Abstracts a right which theretofore did not exist in the city. The body of the act attempts to extend this right of the city not only to appeals from the police court, in the event that these certain rulings are made in favor of the accused and against the city, but also to confer upon the city the right to appeal from the district court to this court in the event the ruling of the district court is again in favor of the defendant and against the city, and in so doing violates section 16, art. 3, of the constitution; for it cannot be said that the second right of appeal by the city, not from the police court to the district court, but from the district court to this court, is clearly expressed in this title. Indeed, it cannot be said that it is expressed or included in this title at all. Again, in this case the city was not called upon, neither did it exercise any right of appeal from the police court; the judgment of that court being in favor of the city and against the defendant. The ruling of the district court, however, was against the city and in favor of the defendant, and it is from this ruling that the city appeals. The right of appeal by the city in such event is not only not clearly expressed in the title of the act, but is not contemplated by the act itself. It follows that the right of appeal by the city in this case must be denied, and the appeal dismissed. It is so ordered. All the justices concurring. Treasurer of City of Elizabeth et al. v. State (Central R. (Supreme Court of New Jersey, June 10, 1901.) Police Court-Nature of Proceedings-Recitals in Record.-Proceedings in a police court for violation of a city ordinance are of a summary nature, and the conviction must recite the facts necessary to show a legal conviction. Same Insufficiency of Record. The "judgment," so called, returned in this case, does not show the charge against the defendant, or that the magistrate found the defendant guilty of any offense. (Syllabus by the Court.) The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey was convicted under an ordinance of the city of Elizabeth, and the state, on its prosecution, brings certiorari. Reversed. Argued February term, 1900, before GUMMERE and FORT, JJ. John L. Conover, for prosecutor. James C. Connolly, for defendants. FORT, J. This writ brings up a conviction of the defendant founded upon a complaint for the violation of section 187 of the Code of General Ordinances of the City of Elizabeth, adopted January 24, 1895. The charge in the complaint is for "obstructing Broadway, between Front and Third streets, in said city, by placing a train of freight and coal cars thereon, for the whole of Sunday, the 8th day of July, 1900. The Abstracts At record returned shows no legal conviction of the defendant. The conviction fails to set out any of the requisites to make it good. Proceedings in a police court of a city, without a jury, on a complaint for the violation of a city ordinance, are of a summary nature; and the conviction, as stated and signed by the magistrate, must contain everything to show a legal conviction. Salter v. City of Bayonne, 59 N. J. Law, 129, 36 Atl. 667. It is the same in cases under the disorderly act. Preusser v. Cass, 54 N. J. Law, 522, 24 Atl. 480. The testimony sent up in this case was evidently taken stenographically, and at the end of it (evidently a note of the stenographer) appears the following: "The court found the defendant guilty of obstructing Broadway with railroad cars, between Front and Third streets, on July eighth, nineteen hundred, and imposed a fine of twenty-five dollars, in accordance with section 188 of the Code of General Ordinances of the City of Elizabeth." This is, of course, of no legal force whatever. another part of the return the following appears: "Judgment. Aug. 17th. City of Elizabeth in the case of violation of city ordinance, section 187, Code of General Ordinances, section aforesaid, on hearing the evidence of plaintiff and defendant, held the Central Railroad guilty, by obstructing said Broadway, by allowing cars to stand on the said, on Broadway, on the eighth day of July, nineteen hundred, imposed fine of $25.00 (twenty-five dollars). Penalty for violation of said ordinance, under section one hundred and eightyeight. Owen P. Mahon, Police Justice. August 17th, 1900.' This is not sufficient under the cases above cited. The conviction, as signed by the justice, must embody the complaint, showing the offense charged, or at least so substantially as to clearly show the offense with which the defendant was charged, the names of the witnesses, and sufficient of the evidence to show the offense was committed, and of what offense the defendant was convicted. In this "judgment," so called, above set out, no recital of what the complaint against the defendant was appears at all. All it can be said to state on that subject is, "City of Elizabeth in the case of violation of city ordinance, section 187, Code of General Ordinances, section aforesaid." What this means, it would be difficult to determine. That it does not recite any charge against the New Jersey Central Railroad is clear. Nor is there anything in the record sent up showing that the magistrate found the defendant guilty of any offense, unless the statement of the stenographer above referred to can be so considered; but that, of course, has no force whatever. The conviction is set aside. Chandler v. Town of Johnson City. (Supreme Court of Tennessee, Nov. 17, 1900.) Fixing Salary of City Official-Charter Provisions-Ordinance. Johnson City charter provided that the city board of mayor and alder Abstracts men should elect a recorder on the first Monday in April, for a certain term (they also to fix such officer's salary, which should not be changed during his incumbency); that the regular meetings of the board should be held on the first and third Thursdays of each month; and that all ordinances should be read three times, on three different days, before becoming laws. The board's code of laws declared that such board should fix the salary at their first meeting after their qualification, and before the officer's election. Complainant was elected recorder on a certain date, prior to which the salary had been determined by resolution; and on the day immediately following his election the board passed an ordinance fixing such salary, the amount being less than that paid to prior incumbents. Complainant accepted the office and qualified, and thereafter accepted the salary under protest, demanding the amount paid his predecessor: held, that the word "ordinance," as used in the charter, was synonymous with "resolution," and hence complainant was bound by the ordinance fixing his salary, since the meeting at which it was passed was but a continuation of that of the day previous, and the ordinance was passed before he qualified. Appeal from chancery court, Washington county; John P. Smith, Chancellor. Action by G. C. Chandler against the town of Johnson City. From a decree of the court of chancery appeals affirming a decree in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. H. H. Carr and G. T. Lee, for appellant. WILKES, J. The first assignment of error is as to the technical language of the demurrer, which is that the board of mayor and aldermen, under