account of abstraction, 262. Hume on general ideas,

266. Later Philosophers-Mansel, 267. Whence words

as signs of ideas? 268. How children learn words, 269.

How men formed words, 270. Every word was a

general term, 270. Words impossible without concepts,

271. Roots express acts, 272. Noire's theory of the

origin of Roots, 273. Noiré's Philosophy, 275. Des-

cartes, 276, Spinoza, 279. Leibniz, 279. The name

of God, 281. Locke, 283. Condillac and Kant, 284.

Schopenhauer, 285. The Monon and its two attributes,

286. Subjective Evolution, 287. Objective Evolution,

289. Materials for the study of Subjective Evolution,

290. Language, as Subjective Nature, 291. Noiré's

previous theory of Language, 295. Darwin's theory of

Language, 296. Did Darwin retract his theory? 298.

Noiré's explanation of the simultaneous origin of roots

and concepts, 300. Objections to Noiré's theory ex-

amined, 302. Names of colours, 302. Names of sounds

and tastes, 305. Roots expressive of sound, 306. Pho-

netic Compromise, 307. Sympathic Roots, 311. True

nativity of Speech, 315. Growth of Roots, 316. Ono-

matopoeic Roots, 317. Further Modification of Roots,

318. Intransitive and Transitive Roots, 319. Subjective

States, 321 Neuter Verbs used as active, 324. Pas-

sive Verbs, 325. Objective Acts, 326. Fundamental

Metaphor, 327

PAGES

256-330

CHAPTER VII.

THE ROOTS OF SANSKRIT.

Roots of Aryan Languages, 331. Pânini's Dhâtupâtha,

334. The Spoken Language, Bhâ hâ, at the time of

Pânini, 337. Vulgar Dialects at the time of Kâtyâyana,

342. Examination of Pânini's Roots, 346. Variation of

Roots, 350. Phonetic Change, Succession, 353. (1)

Vowel Changes, 354. (2) Other Changes, Consonantal,

etc., 356. Dialectic Variety, 359. Primitive Dialectic

Stage, 361. Root MAR, 363. Sonant Aspirates, 365.

Initial Modifications, 365. Residuum of Real Roots, 374.

PAGES

Unauthenticated Roots, 377. The meaning of Roots,

381. Generalisation and Specialisation of Roots, 382.

Influence of Prepositions, 382. Special meaning

original, 383. To do, DHA, 384. To be strong,

DARMH, 386. DAM, to shape, 387. Vagueness in

these speculations, 388. YU, to join, 390. Many pos-

sibilities, 391. NAM, 392, DÂ, to give, 392. Respecial-

isation, 393. I, to go, 393, GAMH, to kick, 393. Homo-

phonous Roots, 396. SVAR, BHÂ, 401. Classifica-

tion of Sanskrit Roots, 403. Order of Roots, 403.

List of 121 Original Concepts, 404. Further reduction

of Concepts, 406. Spheres of Meaning, 407. KHAN,

407. VÂ, 409. VABH, PÅîK, KART,410. KÆT,

NAH, GRANTH, 411. SÎV, SI, DÆBH, DÆMH, 412.

DÂ, BANDH, PAS, 413. Idées mères, 418 331-419

CHAPTER VIII.

FORMATION OF WORDS.

Imperative,

Radical Period · its true meaning, 420.

421. Vocative, 423. Categories, 424. First Category,

Substance, 426. Categories ii-iv, 427. Categories

of Space and Time, 428. Verbal Categories, 428.

Objections to Aristotle's Categories, 430. Categories

as determining the growth of words, 432. Words

formed by applying the categories to the roots, 432.

Illustrations, 433. Goose, 433. Wolf, Pig, Man,

Birds, 434. Fish, Worms, 435. Naming impossible

without radical concepts, 436. Oak, Horse, 436.

Serpents, 437. Are there savages without abstract

terms? 437.
Apparent exceptions, 438. Original

Predication, 439. The First Category of Substance,

The Second, Third, and Fourth Categories, 442.

The Fifth and Sixth Categories, 443. The Verbal

Categories, 443. General and Sngular Terms, 444.

Are adjectives general or singular Terms? 447. Collec-

tive Terms, 448. Abstract and Concrete Terms, 451.

