Figure 3.

MORTALITY RATE

Buoyant apparatus, life floats, or equivalent flotation used.

APPENDIX I- CASUALTY ANALYSIS

Each of the 15 casualties are described briefly below. At the end of each summary is an estimation of the number of lives that could have been saved and the number of injuries prevented by the indicated equipment. If an EPIRB was or would have been a factor in a rescue, the additional equipment needed both with and without an EPIRB is listed. In several cases, flotsam was used by survivors. For the purpose of this analysis, that kind of flotation is considered equal to a life float or buoyant apparatus. Where life floats or buoyant apparatus are indicated as needed, it is assumed that the capacity available is sufficient for everyone on board, rather than the 50% capacity now required on many small passenger vessels.

COMET, 5/73

The COMET had 27 persons on board and sank in Block Island Sound, Rhode Island, about seven miles offshore, in 48 F water. The COMET had no EPIRB and the only lifesaving apparatus was a 20person buoyant apparatus. About 15 of the survivors held onto the buoyant apparatus at some point, including two of three who set out in a swamped dinghy to get to the buoyant apparatus. Six others were able to use an 8' x 10' piece of flotsam for partial support. Almost everyone on board had a lifejacket on when they abandoned ship. The two or three people who were not able to get a lifejacket were able to use either the buoyant apparatus or the flotsam. The first death occurred in the dinghy about 1/2 hour after the sinking. Deaths continued until rescuers happened on scene 4 hours later. A total of 16 persons died in this time. If the COMET had been equipped with an operating satellite EPIRB, and if a satellite pass had occurred shortly after the accident, Coast Guard rescue units might have been on scene in a few hours. This would have been in time to save all but 2 of those who died. To save everyone on board, the vessel would have had to have an inflatable buoyant apparatus.

The most probable cause for the loss of the COMET was determined to be poor hull condition, which can be linked to its age and wood hull material. However, the COMET was not operating with a valid Coast Guard inspection, because of its numerous deficiencies, including deteriorated hull planking. For this reason, it may be appropriate not to include the COMET in a casualty analysis relevant to inspected vessels.

ACTUAL LIVES SAVED BY INDICATED EQUIPMENT:

Lifejackets
5

L/F-B/A
6

Inf. B/A

Liferaft

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAVE INDICATED NUMBER OF LIVES:

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO PREVENT INDICATED NUMBER OF INJURIES: Lifejackets

L/F-B/A

Inf. B/A

(Insufficient information)

Liferaft

ZEPHYR II, 2/74

The

The ZEPHYR II had 12 persons on board and sank five miles offshore at the entrance to New York harbor in 40° F water. ZEPHYR II had no EPIRB and the only lifesaving apparatus was a buoyant apparatus. As the vessel sank, everyone but the operator got a lifejacket on. Flares were used to attract the attention of nearby vessels, the first of which were on scene as the vessel went under. The operator, helped by a passenger, held onto the buoyant apparatus for about 5 minutes until pulled from the water. Nevertheless, the operator died of drowning, probably complicated by the effects of hypothermia. All others in lifejackets survived the 10 or 15 minutes it took to get them on board vessels which had come to the rescue.

If the ZEPHYR II had been equipped with an EPIRB, there would have been no difference in this casualty. Help was summoned with flares and by radio. Coast Guard helicopters were on scene just a few minutes after the sinking. If the operator had been wearing a lifejacket, he probably would have survived the few minutes it took for help to arrive. Everyone on board was taken to hospitals and treated for exposure. The passenger who helped the operator was on the critical list for six days as a result of his few minutes in the cold water. An inflatable buoyant apparatus would have been needed to prevent the injuries from hypothermia.

The most probable cause for the loss of the ZEPHYR II was determined to be poor hull condition, which can be linked to its age and wood hull material.

