Abstracts Action by one Williams against the mayor and city council of the city of Nashville. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Pitts & Meeks and H. C. Lassing, for appellant. From the declaration in the present case, it is apparent the plaintiff was a stranger to the defendant. He was on the land of the latter without an invitation of any kind, and for his own convenience; and while it does appear that the way which he was using was also used at its pleasure by the public, this was only done by the passive acquiescence of the defendant. In such case it is well settled by adjudication in England and America that the party injured under such circumstances is a mere licensee, and he must bear the consequences of his own misfortune. Cusick v. Adams, 115 N. Y. 55, 21 N. E. 673, 12 Am. St. Rep. 772. This distinguishing principle was recognized in Clapp v. La Grill, 103 Tenn. 164, 52 S. W. 134. where will be found a full citation of cases. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Ziegler et al. v. City of Spokane. (Supreme Court of Washington, July 3, 1901.) Defective Sidewalk-Personal Injuries—Defendant's Liability Question for the Jury. The sidewalk where plaintiff fell was full of holes, caused by decay. Slushy snow fell the day before, and froze hard, making the walk very slippery. There was evidence from which it might be inferred that her fall was caused by the icy condition of the walk, and tending to show that she slipped into a hole in the walk: held, that it was not error to submit the question of defendant's liability to the jury. Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; Leander H. Prather, Judge. Action by Maggie J. Ziegler and husband against the city of Spokane. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed. A. G. Avery and F. M. Dudley, for appellant. Sullivan, Nuzum & Nuzum and Graves & Graves, for respondents. FULLERTON, J. This is an action for personal injuries received by respondent Maggie J. Ziegler from a fall upon the sidewalk of the appellant city. From a judgment in favor of the respondents the city appeals. The only error assigned is that the evidence was insufficient to justify the submission of the cause to the jury. The evidence tended to show that the sidewalk upon which the respondent fell was old, and worn out, full of holes, caused by the decay of the materials of which it was constructed, and in a generally unsafe condition for ordinary travel; that on the day preceding the accident a fall of snow occurred, which, Abstracts owing to the temperature, was wet and slushy; that during the night it froze hard, leaving the walk at the time of the accident in a very slippery condition. It is the contention of the appellant that the efficient and proximate cause of the injury to the respondent was the slippery condition of the walk, and that, under the circumstances shown, it is not liable therefor. While the testimony of the injured respondent herself is not clear as to the cause of the accident, and while it might be inferred from the testimony of other witnesses that the icy condition of the walk was a concurring cause, if not the proximate cause, of the fall which caused the injury, yet there was competent testimony on the part of the plaintiff tending to show that the respondent stepped into a hole in the walk, and that this was the cause of her fall and her consequent injury. It was thus for the jury to determine whether the mere slipperiness or the defective condition of the walk was the proximate cause of the accident, and it was not error on the part of the trial court to submit the question of the appellant's liability to them. The judgment is affirmed. REAVIS, C. J., and DUNBAR and ANDERS, JJ., concur. Paducah Ry. & Light Co. et al. v. Ledsinger. Defective Street-Abandoned Railway in Street-Personal InjuriesNegligence-Notice.-Where a street-railroad track which had been abandoned was covered with gravel, but the rails subsequently became exposed, whereby plaintiff was injured in driving along the street, the questions of negligence on the part of defendants, city and street-railway company, and of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, were for the jury; the defect in the street having existed so long that defendants were chargeable with notice thereof. Contributory Negligence-Instructions.-As the court instructed the jury as to contributory negligence, defendants cannot complain of the court's refusal to further instruct the jury that if plaintiff drove on the right side of the street, when the left side was the usual and nearer and safer route to travel, they should find for defendants. Appeal from circuit court, McCracken county. "Not to be officially reported." Action by Boss Ledsinger against the Paducah Railway & Light Company and the city of Paducah to recover damages for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Henry Burnett and R. T. Lightfoot, for appellants. HOBSON, J. Some years ago the Paducah Street-Railway Company laid down a track on Sixth street, in Paducah. This track it afterwards abandoned. The trolley wires were taken down and the track covered with gravel; but, either from an insufficiency of gravel, or the wear of the street, the rails became exposed, and, while driving down the street in Abstracts what is called a "drummer wagon," appellee, Boss Ledsinger, by reason of the exposure of the rails, was thrown from the wagon and injured in his knee. For this he filed suit against the street-railway company and the city, charging that the street was in a dangerous condition, and had been allowed by the defendants to remain in this condition for a long time, with knowledge of the danger, and that by reason of it his wagon had been overturned and he had received serious injuries, damaging him in the sum of $2,000. The defendants denied the allegations of the petition, and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The case was tried before a jury, who found for the plaintiff, and fixed the damages at $200. While the evidence is conflicting, it was sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to the jury, and their finding is not so against the evidence that it can be disturbed by this court. The instructions fairly submitted the issue to the jury. The defect in the street had existed so long that the defendants were chargeable with notice of it. The amount of the verdict is reasonable, considering the injury sustained by plaintiff. The chief point relied on is that the court refused to instruct the jury that if the plaintiff drove on the righthand side of the street, when the left side was the usual and nearer and safer route to travel, they should find for the defendants. This instruction was properly refused, as the court had given a very clear instruction on contributory negligence, and the matter referred to was only a circumstance from which the jury might have inferred negligence on his part, and was to be considered by the jury, in connection with the other facts in the case, on the question of contributory negligence, under the general instructions. Judgment affirmed. Parker v. City of Ottumwa. (Supreme Court of Iowa, April 13, 1901.) Defective Sidewalk-Notice-Evidence.