the charter and ordinance, had the authority and power to fix the fees and salaries of all officials elected or appointed by the board, it being the duty of each board, under the ordinance set out, to fix the compensation of its own appointees, and, having fixed the compensation at $500 per annum complainant is bound by it; and, second, that, having accepted payment at the rate, he is estopped from claiming more. The first ground of demurrer is somewhat ambiguous, and capable of two different constructions, but we are of opinion that it sufficiently raises the question of the legality of the action of the board which is complained of. There is a contradiction between the charter of the city and its ordinances, in this: That the ordinance provides that the board of mayor and aldermen shall at its first meeting after the election and qualification fix the salaries of officers by ordinance, while the charter provides that all ordinances shall be read three times on three different days, before they become laws. It is evident that the word "ordinance," as used, was intended to be synonymous with "resolution"; and the exhibits filed with the bill show that previous to the election of complainant the incumbent's salary had been fixed by motion or resolutions in open board. If it be insisted that the board should at its first meeting fix the salary by ordinance, then it is evident that this has not been done, and the complainant cannot recover upon this theory; and, if it be contended that the former salary was continued, Abstracts complainant is confronted by the provision that each board should fix the salaries of its own officers by ordinance. It is, we think, evident, or may fairly be presumed, that the meeting of the 2d of April was but an adjourned or continued meeting from the 1st, as regular periodical meetings of the board would not be held so near together. The charter provides that the regular meetings of the board should be held on the first and third Thursdays of each month, and the bill does not aver that these two meetings on the 1st or 2d of April were regular meetings of separate sessions. We conclude that the fixing of the recorder's salary in 1894 did not have the effect of a formal ordinance or law; that it was a substantial compliance with the general ordinance, requiring the salary to be fixed in advance of the election, that it should be fixed before the party elected had qualified and been inducted into office, and, as was done in this case, within 24 hours after the election. The salary having been thus fixed, as we think, substantially correctly, and the complainant having afterwards qualified and been inducted into office, and having continued therein and received the salary of $500 per annum, he is estopped to claim more. We are of opinion that there is no error in the decree of the court of chancery appeals, and it is affirmed. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore et al. v. Lyman. Public Schools-Superintendent Not a City Officer - Eligibility.— The superintendent of public instruction in the city of Baltimore, being appointed at the pleasure of the board of school .commissioners, in pursuance of the power conferred on it by City Charter (Acts 1898, c. 123) 100, is merely an employee of that department of the city government, and not a "municipal official," within section 26 of the charter, which provides that all municipal officials shall be registered voters of the city; and hence the fact that one not a registered voter was appointed was no ground for restraining payment of his salary. Appeal from circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore city. Edgar H. Gans, William A. Fisher, and Olin Bryan, for appellants. Karl A. M. Scholtz and Geo. P. Mister, for appellee. BRISCOE, J. We are, therefore, all of the opinion that section 26 of chapter 123 of the Acts of 1898, providing that all municipal officials, except females, shall be registered voters of the city of Baltimore, has no application to the position of superintendent of public instruction. It follows, then, that the order of the court below overruling the demurrer to the bill will be reversed, the demurrer sustained, and the bill. dismissed. Order reversed, demurrer sustained, and bill dismissed, with costs. 6 M C Cas-55 Abstracts People ex rel. Grogan v. York et al., Police Commissioners. (Court of Appeals of New York, April 26, 1901.) [60 N. E. Rep. 258.] Dismissal from Police Force-Certiorari-Return.-On certiorari to review the proceedings of police commissioners in dismissing relator from the police force, where the return shows affirmatively that relator had no notice of, and there was no competent proof of, the charges, and the dismissal was consequently invalid, the contention that the writ must be dismissed, because relator did not set up the invalidity of a claim, not made until two years after the petition was filed, that relator had ceased to be a member of the police force for absence without leave, and which claim had no connection with the act for which relator was dismissed, was without merit. Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First depart ment. Certiorari by the people, on the relation of Thomas R. Grogan, to review the decision of Bernard J. York and others, police commissioners of the city of New York. From an order of the appellate division (69 N. Y. Supp. 1142) affirming the action of the defendants in dismissing relator from the police department, he appeals. Reversed. Louis J. Grant, for appellant. John Whalen, Corp. Counsel (Theodore Connoly and Terence Farley, of counsel), for respondents. MARTIN, J. (after stating the facts). On the 20th of December, 1897, the relator, a member of the police force of the city of New York, was dismissed upon the sole ground that he failed to attend roll call on the 19th of the preceding October. He had no notice of the hearing upon the charges made against him until two days after the time appointed therefor, and it is admitted there was no competent proof to sustain the charges. The dismissal was based upon unverified statements alone, and was, consequently, invalid. People v. Board of Police Com'rs, 155 N. Y. 40, 49 N. E. 257. Thus it was conclusively shown that the relator was improperly dismissed, and that the action of the commissioners was invalid, and should have been set aside. But the commissioners, to sustain such dismissal, applied to the supreme court for, and obtained, leave to serve a further or amended return by setting up that upon the day of the pretended trial the relator had ceased to be a member of the police force by reason of his absence for more than five days without leave. This attempt was made, but finally resulted in showing affirmatively that the relator had not been absent five days before the day of trial. Thus it was conclusively established that the second ground upon which the commissioners sought to justify the dismissal of the relator had no existence in fact, and that his dismissal was wholly unauthorized. With the record showing affirmatively that the relator was improperly dismissed because there was no proof of the charges against him, and that he had not ceased to be a member of the force by reason of five days' absence without leave before the day of trial, the |