Gage v. City of Chicago plaintiff in error in the county court was the objection that the ordinance lying at the basis of the assessment was void for uncertainty. The following diagram shows the situation and aspect of the proposed sewers, and the streets through which they were to run: By the terms of section 1 of the ordinance it was ordained: "That a connected system of vitrified tile pipe sewers be constructed as follows, to wit: In West Sixteenth street, along the center line thereof, from and connecting with the sewer in Central Park avenue to the west line of Lawndale avenue; in West Fifteenth street, along the center line thereof, from and connecting with the sewer in Central Park avenue to the west line of Bonney avenue; in Douglas Park boulevard, along a line thirty feet north of and parallel with the south line thereof, from and connecting with the sewer in Central Park avenue to the center line of Bonney avenue; and in Millard avenue, Lawndale avenue, and Bonney avenue, along the center line thereof, from their connections with said sewer in West Sixteenth street to their connection with said sewer in West Fifteenth street, and thence to their connection with said sewer in the south side of Douglas Park boulevard." The streets running north and south are Central Park, Millard, Lawndale, and Bonney avenues, and the streets running east and west are Douglas Park boulevard, West Fifteenth, and West Sixteenth streets. The sewer in West Sixteenth street is, by the terms of the ordinance, to run west to Lawndale avenue only, while the sewers in West Fifteenth street and Douglas Park boulevard run west to Bonney avenue, which is a block further west than Lawndale avenue. As the West Sixteenth street sewer runs only to Lawndale avenue, it is apparent that between Lawndale and Gage v. City of Chicago Bonney avenues there is a hiatus, and no sewer; hence a sewer in Bonney avenue could not connect with the sewer in West Sixteenth street. The reference in the ordinance could not be to any existing sewer in West Sixteenth street between Lawndale and Bonney avenues, nor to any sewer to be thereafter constructed in West Sixteenth street between Lawndale and Bonney avenues, because the ordinance specifies that the sewers shall be constructed in Millard, Lawndale, and Bonney avenues, along the center line thereof, "from their connections with said sewer in West Sixteenth street." The words "said sewer" can refer to nothing else than the provision theretofore made in the ordinance for a sewer in West Sixteenth street from Central Park avenue to Lawndale avenue. Therefore the sewer referred to in the ordinance is only the sewer extending in West Sixteenth street from Central Park avenue to Lawndale avenue, and not any sewer in West Sixteenth street extending from Lawndale avenue to Bonney avenue. It follows that the sewer in Bonney avenue could not connect with the sewer in West Sixteenth street. In view of this uncertainty, we are of the opinion that the ordinance was void. City of Alton v. Middleton's Heirs, 158 Ill. 442, 41 N. E. 926. As the Bonney avenue sewer has no connection with the West Sixteenth street sewer, its point of commencement in West Sixteenth street is not designated. Its starting point being an unknown quantity, neither its length nor depth can be known, and no intelligent bid could be made for that part of the work. As the sewer running south in Bonney avenue would have no connection with any sewer in West Sixteenth street, its outflow would make a cesspool of private property. The city would have no right to empty the sewage upon private property. Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 89 Am. Dec. 392. The ordinance makes no provision for the outflow. In addition to what is said above, the ordinance provides for "house-connection slants of six-inch internal diameter to be placed on both sides of the sewer opposite each twenty feet of lot frontage." It sufficiently appears from the assessment roll that the lots of the plaintiff in error have a frontage of about 50 feet; certainly of more than 20 feet. The arbitrary subdivision of such lots into subdivisions of 20-foot lots necessarily increases the expense of the improvement, and casts a burden upon the property in excess of the benefit received, and is beyond the power of the council. We have held in a number of cases that the city has no power to dictate to a landowner how he shall subdivide his land; and lots of a greater frontage than 20 feet cannot be subdivided by the city into lots, each having a frontage of 20 feet, for the purpose of being assessed. Bickerdike v. City of Chicago, 185 Ill. 280, 56 N. E. 1096, and cases therein referred to. For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the county court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded. WHITE V. KNOWLTON et al. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, July 5, 1901.) [86 N. W. Rep. 755.] State Tax-Lien-Special Assessment-Priority.-Sections 34, 47, subc. 7, c. 7, Sp. Laws 1887, relating to special assessments for local improvements in the city of St. Paul, construed, and held: The lien of such an assessment is subordinate to the lien of the state for all taxes which have been or may be levied upon the same property under the general laws of the state, without reference to the time when the state lien accrued. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, Ramsey county: Olin B. Lewis, Judge. Action by William G. White against Dexter A. Knowlton and Charles D. Knowlton. Findings for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed. Henry B. Farwell, for appellants. START, C. J. Action to determine adverse claim to a certain lot in the city of St., Paul. The plaintiff asserts title thereto by virtue of a tax sale thereof by the state based upon a judgment for the delinquent taxes of the year 1893. The defendants claim title to the lot by virtue of a sale thereof by the city of St. Paul upon a judgment on a local assessment for the cost of sprinkling the street in front of the lot during the season of 1894. The judgment and sale in each case was valid, and no redemption was ever made in either case, although due notice of the expiration of the time for redemption was given in each case. The trial court found that the plaintiff was the owner of the lot, that the defendants had no title thereto or lien thereon, and ordered judgment accordingly. The defendants appealed from an order denying their motion for a new trial. The record presents for our decision the sole question as to which party holds the paramount title. The lien of the state for the general taxes on the lot under which the plaintiff claims attached as of May 1, 1893, while the lien of the city for the local assessment under which the defendants claim attached February 14, 1895. Judgment was entered for the state