Berkeley on Abstraction, 453. Mill, 454. Abstract

originally the same as General Terms, 456. Concrete

441.

the same as Singular, 457. Every name General and

Abstract, 458. Later phases of Abstraction, 460. Are

Adjectives abstract or concrete Terms? 463. Abstract

Terms derived from Adjectives, 464. Subtract and

Abstract Terms, 466. Mill's Terminology, 467. Con-

notative and Denotative Terms, 471. Roots or Con-

cepts, 475. The Categories in Language, 475. Roots

used categorically, 477. The first outgrowth, 479.

Categories applied to words, 480. Composition, 483.

Prepositions, 483. Metaphor, 485. Fundamental

Metaphor, 495. Grammatical Metaphor, 497. Meta-

phor the result of Generalisation and Abstrac-

tion, 499.
Transition from Man to Animal, 503.

From Animal to Man, 504. From Material to Imma-

terial, 506. From Immaterial to Material, 510. From

the Sign to what is Signified, 510. From Cause to

Effect, 511. From Effect to Cause, 511. From Part

to Whole, 511. From one to another of things generally

associated, 512

PAGES

420-518

CHAPTER IX.

PROPOSITIONS AND SYLLOGISMS.

How children learn words, 519. How names were first

framed, 520. T. H. Green, on the beginning of know-

ledge, 521. Difference between the two processes, 522.

All nouns originally synthetical, 523. Formation of

names, 523. Palaeontology of the human mind, 524.

Imperfect beginnings, 524. Adjectives, 526. Verbs,

528. Propositions, 528. Propositions and Judgments,

529. Synonyma and Polyonyma, 530. Purpose of Predi-

cation, 531. Singular, Dual, Plural, and Universal Pro-

positions, 531. Classification by Gender, 533. Copula,

533. Proposition, as defined by Hobbes, 534. Mill's

criticism unjust, 535. Synthetical and Analytical Pro-

positions, 538. Tautological Propositions, 541. Tauto-

logical Syllogisms, 541. Euler's figures, 542. Syllo-

gism, 545

519-547

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSION.

What have we gained? 548. Thought and Language

inseparable, 549. Logic and Grammar, 549. Philo-

sophy deals with Language, 550. Nature of Language,

551. Language begins with Roots, not with Nouns or

Verbs, 552.
Radical Analysis, 554. Simplicity of

Thought, 557. Poetry and Argument, 557. Simplicity

of the Mind, 558. Names, 559. Verbal knowledge,

562. Gold, 562. Matter, 567. Materialism, 570.

Spiritualism, 572. Species, 574. Is man a species ?

579. Definitions, 581. Definition and History of

Words, 581. Meaning of à priori, 581. À priori

and à posteriori knowledge, 582. Mill and Whewell,

583. À priori knowledge also à posteriori, 584.

À posteriori knowledge not always sensuous, 584.

Whewell's definition of à priori, 585. Mill's objections,

585. H. Spencer's compromise, 586. H. Spencer's

later view, 587. Mill's repetition of experience, 588.

Three kinds of knowledge, 588. Analytical and

Synthetical Propositions, 588. Mill's facts, 589. We

know in names, 591. Names imply more than one

attribute, 591. Names depend on essential attributes,

591. Separable and inseparable attributes, 593.

Essential attributes, 593. Accidental attributes, 595.

Unconditional Truths, 597. Mathematics, 597. Cate-

gories of the understanding,

The other Categories, 603.

Mill's transcendent views, 607.

sity of definition, 610. The

Verbal fallacies, 613. Empty space, 614. Matter,

601. Causality, 601.

Mill's Categories, 605.

Definition, 609. Neces-

odour of words, 611.

PAGES

548-618

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT.

CHAPTER I.

CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.

FEW words have been used in so many different senses as Thought. I mean by Thought The meaning the act of thinking, and by thinking I of Thought. mean no more than combining. I do not pretend that others have not the right of using Thought in any sense which they prefer, provided only that they will clearly define it. I only wish to explain what is the meaning in which I intend to use the word, and in which I hold that it ought to be used. I think means to me the same as the Latin Cogito, namely co-agito, 'I bring together,' only with the proviso that bringing together or combining implies separating, for we cannot combine two or many things without at the same time separating them from all the rest.

Hobbes expressed the same truth long ago, when he said that all our thinking consisted in addition and subtraction.

Humiliating as this may at first sight appear, it is really not more so than that the most subtle and complicated mathematical processes, which to the uninitiated seem beyond all comprehension, can be reduced in the end to addition and subtraction.