ACTUAL LIVES SAVED BY INDICATED EQUIPMENT:

Lifejackets
11

L/F-B/A

Inf. B/A

Liferaft

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAVE INDICATED NUMBER OF LIVES:

Lifejackets
12

L/F-B/A

Inf. B/A

Liferaft

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO PREVENT INDICATED NUMBER OF INJURIES:

Lifejackets

L/F-B/A

Inf. B/A
12

Liferaft

PEARL C, 9/76

The PEARL C had 10 persons on board and sank crossing the Columbia River bar in the tow of a Coast Guard 44 ft lifeboat. Water temperature was 57° F. The PEARL C had an 8 person buoyant apparatus which was recovered after the accident, but there is no indication it was used. No one on board was wearing a lifejacket. The only two survivors were picked up within 10 minutes of the capsizing.

Since two Coast Guard boats were on scene when the vessel capsized, EPIRBS would not have been a factor in the survival of those on board immediately after the capsizing. However, when the PEARL C lost power and radioed for help at 1:30 P.M., it took the Coast Guard boats four hours to find, although the PEARL C was only 18 miles from the Coast Guard station. This was due in part to the operator's confusing and contradictory position reports on the VHF radio. With an EPIRB, the vessel could have been located and taken in tow in about two hours. This might have led to crossing the bar while there was more daylight, and under better bar conditions. The capsizing occurred during maximum ebb current and a 30 knot wind. Two hours earlier, the wind had been reported at 18 knots. Therefore, there is some reason to believe that a satellite EPIRB might have prevented loss of life in this case. If the probability that a satellite EPIRB would have prevented this accident is taken as 50%, then it may be assumed for statistical purposes that an such an EPIRB would have saved four lives in this case.

There is no reason to conclude that any additional survival equipment carried on the PEARL C would have contributed to the saving of lives after the capsizing. The rigid buoyant apparatus that was on board floated free, but was not used.

The primary cause of the accident was concluded to be the manner in which the Coast Guard conducted the tow. Contributing to the vessel's loss of stability was the taking of water into the engine compartment. Leakage through hatchboards and inadequate engine compartment closures were cited as problems. To this degree, the wooden construction of the vessel and its age of 33 years could be considered factors in the casualty.

ACTUAL LIVES SAVED BY INDICATED EQUIPMENT:

Lifejackets
0

L/F-B/A
0

Inf. B/A

Liferaft

(2 rescued from water without benefit of any equipment)

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SAVE INDICATED NUMBER OF LIVES:

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO PREVENT INDICATED NUMBER OF INJURIES: Inf. B/A Liferaft w/

Lifejackets

10*

L/F-B/A

EPIRB (EPIRB could have prevented accident)

w/ no EPIRB

* Lifejackets should have been worn under hazardous bar conditions.

DIXIE LEE II, 6/77

The DIXIE LEE II had 27 persons on board and was capsized by a sudden and extremely high wind in Hampton Roads about 3/4 mi offshore, in water estimated to be at 65° F. The DIXIE LEE II had no EPIRB and the lifesaving apparatus was a 13-person buoyant apparatus. The buoyant apparatus floated free and was carried away too quickly to be used by anyone. This casualty was the basis for the present rule requiring buoyant apparatus and life floats to be secured to vessels by a painter and float-free link. A total of 14 persons survived the accident. It is not known how many of the 13 who died might have drowned in the overturned vessel, and how many might have drowned after escaping. For the purposes of this analysis, it has been assumed that about half (7) of the deaths were a result of the capsizing and the remainder occurred later.

The DIXIE LEE II capsized suddenly and without warning. There was no distress message sent. The survivors were discovered by a fishing vessel which happened on the scene about 1/2 hour after the accident. If the vessel had been equipped with an operating satellite EPIRB, the outcome would probably have been no different. Since no alert would be received until a satellite passed overhead and the signal processed, it is doubtful that Coast Guard rescue units could have been on scene any faster. Also, since the vessel did not sink, the EPIRB might not have been released. The operator did not survive the accident, so when the vessel rerighted itself shortly after capsizing, it is unlikely that any of the passengers or bait-boys would have known how to activate the EPIRB manually.

It is unlikely that any other piece of lifesaving apparatus would have resulted in any additional lives saved. Most of those who died probably drowned when the vessel capsized. The warm water would not have been an immediate threat of hypothermia. The buoyant apparatus, if held close by a painter would have provided adequate flotation until rescue arrived.