surf-beaten, rock-bound shore, was constantly shown, and the navy appeared to leave the army at last much to its own devices.

The almost insuperable difficulties that attended the debarkation of our army continued when the advance was made, and the disadvantages of our troops operating against a strongly intrenched and fortified enemy were incalculably great. Nothing like the usual proportion of artillery was present in the field to aid the other arms as accessories before the fact, and the comments on and results of this can come best from line officers of the other arms.

The remarkable marksmanship of our trained soldiers was hardly more exploited than the gross ignorance of our recruits. The books say that it ought not to be possible to successfully assault in front unshaken, still more well fortified infantry, under modern conditions. But in

Book Rules.

this instance dismounted cavalry, as well as its confrere of Our Victory Violates the infantry arm, did, without bayonets, successfully assault infantry posted on commanding ground, behind water, well intrenched, valiant and unshaken, and the severity of the task is indicated by the list of casualities, as compared with the actual numbers which the immediately opposing trenches held.

When the fight was over, though successful everywhere, we had no reserves—Bates' independent brigade having been in the assault first at Caney and then by a night march reinforcing the left at San Juan under most urgent calls. It was afterward supposed that the gap between our right and the bay was closed by Garcia's forces, and the demand for the surrender of the Spaniards was made prior to any knowledge of the intention of Cervera to escape with his fleet or of the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements. Such a conjunction of events may indicate the rapidity of the changes in the situation. Indeed, the fighting of this army came up to the highest expectations, and accomplished results beyond what it is usual to expect of a force so constituted.

a Target.

At early dawn of July 1 the troops of Lawton's division started into the position previously designated for them to occupy. The one battery of artillery assigned to duty with this division for the day occupied a position overlooking the village of El Caney, 2,400 yards distant. General Chaffee's brigade took up a position east of the Ludlow's White Hat village, ready to carry the town as soon as it should have been bombarded by the artillery. General Ludlow's brigade took up a position to the west of the village in order to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards, when they should be driven out and attempt to retreat to the city of Santiago. But with soldierly instinct and admirable effect he closed in upon the

defences of the village, and his white sailor hat became a target for the enemy during the hours he hugged the blockhouses on his flank of the well-defended village. Colonel Miles' brigade was held in reserve south of the village.

The artillery opened fire about 7 a. m. The battery was entirely beyond the reach of small arms' fire, and the enemy had no artillery. The battery opened with shrapnel at what appeared to be a column of cavalry moving along the road from El Caney toward Santiago, then fired a few shots at the blockhouse, then a few at hedges where the enemy's infantry seemed to be located, and then fired a few shots into the village. At about II o'clock the battery stopped firing. During all this time a continuous fire of musketry, partly firing at will and partly by volleys, was kept up along all parts of the lines. Our advance was drawing closer toward the enemy's works, and the brigade in reserve brought up the line.

Fine Artillery
Practice.

General Bates' independent brigade reached the position in the afternoon and also went into the line, all closing on toward the village. Between I and 2 o'clock the division commander directed the battery of artillery to concentrate its fire upon the stone fort, or blockhouse, situated on the highest point in the village on the northern side, and which was the key-point to the village. The practice of artillery against this was very effective, knocking great holes in the fort and rendering it untenable. The infantry of Chaffee's, Bates' and Miles' brigades then made an assault upon the work and carried it.

There were a number of small blockhouses on the other side of the village, from which a strong fire was kept up for some time after the stone fort had fallen. Word was sent to the commander of artillery to bring his battery down so as to take these blockhouses, but by the time the battery had arrived the fire had ceased. But there was one blockhouse still occupied by the Spaniards, and at this the battery fired four shots, resulting in the loss of a number of Spaniards. Orders having reached the division commander in the meantime to withdraw his forces as soon as possible and come into touch with the division on his left, our troops were not moved into the village, but were ordered to bivouac near the main road leading to the city of Santiago.

During the second of July there were a great many casualties, resulting not entirely from aimed fire, but from bullets clearing the crest of our intrenchments and going far beyond, striking men as they were coming together into position or as they were going back and forth bringing water, caring for the wounded, etc. Many casualties also resulted from the fire of sharpshooters stationed in trees with such thick foliage that the sharpshooters could not be seen.

Sharpshooters

in the Trees.

It seemed incredible that men should be so reckless as to remain within our lines and continue firing, and it is believed by many that what was reported to be fire from sharpshooters was simply spent bullets that came over the crest of our works. But I and the members of my staff can testify to the fact that in many places along the road leading up to the centre of our lines the sharp crack of the Mauser rifle could be heard very close to the road, and there were all the usual indications of the near and selected aim against individuals. Scouting parties were sent out from time to time to get hold of these fellows, and a number of them were captured or shot; it was not until a day or two afterward, however, that they were all cleared out.

