early as 1819, during the residence of the first American commissioners in South America. The commissioners make no mention of it in their report. The first direct intimation of this fact which seems to have come to the knowledge of the government of the United States is noticed in a correspondence of the secretary of state, J. Q. Adams, with certain diplomatic agents of the United States in South America. In a letter dated the 17th of May, 1823, to Cæsar A. Rodney, minister plenipotentiary to Buenos Ayers, Mr. Adams says that he has news from Mr. Forbes at Buenos Ayres, of the project of the alliances between Colombia and the other Spanish-American states, and also of the proposed general congress of all those states. And by letters of a previous date, received from Mr. Prevost, it appears that the project is still more extensive.

"It embraces North as well as South America, and a formal proposal to join and take the lead in it is to be made known to the government of the United States."

"Intimations of the same design have been given to Mr. Todd at Bogota. It will be time for this government to deliberate concerning it when it shall be presented in a more definite and specific form. At present it indicates more distinctly a purpose on the part of the Colombian republic to assume a leading character in this hemisphere than any practical object of utility which can be discerned by us. With relation to Europe, there is perceived to be only one object in which the interests and wishes of the United States can be the same as those of the southern American nations, and that is, that they should all be governed by republican institutions, politically and commercially independent of Europe. For any confederation of Spanish-American provinces for that end the United States would yield their approbation and cordial good wishes. If more should be asked of them, the proposition will be received and considered in a friendly spirit, and with a due sense of its importance.

Nothing further is heard of the matter till the spring of the year 1825. Soon after Clay became secretary of state, the ministers of Colombia and Mexico, at Washington, sought informal interviews with him to ascertain whether it would be

1 U. S. St. Pap., F. R., V., 918; see also Letter of Adams to Anderson, May 27, 1823, Ib. 834.

agreeable to the government of the United States to receive an invitation from the governments they represented, to send delegates to the proposed congress at Panama. Upon learning these facts, Mr. Adams, now become President, directed Mr. Clay to say:

"That of course the United States could not make themselves a party to the existing war with Spain. The President believed such a congress as was proposed might be highly useful in settling several important disputed questions of public law, and in arranging other matters of deep interest to the American continent, and strengthening the friendship and amicable intercourse between the American powers; but, before such a congress assembled, certain conditions should be complied with, namely, the fixing of the subjects to be discussed at the congress, the powers to be given to the commissioners, and the mode of organising the congress." 1

Accordingly some months later formal notes of invitations were sent to the secretary of state by the aforesaid ministers. That of Mr. Salazar, the Colombian minister, is dated the 2d of November, 1825. Unable, he says, to give a minute enumeration of the subjects to be discussed at the congress, he will however by the instruction of his government suggest some that will form useful matter for discussion. These constitute two classes.

1. Matters peculiarly and exclusively concerning the belligerents.

2. Matters between the belligerents and neutrals. The United States would not be expected, he said, to take part in the discussion of subjects of the first class. But a most opportune occasion would be afforded at Panama, "to the United States to fix some principles of international law, the unsettled state of which has caused much evil to humanity." Also, "the manner in which all colonisation of European powers on the American continent shall be resisted, and their interference in the present contest between Spain and her former colonies prevented, are other points of great interest." An eventual alliance is suggested, to have effect in the case of the above-mentioned events taking place. "This is a matter of immediate

1 U. S. St., Pap., F. R., V., 835.

utility to the American states that are at war with Spain, and is in accordance with the repeated declarations and protests of the cabinet at Washington." The means for the abolition of the slave trade was another subject suggested.

What should be the basis of the relations of Hayti and "of other parts of our hemisphere that shall hereafter be in like. circumstances," was also expected to be settled at the con

gress.

The representatives of Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, and Mexico, were, it was presumed, already assembled at Panama, and at work upon the preliminaries of organisation and subjects of discussion.1

The note of the Mexican minister, Mr. Obregon, dated the 3d of November, is of similar purport, except that the question of the slave-trade and of Hayti are not mentioned. The two principal questions, in Mr. Obregon's opinion, were, the "resistance or opposition to the interference of any neutral nation in the question and war of independence between the new powers of the continent and Spain." And second, "The opposition to colonisation in America by the European powers." 2

Mr. Canas, envoy from the Federation of Central America, or Guatemala, also extended an invitation in the name of that Republic.

