Woodford writes that since last August he has gradually lost hope of preserving peace, but that now he had greater faith in the prospects of peace than at any time since he had left the United States. In interviews with prominent business men he thought he saw a growing popular willingness to sell Cuba to the United States; and the Spanish minister of foreign affairs even permitted him to make such a suggestion, a subject which for years had been most rigidly tabooed in diplomatic intercourse with Spain. He writes on the 19th to President McKinley, "You see how my faith [in peace] has strengthened."

But affairs in Spain did not move rapidly enough to satisfy the American Congress and people. On March 26th, the president suggested to Spain that she revoke the reconcentration order, support the reconcentrados until they could maintain themselves, grant full self-government to the Cubans, and permit the United States to assist in bringing about these reforms. The next day Woodford proposed an armistice in Cuba. In America the long expected message of the president on the Cuban situation, which Congress had demanded months earlier, was being withheld from day to day. But it could not long be deferred. Urgent cable messages were sent to Woodford to hasten the propositions for peace: "Important to have prompt answer on armistice matter"; "feeling here is intense." But the Spanish habit of delay could not be changed; the Cortes would meet in May and they must be consulted.

At last through the influence of the Pope with the Spanish Queen counter-proposals were obtained, but these were not satisfactory, and an armistice in Cuba was again demanded. The following day, April 6th, the representatives in Washington of Great Britain, France, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy, and Russia expressed through the secretary of state an appeal to the moderation and humanity of the American people in the negotiations with Spain. To this the president replied that he shared the hopes of the powers for peace, and wished the equal recognition by the powers

of our "own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.”

The president's message could not longer be withheld in view of the popular and Congressional demand for action; and although the president learned a few hours before the sending of the document to Congress that Blanco had ordered a conditional suspension of hostilities in Cuba, he could not longer keep silence. The message went to Congress on April 11th, and from that day the overthrow of Spanish power in Cuba was assured. This was not because the president added anything of a sensational nature to the facts already known concerning Cuba, for, indeed, the message was somewhat mild when compared with the violent editorials and thrilling news items to which the people had become accustomed, but rather because of the altered attitude of the president, who, in the message, surrendered his peace policy, and gave full play to the plans of the war party in Congress. He recommended impartial intervention as the only practicable means of stopping the anarchy and destitution in Cuba; he asked Congress for authority to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and he protested that he had "exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors."

Nothing now remained to be done from the Congressional point of view, but to decide the nature of the demand to be made upon Spain. From the administrative standpoint there was much to be done before the country could be properly prepared for war; but Congress granted the departments only one more week for preparation, while the two houses meanwhile vigorously debated whether they should recognize the independence of the Cuban people or of the Cuban Republic. Fortunately, the majority in Congress followed the president's advice and refused to recognize the existence of the Cuban Republic. The Senate resolutions adopted on

April 16th, provided for the recognition of the Republic of Cuba as the lawful government of the island; the House, on motion of Mr. Dingley, struck out this provision, and afterward, in conference, the Senate receded from its position. The House conferees, however, were compelled to adopt the amendment of Senator Teller which became the fourth of the resolutions. As approved on the 20th of April the joint-resolutions provided, first "That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent"; second, that the United States demands the relinquishment by Spain of its authority and government in Cuba, and the withdrawal of its land and naval forces; third, that the president be empowered to use the land, naval and militia forces to the extent necessary to carry into effect these resolutions; and fourth, that the United States disclaims any intention to exercise sovereignty over the island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination to leave the government and control of the island to its people. These resolutions were adopted in the Senate by a vote of 42 to 35, and by 311 to 6 in the House.

Spain, on learning that the president had signed these resolutions, did not wait for the demands set forth therein to be made upon her, but on April 21st, gave Minister Woodford his passports. War had begun.

CHAPTER II

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

At the outbreak of the war with Spain the United States was ill prepared for war. Financially it was strong, as the overwhelming subscriptions to the national loan of two hundred million dollars showed; and the navy, too, although not so large as its friends had wished, was yet excellently equipped, manned and disciplined. But in the military department hardly an approach had been made toward placing the army upon a war footing. As in the War of 1812, the Mexican War and the Civil War, so in the War with Spain armies had to be formed out of untrained militiamen and civilians, who were ready to volunteer their services. On the first of April, 1898, the regular army numbered 2,143 officers and 26,040 privates, a total of 28,183 This force was at the time scattered at eighty different posts, mainly in the west, and hundreds or even thousands of miles distant from the Atlantic sea-coast.

men.

Not only was the army insignificant for either defensive or offensive operations, but also the number of staff officers of the war department was not sufficient for more than the bare needs of the existing army. For years Congress had been cutting down the estimates for the army service until in 1898 when war came, the department lacked almost everything necessary for the equipment of an army ten times the size of that on a peace footing. The quartermaster's department had equipment for only ten thousand men more than the regular army; the ordnance department had on hand

only 53,000 Krag-Jorgensen rifles, while for the 265,000 Springfield rifles there was no smokeless powder. Further, the necessary plants and machinery for the manufacture of the needed articles existed, in many cases, on only a small scale in a few establishments. The plants for the manufacture of smokeless powder were small; the needed supply of cotton-duck, of blue cloth, of khaki-cloth, and of many other articles did not exist in the country on April 21st. The medical department was as poorly prepared; its supplies and operating force were no more than necessary for the existing army on a peace footing.

These departments would have been more nearly ready for actual war but for the president's interpretation of the "National Defence Act" of March 9, 1898. President McKinley believed that the appropriations under this act could be used only for coast defence until after war had been declared. Consequently, while money was spent freely by the navy department, and for harbor and coast defences under the direction of the war department, no funds were available for increasing the regular stores at the great supply agencies of the war department. Much of the confusion, delay and suffering experienced later in the military service would have been avoided if this money had been used and contracts made and filled between March 9 and April 21, 1898. Under the president's instructions nothing was added to the stock of clothing, tentage, harness, food supplies, camp furniture, or medical supplies before April 21st, except that warranted by existing appropriations and laws. On the other hand, the ordnance, engineer, and signal bureaus of the war department received all the money necessary for thorough war preparation. This was expended in placing coast defence guns, in setting mine-fields in twentyeight principal harbors, and in establishing a system of telegraph, telephone, and signal communication along the coast. The navy department was far better prepared for hostilities than the war department. The navy has always been more popular than the army, and for years Congress has