-Where a petition alleged that defendant had notice of the unsafe condition of the walk on which plaintiff was injured long before and at the time of the accident, evidence was admissible to show its unsafe condition prior to the accident. Evidence-Objections.-An objection to a question after the answer is in is too late to be available. Same Same-Exception Not Taken.-Where there was no exception to the court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, an objection to the ruling will not be considered. Same-Admissibility. - Where defendant in an action for injuries occasioned by a defective sidewalk offered evidence tending to show that the walk was in good repair before, at, and after the accident, it was competent to show in rebuttal that repairs were made near the place in question after the accident. Same-Admissibility of Evidence to Show Special Damage.—Where plaintiff's knee was injured by a defective sidewalk, and the petition alleged that the injury caused great pain and suffering, evidence that Abstracts she was pregnant when injured, and that the labor of childbirth necessitated the movement of the injured knee, and consequent pain, was admissible, without an averment of special damages because of her pregnancy. Appeal from district court, Wapello county; Robert Sloan, Judge. Plaintiff was tripped and thrown by a loose board in defendant's sidewalk, and brings this action to recover damages for the injury received. There was a trial to a jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. Affirmed. W. H. C. Jaques, for appellant. SHERWIN, J. The petition alleges that the defendant had both actual and constructive notice of the unsafe condition of its walk at the place where the plaintiff was injured long before and at the time the accident happened. Witnesses were permitted to testify as to this condition, and of this the defendant complains. It does not appear that an exception was taken to the ruling of the court on the motion to strike the answer of the witness Graham, but, regardless of this, the evidence was properly received. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 84 Iowa, 685, 51 N. W. 77; Hunt v. City of Dubuque, 96 Iowa, 314, 65 N. W. 319; Wilberding v. City of Dubuque (Iowa) 82 N. W. 957. A witness for the plaintiff on his examination in chief was asked whether he had noticed repairs in the sidewalk before or after the accident. He answered that he had "seen where they took pieces and nailed them down." The question was then objected to, and the objection overruled. The witness then went on and answered where he had seen the repairs, and that it was after the accident. A similar objection was made after the answer was in, which was overruled, but no exception taken to the ruling. An objection to a question after the answer is in is ordinarily too late, and is of no avail. Leipird v. Stotler, 97 Iowa, 169, 66 N. W. 150. The answer to the first question did not specifically disclose when the repairs were noticed by the witness. When he answered afterwards that it was after the accident, no exception was taken to the ruling of the court thereon; hence we cannot consider it. The defendant offered evidence tending to show that the sidewalk was in good repair before, at, and after the time of plaintiff's injury. In rebuttal the plaintiff was permitted to prove that repairs had been made at and near the place in question after the accident. This evidence was clearly competent, as tending to refute the defendant's claim. There was also evidence tending to show that the walk had been in an unsafe condition long before the plaintiff was hurt, and continued so for some time thereafter. Plaintiff's attending physician was permitted to testify that Abstracts she was pregnant when injured, and that the labor of childbirth necessitated movement of the injured knee, and consequent pain. It is urged that this evidence should not have been received, because no special damage on account of pregnancy was pleaded. This was not necessary. It was alleged that the injury caused great pain and suffering, and her physical condition at the time thereof was proper for the jury to consider in determining its extent. Lastly it is said the verdict is not supported by the evidence. With this we cannot agree. The evidence is in conflict on all material matters, except, perhaps, the question of the defendant's knowledge that the walk in question needed constant supervision and repair, and this is clearly shown by even its own witnesses. The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. Burns v. City of Emporia. (Supreme Court of Kansas, June 8, 1901.) Personal Injuries-Defective Street-Live Wires-Notice-Question for Jury. Whether a public street in a city, rendered unsafe for travel by the falling of an electric wire, has remained in such condition a sufficient length of time to charge the city with constructive notice of its unsafe condition, or whether the city has actual notice of the unsafe condition of the same, and might with reasonable diligence after the receipt of such notice have repaired the same and averted an alleged injury occasioned thereby, is a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law for the court. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error from district court, Lyon county; W. A. Randolph, Judge. Action by Sarah Burns against the city of Emporia. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Reversed. Madden Bros., for plaintiff in error. POLLOCK, J. This is an action brought to recover damages for personal injury alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, occasioned by the falling of an electric wire at the corner of Rural street and Eleventh avenue, in defendant city. The plaintiff was driving a family horse, alleged to be gentle and quiet, drawing a carriage in which plaintiff, her daughter, and four children were riding. The horse, becoming entangled in this fallen wire, became frightened, and reared and plunged, throwing the plaintiff from the carriage, causing the injury complained of. The injury occurred about 7 o'clock in the evening. There was evidence that the mayor and a member of the council were notified of this wire being down. There was also evidence that this wire was down on the day before the injury occurred. Upon the trial the jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. The sole question presented for our determination arises upon the instructions of the court, and particularly instructions |