The objects of the proposed congress, as understood by the Spanish-Americans, are fully set forth in an article in the "Gaceta" de Colombia of February 27, 1825, as follows:

"1. To form a solemn compact, a league, by which the states, whose representatives are present, will be bound to unite in prosecuting the war against their common enemy, Old Spain, or against any other power, which shall assist Spain in her hostile designs, or any otherwise assume the attitude of an enemy.

"2. To draw up and publish a manifesto, setting forth to the world the justice of their cause, and the relations they desire to hold with other Christian powers.

"3. To form a convention of navigation and commerce, applicable both to the confederated states, and to their allies..

“4. To consider the expediency of combining the forces of the republics, to free the islands of Porto Rico and Cuba from the

1 U. S. St., Pap., F. R., V., 836.

2 Ib., 838.

yoke of Spain, and in such case, what contingent each ought to contribute for this end.

"5. To take measures for joining in a prosecution of the war at sea, and on the coasts of Spain.

"6. To determine whether these measures shall also be extended to the Canary and Philippine islands.

"7. To take into consideration the means of making effectual the declaration of the President of the United States, respecting any ulterior design of a foreign power to colonise any portion of this continent, and also the means of resisting all interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the American governments. "8. To settle by common consent the principles of those rights of nations, which are in their nature controvertible.

"9. To determine on what footing shall be placed the political and commercial relations of those portions of our hemisphere which have obtained or shall obtain their independence, but whose independence has not been recognized by any American or European power, as was for many years the case with Hayti."1

Clay, in his answers to these invitations, November 30, tells Salazar and Obregon that they had not, in their notes of invitation, complied wholly with the conditions upon which the President had expressed his willingness to send envoys to Panama. That is, the subjects for discussion in the congress were not set forth with sufficient fullness or definiteness, and that nothing was said by them as to the powers of the envoys or the mode of organization of the congress. But as the want of the adjustment of these preliminaries, could, at all events, only be productive of some delay, the President had determined to waive the objection on this score and, "should the senate of the United States, now expected to assemble in a few days, give their advice and consent," to at once send commissioners to the congress.

2

A few days later, in his first annual message, the 6th of December, 1825, Mr. Adams, after stating the fact that the United States had been invited to send envoys to the congress at Panama, said: "The invitation has been accepted, and ministers on the part of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations and to take part in them, so

1 N. A. Review, January 1826. Also Marten's Nouveau Receuil, Vol. VI., p. 791. 2 U. S. St. Pap., F. R., V., 838.

far as may be compatible with that neutrality, from which it is neither our intention, nor the desire of the other American states, that we should depart."1

Nothing is here said in respect of the "advice and consent" of the senate; an omission to which many of the senators took decided exception; and it was owing, doubtless, to the criticism of his position in this respect, that the President, in sending the names of the commissioners to the senate for their confirmation, said, in the accompanying message, December 26, "Although this measure was deemed to be within the constitutional competency of the executive, I have not thought proper to take any steps in it before ascertaining that my opinion of its expediency will concur with that of both houses of the legislature; first, by the decision of the senate upon the nominations to be laid before them; and, secondly by the sanction of both houses to the appropriations, without which it cannot be carried into effect." 2

In asserting the very doubtful prerogative of the executive to institute a new and extremely important mission without assent of congress, Mr. Adams raised a storm of opposition against himself, and prejudiced at the very outset many minds against the whole project. The constitutional point was discussed at great length both in and out of congress. Mr. Adams afterwards admitted that his language was "positive," and "gave a handle" to misconstruction-though misconstruction was "palpably erroneous." He even considered the "humiliating" act of sending a note of explanation to the senate (Memoirs, VII. 99.) The discussion of this controversy belongs properly to the subject of constitutional history, rather than to a history of the Panama mission.

In this message to the senate, the President explains the general objects of the congress, and states the special subjects which, in his opinion, should be discussed therein. "The United States," he declares, "neither intend nor are expected to take part in any deliberations of a belligerent character; that the motive of their attendance is neither to contract alliances, nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing hostility, to any other nation."

1 Statesman's Manual, I., 582.

2 U. S. St. Pap., F. R., V., 834.