here to express again my admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation. Ready to Take the City. Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of General Greene's, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of entrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready. However, the brigade of General MacArthur was in position, and the "Monterey" had arrived, and under date of August 6, Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the captaingeneral (Augustin) notifying him that he should remove from the city all noncombatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations against the defences at Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that period. Ultimatum to This letter was sent August 7, and a reply was received the same date, to the effect that the Spanish were without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women and children now lodged within the walls. On the ninth, a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. This demand was based on the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of the Spaniards and that every consideration of humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to bombardment under such circumstances. The captain-general's reply, of same date, stated that the counsel of defense had declared that the demand could not be granted, but the captaingeneral offered to consult his government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary for the communications by way of Hong Kong. This was declined on our part for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to relieve troops from the trenches and from the exposure of unhealthy conditions, which was unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season. The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself, that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of entrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy. Mercy to Non- It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. It was believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his entrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city. By orders issued some time previously MacArthur's and Greene's brigades were organized as the Second Division of the Eighth Corps, BrigadierGeneral Thomas Anderson commanding, and in anticipation of the attack General Anderson moved his headquarters from Cavite to the brigade camps and assumed direct command in the field. Copies of the written and verbal instructions, referred to above, were given to the division and brigade commanders on the twelfth, and all the troops were in position on the thirteenth at an early hour in the morning. About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and before 10 a. m. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid fire projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish entrenchments at the powder magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah Batteries, in position in our trenches near the "Calle Real," began firing with great accuracy. Assault by Land and Sea. At 10.25 on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance, the navy ceased firing and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order. Both these lines found the powder magazine, fort and the trenches flanking it deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldiers who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own. The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions. In the meantime, the brigade of General MacArthur advancing simultaneously on the Passay Road, encountered a very sharp fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the roads and the heavy undergrowth which concealed the enemy. With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigado commander and the troops engaged these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss, and MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of Malate. Manila Capitulates. The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers, of my staff, and Lieutenant Brumby, United States Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the captain-general. I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the governor-general, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was signed by the captain-general and myself. This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers representing the two forces. Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea front were hauled down and the American flag displayed, and saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred in the proceedings of surrender to our forces of the Spanish army of defence, and our complete occupation of Manila. OUR BATTLES WITH THE FILIPINOS. Aguinaldo Leads a Host of His Followers Against the American Army Occupying Manila. T By J. W. BUEL. HE intervention of a superior power to aid a struggling people to free themselves from the oppressions and abuses practiced by their subjugators is invariably attended by ingratitude, which usually manifests itself in hostile demonstrations against their liberators. This sudden change to enmity of a freed people has its origin in the soulless ambition of thankless leaders, who, conceiving a purpose to become absolute as rulers, promote the military spirit of their followers, which they then employ for their own selfish ends, and often to the ruin of their purblind followers as well as themselves. This is especially true of the semi-civilized, among whom insurgent leaders who once taste the fruit of victory, however small and transitory, may never thereafter be depended upon to yield loyal allegiance to any power above them. The United States Government is in an attitude to feel the effects of this base ingratitude, and that our humane intervention in Cuba and in the Philippines will bring upon us the hostility of those liberated peoples there can be no doubt, and may involve us in a long and costly war, wherein we shall occupy the position from which our armies have recently driven Spain. Indeed, the first blow has already been struck by the Filipinos, who, mindless of the service which the United States rendered in freeing them from the exactions and cruelty of their Spanish taskmasters, are now anxious to expel their civilized liberators, to disclaim all obligations, and to assert their independence. Aguinaldo's Assumptions of Authority. The signing of the Peace Treaty at Paris, December 10, which terminated our war with Spain, was almost immediately followed by acts of arrogance and supercilious conduct on the part of Aguinaldo, who assuming the powers of a sovereign-though without recognition-proceeded to levy taxes, issue proclamations, impose restrictions upon American troops, and conducted himself in a manner that was calculated to irritate our officers and to incense our soldiers to the limit of patience. Refusal by the President and Secretary of State to recognize Aguinaldo's representative, Agoncillo, who visited Washington and memorialized Congress in a vain effort to secure acknowledgment of Philippine independence, so angered Aguinaldo that he ? 130477 (5 made preparations to resume the war against American troops in the Philip pines as invaders. He was able to secure from traders, who were more mercenary than patriotic, 10,000 Mauser and Remington rifles, 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition, two 20-pounder Krupp guns and several pieces of field artillery. He thereupon began active operations by intrenching his 20,000 troops in the vicinity of Manila, and in making preparations for conducting hostilities. The administration entertained the hope that forbearance and kind treatment might influence Aguinaldo to accept the kind offices and sincere good will of America, which, however, instead of being appreciated, served no other purpose than to provide opportunity desired by the insurgents to strengthen their position and to complete their preparations for war. It unfortunately happened that the administration's pacific utterances and great forbearance was regarded by the Filipinos as an evidence of hesitation and weakness. In practicing toleration to avoid actual conflict with the natives, and to save bloodshed, a certain official recognition was given the Filipinos. A striking illustration of this fact occurred on December 21, when the two forces were very near an engagement. Up to that date the sentries of the American and insurgent forces had guarded opposite ends of the Paco bridge, a stone structure across a ten-foot creek on the outskirts of the city, but in accordance with instructions the American officer of the day essayed to post his sentry in the centre of the bridge. The Filipino guard objected, however, and when a protest was made informed the Americans that at nine o'clock the next morning they would fire upon the American line unless the sentry was withdrawn. At the appointed hour Major-General Anderson and some 4,000 men were on hand, but after a conference the Filipinos were recognized to the extent that the sentry was withdrawn to his former position, and the American troops marched back to their quarters. The issuance of General Otis' proclamation regarding the intentions of the Americans in the Philippines gave Aguinaldo the opportunity desired, and in less than twelve hours after the former was published the Filipino's response was posted on the walls of the city. Its effect was instantaneous upon the natives generally and their attitude was such that it was deemed advisable to keep the entire army of occupation in quarters and under arms, in order that they might be ready should an emergency arise. Two trivial incidents which occurred simultaneously in different parts of the city occasioned a false alarm at 2.30 o'clock, January 6, 1899, and the entire troops were called "to arms." Within fifteen minutes after the echoes of the bugles had died away the whole force was under way, every company of every regiment being in its allotted position ready for action. While this |