less probation, and thereby there would exist a fearful hazard of increased "sin and damnation."

Of this so-called "limitation" of Wesley's words, the reviewer is pleased to use this language: "Here again the critic is very careful not to quote the language on which so great a limitation depends." And he gives the following as Wesley's real argument: "He argues that besides the infinite advantages which accrue from the permission of the fall, any alteration of the scheme in the important point of our connection with Adam might have involved a universal sin without the benefit of the redemptive economy. But this is only a supplementary view thrown in to give completeness to an argument which has a far different foundation." After thus attributing to us a disingenuous omission of Wesley's words, the reviewer himself omits to quote what he so very peremptorily, though very mistakenly interprets. We quote:

12. There is one advantage more that we reap from Adam's fall, which is not unworthy our attention. Unless in Adam all had died, being in the loins of their first parent, every descendant of Adam, every child of man, must have personally answered for himself to God. It seems to be a necessary consequence of this, that if he had once fallen, once violated any command of God, there would have been no possibility of his rising again: there was no help, but he must have perished without remedy.

Now Wesley speaks not here of any alteration of our "connection" with Adam. He speaks of no "alteration" or variation, save of Adam's not falling, and so preventing our seminally dying

ed and guarded innocent creatures in a state of perfect happiness, before the introduction of moral evil, then nothing more was necessary to be done for their sake, because they were already in possession of perfect and unobstructed happiness. For whose sake then did the Creator wish to display his attributes in any other way? Not for the sake of sinners, for there were none in being. Not for the sake of enlarging the happiness of his creatures, for I presume, had they continued upright their obedience would, through divine beneficence, have regularly enlarged it, without the help of wickedness.-P. 276.

3. God's attributes have never been fully revealed to creatures, and so their display in redemption was not so necessary as to require sin.

But what evidence have we that he ever has fully manifested the whole extent of his perfections to any creature?

If then he has made known but a little portion of his nature to us, it must be because he is perfectly free from a selfish ambition, and manifests his perfections so far only as the general good requires. Upon this principle it is evident, had moral evil never been introduced, goodness would not have manifested itself in redemption, because such a manifestation would not be necessary; but after there were sinners exposed to hopeless misery, the Almighty Father was pleased to make a new display of his benevolence, and to evince before all worlds that even rebels themselves. should not finally perish while goodness could prevent it.-P. 278.

in him. The "advantage" is expressly derived from “Adam's fall" as antithesis to Adam's standing. No reference is made to the non-severance of the chain connecting us to the fall. "Unless in Adam all had died," as they could not had Adam stood. For this "unless" must include all cases of our existing and not dying in Adam. Had Adam by standing trial prevented our lineally dying in him-what then? There would have been, as Wesley says in the remainder of the paragraph, a probation without a redeemer for us. It would have been an undepraved, and so temporally a qualifiedly holy, but still a probationary world. The "hazard," he adds, would have been infinitely greater; and in the entire system, eternally produced, the blended "sin and damnation" would have been, in all probability, increased to an unknown amount.

Our imaginative opponent has entirely mistaken the structure of the sermon. According to the general division at paragraph marked with the first 4, Wesley employs from the second 1 to 10 inclusive, in proving that with the atonement we are holier on earth; and then he employs only paragraph 11 to show our higher happiness in heaven. His argument is then finished so far as holiness and happiness are concerned. It then occurs to him that there is a reverse view, of sin and damnation even in this undepraved and comparatively holy, yet probationary and peccable world. Yet, as it is of a more speculative character, he touches it briefly and supplementarily in 12, above quoted. Really, then, there are three heads. Without the atonement we should be, 1. Less holy on earth; 2. Less happy in heaven; and, 3. More liable to damnation. We submit, therefore, that the comparison is between a Christ-given system of redemption and "Christless system of works." From this it will be seen that our statement still stands, "It is simply saying the less sin the better." We have then the equation-Adam's sin with its consequences is more abundant in good and less in evil than the naturalistic system and its consequences. God is justifiable in permitting that sin from which the greatest good and the least evil will arise.

It is as useless as it is reasonless for our opponent to deny that Wesley's whole argument is a comparison between this human world, minus the atonement, and this human world, plus the atonement. The persons Wesley argues with are

those who find fault with God for permitting the latter; and he proves that it is far superior to the former. He leaves out of the account, but does not exclude, the possibility of myriads of other methods. And then Fletcher, his own chosen expositor, interposes his telling Arminian maxims to vindicate both the infinite versatility of God's inventiveness and his non-obligation to sin. "God has ten thousand strings to his providential bow, and ten thousand bridles in his providential hand,” etc. (P. 661.) "God has no need of sinful man." "If things had not happened one way they might have happened another." "We ought to assert that God will get himself glory every way." Though he uses Judas, he needs him not for the atonement; though he uses Nebuchadnezzar, he needs him not for the punishment of Israel. Though he uses Adam he needs not him nor his sin for a redemptive manifestation. Though he use a redemptive manifestation, as better than the level of naturalism, yet he needs neither Adam nor the redemption in order to the highest good and glory.

