Parmenter v. City of Marion circumstances was a mere condition, and the accident was as likely to follow without the platform as with it. It should also be constantly borne in mind that there is no evidence to show that Rheinheimer so used the platform as to make a nuisance thereof. He had the right to back wagons up to his building for the purpose of loading and unloading them, provided he did not obstruct travel for an unreasonable length of time, and did nothing to unreasonably endanger passers-by. So long as he used the platform for loading and unloading wagons backed up or under it, he was doing no wrong. He could not, of course, use the platform as a place of storage; and if he placed bales thereon, that were likely to fall and injure passers-by, with the knowledge of the city, the city would, no doubt, be responsible. It may be (although we do not decide the point) that if he (Rheinheimer) persistently or continuously threw bales of hay from the second story of his building to the sidewalk below, with the knowledge, express or implied, of the city, and thereby endangered the safety of persons using the streets, and the city failed to use reasonable care to stop this dangerous use, it would be liable. But the facts do not justify the conclusion that the city had knowledge of the dangerous use of the platform. But once before, if at all, was this platform used in such a manner as to endanger the safety of those using the sidewalk. We doubt very much if the city could have interfered with the use of the platform as a place for loading or unloading hay, but, however this may be, it was not bound for any negligent or improper use thereof unless it had, or ought to have had, notice or knowledge thereof, and an opportunity to prevent the same. There was not sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding that it was so used as to be a nuisance, or that, if so used, the city had notice or knowledge thereof. For these reasons the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence should have been sustained. 2. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: "You are instructed that it was the duty of the defendant to keep the street and sidewalk where the accident occurred in a reasonably safe condition for pedestrians passing along the same, and free from obstructions. As applied to this case, if you find from the evidence that the defendant negligently suffered and permitted a platform to be constructed from the second story of a building upon said street in such a manner that the same projected over a portion of the sidewalk, so that objects falling therefrom would be likely to fall upon the heads of passers-by, and that the defendant suffered and permitted the owner or occupant of such building to keep up and maintain the same in such condition, and also to use the same for the purpose of loading and unloading baled hay and straw, or to pass the same in or out of the building, and that in so doing the same was thrown from said platform upon said sidewalk, Crawford v. Mayor, etc., of City of Griffin or a portion thereof, in such a manner as to endanger pedestrians passing along said sidewalk in the exercise of ordinary care, and constituted an obstruction to said sidewalk, and that such condition and use had continued for a long time prior to the injury to the plaintiff, and that the condition of said platform and its construction and use was public, and of such character, and had continued for such a length of time prior to the injury, that the defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care, would have known of such construction and use, and have prevented its continuance, before the time of the plaintiff's injury, and that while the plaintiff was passing along said sidewalk, using ordinary care, a bale of hay was dropped from said platform, and that the same fell upon the plaintiff and injured her, then and in that event your verdict should be for the plaintiff." The whole of the instruction, and particularly that part italicized, is made the basis of an assignment of error. For the reasons already pointed out, we think it was erroneous. It was also erroneous for the reason that it assumes there was evidence tending to show that objects were used or kept thereon that were likely to fall on the heads of passers-by. Again, the use of the same for the purpose of loading and unloading hay, or for passing the same in or out of the building, did not of itself render it a nuisance. Other questions are discussed, that we will not consider, for the reason that the foregoing seems to dispose of the case. Reversed. CRAWFORD V. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF GRIFFIN. (Supreme Court of Georgia, May 23, 1901.) [38 S. E. Rep. 988.] Personal Injuries-Liability of City for Private Bridge.*-Where, upon the trial of an action for damages against a city for physical injuries alleged to have been caused by a defective bridge, it appeared from the evidence submitted in behalf of the plaintiff that the bridge in question extended from the street to the sidewalk over a drainage ditch, not at a regular public crossing or street intersection, and was built solely for the convenience of an owner of abutting land, and was not in general use by the public, and was of no public utility, held, that the granting of a nonsuit was proper, although it further appeared that prior to the plaintiff's injuries the city, after taking up the bridge for the purpose of deepening the ditch, had replaced the same, and had subsequently made some repairs upon it, and that some of the public used it. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error from city court of Griffin; E. W. Hammond, Judge. Action by Martha Crawford against the mayor and city council of the city of Griffin. At the close of plaintiff's case a nonsuit was granted, and both parties bring error. Affirmed. Searcy & Boyd and Marcus W. Beck, for plaintiff. *See Mayor, etc., of Sandersville v. Hurst, 4 Mun. Corp. Cas. 230, and cross-reference note. Crawford v. Mayor, etc., of City of Griffin FISH, J. Martha Crawford sued the mayor and council of the city of Griffin for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by her by reason of the breaking of a rotten plank in a bridge over which she was walking in such city. The court granted a nonsuit, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted. From the evidence submitted in her behalf, it appeared that the bridge in question was not situated at a public crossing, nor at the intersection of streets, but was located opposite the garden gate of Mr. Mills, and extended from the street to the sidewalk over a gutter or ditch for drainage, and was built solely for the convenience of Mr. Mills in hauling manure into his garden. He furnished a part of the lumber for the construction of the bridge, but it did not appear who built it or caused it to be built. Some four or five years after its erection it became necessary to deepen the ditch under the bridge for drainage purposes, and to do this the bridge was removed by the hands working the streets of the city, and, when the ditch had been deepened, was replaced in its original position by such hands. It appeared that the street hands subsequently repaired the bridge, but how often or in what manner was not shown. Plaintiff was a servant of Mills, and in going to his house she left the sidewalk on the opposite side of the street, some 40 or 50 feet below the bridge where she was hurt, and followed a path leading diagonally across the street to the bridge, and while walking over it one of the planks thereon, which was rotten, broke, causing her to fall and to fracture her leg. The plaintiff testified: "I have seen people cross the bridge. There was a path going across the bridge. It was a path that people walked across the bridge from the sidewalk to the street. I have seen people walk across there. It was my regular way of passing. As to persons who cross that bridge, I saw Clara Baker and Tena cross there. They came over there often. I don't know how often they crossed it. They work often at Mr. Mills'. They cross frequently. I saw the Hardaman girl, Mrs. Mills' chambermaid, cross there. I have seen others. I thought it was a regular crossing. I have seen people passing it all the while. More use it than those who come from Mr. Mills' house, whether it was a public crossing or not. They used it anyway. They used it as a public crossing. * * * * * * * * * * * * in the public street. The bridge is across a gully between the sidewalk and the street." Plaintiff proved her earning capacity before and after her injury, her age, and that she suffered much physical pain. Under the proof submitted, there was no error in granting a nonsuit. A city is not bound to maintain bridges across gutters and drainage ditches running along the edges of sidewalks, except at regular public crossings or the intersection of streets. Elliott, Rords & S. (2d Ed.) § 621; McCarthy v. Corporation of Village of Oshawa, 19 U. C. Q. B. 245. "The Town of Colorado City v. Liafe general use of a bridge by the public as a part of the common highway, and its public utility, are necessary, to constitute it a public bridge." 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 920. The bridge in question was not at a regular public crossing, nor at the intersection of streets. It was no part of the street or sidewalk, nor was it shown to be in general use as such, or of any public utility. It was a mere private bridge, built solely for the convenience of an individual. It was not shown that the city had built it. The mere fact that the city took it up and replaced it, and made some repairs upon it, did not constitute it a public bridge. The city being under no duty to keep up the bridge, its failure to do so was not negligence, and the plaintiff could not recover. The cases cited by plaintiff in error are not in point. In Mayor, etc., v. Dodd, 58 Ga. 238, the record shows that the ditch was across a sidewalk, and the bridge a part of the sidewalk. In Town of Belton v. Vinton, 73 Ga. 99, the bridge was over a gully running across the street, and formed part of the public street. In Mayor, etc., v. Johnson, 84 Ga. 279, 10 S. E. 719, the bridge through which the plaintiff fell was, on a public sidewalk, and consequently a part thereof. Bentley v. City of Atlanta, 92 Ga. 623, 18 S. E. 1013, was an action against the city for permitting a railway company to erect a bridge at a street crossing, and to maintain it, together with the approaches thereto, in such a manner as to render the same a public nuisance. The court held that under