in a barn, and go out and rescue him. But that is the way things are done in the East. These men are practicing what they have learned; they are willing to learn new lessons and are easy to teach. I have never seen a drunken Filipino. They are a very quick and intelligent race, and capable of rapid improvement, and being tractable and amenable to good influences, they may soon be made a really desirable acquisition to the American brotherhood, which has already absorbed and assimilated many nationalities. THE NOW FOREVER HISTORIC ENGAGEMENT IN MANILA BAY. Τ' BY REAR-ADMIRAL Junge Diary. (Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron). HE squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27, arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30, and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon. The "Boston" and the "Concord" were sent to reconnoitre Port Subig. A thorough search was made of the port by the "Boston" and the "Concord," but the Spanish fleet was not found. Entered the south channel at 11.30 p. m., steaming in columns at eight knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots taking effect. The "Boston" and "McCulloch " returned the fire. The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed and arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 a. m. by three batteries at Manila and two near Cavite, and by the Spanish fleet anchored in ar approximately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water in Canacao Bay. Mines. The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship "Olympia," under my personal direction, leading, followed at a distance by the "Baltimore," "Raleigh," "Petrel," "Concord" and "Boston" in the order named, which formation was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5.41 a. m. While advancing to the attack two Explosion of Two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, but too far to be effective. The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, counter-marching in a line approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally harmless. Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the "Olympia" with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before they were able to discharge their torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish flagship, "Reina Cristina," made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received with such a galling fire, the entire battery of the "Olympia" being concentrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started in her by our shell at the time were not extinguished until she sank. The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which was not however returned by my squadron. The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance of the Pasig River, the second on the south position of the walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about onehalf mile further south. At this point I sent a message to the governorgeneral to the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing them. Great Destruction by Dewey's Guns. At 7.35 a. m. I ordered the firing to cease and withdrew the squadron for breakfast. At 11.16 I returned to the attack. By this time the Spanish flagship and almost all the Spanish fleet were in flames. At 12.30 the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the Spanish ships sunk, burned and deserted. At 12.40 the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the "Petrel" being left to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible. The Spanish lost the following vessels: Sunk, "Reina Cristina," "Castilla," "Don Antonio de Ulloa "; burned, "Don Juan of Austria," "Isla de Luzon," "Isla de Cuba," "General Lezo," "Marquis del Duero," "El Correo," แ Velasco," and "Isla de Mindanao" (transport); captured, "Rapido" and "Hercules" (tugs), and several small launches. The losses of the enemy were very heavy. The "Reina Cristina " alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and ninety wounded. I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed and only seven men in the squadron were slightly wounded. Several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest and the squadron was in as good condition after as before the battle. I doubt if any commander-in-chief was ever served by more loyal, efficient and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my command. Captain Frank Wildes, commanding the "Boston," volunteered to remain in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving Hong Kong. Assistant Surgeon Kindelberger, of the "Olympia," and Gunner J. C. Evans, of the "Boston," also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them had arrived. The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P. Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position, and gave me most efficient aid. Lieutenant Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign E. P. Scott, aide, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable manner. Caldwell, flag secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a sub-division of the 5-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my aide, and rendered valuable service. I desire especially to mention the coolness of Lieutenant C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the "Olympia," who came under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proved by the excellence of the marksmanship. On May 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it remained for several days. On the third the military forces evacuated the Cavite arsenal, which was taken possession of by a landing party. On the same day the "Raleigh" and "Baltimore "secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, paroling the garrison and destroying the guns. On the morning of May 4 the transport “Manila,” which has been aground in Bakor Bay, was towed off and made a prize. THE STORY OF MANILA'S FALL. U By mentt Major Sinerse PON my arrival at Manila, July 29 (1898), I found General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land, running parallel to the shore of the bay, and not far distant from the beach, owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had shelter-tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season. The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent. No Favors from Aguinaldo's Achievements. As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operative upon the political condition of the inhabitants, I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasig Road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs. To return to the situation of General Greene's brigade as I found it on my arrival, it will be seen that the difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the "Calle Real," so that Greene could move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the roads in the immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the "Calle Real" and the beach, and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the "Utah" batteries was placed. The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have in cablegrams to the War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. Attack on the sylvania. Our position was extended and strengthened after this, and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained. Hard to Land The strain of the night fighting, and the heavy details for outpost duty, made it imperative to reinforce General Greene's troops, with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports July 31. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be over-estimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavite, five miles from a point on the beach, where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ashore was to load from the ship's side into native lighters (called "cascoes ") or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp and then disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters' heads on the beach. The landing was finally accomplished after days of hard work and hardship; and I desire |