taxes March 21, 1895, and the lot sold by virtue thereof on May 5, 1895. Judgment for the local assessment was entered on June 29, 1895, and the lot sold by virtue thereof on November 4, 1895. The general rule as to priority of tax liens is the reverse of the rule in ordinary cases, and the tax lien last in time is the first in right. Whether the general rule would apply in any case to the lien of the state for general taxes, as against a subsequent lien in favor of a city for local assessments, we need not discuss or decide, for this particular case is controlled by the charter provisions of the city of St. Paul. The city is given ample power by its charter to 6 M C Cas-14 Shurtleff v. City of Chicago levy and enforce local assessments, which are made a paramount lien on the real estate on which the same may be imposed from the date of the warrant issued for the collection thereof, subject, however, to the lien of the state for all taxes which have been or may be levied upon such property under the general laws of the state. Sp. Laws 1887, c. 7, subc. 7. §§ 34. 47. The specific language of such exception is this: "Provided that nothing in this act contained shall be construed to affect or prejudice the lien of the state for all taxes which have been or may be levied upon such property under the general laws of the state. The purpose of this proviso lies so clearly upon its face that no question of construction can arise. Its meaning is just what the words used import; that is, that the lien for a local assessment is subordinate to the lien of the state for taxes levied under the general laws of the state, without reference to the time when the lien of the state accrues. It follows that the lien which is the basis of the plaintiff's title was paramount to the lien under which the defendants claim, and that the plaintiff, and not the defendants, own the lot in question, by virtue of a sale thereof on such paramount lien. The record suggests other interesting and complicated questions, but it is our duty to decide this particular case, and leave other questions to be solved when they arise, if ever they do. Order affirmed. Shurtleff v. CITY OF CHICAGO. (Supreme Court of Illinois, June 19, 1901.) [60 N. E. Rep. 870.] Street Improvements-Assessment of Benefits-Deduction for Lands Donated.-Local Improvement Act 1897, § 17, provides that, where part of the land "to be laid out into a street" has been donated by any person, it shall be lawful for the commissioners, in making the assessment for benefits, to appraise the land so donated, and apply the value thereof as an offset to the benefits assessed against such person. In 1891 plaintiff dedicated a strip of land for the extension of a street in defendant city. In 1899 defendant instituted proceedings to lay out and open a portion of such street lying several blocks east of the land dedicated by plaintiff, which constituted another part thereof. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to have deducted from his assessment for benefits the value of the land dedicated by him in 1891, since the statute only contemplates. a deduction for land donated "to be laid out into the street" for the opening of which benefits are assessed. Same Same-Ingress and Egress.—That plaintiff's lot does not abut on a proposed street, and that ingress and egress to and from it will not be affected by the opening thereof, is no objection to an assessment of benefits against it. Same Same-Hearing-Judgment.-Local Improvement Act 1897, § 26, provides that, on return of the verdict of the jury in proceedings to assess benefits of street improvements, the court shall enter such judgment thereon as the nature of the case may require, but that "no final judgment shall be entered until all the issues in the case have been disposed of." Objections were filed by plaintiff to a special assessment for the opening of a street, and the question of benefits was submitted to a Shurtleff v. City of Chicago jury. Held, that on the return of a verdict against plaintiff the court did not err in entering final judgment thereon before disposing of the objections filed by other property owners, since the statutory provision relates only to the final determination of the condemnation and assessment after all the issues between the different parties shall be settled under the other provisions of the act. Appeal from county court, Cook county; Russell P. Goodwin, Judge. Proceedings by the city of Chicago to lay out and open Oakdale avenue, in which commissioners were appointed to report the compensation to be paid the owners of private property to be taken or damaged. or damaged. Plaintiff. Benjamin Shurtleff, appeared and filed objections to the commissioners' report. From a judgment on a verdict in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. D. G. Robertson and Cyrus Heren, for appellant. Charles M. Walker, Corp. Counsel, Robert Redfield. Asst. Corp. Counsel, and William M. Pindell, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellee. CARTWRIGHT, J. The city of Chicago, appellee, instituted this proceeding in the county court of Cook county to lay out and open Oakdale avenue from Burling street to North Clark street, in said city. Commissioners were appointed to ascertain and report the just compensation to be paid to the owners of private property to be taken or damaged for the street, and also what real estate would be benefited by the improvement, and the amount of such benefits; and they made their report of such compensation, and gave a description of property which, in their judgment, would be specially benefited by the improvement, with the amount of benefit to each lot, tract, or parcel of land. Benjamin Shurtleff, appellant, being the owner of lots assessed for such benefits, appeared and filed objections, among which were the following: That the improvement was a private and local one, of no general public benefit, and that he had before that time donated for said Oakdale avenue a strip of land of the value of $15,000, largely in excess of said assessment; and the commissioners failed to appraise the value of the land so donated, or to apply such value as a set-off against the benefits assessed. There was a hearing of said objections before the court, and they were overruled. Thereafter the case came on for hearing on the question of benefits before a jury, which returned a verdict against appellant. The court rendered judgment on the verdict, and this appeal followed. Appellant's property is located west of that portion of Oakdale avenue to be opened, and there are intervening streets. so that it is not dependent upon said portion for ingress or egress. There are streets running north and south on both sides of said property, and intersecting east and west streets. so that appellant has full access from his property to the gen |