such circumstances the city would be liable for the consequences, just as it would if the improper work had been done by the city itself. We think it quite clear that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. Judgment on main bill of exceptions affirmed. Cross bill of exceptions dismissed. All the justices concurring. TOWN OF COLORADO CITY v. LIAFE. (Supreme Court of Colorado, June 17, 1901.) [65 Pac. Rep. 630.] Personal Injuries-Gravel Pit-Implied Authority of Street Commissioner. A street commissioner had authority to superintend the work of all teams in the employ of the city, and, under the direction of the town board, had general supervision of all streets. Plaintiff was injured while securing gravel from a pit under the commissioner's direction. Held, that the commissioner had implied authority to secure the gravel to repair the streets, without an express direction from the town trustees. Same-Sufficiency of Complaint-Waiver of Objections by Answering Over. Where plaintiff was injured while working under the direction of the street commissioner, defendant, by answering over, waived any objection to the complaint in not alleging which city officer committed the negligence resulting in plaintiff's injury. Same Notice of Dangerous Condition of Pit-Evidence.-Where plaintiff was injured by the caving of a gravel pit, a conversation between the street commissioner under whom plaintiff was working Town of Colorado City v. Liafe and another employee, which occurred a few minutes before the accident, and in the absence of plaintiff, as to the existence of a crack in the wall of the gravel pit, was admissible to show that the commissioner had notice of the dangerous condition of the pit. Same Same-Negligence of City Officials.*-The failure of the commissioner to inform plaintiff of the existence of the crack in the wall of the pit constituted negligence. Objections to Charge of Court-Failure to Point Out Specific Errors. -Where the court gave a general charge and the defendant made a general objection to it, without pointing out any specific errors, defendant's exceptions to the charge will not be considered. Excessive Verdict-Voluntary Remittitur.-Where the court informed plaintiff, who had recovered a judgment for $20,000, that a new trial would be granted unless $15,000 was remitted, and plaintiff elected to remit, the remittance was voluntary, and plaintiff cannot complain of the court's refusal to enter judgment on the verdict. Verdict on Conflicting Evidence Will Not Be Disturbed. Where the jury in an action for injuries found for the plaintiff on conflicting evidence, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. Release of Claim for Damages Extorted While Plaintiff Was under Influence of Narcotics-Refunding of Money Paid under Such Release Not a Condition Precedent to Right to Sue.-Where plaintiff, when he signed a release of any claim for damages against defendant for his injuries, in consideration that defendant should furnish him care and medical services, was so much under the influence of narcotics as not to understand the nature of the release, he was not obliged to refund the amount paid by defendant to third parties for plaintiff's care and medical services, as a condition precedent to the right to sue for his injuries. Same-Instructions Crediting City with Money Paid under Such Release Not Improper. Where the plaintiff, when he signed a release of any claim against defendant for his injuries in consideration that defendant should furnish him care and medical services, was so much under the influence of narcotics that he did not understand the nature of the release, it was proper to charge that, if the jury should find for plaintiff, they should credit defendant, in rendering their verdict, with the amounts paid by it for plaintiff's care and medical services. Appeal from district court, El Paso county. Action by William F. Liafe against the town of Colorado City. From judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. William F. Liafe was employed by the street commissioner of Colorado City to work in a gravel pit as an ordinary laborer, and while so employed the gravel bank caved in and fell upon him, injuring him to such an extent that he was compelled to have his left leg amputated just below the knee. In the complaint the plaintiff charges that his injury was due to the negligence of the officers of the town; that the officers knew that *See City Council of Augusta v. Owens, Mun. Corp. Cas. 194; Rhobidas v. City of Concord, 5 Mun. Corp. Cas. 91; Lynch v. City of Springfield, 3 Mun. Corp. Cas. 219; Afflick v. Bates, Treasurer, 3 Mun. Corp. Cas. 222; Missano v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 654 ; notes, 1 Mun. Corp. Cas. 33, 41, 489; 5 Mun. Corp. Cas. 29, 337. See Perrette v. City of Kansas City, 5 Mun. Corp. Cas. 642; City of Covington v. Diehl, 4 Mun. Corp. Cas. 732; City of Goshen v. Alford, 4 Mun. Corp. Cas. 405; Badgley v. City of St. Louis, 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 36; City of Roanoke v. Shull, 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 667; Frohs v. City of Dubuque, 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 679; Twist v. City of Rochester, 1 Mun. Corp. Cas. 20; Seamons et ux. v. Fitts, Town Treasurer, 1 Mun. Corp. Cas. 465. |