By a curious apparent afterthought our reviewer adduces the fact that in his original treatment of Wesley, to which we first applied the word "misrepresents," he actually stated the "limitation" for which we contend; and he adduces this fact as proof of his "accuracy" and our unfairness. Why then, alas! did he not stay "accurate" and thus deprive us of all ground of controversy? And if he was then "accurate," then we are still accurate, and he is wrong and we are right in the whole discussion. He was accurate. Yet though he first stated Wesley with the true limitation, he even then, more than once, so brought Wesley in as an instance under the genus of maintainers of the "dogma," he so adduced Bledsoe as on the same ground with Wesley, that Wesley was huddled with the rest, and so misrepresented by classification. By the "limitation" he showed he knew the distinction; by association he obliterated it. And this apparently conscious wrong-doing called for a term that admitted though it did not affirm intention. We do not express more by the word misrepresentation than representation amiss.

The "accuracy" of his first article our reviewer bravely abjured in his second. "All that is most obnoxious in the extreme Calvinistic view of this subject is surpassed and outdone by the FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XIV.-10

boundless extravagance of both the Romish and Wesleyan Theology." For this "boundless" assertion all the reviewer has thus far to show is some extracts from Bledsoe, who is not "Wesleyan," and from Wesley, where the task of making good his assertion is yet before him.

In very strong language our reviewer declares that this "monstrous dogma" is maintained by Arminian theological writers. In his first article he says, "It has pervaded alike all the theological schools, and was as readily recognized and accepted among the Arminian, and indeed the Catholic, as among the Calvinistic theologians." The doctrine of fore-ordination, we reply, renders this dogma convenient and acceptable to Calvinistic divines, but leaves it abhorrent to the Arminian. Toplady therefore could make it tally with his system; but Wesleyan theology, by its spokesman Fletcher, consigned it to the same repudiation with predestination and its cognate dogmas that were felt to indicate the divine volition in favor of sin. Will our reviewer please verify his statement that Arminian "theological schools" or teachers have accepted the "monstrous dogma?" We shall believe it when we see it. Let him take our old Hollandic Remonstrants, in their magnificent contest with the "dogmas" of Dort. Did Arminius? did Episcopius, or Limborgius, or Curcellæus, or any of that class accept this "monstrous dogma?" We would like to see the passage quoted from one of these eminent doctors endorsing the "dogma." Or take the old English Arminians: Did Cudworth, or Henry More, or John Goodwin, or Archbishop King, or Sherlock, or Whitby approve this dogma? Produce the passage. It is hazardous to posit a universal negative; but long, we suspect, will be his "novitiate of silence and study" before that passage dawns.

Quite important, however, it will be for our opponent to take new caution in his method of interpreting Arminian authors. He will find Archbishop King, for instance, saying that the existence of the sinning sphere may contribute, and be necessary to, the completeness and perfection of the universe. And this he may construe to mean that the existence of sin in that sphere is necessary to the best universe. As a mole, the archbishop tells us, though a defect in itself, may perfect the beauty of a whole person, so that planet in which

the agents sin, may, since it was foreseen that those agents will sin, be made to perfect the resultant universe. Nevertheless, just as a diamond, instead of the mole, might raise the body to a higher character of perfection, so that one sinning sphere, as the archbishop denies not, freely choosing to be holy, might have raised the universe to a different grade and character of perfection. Our opponent will find few, if any, Arminian authors, we think, affirming that sin is aboriginally necessary to the existence of an absolutely optimistic universe.

We now trust that we have afforded our respected opponent's candor another occasion for exercise. A Dorian was expected to understand Doric,

Δωρίσδεν δ' ἔξεστι, δοκῶ, τοῖς Δωριέεσσι,

and a Wesleyan is perhaps very likely to have some correct notions of Wesley's theology.

The issue between the consistent fatalism of Edwards and the uniform freedomism of Wesley will, we trust, be discussed in a future number.

ART. VIII.-FOREIGN RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.

ac

WE place at the head of our "Religious Intelligence" department an count of the Fourth General Assembly of the Evangelical Alliance, as its grand results belong more to the Church history of Protestantism in general than to that of little Switzerland, within whose borders the meeting was held.

FOURTH GENERAL MEETING OF THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.-The Fourth General Assembly of the Evangelical Alliance at Geneva seems to have been a great success. Such is the testimony of all who took part in it, and of the entire religious press of Europe. The large attendance, the interesting proceedings, the important resolutions, and the cordial reception of both by the Churches, show that the actual alliance of the Protestant Churches has now become a fact. The High Church Episcopalians of England, the High Lutherans

of Germany, and the Rationalists of all tion; but their very isolated attacks only countries still continue in their opposihelp to present the spiritual unity of the majority of Christian Churches in a stronger light. We select from the full account of the proceedings of the meeting at Geneva a few points which, in our opinion, are best calculated to show that the reunions of the Alliance have a fair title to being regarded as the most important religious meetings in the Protestant world, that they are already fulfilling a great mission, and that a still greater sphere of usefulness awaits them.

ECUMENICAL CHARACTER OF THE MEETING.-LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES REPRESENTED.-NAMES OF DISTINGUISHED ATTENDANTS.-A distinguished Church historian of Germany, Professor Jacoby of Halle, has appropriately called the meetings of the Evangelical Alliance the œcumenical councils of Protestant