Our troops suffered a great deal of unavoidable exposure from heat and rain. Many days and nights it was necessary for them to bivouac without putting up their shelter tents. In other cases the ground was so wet that it was impossible to be protected from it, and so our men were obliged to remain for days and nights in their wet clothing, the same being true of officers as of men. All this, moreover, occurred within a day's march of the base of supplies.

Equipments Thrown Away.

We were told when we entered upon the campaign that it was necessary above all things to sleep off the ground, and hammocks were recommended to secure this end. Some were seen in the original bales on the transports, but it is doubtful whether the soldiers could have carried hammocks in addition to what they already had to carry. Even such heavy intrenching tools as were on hand were felt to be a burden. Some men, notably among the volunteers, started out with overcoats, but these were left on the transports or quickly abandoned; in some cases even blankets, blouses and underclothing were thrown away. Knapsacks were strewn along the roadsides. And yet it is almost as difficult in the Cuban climate to keep warm at night as it is to keep cool in the daytime. What became of personal property wherever left will possibly prove a problem for some one to solve. On the subject of uniforms it is said, the khaki uniform quickly loses its shape and dandy color, and is not strong enough to withstand the thorns constantly met with beside the roads. The knapsack or pack seems to disappear and all come down naturally to the blanket roll.

A serious question presented was the disposition of the heavy pack when the soldier goes into action. Shall he carry it with him, weighing him down in the charge and pursuit, or shall he throw it away never to see it again, perhaps? In the battles of July 1 and 2 it became in most cases a physical necessity to throw the pack aside. In some instances the

regiments deposited their packs by the roadside and marched some miles after the battle to recover them again. In others, packs were thrown haphazard into the bushes, and in many cases were never recovered by their proper owners. Apparently the Cubans and the sick found some comfort from the owners' loss. Both pack animals and packers were overworked. It was some time before the wagons could be unloaded and used. At one time the places of the packers, who were nearly all sick, were taken by men from the firing line.

Woeful Lack of
Supplies.

As an indication of the strain, little or no commissary supplies, such as are furnished by post exchange and commisssaries, were at any time furnished beyond Sabilla. Such things as pocket-combs, tooth brushes, shoestrings, matches, tobacco, pipes-little things that did not take up much room and are of such small weight, but are of incalculable importance to the soldier-were not to be had. The stories of the prices paid for tobacco, and discontent about insufficient coffee, officers without a shirt to their backs, and clusters of them in ragged and soiled trousers, are too numerous to need more than a reference.

The volunteers found it difficult to contend with an invisible enemy pouring in an effective fire from a position impossible to determine. The bayonet was not used in the campaign, except as an intrenching tool and to grind coffee.

In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were used largely as outposts on our front and flanks. There was a great deal of discussion among officers of the expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they rendered. It appears that they had very little organization or discipline, and they did not, of course, fight in the battle line with our troops. Yet in every skirmish or fight where they were present they seemed to have a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance in our first landing and in scouting our front and flanks. It was not safe, however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to our expectation and understanding, unless they were under the constant supervision and direction of one of our own officers, as our methods and views were so different and misunderstanding or failure so easy.

DEWEY'S VICTORY IN MANILA BAY.

A Graphic Description of the Great Engagement, by an Eye Witness.

C

By E. W. HARDEN,

OMMODORE DEWEY'S final instructions from the Navy Department were brief. He was advised that "hostilities had commenced between Spain and the United States," and he was directed to "proceed to the Philippine Islands, find the Spanish fleet and

capture or destroy it."

At 5 p. m. on Saturday, April 23, the acting Governor of the British colony at Hong Kong, Wilson Block, notified Commodore Dewey that as "a state of war existed between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain" he had been "instructed by Her Majesty's Government to order the United States squadron to leave the harbor of Hong Kong and the waters of the colony by four o'clock p. m. Monday, April 25." Commodore Dewey, whose preparations had been completed, sailed on Sunday afternoon without waiting for the expiration of the time fixed by the British Government. During the six-hundred-mile voyage to Manila the squadron changed its formation several times to prove the ability of the ships to manœuvre to the satisfaction of Commodore Dewey. On Saturday afternoon, April 30, the headland of Cape Bolinao, in the Philippine Islands, was sighted.

Careful Preparations

Made for Battle.

Only half the boilers of the squadron had been in use since the squadron sailed from Hong Kong. Fires were now kindled under every boiler. Black smoke poured from every funnel. Splinter nettings were spread, fire hose was run between decks ready instantly to drown any fire caused by bursting shells, ammunition hoists were tried, magazines opened and every strip of bunting, except the signal flags used in navy codes, was taken in. Stanchions, rails, davits and other movable stuff was unshipped and stowed below, where no shot could reach them to create dangerous splinters. The few lifeboats left on board were gotten into shape for lowering to be towed behind a steam launch away from the ships in action. All spars and ladde s which could not be stowed below decks were swung over the sides of the ships. Rigging that could be dispensed with was taken down, and the wire stays which stiffen the masts were so lashed with ropes that if shot away they could not fall on deck to interfere with the working of the guns.