and terminated the most expensive and hazardous war we were ever engaged in, with dignity and with glory. Wandsworth, Sept. 5, 1762. WE An answer to the preceding letter. E are told by the letter-writer at Wandf worth, what has been fince repeated by the Auditor, that "the peace now offered by France "and Spain united, is in many refpects better, and "in no refpect worse, than the peace which was fo near being concluded last year, when we had no "enemy but France to contend with." I should be glad to know, from one of thefe gentlemen, (fuppofe the Auditor, for he is a weekly writer, and probably the best instructed) what is meant here by the word better? Does it not mean fimply, that more is to be given up to us by these preliminaries, than what was to have been yielded to us last year? Or has it a fair and comparative relation to the circumftances of the war, as it ftood then, and as it ftands now? And that, as the uti poffidetis was to be the bafis of the peace at that time, fo the prefent uti pofidetis is to be the foundation of the present peace. If the laft be the true meaning of this paragraph, and if this overture of peace be not to take place till the fate of the Havannah be determined, (as was the cafe laft year with refpect to Belleifle) every true Englishman will blefs the inftruments of fo happy and honourable an event: and indeed, if thefe writers have any authority for what they fay, this laft can be the only true and genuine meaning: for, France and Spain united, and, no enemy but France to contend with, argue a comparifon between our fituation laft year, and our pre fent fent fituation; and it would imply the meaneft prevarication, partially to compare one circumftance of the war, and to drop the comparison in every other circumftance. If, to the misfortune of Britain, the first interpretation is the true one, I fay, we may have the offer of a better peace than what was near being concluded last year, and yet the acceptance of fuch a peace may be now highly difhonourable and injurious to this nation. To exemplify this truth, nothing more is needful than to purfue the comparative ftate of the war, fo artificially introduced in one point of light only, and fo filently paffed over in every other point; let us candidly view it in every point of light. Since the last year we have incurred an additional debt of twelve millions, a war with Spain, and the lofs of Newfoundland.-On the other hand, we have gained Martinico, and all the adjacent islands; the Havannah, with twelve fhips of the enemy's line of battle, and an immense treasure, are most probably in our poffeffion; Portugal, which employs feventy or eighty thousand of the enemy's forces, is now in our alliance; our brave ally, the king of Pruffia, who was befet by foes on every fide, has emerged from his diftreffes, having fcarcely more than one power to contend with, over which he has a manifeft afcendancy; the French, who threatened Hanover from the banks of the Wefer, are now fled to the Mayne, after leaving fome garrifons in Heffe, which in all human likelihood will be foon reduced; and that country, which, if I mistake not, was valued againft Guadalupe and its dependencies in the laft preliminaries, will now be refumed without the ranfom of fo precious an exchange. To compare then our present fituation with what it was last year, we have to confider, what we have gained, and what we have loft. We We have gained, We have loft, Martinico, the Grenadil- St. John's in Newfoundlos, St. Lucia, Domi- land: which was taken nica, St. Vincent: an equivalent for Guadalupe and Marigalante: and most probably the Havannah. by the enemy, with two fhips of the line of battle, and a few foldiers. This fair representation of facts must convince every one, without further comment, that we have a right to infift on much better terms of peace, than we could prefume to think of in the last year's preliminaries, though the lofs of St. John's may juftify a lefs advantageous peace than might otherwise reasonably have been expected.-After all, we may comfort ourfelves with the affurance of an excellent peace, on the footing of each power retaining what it has conquered, though a very valuable conqueft on our part fhould be fet off against this acquifition of the enemy. With regard to our increased debt, we ought to confider that great advantages cannot be obtained without great expence; it would be as vain to imagine it, as to expect great victories without bloodshed; if we complain in victory, what must be the lamentations of the vanquished? And if our conquefts have coft us dearly, we have the more right to demand the fruits of them. As to our war with Spain, this year's experience has fhewn how little caufe we had to fear the enmity of the Spaniards, and how much reason they had to dread ours: for, provided the Havannah be taken, they will foon feel inevitable ruin on themselves, while they fought to avert it from the French; and fince our conquefts this year have exceeded the conquefts of any former year, it appears that France and Spain united are not near fo ftrong as France alone was at the commencement of the war: why then fhould we quit any any of our pretenfions to what we have conquered? Why not demand the fame kind of terms, viz. the retention of our conquefts, as would have been the cafe had the treaty laft year taken place. That treaty went off: the laft hope of France was in Spain Spain unites herself with France, and has fhewn how light fhe is in the fcale against us. Beaten as the French are, out of all their hopes, as well as out of the field, fhall we give them back all their islands, and all their commerce, that they may be enabled once more to difpute with us the fovereignty of the Seas? Is it beft to raise an implacable enemy from the duft, and give him time to breathe, 'till he can renew the affault when he finds it moft for his advantage? or to take proper meafures to impair his ftrength, fince we cannot eradicate his malice? In fhort, fhall we be generous enough to confult the intereft of France, and forego our own? for that may be the cafe in the prefent pofture of our affairs, though the present treaty compared literally with the former, may be in many respects better; though the former, at that time, might not deferve blame. For by the fame rule that a peace, on equal terms, would have been a good one two years after the commencement of the war, when we had loft Minorca and been beaten in America, yet if the fame fort of terms had been adopted last year as a plan of pacification, though mingled up with fomething that would have made it in many refpects better, and in no refpect worfe, all the world would have decried fuch an infamous peace; fo the peace which was near being concluded last year, might not then have been difguftful, yet, without confiderable additional ceffions by the enemy, it may now become very unpalatable, and be held in abomination, even if it fhould be fweetened over with fomething better. Every one knows that our enemies. would give up nothing that formerly belonged to them them through the mere defire of peace; it is neceffity that drives them to any conceffions, and the fame neceffity will compel them to accept fuch conditions as our conquefts enable us to impose. They will certainly renew their claims when they think themselves ftrong enough, whether we keep the whole, or a part only of what we have poffeffed ourselves by dint of arms; and they will foon forget our bounty in reftoring a part, whilft they will remember the injury done them in retaining any thing. Can there be a doubt, therefore, whether we ought to infift on the retention of the whole? there is a double policy in it, we strengthen ourselves and weaken the foe. If the enemy comply we have nothing to fear from them for many years to come; if they reject the terms, when can there be fo fit a time to profecute the war, as when the enemy cannot effectually refift us either by fea or land? I have argued thus far on a fuppofition that this affertion of a better peace came from authority. Who tells us fo? why, an anonymous letter writer, and a common weekly advocate for minifterial measures, (the auditor). This is poor authority indeed. But, befides the futility of fuch teftimony, we ought to be peculiarly on our guard at prefent, how we truft to any pretended authority till lately, I thought the Gazette a very good authority; but I dare fay the miniftry will not allow it to be authority; for juft before our rupture with Spain, the Gazette told us, we were on the most friendly and loving terms with Spain, and the very next Gazette informed us, that we were underftood by that court to have made a formal declaration of war, by afking a question, which in fubstance amounted only to this, Whether Spain was refolved to be at war with us or no? The ministry knew full well on what ticklish ground we stood with that court, and had instructed our ambassador to |