous. The public buildings are more than ordinarily imposing. The church and a convent, or priest's house, are in excellent repair, and the population generally seemed happy and contented, although instances of the most cruel oppression on the part of the Spanish rulers were frequently witnessed. Living costs little. The average Visayan with a